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BAUMGAERTNER, MARCIA ANNE. An Approach to Characterization 
in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde. (1977) Directed by: 
Dr. James I. Wimsatt. Pp. 534. 
Criticism of Chaucer's characters in Troilus and Criseyde 
has been profoundly marked by a controversy over the nature 
of Chaucer's approach to poetics. On the one hand, there 
are those critics who approach Chaucer from the modern 
standpoint, seeking to find in him affinities wi-ch nineteenth-
century imitative realism. On the other hand, there are 
those critics who approach Chaucer from a classical stand­
point, emphasizing the fixed nature of his poetic and its 
didactic quality. Members of the first group often ignore the 
controlling system of theological value which so often sur­
rounds and informs Chaucer1s characters, while the second 
group overemphasizes that system to the extent that Chaucer 
is construed as having shunned the depiction of any subjective 
feeling in characterization. It seems to me, however, that 
Chaucer's characters, although controlled by a strong theolog­
ical framework, also evince psychological states of joy, 
grief, and willing. In fact, the theological tradition out 
of which Chaucer writes allows—even directly facilitates— 
the depiction of subjective feeling in characterization. 
One of the aims of the dissertation is to determine the 
nature of the realism of Chaucer's characters. Since those 
characters spring from the artistic and cultural milieu which 
informed the Middle Ages, the first part of this study deals 
with the peculiar definitions of historical reality operative 
during Chaucer's lifetime, and the specific influences such 
concepts may have had on the understanding of characterization 
held at the time. Comparative analysis is the method I 
adopt in this study, not only for purposes of clarity 
and accuracy but because vestiges of the Greco-Roman view of 
historical reality continue to exert strong influences on the 
basically Christian view of reality which dominates the Middle 
Ages. 
Accordingly, in the first through the third chapters of 
the study, I demonstrate the major philosophical differences 
between the larger classical and the Christian perspectives on 
reality which result in differing approaches to the problem 
of characterization—especially in terms of the general view 
of history, the position taken on fate and free will, and the 
attitude toward comedy and comic figures. In the fourth 
chapter I deal with the same general contrast in terms of the 
approach taken to the problem of symbol and allegory in the 
exegetical tradition, with particular attention to the nature 
of the relation between the literal level of the text and its 
allegorical meaning. The fifth and sixth chapters provide 
an analysis of four major groups of literary theorists leading 
up to the Age of Chaucer from the standpoint of theoretical 
material supplied by the first part of the study. Analysis 
of the relevant material is carried on with an eye to isolating 
the philosophical and allegorical elements, both explicit and 
implicit, which have been shown to bear directly on the approach 
to characterization taken by given aestheticians. Those 
theorists analyzed have been chosen as representative of the 
literary theorists of the early Christian period (Martianus 
Cappella and Cassiodorus on the classical side, Bede and 
Augustine on the Christian); the Neo-Platonic theorists of the 
twelfth century (including Alain de Lille, John of Salisbury 
and Hugh of St. Victor); the poetic theorists of the later 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Matthew of Vendome and 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf); and those theorists and artists most 
immediately relevant to Chaucer (Dante and Boccaccio). 
Chapter 7 is an application of material gleaned from the 
background study of medieval characterization to Chaucer1s 
Troilus and Criseyde with the resulting conclusion (Chap­
ter 8) that Troilus and Criseyde, although evincing some ele­
ments of the classical approach to characterization, is yet 
rooted more firmly in the Christian tradition which can be 
shown to inform Chaucer's characterization at all points. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Rene Wellek takes "realism" in its widest and most 
enduring sense to mean "fidelity to nature" and thus identi­
fies the concept of imitation as central to the concern of 
1 
critics dealing with the problem of reality. Although all 
art in the past has aimed at the imitation of reality, the 
definitions of what true reality is and of what it means to 
imitate it have varied widely throughout the ages. This 
diversity in turn has had its effect on the formulation of 
the concept of characterization in literary theory. Wellek 
has noted, for example, that the concept of character "type" 
is almost universal in realist theory and seems to have 
associations, depending on its place in history, with either 
or both concepts of prescriptive idealism and objective 
social observation ("representationalism" in the most common 
sense). It thus represents a formulation, he points out, of 
2 
the problem of universality and particularity and is linked 
directly to the problem of "eternal realism," the problem of 
mimesis. 
1 / Rene Wellek, "The Concept of Realism m Literary Schol­
arship," Concepts of Criticism, ed. Stephen G. Nichols, Jr., 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 223. 
^Wellek, p. 245. 
2 
The relation of universal to particular finds expression 
in the philosophies of all ages, but is especially prominent 
during the Middle Ages when it was considered the crucial 
issue for a scientific investigation of the world. Gen­
erally, the problem of universals is a description of the 
fact that in all our perceiving and thinking we find a two-
3 
fold content. On the one hand, we perceive things, the 
separate items of existence; we see this chair, that book. 
On the other hand, every object we perceive also has a gen­
eral content. The chair or book is also a chair, a book, 
part of a class or species. It is thus possible for us to 
abstract the common qualities of certain objects from their 
4 
sensible bodies and deal with them as general entities. Dur­
ing the Middle Ages, the discussion of the nature of man was 
5 
generally formulated in these terms; that is, any philosophy 
offering a definition of human personality dealt with the 
extent and nature of man's participation in the moral and 
3 * Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 32. 
4 / Carre, p. 33. 
5 See G. P. Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953); F. C. 
Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972); Friedrich Heer, The Intellectual History 
of Europe, trans. Jonathan Steinberg (New York: World Pub­
lishing Co., 1966); Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval 
Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downer (New York: Charles 
Scribners Sons, 1940); Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval 
Philosophy, trans. Ernest C. Messenger, 2 vols. (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1926). 
3 
spiritual "universals" of existence and/or the extent to 
which he could be defined as an "individual" being. 
The discussion of the relative importance and relation 
of the universal and the particular finds a literary formula­
tion in the critical controversy over the nature of Chaucerian 
characterization. One side of the discussion emphasizes the 
universality of Chaucer's characters, their "representative" 
or "abstractive" value. Typical of this view is Robert M. 
Jordan1s statement that 
Chaucer's art...is historically very much closer to 
mimetic allegory than to modern realism, and for this 
reason his characters are generally to be read more 
as personified illustrations of broad abstract mean­
ings than as self-limiting centers of interest.^ 
The other side of the controversy emphasizes the sense of 
felt life in Chaucer's characters, what is defined by Scholes 
and Kellogg as their "illustrative" quality, their capacity 
7 
to project an individual psychology. Typical of this view 
is Dryden's comment on Chaucer's genius for distinctly 
individualized portraits: 
Not a single character escaped him. All his pilgrims 
are severally distinguished from each other and not 
only in their inclinations, but in their very physiog­
nomies and persons.® 
^Robert M. Jordan, Chaucer and the Shape of Creation 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 99. 
7 
Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narra­
tive (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 91. 
g 
John Dryden, "Preface to the Fables," in The Best of 
Dryden , ed. Louis I. Bredvold (New York: Ronald Press Co., 
1933) , p. 517. 
4 
The controversy over Chaucerian characterization can 
be seen as the result of two general ways of looking at medie­
val poetic. On the one hand, there are those critics who 
approach Chaucer from a classical standpoint, emphasizing 
the fixed nature of his poetic and its didactic quality. 
On the other hand, there are those critics who approach 
Chaucer from the modern standpoint, seeking to find in him 
affinities with 19th-century imitative realism. The former 
group tends to emphasize either Chaucer's dependence on the 
classical theoretical tradition which informs his art, making 
its final appeal to Chaucer's knowledge of classical poetics 
or to Chaucer's knowledge of the exegetical tradition (which, 
they claim, promotes prescriptive ideals which result in the 
same universalized figures fostered by classical rhetoric). 
This group stresses the aesthetic-intellectual distance 
between character and audience which they say Chaucer culti­
vates through his use of the rhetorical conventions; the other 
stresses the character's immediate emotional appeal. 
D. W. Robertson offers perhaps the classic exposition of 
the first view along with some valuable contrasts with the 
9 
second. In the well-known Preface to Chaucer, he has pointed 
9 / D. W. Robertson, A Preface to Chaucer (Prxnceton Uni­
versity Press, 1962); see also Christopher Gillie, Character 
in English Literature (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965), 
pp. 15-20; G. R. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval Eng­
land (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp. 401-
402; Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle 
Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), 
p. 205, and others„ Reservations about Robertson's view are 
voiced in book reviews by: Robert Payne in Comparative 
5 
out some of the characteristics of the medieval view of art 
which separate it from modern views. According to Robertson, 
medieval man conceived of the world as an ordered hierarchy 
where the world of the senses consisted of types and symbols 
of the world of spirit. The real world was conceived of 
as an ordered system of ideals to be reached through tra­
ditional wisdom. Literary expressions based on such a concept 
tended to be explicit and to exalt discursive ideas as vehi­
cles of truth. Artistic ornament of any kind was viewed as 
a covering or shell for the communicable truths hidden within 
a work of art. In contrast, the modern view of art has 
assumed an internal discord between the world of spirit and 
sense which has led it to exalt poetry as the reconciler of 
the two worlds by a process in which, according to Schlegel, 
the inner impressions of the senses are to be hallowed 
by a mysterious connection with higher feelings; and the 
soul, on the other hand embodies its forebodings, or 
indescribable intuitions of infinity in types and sym­
bols borrowed from the visible world.10 
Robertson points out that literary expressions based on these 
attitudes will tend to be "suggestive rather than explicit" 
in both technique and implication and will "subordinate dis­
cursive idea to mood, emotion and feeling" (Robertson, p. 31). 
Literature 15 (summer,, 1963), 269-71; R. T. Davies in MLR 59 
(April, 1964), 255-257; David C. Fowler, MLQ 25 (March, 1961), 
117-120; C« L. Wrenn, JEGP 62 (October, 1963), 794-801; 
John Lawlor, RES 15 (November, 1964), 415-418. 
^A. W. Schlegel in A Course of Lectures on Dramatic 
Art and Literature, London, 1876, quoted by Robertson, p. 31. 
According to Robertson, the modern perspective is based 
upon a tendency to see life as a dynamic tension between 
various polarities. A tension between opposites in the 
present era, he writes, is necessary to a "progression" or 
11 
creation of any type. This notion directly affects the 
modern understanding of the aesthetic process. Modern roman­
tic criticism is based on the notion that "drama" should 
include only "a compendium of whatever is moving and pro-
12 
gressive in human life," and should omit the trivial details 
of everyday life which would clog the dramatic movement. In 
the modern pattern, "rising" and "falling" action is what 
constitutes "plot" and Robertson defines them in turn as 
"our emotional involvement with the protagonist," and as an 
increase in inner tensions until the catastrophe, where the 
emotional expectations initiated by the narrative pattern are 
met either by tragic catharsis or by comic relief. The success 
of the narrative depends on the successful creation of emo­
tional tension by the story line: it is said to be "profound" 
if it is emotionally moving; it is said to be "boring" if it 
fails to move, fails to produce the emotional tension and 
satisfaction required. Stories of this type, because they 
distill the dynamic movement of the dramatic pattern from 
life, to produce as pure a "fiction" as possible, concludes 
Robertson, are ideally suited to a theory of "art for art's 
11 
Robertson, p. 12. 
12 Robertson, p. 45. 
7 
sake," i.e., to a theory of art which promotes the release 
of fictional emotions for their own sake. 
In medieval literature on the other hand, the model of 
life is one of hierarchical stasis rather than one of dynamic 
tension, and Robertson characterizes its ends as intentionally 
didactic. Medieval man conceived of the universe in terms 
of the fundamental principle of an ordered hierarchy with 
God at the top and the various stages of spiritual order 
deriving from and presided over by Him. The relation between 
the sensual world and the invisible world was not one of 
opposition, but one of ordered subjection. One moves from 
the sensual to the spiritual by means of a natural ascent 
from the inferior realm of sense to the higher realm of spirit. 
This can be seen through the period in such works as Dante's 
Divine Comedy, St. Augustine's On Christian Doctrine and 
Boethius1 Consolation of Philosophy. 
The fundamental system of hierarchical value has been 
shown by Robertson and others to have had a deep influence on 
13 
the aesthetic theories of the day. Robertson in particular 
notes the effect on narrative structure, where in the medieval 
understanding he can find no evident use of the concepts of 
"rising" and "falling" action. Since the primary goal of the 
medieval view of narrative structure is not to produce vicar­
ious emotion through the conflict of the will against opposing 
13 
Robert Mo Jordan's study, Chaucer and the Shape of 
Creation, is perhaps the most notable study aside from Rob­
ertson. 
I 
8 
forces, but instead to restate in poetic form an already-
known theological or philosophical truth, the conception of 
emotional catharsis offered by the Greek theorists is finally 
untenable to the medieval artist. According to Robertson, 
the appeal made by medieval drama is thus ultimately to the 
intellect rather than to the emotions, and such emotion as 
there is, is rigidly controlled by preconceived and inorganic 
notions of formal convention. 
In Robertson's view, the difference between the medieval 
and modern views of art not only affects narrative, but char­
acterization as well. A dramatic mode, he points out, re­
quires a free revelation of the inner feelings of the personae 
in will and action. Freytag, he writes, defines dramatic 
action as "the outpouring of the power of the will from deep 
feeling toward the outer world, 11 or "the pouring in of stimuli 
14 
from the outer world into the inner depths of the feeling." 
The content of the drama as Freytag expresses it is "always a 
struggle with strong motions of the soul which the hero 
15 
carries on against opposing powers." Brunetiere, too, 
describes the theater as "the spectacle of a will striving 
16 
towards a goal and conscious of the means which it employs," 
and Robertson himself writes that "violent emotional states 
Robertson, p. 33. 
15 Robertson, p. 33. 
^Robertson, p. 34. 
9 
resulting from a conflict between the will of the protago­
nist and obstacles of some kind seem to be necessary to our 
17 
sense of the dramatic." In Robertson's view, an identifi­
cation with the heroic qualities of one of the chief charac­
ters, or a recognition of "just that particular human condi­
tion" in the situation of one of the characters "in which we 
find ourselves," is also necessary for an emotional partici­
pation in characterization. According to Robertson, medieval 
literature is almost exclusively void of the dramatic content 
described in stories like the 15th-century Robyn Hood and 
the Sheriff of Nottingham, where Robyn overcomes a series of 
obstacles in the best dramatic tradition, to win a specific 
goal. Medieval characters, says Robertson, may be "exemplary 
either of wise or unwise action," but their creators "do not 
18 
invite us to share their experiences." Again, Robertson 
emphasizes what he sees as the didactic nature of medieval 
characterization to the exclusion of any self-expression in 
the psychological sense. Even where medieval man looked 
inward, he concludes, it was not to find the roots of emo­
tion, but to find God. Expression of love is "not so much a 
matter of asserting 'self' as a psychological entity as a mat-
19 
ter of revealing a gift from above." 
17 Robertson, p. 33. 
1 8 
Robertson, p. 37. 
19 Robertson, p. 16. 
II 
I ! 
10 
As an example of the direction of his thought in this 
line, Robertson suggests that Chaucer1s presentation of strong 
emotion is conventionalized or "rhetorized," and does not pro­
duce an effect appropriate to dramatic action as we have 
defined it above. He cites Chaucer's treatment of the idea 
of "dying for love" as an example of literary convention, 
emphasizing that the repeated association of strong emotions 
of love with the idea of death if the lover "have not his will" 
is a convention expressive of the behavior of the courtly 
lover. Such a convention is not calculated, Robertson asserts, 
to provoke a strong sympathetic response in the reader, but 
20 
rather to stimulate thought; in this case, thought about 
the fact that inordinate desire often ends in death. Thus 
the Troilus, writes Robertson, is not calculated to produce a 
21 
dramatic effect. He cites the lack of dramatic will in 
Troilus during the first half of Chaucer's story, the "dra­
matically inconsequential" dialogues of the second half, and 
Troilus' long meditation on free will as aspects of the poem 
which discourage the reader's sympathetic emotional partici­
pation in it. 
Should we remain skeptical of this line of argument, 
unconvinced that Chaucer's characters can be so quickly 
deprived of their humanity and dramatic force by the reference 
20 
Robertson, p. 46. 
2̂ Robertson, p. 47. 
11 
to Chaucer's use of rhetorical convention, Robertson clinches 
his point by evoking the theological perspective out of which 
Chaucer writes. He reminds us that although freedom of the 
will was a major tenet of medieval orthodox philosophy, free­
dom from the order of Divine Providence was not: 
The goals that a protagonist set for himself were 
always seen against an implicit system of values which 
acted both as a comment on the goals themselves and on 
any emotional experience the protagonist might have in 
seeking them. This fact is probably in part respon­
sible for a lack of interest in "strong motions of the 
soul" for their own sake in medieval literature. In 
spite of the conclusions of some modern critics, medie­
val literary art did not develop the means of analyzing 
such phenomena. It is, as distinct from romantic or 
modern literary art, rigorously non-psychological.22 
Dramatic or psychological action, in other words, is not 
possible where the personae are stylized to represent various 
abstractions in an objective scheme of moral values, and 
where the conflicts explored by the artist are designed to 
produce moral results, not necessarily a sympathetic partici­
pation in the feeling lives of the characters and their 
23 
psychological tensions. 
Robertson concludes his critique of the modern aesthetic 
by suggesting that the cathartic or "hedonistic-aesthetic" pro­
cess justifies emotional participation in character on the 
22 Robertson, p. 34. 
23 Robertson bases his understanding of medieval aesthet­
ics on his theory that Augustinian theology and notions of 
spiritual hierarchy thoroughly informed the medieval sense of 
aesthetic value. Augustine, he writes, comments forcefully on 
the "insanity" of feeling participation in the lives of fic­
tional characters and emphasizes almost exclusively the moral 
value of medieval works of art. 
12 
basis of heroic "greatness," at the expense of ethical consid­
erations. This modern identification with characters of 
questionable ethical conduct was caused in great part by the 
breakdown of the medieval hierarchy of value to the extent 
that good may conflict with good, as well as with evil. Thus 
in Hegelian tragedy two forces which are essentially just 
become wrongs, and the resulting breakdown of justice is 
2 4  
resolved by processes in the moral order itself. The 
tragic protagonist thus has ample moral justification for his 
actions because he is faced with a set of circumstances which 
"damn him if he does and damn him if he doesn't." 
In the medieval system, according to Robertson, it would 
have been very difficult to make opposing forces out of two 
aspects of charity: 
The commonly accepted medieval system of values was 
not subject, except perhaps among the very unlearned, 
to the kind of initial fragmentation necessary to 
produce an Hegelian tragic situation.2-' 
No one in the medieval system is above morality in the 
tragic sense of a great protagonist; and the final outcome 
of medieval tragedy is always the triumph of Divine Providence. 
24 Robertson, p. 43. 
25 
Robertson, pp. 37-38. Robertson here enlarges on his 
belief that though dramatic conflict is seen in some plays 
in the Middle Ages, the audiences for whom these plays were 
performed or read were "unsophisticated and unlearned." He 
thus makes a rather rigid distinction between the medieval 
"intellectual" audience and the "common" audience, and even 
seems to suggest that intellectual audiences would have been 
immune to the kind of dramatic action contained, for example, 
in the medieval play Robyn Hood and the Sheriff of Notting­
ham. This I find hard to accept. 
13 
A medieval man falls into the order of justice because he 
sins, and it is impossible in Robertson's view to sympathize 
with this from any medieval standpoint. To be human after 
Rousseau may have meant to develop the natural affections of 
the human heart but to be human according to St. Augustine 
meant to control the passions. 
Thus Robertson bases his theory that the medieval char­
acter is more conducive to generalized type than to individ­
ualistic expression on the fundamental medieval system of hier­
archical value which affected the aesthetics of the period and 
found its clearest spokesman in St. Augustine and the Scho­
lastic tradition. Robertson's analysis of character in Chaucer 
is based on Chaucer's adherence to the conventional rhetori­
cal formulas, formulas which were designed to evoke a strong 
intellectual-moral response which, if it does not nullify, 
at least strongly counteracts any emotional response on the 
part of the reader. He thus seeks to remove all traces of 
romanticism from Chaucer's presentation of his characters to 
fix their worth firmly in their value as "exempla," and not 
in their capacity to invite our emotional identification with 
their joys and sorrows. 
Some critics, however, are not so ready to exclude all 
possibility of emotional identification with Chaucer's char­
acters o The structure and characterization of Chaucer's 
Troilus and Criseyde again offers these critics a focal point 
for disagreement with Robertson's approach. The issue in 
14 
Troilus seems to center at one point on the religious con­
clusion of the poem and its relation to—or alienation from— 
the characterizations in the rest of the poem. The Robert-
sonian school sees the conclusion as the essence of the 
poem's moral message while the "modern school" sees it as an 
affront to human sensibility. S. Nagarajan, for example, is 
angered at interpretations of the Troilus which "seek to 
justify the conclusion at the cost of our previous emotional 
26 
responses to the love described." We sense an echo of Mr. 
Nagarajan's objection to the conclusion in Dorothy Everett's 
perspective on the poem. She denounces an integrated view of 
the Epilog as the logical end of a movement from earthly to 
heavenly love and asks: 
If this were all that Chaucer meant us to see in his 
poem, why does he expend so much of his powers in mak­
ing the love of Troilus a beautiful thing, and what is 
the point of the long wooing?27 
This implicit question reappears in Sanford Meech's study of 
28 29 
the poem and in Gary Brennan's recent analysis. 
The preoccupation of these critics with the dramatic and 
psychological appeal of the characters—especially in Chaucer's 
^S. Nagarajan, "The Conclusion to Chaucer's Troilus," 
Essays in Criticism,13 (January, 1963), 1. 
27 Dorothy Everett, "Troilus and Criseyde," in Essays 
on Middle English Literature, ed. Patricia M. Kean (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1959), 136-37. 
2 8 Sanford B. Meech, Design in Chaucer's Troilus (Syra­
cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959),p. 15 
29 Gary Brenner, "Narrative Structure in Chaucer1s Troilus 
and Criseyde," Annuale Medievale, 6 (1969), 17. 
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Troilus and Criseyde—may not be entirely unmerited. It 
seems to me, in fact, that Chaucer does allow a certain kind 
of emotional participation in the lives of his characters, 
and that his characters do evince psychological states of 
joy, grief, and willing, though on a different basis than 
that offered by most modern critics. This is not to say that 
Robertson's emphasis on the controlling system of theological 
value is wrong; it is simply to suggest that the Christian 
aesthetic system he describes may also allow—even directly 
facilitate—the depiction of subjective feeling in charac­
terization and allow room for a much more individualized 
character than he envisions. I hope to demonstrate that the 
medieval conception of structural order and the poetic tra­
dition out of which Chaucer writes provide room for a char­
acter who is more than a conventional type on the one hand 
and more than a historical individual restricted to the 
concretes of existence on the other. In fact, both Chaucer's 
ties with the Christian poetic tradition and his particularly 
Christian blend of matrix and motive enables him to broaden 
the scope of his characters, making them not only the repre­
sentative types of a particular view of reality, but delight­
ful individuals as well. 
One of the aims of this study is to determine the nature 
of the realism of Chaucer's characters. Since those char­
acters spring from the artistic and cultural milieu which 
informed the historical period we call the Middle Ages, one 
16 
of the first tasks we can set ourselves is that of determin­
ing the peculiar definition of historical reality operative at 
that time, and the specific influences such a concept may 
have had on the understanding of the literary concept of char­
acterization held at the time. Wellek has suggested that such 
a study can have maximum accuracy only as it proceeds compara­
tively, distinguishing the particular concept of reality 
from the formulations which precede and follow it. Compara­
tive analysis is the method I will adopt in this study, 
not only for the purposes of clarity and accuracy which Wellek 
suggests, but because vestiges of the Greco-Roman view of his­
torical reality continue to exert strong influences on the 
basically Christian view of reality which dominates the Middle 
Ages. A thorough understanding of each is necessary for an 
understanding of their effects on Chaucerian characterization. 
The first chapter of this dissertation will offer a gen­
eral introduction to the problem of characterization in litera­
ture and offer a rationale for the specific study I propose. 
In the second and third chapters of this study I will attempt 
to demonstrate the major philosophical differences between the 
larger classical and Christian perspectives on reality which 
result in differing approaches to the problem of characteriza­
tion—especially in terms of the general view of history, the 
position taken on fate and free will and the attitude toward 
comedy and comic figures. In the fourth chapter, I will deal 
with the same general contrast in terms of the approach taken 
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to the problem of symbol and allegory in the exegetical tra­
dition, with particular attention to the nature of the rela­
tion between the literal level of the text and its allegori­
cal meaning. The fifth and sixth chapters will provide an 
analysis of four major groups of literary theorists leading 
up to the Age of Chaucer from the standpoint of theoretical 
material supplied by the second, third, and fourth chapters. 
In other words, analysis of the relevant material will be 
carried on with an eye to isolating the philosophical and 
allegorical elements, both explicit and implicit, which have 
been shown to bear directly on the approach to characteriza­
tion taken by given aestheticians. Those theorists analyzed 
have been chosen as representative of the literary theorists 
of the early Christian period (Martianus Capella and Cassio-
dorus on the one side, Bede and Augustine on the other); the 
Neo-Platonic theorists of the twelfth century (including 
Alain de Lille, John of Salisbury and Hugh of St. Victor); 
the poetic theorists of the later 12th and 13th centuries 
(Matthew of Vendome and Geoffrey of Vinsauf); and those theo­
rists and artists most immediately relevant to Chaucer (Dante 
and Boccacio). The seventh chapter will be an application of 
the principles gleaned from earlier chapters to Chaucer's Troi-
lus and Criseyde for the purposes of determining the nature 
of Chaucerian realism and its resulting effect on characteriza­
tion, and the final chapter will offer a summary of the 
findings of this study and a conclusion based on the evidence 
at hand. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GRECO-ROMAN VIEW OF HISTORY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE 
LITERARY REPRESENTATION OF CHARACTER 
In the Greek mind there was a separation between what I 
will call "historical" actuality—that is, history in the 
sense of the recorded acts of men in time, sensory reality, and 
the experience of men in the natural world; and what the 
Greeks called the "eternal verities," the ideal forms which 
existed independent of earthly history. R. G. Collingwood 
has characterized the basic direction of Greek thought as 
"anti-historical" because it was founded on the principle of 
1 
the separation of truth and history. If only what is uni­
versal and unchanging can be known, then only moral and 
spiritual truth can be known. History is basically a reposi­
tory of the inferior world of particularities and cannot be 
defined as a serious science in the Greek sense. Only 
poetry and philosophy, which abstract the eternal and knowable 
from the substrata of transitory experience, can be ultimately 
known, simply because they alone deal with the universals of 
experience. Aristotle is the major proponent of the view 
that poetry is a worthy vehicle for universal truth; in the 
Poetics he writes that the function of the poet is to describe 
the universal aspects of experience, 
"Si. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clar­
endon Press, 1946), p. 20. 
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...not what has actually happened, but the kind of 
thing that might well happen—i.e., what is possible 
in the sense of being either plausible or inevitable... 
hence poetry is more highly serious than history, for 
poetry tends to express universals, history particu­
lars .2 
Plato is, of course, the major proponent of the view that 
philosophy is the best repository for the eternal verities. 
The separation of truth from the particulars of sensory 
existence that we see in both views leads to some serious re­
strictions on the definition and study of history, which is 
3 
not viewed as a science, but as "an aggregate of perceptions." 
Historical evidence is thus defined as a series of eyewit­
ness reports of contemporary events, and historical method 
consists of collecting the reports. The historian's capacity 
for eliciting a coherent and accurate report through an almost 
legal line of tough questions is the test of his vocation. 
This view obviously imposes a shortened perspective on 
the historian, whose critical endeavor is then limited to 
his source material, the length of a living memory. This 
meant that Greco-Roman historians could never aspire to write 
a factual history which went beyond the reports allowed by 
what men remembered in their immediate lifetimes. The idea of 
a universal overview of history which could offer a legitimate 
basis for historical analysis of the remote past was precluded 
2 Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Phillip Wheelwright (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1959), 
p. 302. 
3 Collingwood, p. 24. 
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by the restricted definition of "evidence," i.e., what had 
been seen by immediate eye-witnesses. 
These facts were paralleled by a gradual shift in the 
understanding of the overall purpose of history. For the 
Hellenic Greeks greater optimism about the usefulness of edu­
cation led Greek historians to think of their task as a matter 
of training men to avoid the mistakes of the past. From this 
perspective, history is a school for training statesmen and 
has the practical function of teaching the business of run­
ning a smooth government. In later Greek and early Roman 
thought the educative function of history remains, but the 
immediate goal is less ambitious. Polybius, an early Greek 
4 
historian no longer sees the writing of history as a means 
of controlling the external affairs of the state, but as a 
means of educating the inner man to accept the vicissitudes 
5 
of fortune in life. This view is common to the Epicurean 
and Stoic philosophies, both of which promote knowledge of 
self as a retreat from a world which is basically disordered 
and chaotic. Such an outlook on history led gradually to a 
defeatism about the possibility of attaining accuracy in his­
torical method and tended to reinforce the old split between 
history, the transitory world of chaotic circumstance, and 
"substance," the world of the eternal verities. 
4 See Collingwood, p. 35. 
5 Polybius, The Histories, trans. W. R. Paton, 2 vols. (Lon­
don: Wm„ Heinemann, 1922), 1:7. 
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In sum, the Greek view of history was informed by a world 
view which tended to define reality as what was intangible, 
immutable, and therefore substantially real in the sense 
just described. History referred to the realm of tangible 
sense-objects, the world of particulars, and simply had not 
the status of the substantive universals. Because it dealt 
with the realm of sense-perception, that aspect of life sub­
ject to fortune and fate, it could not be deemed a science 
in the Greek sense. History was unknowable because it was 
mutable and constantly in flux. Consequently, the methodology 
of history was suspect from the first since factual material 
could only be trusted if it had the authority of an immediate 
eye-witness report, and even then, such material belonged to 
the inferior world of sense. Thus the writing of remote 
history or of an overall or interpretive history which is 
arrived at deductively from divine revelation and which 
treats past, present and future events with equal importance 
6 
was essentially foreign to the Greek mind. The only rationale 
for the study of history became first the education of states­
men in governmental affairs and later and more pessimistically, 
the education of the inner man to prepare for the inevitable 
evils of fortune in life. 
Rene'wellek, as we have noted, observes that what is 
imitated, the conception of what is real in a given theory of 
^See James V. Thompson, History of Historical Writing, 
2 vols. (New York: MacMillan Co., 1942), 1:24. 
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mimesis, determines to a large extent the nature of the 
literary representation of human character; i.e., whether a 
character will be closer to a concept of prescriptive idealism 
or to a concept of objective social observation. For the 
Greeks the emphasis can be seen to fall on the prescriptive 
end of the scale. Where history is seen as an unworthy sub­
ject for imitation, we might expect the emphasis in literary 
representation of character to fall on what the Greeks defined 
as substantive reality, and that such an emphasis might result 
in characters who exemplified universal rather than indi­
vidually historical characteristics. 
In fact, this tends to be the case, and it will be the 
purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the effects of the 
Greek view of history on the conception and representation of 
character both in Greek historical writing and in the imagi­
native literature of the period. After a general discussion 
of the relation of the Greek idea of reality to character 
representation, I will attempt to show the effect of such a 
world view more specifically on two literary theories of 
characterization extant in the period. 
First, because of their tendency to put the substantive 
origin of all things outside of the immediate purview of 
history which focused only on the contemporary event, the 
Greeks saw the origins of human character as outside of his­
tory as well. The personae of history were viewed as a duality 
of universal character or innate nature—that part of 
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character which went beyond the limits of historical repre­
sentation—and "action," or the particularized doings of uni­
versal nature in history. The moral nature and physical 
capacity of a given historical agent remains stationary at a 
certain point for all time, because his true nature is a 
function of his origins and not of his acts in life. No 
matter what transitory actions a historical character per­
forms, his universal nature remains the same eternally. The 
innate moral nature of a historical character never substan­
tially changes. As Collingwood puts it, "the idea of devel­
opment in a character is to the Graeco-Roman mind a metaphysi-
7 
cal impossibility." 
The emphasis on substantive character over the actions 
of the character in history leads to a character who may seem 
to develop but whose actions can always be traced back to 
that innate moral character, fixed before historical life. 
History itself tends to become an expression of the actions 
of "good" and "bad" characters and takes on decidedly didac­
tic overtones. Tacitus' report of the break-down of Tiberius 
under the strain of empire serves as a clear example of this 
kind of ethical rigidity in historical writing. The avowed 
purpose of Tacitus' history is "to rescue virtue from oblivion," 
and to teach that "base words and deeds should have the fear 
7 Collingwood, p. 44. 
8Tacitus, The Annals of Tacitus, ed. Henry Furneaux, 2 vols, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 1:27-28. Collingwood points 
out the passage. 
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of posthumous infamy" (Liber Tacitus, III, Cap. 65:1). In 
the text of the treatise the Greek attitude toward character 
development becomes apparent. Toward the end of Tiberius' 
life Tacitus summarizes his personal history and reveals his 
essential character: 
His character, again, has its separate epochs. There 
was a noble season in his life and fame while he lived 
a private citizen or a great official under Augustus; 
an inscrutable and disingenuous period of hypocritical 
virtues while Germanicus and Orusus remained; with his 
mother alive, he was still an amalgam of good and evil; 
so long as he loved or feared Sejanus, he was loathed 
for his cruelty, but his lust was veiled; finally, when 
the restraints of shame and fear were gone, and nothing 
remained but to follow his own bent, he plunged impar­
tially into crime and into ignominy. 
Tacitus finds it impossible to treat Tiberius as a human 
figure capable of development because his idea of history 
will not allow the depiction of such a development. When 
Tiberius, who appears as a basically good ruler at the begin­
ning of his story, gradually reveals tyrannical characteris­
tics which were not evident at first, Tacitus assumes that 
these characteristics must have been there from the beginning. 
It is interesting that Tacitus foreshadows the very 
qualities he mentions here a number of books earlier in the 
Annals by repeating the gossip circulating around the declining 
9 Tacitus, I, 469. Furneaux notes that the moral purpose 
expressed by Livy is very similar: "thus it is that is so 
salutary and fruitful in historical study, that you see spec­
imens of every type of character conspicuously displayed; 
and may hence take models for yourself and your country to 
imitate, or instances of what is vile in its beginning and 
issue to avoid." Livy, Praef. 10, cited by Furneaux in 
Tacitus, I, 28. 
•^Tacitus, The Histories and The Annals. trans. Clifford 
H. Moore and John Jackson, 3 vols. (London: Wm. Heinemann, 
Ltd., 1937), 111:245. 
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Augustus Ceasar concerning the character of the rising Tiber­
ius. Faced with the imminent death of Ceasar, Tacitus writes 
that most of the people "merely exchanged gossip derogatory 
to their future masters" and then imitates their complaints 
about Tiberius: 
'Tiberius Nero was mature in years and tried in war, 
but had the old, inbred arrogance of the Claudian fam­
ily, and hints of cruelty, strive as he would to repress 
them, kept breaking out. He had been reared from the 
cradle in a regnant house; consulates and triumphs had 
been heaped on his youthful head: even during the 
years when he lived at Rhodes in ostensible retirement 
and actual exile, he had studied nothing save anger, 
hypocrisy, and secret lasciviousness. Add to the tale 
his mother with her feminine caprice....-^ 
Thus Tacitus, by using the technique of repeating the "gos­
sip" of others, retains the objective distance required of 
the historian while yet introducing several telling points 
about Tiberius' character at the onset. 
All this emphasizes the fact that Tiberius is revealed 
to be a bad character because he was actually bad from the 
first and simply hid the fact through hypocrisy. Col lingwood 
comments on the kind of technique used here and the presuppo­
sitions on which it is based: 
A 'character' is an agent, not an action; actions come 
and go, but the 'characters' (as we call them), the 
agents from which they proceed are substances and 
therefore eternal and unchanging. Features in the 
character of a Tiberius or a Nero which only appeared 
comparatively late in life must have been there all the 
time. A good man cannot become bad. A man who shows 
himself bad when old must have been equally bad when 
young and his vices concealed by hypocrisy. As the 
Greeks put it: 'The beginning will make the man' 
11 Tacitus, The Histories and the Annals, trans. Moore, 
II, 249. 
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(Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1130a). Power does 
not alter a man's character; it only shows what kind 
of a man he already was.^ 
Because of the Greek tendency to separate history from true 
reality, which resided in philosophy and poetry, there was 
a resultant emphasis on the universalization of character. 
The moral ethos of a character was always emphasized over 
any manifestation of individuality which might occur. 
The tendency toward a universalized representation of 
character in historical writing carried over into literature, 
where the concept of the innate moral ethos of a character, 
his universal substance, could be expressed with little or no 
attention to historical action. The emphasis on innate 
nature in character over character conceived of as process, 
as capable in a historical lifetime of substantive change, 
resulted in certain definite stylistic techniques. First, it 
encourages a rather transparent and straightforward presenta­
tion of character in literature, where the substance of a 
man's nature could be known and expressed as a universal. 
Eric Auerbach makes this point when he characterizes the 
Homeric style as a predisposition to "represent phenomena in 
a fully externalized form, visible and palpable in all their 
parts and completely fixed in their temporal and spatial rela-
13 
tions." 
12 Collingwood, p. 44; Eric Auerbach agrees, noting that 
in Homer, "Achilles and Hector are splendidly set forth, but 
have no development." Mimesis: The Representation of Reality 
in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1953), p. 17). 
13 Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 6. 
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This tendency is true, writes Auerbach, even when psycholog­
ical processes are represented. Nothing remains unexpressed: 
With the utmost fullness, with an orderliness which 
even passion does not disturb, Homer's personages vent 
their inmost hearts in speech; what they do not say to 
others they speak in their own minds, so that the reader 
is informed of it.-^ 
The fixedness and openness of the characters of Greek fiction 
are matched by a parallel fixedness in time and location. The 
procession of sensory phenomena takes place in what Auerbach 
calls the foreground, in a local and temporal present. 
The openness with which both the internal and external 
make-up of a character is described leaves no chance for spec­
ulation about character motivation. The relations between 
characters are also set forth simply and directly. Such a 
rational approach to character motivation tends to remove the 
rougher and more historically representational elements of 
unmotivated or obscurely motivated vacillation and internal 
conflict which are characteristic of other approaches to 
characterization. 
Homer's Odyssey affords one example both of the fixed 
nature of characterization in Greek thought and of the clar­
ity of relations between characters. At the beginning of the 
Odyssey, Telemachus calls the men of Ithaca together concerning 
the problem of his mother Penelope and her suitors. After 
reviewing the situation, Telemachus bitterly tongue-lashes 
his countrymen for urging his mother to marry and expresses 
14 
Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 6. 
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his own frustration at not being able to come up to his 
father's superior nature: 
...and lo, our great wealth is wasted, for there is no 
man now alive such as Odysseus was, to keep ruin from 
the house. As for me I am in no wise strong like him 
to ward mine own; verily to the end of my days shall 
I be a weakling and all unskilled in prowess. Truly 
I would defend me if but strength were mine; for deeds 
past sufferance have been wrought, and now my house is 
wasted utterly beyond the pretense of right. Resent 
it in your own hearts and have regard to your neighbors 
who dwell around and tremble ye at the anger of the gods, 
lest haply they turn upon you in wrath at your evil 
deeds. l-> 
In this passage Telemachus makes the motive for his anger 
crystal-clear: the lack of support from his countrymen, who 
have done him evil deeds in not supporting him and in 
defaming his mother for not facing up to her circumstances. 
Not only is his motive clear, but he analyzes his own char­
acter, fixing it at one frustrated point inferior to Odysseus 
for all time. 
This conception of character, as we have shown, results 
from an almost unwitting preoccupation with the universal 
aspects of characterization; there is practically no willing­
ness to descend into the everyday depths of history, to "take 
16 
seriously what is encountered there." Ultimately, there is 
no desire to make historical forces concrete because there 
is no real reason for taking historical reality as seriously 
as the unchanging universals of which the Greeks were so 
15 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. S. H. Butcher and A. Lang 
(New York: Modern Library, 1967), pp. 16-17. 
"^Collingwood, p. 45. 
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enamored. This results finally in a kind of rhetorical 
ethicism which fixes characters at a certain level of ethical 
goodness or badness, of high or low social standing, and does 
not allow them movement and development either within or 
17 
across the categories. It encourages rhetorical rather 
than realistic dialogue because it is more concerned with 
what is fitting and proper to a particular type of char­
acter than what that character might actually have said in a 
given situation. 
There is perhaps a deeper reason for the Graeco-Roman 
tendency to exaggerate fixed ethical and social poles in 
characterization. The philosophies of the age, as we have 
shown, encouraged a view of historical actuality which empha­
sized its chaotic nature. Facing such a world, man is put 
in a defeatist position from the first unless he can find 
some way of controlling or ordering the chaos for the pur­
poses finally of attaining eternal truth. Epicurean and 
Stoic philosophies offered only one solution to the problem 
of a disordered sensory reality: retreat from it. If man 
cannot conquer or control his world, then he must spend his 
energies keeping himself unstained by it. This becomes the 
main function of reason in such a system—to preserve a man 
from the uncontrollable world in which he exists. In Aris­
totle's view, it becomes the main function of art. As Colling-
wood points out, such an attitude toward education tends to 
encourage a new determinism in the understanding of man1s 
control over the events of his human life: 
17 See Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 44; Collingwood, p. 45. 
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Man finds himself no longer master of his fate in the 
sense that what he tries to do succeeds or fails in pro­
portion to his own intelligence or lack of it; his fate 
is master of him, and the freedom of his will is shown 
not in controlling the outward events of his life but 
in controlling the inward temper in which he faces these 
events.I® 
Auerbach goes one step further in his insight that the fate 
from which a man is really trying to escape in the Greek 
view is his own nature. This is most evident in the struggle 
of the protagonist in a Greek tragedy, where the protagonist 
only gradually becomes aware of the destiny which has been 
his from the beginning. Up to the point where he capitulates 
to his destiny, he struggles against it, resisting it by 
action and reason. In so doing, he is fighting against that 
part of himself over which he has no control. 
This causes, as Auerbach points out, an essential dis­
unity in the Greek tragic character—a disunity which has 
much to do with the quality of historical realism attained 
in the character. In Greek tragedy, men are represented as 
so intensely involved in the struggle against themselves 
that most vestiges of individual personality disappear. 
Auerbach writes: 
Nothing remains but their age, sex, position in life, 
and the most general traits of their temperament; their 
actions, words, and gestures are wholly governed by the 
dramatic situation, that is, by the tactical requirements 
of their struggle.^ 
18 Collingwood, p. 36. 
"^%ric Auerbach, Dante; Poet of the Secular World, trans. 
Ralph Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 
p. 3. 
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It is true that the individual at death is reunited with his 
fate, but then he is already outside historical reality. In 
actual history his personality is divided; man is set apart 
from his fate even though it ultimately reveals itself to be 
part of his original nature. 
One of the bases for this view of man1s nature can be 
found in Plato's understanding of human evil. With all the 
emphasis on the representation of the morally ideal man in 
classical literature, one might expect a certain judgmentalism 
in Plato's view of the nature of man and in his presentation 
of character. In fact, the opposite is the case. Plato, 
deeply affected by the substantive view of man's nature and 
by his faith in human reason, has even greater sympathy 
than we will see in Aristotle for the problem of human weak­
ness of the will, and goes so far as to suggest that there 
is no such thing as voluntary evil. Instead, there is only 
moral ignorance. In the Protagoras, for example, he defends 
man's capacity for exercising right knowledge and argues 
against those who would see man as a being governed by passions 
beyond his control. After outlining the bleak view of human 
nature painted by some Greek thinkers of his day, Socrates 
asks Protagoras whether he agrees with those who think know­
ledge is "a slave dragged about by any force" or whether he 
thinks 'that knowledge is "something noble, able to govern man" 
and that "whoever learns what is good and what is bad will 
never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than knowledge 
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bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succour for man­
kind." Protagoras' reply reveals Plato's early faith in human 
nature: 
My view, Socrates, is precisely what you express, 
and what is more it would be disgraceful for me above 
all men to assert that knowledge and wisdom were aught 
but the highest of all human things. (Protagoras 352B)^0 
However, in the Republic and in the still more pessi­
mistic Laws, Plato's faith in mortal comprehension and moral 
capacity takes a decided turn. Speaking to the question of 
the necessity of laws in the state, he writes: 
The reason thereof is this,—that no man's nature 
(phusis) is naturally able both to perceive what is 
of benefit to the civic life of men and perceiving it, 
to be alike able and willing to practice what is best... 
and secondly, even if a man fully grasps the truth of 
this as a principle of art, should he afterwards get 
control of the state and become an irresponsible auto­
crat , he would never prove able to abide by this view 
and to continue always fostering the public interest 
in the state as the object of first importance, to which 
the private interest in the state is but secondary; 
rather, his mortal nature will always urge him on to 
grasping and self-interested action; irrationally 
avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure. (Laws, 905D)^1 
The shift from his earlier belief that human nature could 
develop goodness through proper training to his belief that 
human nature is inherently incapable of perfection seems to 
be primarily a result of Plato's growing conviction that few 
human beings are born with the intellectual or moral sub­
stance to attain eudamonia, the desired state of harmony with 
the universals. 
20 Plato, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, trans. 
W. R. M. Lamb (London: Wm. Heinemann, 1914), pp. 225-26. 
21 Plato, Laws, trans. R. G. Bury, 2 vols. (London: Wm. 
Heinemann, 1926), 11:370. 
33 
The problem in Plato's eyes seems to be less a question 
of intentional evil than of the imperfection endemic to human 
22 
nature itself. As A. W. H. Adkins points out, in the Laws, 
it is not only the licentious criminal who commits intentional 
crimes who is executed, but the man who has a basic intention 
to do good and be just and who yet fails to come up to stan-
23 
dard because of an inherent weakness of nature. Adkin's 
comment on this passage is illuminating: 
In the last resort, intentions are irrelevant: What 
matters is 'true1 aqathon or kakon conferred upon the 
polis or the individual, which is an objective matter 
and has no necessary connection with the individual's 
intentions. (Adkins, p. 168) 
In the final analysis, then, a capacity for reason and passion 
are conferred on every human being by the gods in given mea­
sure. Plato's disillusionment with man seems more to reflect 
a great sorrow at the number of men who are born incapable 
of seeing the light than a sorrow over the voluntary wicked­
ness of mankind. Man's capacity for attaining a knowledge 
of the good, the reflection of the universal image of man, 
is always emphasized over his capacity for voluntary evil. 
The results of this emphasis can be seen in Plato's treatment 
of the characters in his own Dialogues: in his sympathetic 
portrayal of the vain and sensual Alcibiades, in the tolerance 
evinced for the murderers of Socrates. It can also be seen 
22 
A. W. H. Adkins, From the Many to the One (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 168. 
^Plato, Laws, II, 245f. 
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in Sophocles' play Oedipus Rex, where the only evident reason 
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for Oedipus' downfall is his ill-fated moral ignorance. 
Though Plato theoretically excludes any representation 
of evil in the characters of literature, it seems that his 
practice—and the practice of most of the Greek artists—is 
to evidence great sympathy for that evil by presenting it as 
the result of unavoidable ignorance, or of inherent moral 
blindness. The effect of this is to heighten both man's innate 
nobility and the tragedy of his sometimes defective, but unin­
tentionally defective nature. The emphasis here is once 
again on the "substantive" aspect of man, on the fated nature 
of his moral character which is fixed even before birth. 
Aristotle at first seems to reject this notion of a 
fixed human nature. He denounces Plato's idea, for example, 
that "no one is voluntarily wicked," (Protagoras 352-353B) 
presumably because he rejects the notion of a fixed nature 
which determines the ethical state of a character. He makes 
it clear in the Nichomachean Ethics that ignorance of the 
universal principles of law is no excuse for wrongdoing, and 
that men are even responsible to detect evil in what appears 
good to them. (N.E. Ill, 5, 1114b, 1-10) Virtue is cul­
tivated in fact, by habitually intending and then choosing 
24 One must observe, however, that the heavy burden of 
guilt which hangs over Oedipus is never overridden by the ob­
vious emphasis on his moral ignorance. Sophocles seems to 
grasp in some deep and unconscious fashion man's need for 
expiation, despite the fact that Oedipus' own acts are 
largely unintentional. 
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the "right" actions, the conduct which leads to a balanced 
and reasonable life. At one point in Ethics (II, 1, 1114b, 
7-8) he even goes so far as to write that the choice of 
actions determines character: 
Some men become temperate and gentle; others profli­
gate and irascible, by actually comporting themselves 
in one way or the other in relation to those passions. 
In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a 
result of the corresponding activities.^ 
And yet, Aristotle always seems to have one foot in the 
Platonic camp. While he does not absolve men from moral 
responsibility, he does have some sympathy for ethical weak­
ness. For example, he excuses moral failure in men who are 
unable to apply the universal law to the particular situation 
(N.E., VII, 3, 1147b, 35-5) and thus reveals that he has no 
real answer finally to the problem of why some men are incap­
able of choosing the good. Aristotle is able to explain 
that a morally weak man is morally weak because he has an 
excess of passion which overwhelms him and brings about an 
ignorance of his exercise of the particular good action, 
but he has no explanation for why one man has more or less 
passion than another. Thus he cannot finally explain why one 
man is a "morally weak man," another a "wicked man," another 
a "man of practical wisdom," and another a "philosopher." 
The Aristotelian explanation that "habitual actions determine 
virtue" leads us finally in a circle: why do some men habit­
ually choose the good actions they intend and others have 
not the same power? 
25 Arxstotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham 
(London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1934), p. 75. 
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Aristotle has no final answer to the question and avoids 
direct discussion of it. His view of man is paradoxical: he 
does not wish to absolve man from responsibility and yet he 
cannot ultimately explain why one man is good and another 
evil, and like Plato finally has no answer to the problem 
of the relation between human free will and fate. The most 
he can bring himself to say is that we are "partly" respon­
sible for our states of character: 
If, then, as is said, our virtues are voluntary (and 
in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause 
of our moral dispositions, and it is our having a cer­
tain character that makes us set up an end of a certain 
kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; 
they are voluntary in the same manner as our virtues. 
(N.E. Ill, 5, 1114b, 20-25)26 
Man causes his own character, and yet he is born as a cer­
tain kind of person. Because of his emphasis on action, 
Aristotle can be said to judge man1s conduct a bit more 
stringently than Plato, but judgment is always tempered and 
informed by his great sense of historical accident, of the 
uncontrollable forces in life which threaten the structure 
of the personality from without and within. Thus even in 
Aristotle there is a sense of fate, of the doomed state of 
historical man. 
As we can see from the tension represented by Aristotle's 
view of man's responsibility and his fate, a side-effect of 
the problem of fated human nature is a softening of the idea 
of eternal judgment, a fact which has important ramifications 
^Aristotle, Ethics, p. 153. 
37 
for the dramatic intensity achieved by a character conceived 
within the Graeco-Roman weltanschaung. If men are destined 
to one fate or another, eternal judgment cannot be viewed 
too fixedly. The mind resists the idea of punishment for a 
nature already fated before time to a certain moral capacity, 
and as a result, various possibilities for a second chance 
for man after death become a common part of religious thought. 
In the Aeneid, for example, Virgil represents the possibility 
of a regenerative process after death. In fact, though moral 
responsibility is still part of the picture, sin itself is 
seen more as a natural result of descent into the body than 
an inherent propensity toward making the wrong moral choices. 
Even though the taint is strong, writes Virgil, there is poten­
tial for a total cleansing: 
Yes, not even when the last flicker of fire has left us 
does evil, or the ills that flesh is heir to, quite 
relinquish our souls; it must be that many a taint 
grows deeply, mysteriously grained in their being 
from long contact with the body. Therefore the dead 
are disciplined in purgatory, and pay the penalty of 
old evil; some hang, stretched to the blast of vacuum 
winds; for others, the stain of sin is washed away in 
a vast whirlpool or cauterized with fire. Each of us 
finds in the next world his own level; a few of us are 
later released to wander at will through the broad 
Elysium, The Happy Fields; until, in the fullness of 
time, the ages have purged that ingrown stain, and 
nothing is left but pure ethereal sentience, and the 
spirit's eternal flame. (Aeneid, I, 11. 731-748)27 
Thus in the Aeneid there is a possibility of salvation 
after death, a purgation of the taint of earthly life after 
27 Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. C. Day Lewis (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1952), p. 151. 
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some kind of punishment has been endured. The idea of rein­
carnation, also prominent in the Aeneid, has itself had asso­
ciations through the centuries with the idea of a second 
chance. 
The effect of raising possibilities for a kind of moral 
rebirth after death is to reduce the dramatic force of 
28 
choices made in earthly life. If the choice of a right 
way or a wrong way has less ultimate meaning for a given 
human being, then the making of choices in history will have 
less dramatic intensity. In Greek tragedy the drama of the 
situation does not accrue from the making of a choice for 
all eternity, it accrues from our sympathy with a character 
who senses that he is bound by an ultimate fate and who at 
each successive and deeper revelation of it uses all his human 
powers—reason, emotion, will—to stave it off. The drama 
comes not out of the choices which bring about the character1s 
downfall because those choices, although they seemed acci­
dental in the beginning, are shown to have been part of the 
total fate of the character all along. The drama comes 
rather out of the illusion of free will created by the seeming 
reversals of the fateful circumstances. Oedipus thinks he 
has been exonerated when he hears that his old parents have 
died, only to find that they are not his parents and that the 
hideous possibility of incest and murder still shadows his 
life. His choices dwindle into fate; his relief—and his 
2 8 See Auerbach, Dante, pp. 88-89. 
J t 
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sense of freedom—is always short-lived. It is in the very 
scenes where Oedipus recognizes his true fate that the drama 
achieves its most powerful effect. And it is only in the 
plot, Aristotle points out, that these elements of recogni-
29 
tion and reversal occur. Thus freedom of the human will 
is always secondary in Greek drama to the inevitability of 
the action. Where plot is more important than character, we 
might expect to see a strong movement toward cosmic abstrac­
tion in character, away from attention to historic detail. 
The element of abstraction in characterization, the move­
ment away from individualized detail, is further reinforced 
by the Greek ambivalence toward the nature of individual 
existence in the after-life. For Plato, this ambivalence 
arises out of his total understanding of the nature of bodied 
existence in life. 
In the Dialogues, Plato aims at discovering the essen­
tial nature of a subject—its universal identity. These 
identities he sees as underlying reality and as having an 
existence independent of the sensible world. They are, as 
Plato sees them, more real than the changeable and often 
confusing data of sense-experience. All the unchangeable 
realities of the eternal world can be perceived through 
reason, which perceives unity in the connections underlying 
the various divisions of reality. In like manner, the human 
29 
Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Wheelwright, pB 298. 
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soul as Plato describes it in the Phaedo is akin to the uni­
versal realities, having pre-existed with them before descend-
30 
ing into the changeable particularity of the body. The 
soul is seen as eternal, immutable, ideally suited to appre­
hending the eternal verities, while the body is mortal, in 
process, suited to the inferior world of sense perception. 
The very definition of soul in Plato's terms, for example, 
demonstrates its self-perpetuating, eternal quality. The 
soul, he writes, can be defined as self-motion, "for every body 
that derives its motion from within itself has a soul, since 
that is indeed the soul's nature...this self-motion is the very 
31 32 
definition of the soul." In Book X of The Republic the 
soul is described as "immortal," "indestructible," and "pure," 
but as encrusted in this life with the "thousand ills" of 
human existence, much as a sea-statue is encrusted with 
barnacles and shells. Again in the Phaedrus, Plato refers 
to the pre-existent state when the pure soul gazed on reality, 
"not disfigured by this so-called body that we carry about us, 
33 
imprisoned like oysters in a shell." 
30 Plato, Phaedo, trans. F. Church (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, Inc., 1951), p. 35. "So she thinks that she should 
live in this life and when she dies, she believes that she 
will go on to what is akin to and like herself, and be 
released from human ills." 
31 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. W. C. Helmbold and W. G. 
Rabinowitz (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 33. 
32 Plato, The Republic, trans. Benjamin F. Jowett (New 
York: Random House, 1941), p. 389. 
33 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 28. 
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The soul apart from the body, however, is itself seen 
in the Phaedrus as a tri-unity of "appetite" or concupiscence, 
34 
mettle or "spirit," and reason. Plato describes the trio 
and their proper hierarchy in the Phaedrus by means of the 
illustration of a charioteer (reason) who controls two 
horses: the one good (spirit); the other, bad (appetite). 
In order for the charioteer to control the horse of appetite 
he must enlist the strength of the spirited horse on the side 
of reason and forcefully control the concupiscent element of 
the soul "which in each of us is the largest part of the soul 
35 
and by nature the most insatiable of gain." This analogy 
seems to suggest that the soul is not the "pure unity" which 
is suggested by the passage in the Phaedo, but that it has 
an element which pulls it downward to the body even as the 
rational principle draws it up toward the unchanging reali­
ties. Plato seems to be describing the universal experience 
of a dualism at the center of personality. As Paul Elmer 
More puts it: 
Sometimes our real personality seems to reside in that 
portion of our being which is divine and uncontaminated 
by the world, in the soul, that is to say, considered 
apart from the body and the contacts with phenomena, 
while at other times we are more conscious of a division 
of our being which opens down into the depths of perso­
nality.-^" 
34 
Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 28-29. The names given to the 
three aspects of the soul are A. E. Taylor's in Plato: The 
Man and His Work (London: Methuen & Co., 1934), p. 307. 
35 Plato, The Republic, p. 160. 
36 
Paul Elmer More, The Religion of Plato (London: 
Princeton University Press, 1921), pp. 55-56. 
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And yet, Plato, as we have pointed out, insists upon the 
pure unity of the soul in other places, its intimate rela­
tion with the unchanging verities. Mr. More finds the 
solution to the apparent contradiction here in Plato1s under­
standing of unity in this passage, a unity which can finally 
be defined as an ordering of all parts of the soul in a graded 
hierarchy. There is, as he puts it, no longer a "hostile 
division of the powers within the soul like to factions with­
in a city, but a measured harmony and the unity of subordina-
37 
tion." The "just man," like the "just society" appears 
where this unity of subordination has been achieved. 
One intuits, however, that Plato is not ultimately 
comfortable with the hierarchy as it operates in the philos­
opher-lover, for as adamantly as he insists on a correctly 
ordered soul in life, his final goal is always a completely 
ideal reality to be achieved only after death, when the 
concupiscent soul will have no body to inflame, when appetite 
will disappear in the absence of bodily need. In fact, it is 
clear that for Plato, to be truly human requires a complete 
and final turning away from the world of sense-perception, 
of particular and manifold objects to the world of unity per­
ceived only by reason and spirit: 
For to be a man, one must understand the content of 
a general term, leaving the field of manifold sense-
perceptions and entering that in which the object 
37 More, p. 56. A. E. Taylor follows this view, suggest­
ing that we are encouraged by Plato to think of the soul as 
"one organism." A. E. Taylor, Plato; The Man and His Work 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1949), p. 307. 
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of knowledge is unique and grasped only by reason­
ing.38 
The process of "becoming human" in these terms is a process 
of ascent toward the clear condition of vision experienced 
in the pre-existent state, a condition of experiencing the 
"content of the general." The process is achieved in only 
those few philosopher-lovers who rightly order their souls on 
earth, keeping the bodily passions under strict control 
through the power of reason, and contemplating with greatest 
concentration the eternal ideas. The soul of a philosopher, 
writes Plato in the Phaedo, is constantly meditating on 
"what is true and divine and real:" 
And will not a man attain to this pure thought most 
completely if he goes to each thing, as far as he can, 
with his mind alone, taking neither sight nor any other 
sense along with his reason in the process of thought 
to be an encumbrance? In every case he will pursue pure 
and absolute being with his pure intellect alone. He 
will be set free as far as possible from the eye and the 
ear and in short, from the whole body, because inter­
course with the body troubles the soul and hinders 
her from gaining truth and wisdom. Is it not he who 
will act in the knowledge of real being, if any man 
will?39 
Plato, then, consistently emphasizes the soul as the highest 
and best part of man. When he does mention the tripartite 
division of the soul in the Republic and the Phaedrus, allow­
ing for the expression of passion and emotion, he appears to 
do so only in order to have an adequate and unified explanation 
of the human personality in life. However, when Plato 
38 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 32. 
39 Plato, Phaedo, p. 11. 
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reiterates this tripartite division of soul in the Timaeus, 
there is no doubt which part of the soul is immortal and 
which is not. At an early point, he distinctly calls the 
two lower categories the "mortal form of soul" and places 
40 
them in fixed places within the body. Later on, he draws 
a distinction between those who devote themselves to the lower 
soul and its passions and who thus "will not fall short of 
being mortal," and those who devote themselves to the high­
est part of the soul ("learning and true thoughts") who will 
41 
thus partake of immortality. 
While there is little argument among the critics that the 
rational part of the soul is for Plato the most akin to the 
eternal verities, there is a controversy over the nature of 
reason or mind as Plato defines it. What is the charac­
ter of that rational part of the soul? Is it personal 
in some sense? Does it have individual existence of some 
kind after death, or is it simply a pure abstract of the 
concepts of justice and virtue which were developed by the 
individual during life in the body? 
G. M. A. Grube explains that this highest part of the 
soul is the mind or intellect, the "capacity to apprehend 
general truth," and reminds us that the aim of the Platonic 
philosopher is always to exercise that capacity, to lose 
himself —his private opinions and bodily feelings—more and 
40 
Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury (London: Wm. 
Heinemann, Ltd., 1929), p. 179. 
41 Plato, Timaeus, p. 247. 
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more in contemplation of the universals. The perfect Pla­
tonic psyche, in Grube's view, would remain imperfect in 
direct proportion to its unwillingness to give up its indi­
viduality, For Plato the idea of personal immortality is 
42 
thus "not something to aim at, but something to outgrow." 
Robert William Hall, on the other hand, takes issue with 
an analysis of Plato which seeks to "de-personalize" the 
43 
rational part of the soul after death. He points out that 
while a case can be made for the fact that in the Republic 
justice and virtue in themselves are to be valued above all 
things, the concept of virtue has much more meaning when pred­
icated on a concept of personal immortality; justice can have 
no meaning apart from ethical man: "The great eschatological 
myths in the Dialogues," he argues, "would lose their impact 
and significance if there were serious doubt of the survival 
44 
of the individual's personality." 
In addition to Hall's point, other factors in Plato seem 
to suggest the idea of a personal or individualized mind of 
a certain type. One would expect, for example, that the 
expression of desire and passion in Plato's view would be 
alien to pure rationality, and yet in the Symposium the desire 
of the philosopher for immortality, for contemplation of the 
42 G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London: Methuen 
and Co., 1935), p. 148. 
43 Robert William Hall, Plato and the Individual (The 
Hague: Martinus Nizhoff, 1963), p. 162, n. 1. 
44 
Hall, p. 145. 
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eternal forms, is seen in terms of the human individual1s 
desire to beget physical life. Is the comparison between 
human passion and philosophic desire simply an unfortunate 
choice of metaphor, or is the personal analogy somehow nec­
essary to the very understanding of philosophic love? The 
idea of personal existence of some kind seems to be at least 
partially supported by the characterization of God presented 
in the Laws, (905D) where Plato at least suggests the notion 
of a personal Providence by arguing against the heresy that 
God is indifferent to men's affairs and by presenting a 
deity to whom all human behavior is a matter of importance 
45 
and concern. 
Other factors point in the opposite direction. A. E. 
Taylor, for example, reminds us that the concern for man­
kind evinced by Plato1s god is not the same kind of care dem-
46 
onstrated by the Christian deity. In Plato's view, God 
attends to the affairs of men by establishing what could be 
called a law of gravitation —that is, a man as he becomes 
better or worse is drawn into the company of other men of the 
same type, and receives the care and concern natural to the 
group in which he moves. In this schema, there is still not 
specific possibility left for the direct personal intervention 
of God in the affairs of men. In addition, Plato directly 
undercuts the notion of a personal deity in the Phaedrus. 
45 Plato, Laws, II, 370. 
46 
A. E. Taylor, Platonism (New York: Longman's, Green 
& Co., 1927), p. 105. 
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In this work, God is made to conform to an impersonal defini­
tion of immortality, and Plato berates the human imagination 
which would create a "souled" and "bodied" deity: 
This composite structure of body and soul joined 
together is called a living being and is further desig­
nated as mortal. Immortal it is not on any reasonable 
supposition; in fact, it is our imagination, not our 
vision, not our adequate comprehension, that presents 
us with the notion of a god as an immortal living being, 
equipped with both soul and body, and with these, more­
over, joined together for all time.47 
The passage in the Phaedrus and the form of God's "care" as 
designated in the Laws, suggest a somewhat less personal 
vision of God than that presented, for comparison, in the 
Christian view, where the deity becomes human and thus heir 
to all human passions, sympathies, etc. Still, the human 
desire which forms the underlying metaphor for Plato's 
Symposium, and the conception of justice and the view of God 
presented in his last work, the Laws, suggests a re-evaluation 
of the rational conception of pure mind which informed the 
early works. As Paul Shorey puts it, Plato "smuggles in 
other attributes of mind involving also the proposition which 
Matthew Arnold refused to affirm, 'that God is a being who 
48 
thinks and loves.'" And yet, this love cannot have 
the same historical content as love defined within the 
Christian context, for Plato's god never has an individual 
historical manifestation, is never openly identified with 
earthly man by becoming an individual. The metaphor of human 
47 Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 28-29. 
48Paul Shorey, Platonism: Ancient and Modern (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1938), p. 70. 
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desire used in the Symposium to explain philosophic love was 
probably chosen less in praise of human emotion and of life 
in the body than for its aptness in expressing a cosmic 
desire for unity, and we are left with a philosophy which 
overwhelmingly supports the superiority of the universal, the 
homogenous, the general, the One, which has become synonymous 
with Plato1s name. 
What form the unbodied soul has when it achieves this 
unity is open to question—and there has been some scholarly 
controversy on this very point. The basic question seems to 
be whether the soul is historically personalized or indi­
vidualized in some sense, as Hall, Hackforth, and others 
49 
suggest, or whether it is a kind of homogenous unity in 
which the universal part of the historical individual finally 
rejoins the eternal realities from which it sprang. Evi­
dence—especially Plato's constant reference to the superior­
ity of the universals and the soul1s universal aspect along 
with his rejection of any historical image of God—seems to 
point away from an emphasis on individual existence in general 
and toward a vision of cosmic homogeneity. This vision then 
forms the background for what Plato considers the basic issue 
in mimesis—the representation of the real man. For Plato, 
such a representation must begin with an imitation of the 
49 See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Uni­
versity Press, 1952), pp. 87-88: "There is nothing in the 
Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and we might add the Laws to 
deny the retention of individualized existence in favor of 
the absorption of the individual in a world soul." 
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universal, not the historically particular man, because he 
conceives of character in terms of the ideal philosopher-
lover, whose very capacity for existence is tied up with his 
ability to contemplate the eternal verities, to apprehend 
the general. 
Thus we see that Plato in his general understanding of 
the nature of man and the nature of God, consistently reveals 
an interest in the universal aspect of experience, a tendency 
to move from the earthly realities of matter and action 
toward the ideal reality beyond time. The embryonic Ideal 
Man in history is a graded hierarchy of reason, spirit, and 
appetite. Man in history is only good, only philosophically 
successful to the extent that he orders his earthly life by 
enlisting reason on the side of spirit to control appetite. 
The ultimate goal of true manhood, however, is outside of 
time, when the soul, having outgrown earthly appetite will 
have no need to struggle against it. The true end of man is 
finally to "leave the field of manifold sense-perception," 
50 
and to "understand the content of a general term." In 
other words, the true definition of man for Plato is a state 
of unhindered, rational communication with the universals. 
In Aristotle, on the other hand, the notion of individual 
human identity finds a more solid grounding in the natural 
world. Aristotle begins his study of "What Is" with the 
analysis of being or substance, a term which is used in 
50 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 32. 
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three senses to mean (1) form, or the aspect of a thing 
which determines its shape and nature; (2) matter, or the 
underlying substratum in which the development of the form 
takes place; and (3) a combination of form and matter result-
51 
ing in an individual thing (Metaphysics V, vii). Although 
the form of an individual thing is more akin to the uni-
52 
versal or the generic (Metaphysics III, v.), an individual 
thing cannot exist apart from the sensible substrate which 
it shapes, and which gives the form the unique matter of 
its being. According to A. E. Taylor, Aristotle takes sub­
stance to mean "thing" in this primary "substantive" sense 
rather than qualities or attributes of things, even though 
53 
these are often spoken of as a mode of being. Thus, while 
substance can in Aristotle refer to general classes of 
things (as when we say that Plato is a man), substance in 
a primary sense means an absolutely individual thing (this 
man, this horse), individual beings which undergo changes and 
processes in quality and quantity ( accidents ) while remain-
54 
ing essentially one thing. For example, Socrates can be 
successively young and old while remaining permanently 
51 Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. H. Tredennick (London: 
Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1933), p. 239. 
5 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 137. 
53 
A. E. Taylor, Aristotle (London: T. C. and E. C. 
Jack, Ltd., 1919), p. 50. 
54 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 241. 
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Socrates. Taylor characterizes the existence of these indi­
vidual substances in Aristotle as "the most fundamental con­
dition of the existence of the universe, since they are the 
bearers of all qualities, the terms of all relations, and the 
55 
agents and patients in all interaction." 
Aristotle's analysis of this substantial individuality 
follows two antitheses—the contrast between matter and form 
and the contrast between the potential and the actual. In the 
first place, an individual is made up of its form (eidos, 
forma) and the stuff of which it is made (materia), as a cop­
per bowl is made of copper material and formed into the shape 
of a bowl. Also, "matter" can refer not only to the physi­
cal body, but to other incorporeal "raw materials," for exam­
ple, the concept of "character" in men requires both a "mat­
ter" of native disposition and a "formation" of training and 
education. 
In turn, this analysis of matter and form receives its 
dynamic formulation in the antithesis of the potential and 
the actual. All processes, writes Aristotle, can be analyzed 
in terms of a "matter" which has the potential of becoming a 
fully actualized "form." An oak seed, for example, has the 
potential to become a fully developed "actualized" adult oak. 
The individual thing in this sense can be regarded as "the 
actuality of which the undeveloped Matter was the potential-
56 
ity." Aristotle concerns himself not only with the definition 
55 Taylor, Aristotle, p. 51„ 
56 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 57. 
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of individuality as a combination of form and matter and of 
potentiality and actuality, but also with the initial forces 
which cause the development of the individual to take place— 
with the conditions which initiate the production of the indi­
vidual being. Aristotle identifies four causes: (1) the 
matter or material cause of a thing, (2) the essence or for­
mal nature of a thing, the "law according to which it has 
grown and developed," (3) the immediate starting-point of 
the process, or the efficient cause, and (4) the final cause, 
or the "purpose or good which is the end of every generative 
57 
process." In terms of a biological process, the four 
causes can be explained by the illustration of an oak tree, 
which in order to grow, must have (1) a material cause, or 
seed which contains within it the potential for development, 
(2) a definite Law which causes it to develop into an oak 
tree as distinguished from a birch or willow, (3) a parent 
tree which produced the seed, (4) a final condition of matur­
ity or actualization when growth no longer takes place and the 
individual tree is capable of generation itself. Thus organic 
beings reproduce other organic beings of the same kind, that 
is: 
The efficient cause produces as the end of its action, 
a second being having the same "form" as itself, though 
realized in different "matter" and numerically distinct 
from itself. Thus, the efficient cause (i.e., the par­
ent) is a "form" realized in matter, and the "end" is 
the same "form" realized in other matter. 
57 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 59. 
5 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 60. 
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It is obvious that in this schema both the form and the indi­
vidual matter which bears the form are essential to the notion 
of individual being. The substrate of matter cannot be 
truly said to exist without the individuating principle of 
form, even as the form cannot find individual existence 
without the unique material substrate with which it combines. 
For Aristotle, neither the universal genus nor the under­
lying material substrate in themselves contain the necessary 
individuality to form an individual thing. 
This element in Aristotle's thought opposes him to Plato, 
who, as we have seen, attributes to universals a substantial 
reality apart from particular matter, a fact which leads him 
to define true human nature as a static ideal beyond the 
sensible world. For Aristotle, on the other hand, particular 
movement or "life is an essential part of individual identity. 
In fact, motion and activity find their dynamic origin in the 
interaction of form and matter. At one point in the Meta­
physics Aristotle criticizes the Platonists for supposing 
that it is possible for a man to exist without his parts, 
as a circle does without the bronze. This cannot be, writes 
Aristotle, because 
an animal is sensible and cannot be defined without 
motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some 
definite condition; for it is not the hand in any 
condition that is a part of a man, but only when it 
can perform its function, and so has life in it. 
(Metaphysics, VII, xi, 9)^9 
59 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 367. 
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It is no accident that for Aristotle the very model of 
"what is" is life (bios), while in Plato mathematical symbol 
is the representative metaphor for ultimate reality. In 
Aristotle's view to speak of the universal abstract apart 
from the particular concrete has no meaning. The universal 
for him has no separate existence from the particular (Meta-
60 
physics VII, xv, 5). 
Aristotle's insistence on an integrated view of life in 
this sense appears again in his De Anima, where the substan­
tive categories of "form" and "matter" are applied specifi­
cally to the relationship of soul to body in the human being. 
Every living body, writes Aristotle, which possesses life 
(the capacity for self-sustenance, growth and decay) must be 
"substance" in the earlier sense of a compound of form and 
matter. The soul, following Aristotle's earlier definition 
of "form" in the Metaphysics, is "substance" in the sense of 
being the form of a natural body (material substance) which 
potentially has life. As Aristotle puts it, the soul is 
61 
"substance expressed as the form" (On the Soul II, i). 
Following the earlier schema, Aristotle identifies the mat­
ter of the body as its "potentiality" and the soul as the 
"actuality" of the body, the "final cause," that which enables 
it to exist as a living individuality ("whereby we live and 
^Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 393. 
6 X Aristotle, On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, 
ed. W. S. Hett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), 
pp. 69-71. 
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feel and think in the most fundamental sense" (On the Soul II, 
62 
ii). As such, it is the origin of the faculties of nutri­
tion, sensation, thought and movement and forms a unified 
whole with the body, whose materia is the instrument of the 
faculties of the soul just as the material eye is the instru-
63 
ment for the power of seeing (On the Soul, II, ii). Aris­
totle never separates the functions or affections of the soul— 
anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, love, hate—from 
64 
the body (On the Soul I, i). He thus appears to insist 
uniformly in both the Metaphysics and the De Anima on the 
inseparability of soul and body. Unlike Plato, he rejects 
the notion of a substantial reality apart from particular 
beings, grounding his theory of individuality in empirical 
reality—in a synthesis of the universal and the particular. 
And yet, as much as Aristotle insists on the insepara­
bility of soul and body in life, there is reason to suspect 
him of a slight reversion to Platonism when it comes to spec-
65 
ulation about God, the afterlife, and the problem of evil. 
6 2 Aristotle, On the Soul, p. 79. 
6 3 
Aristotle, On the Soul, p. 71. 
64 Aristotle, On the Soul, p. 15. 
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See Philip Wicksteed, "Introduction," Aristotle, 
Physics. trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis Cornford, 2 vols. 
(London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1929), I:Lxxii; Aristotle, 
The Metaphysics, p. xxxi; A. E. Taylor, Aristotle, p. 69; 
and Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. Richard Robinson (Ox­
ford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 352. Jaeger, for example, 
writes that Plotinus was one of the first to see the diffi­
culty of Aristotle's reversion to the notion of an immaterial 
final cause, and summarizes his insight: "If matter is the 
principle of individuation, as Aristotle teaches here and 
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The problems raised by this speculation put some limits on 
his theory of individuality. 
First, Aristotle does not seem to be able to escape from 
the notion of an ultimately immaterial Cause. The continuity 
of the processes of life, the interaction of form and matter 
in life presupposes an eternal Cause which maintains these 
processes. This eternal cause must of necessity be eternal 
and unchanging and therefore immaterial. Aristotle identi­
fies this cause not as a composite of form and matter but as 
the final actuality, the pure form which initiates the 
world outside of which it stands. The world is not created 
from this pure form or actuality, but the matter of it is 
moved by its inherent desire for the ultimate good. Thus 
66 
"god moves the universe by being its good." Without Him, 
there can be no form, or soul. And yet primary matter, 
the stuff which God, who is a kind of dynamic force, forms • 
into existence, is as much a condition of individual existence 
as God himself. Then too, God or the First Cause, is conceived 
of as essentially disinterested in the world he moves. There 
is no personal concern exhibited by this "Unmoved Mover," 
even in the limited sense in which we saw it in Plato's god. 
elsewhere, either the movers of the spheres cannot be imma­
terial since they form a plurality of exemplars within a 
genus; or Aristotle refutes himself by retaining his doctrine 
of immortality, since this excludes individual multiplicity. 
In either event he falls into contradictions within the pre­
suppositions of his own philosophy." 
^^Taylor, Aristotle, p. 68; Aristotle, De Physica, II, 
267-425. 
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The primary activity of this deity is one of self-contempla-
67 
tion—of "thinking of thought itself," an activity which is 
self-continuous and self-pleasurable, entirely abstracted 
from the world of human passion and desire. Insofar as man 
participates in this kind of pure contemplative thinking he 
is participating in the activity of God. 
This notion of God as Immaterial Cause may provide the 
only basis we can find in Aristotle for the soul's individual 
immortality after death. W. D. Ross has pointed out that in 
the De Anima there are hints that at least one faculty of 
the soul—the reasoning faculty—has an immortality beyond 
68 
time (De Anima III, iv and v), at least when it engages in 
the self-contemplative thinking of which the Unmoved Mover 
is the model. Whether this exists as the function of an 
individual form or soul or as part of a generalized good, 
69 
Aristotle does not say. If Aristotle's passionless concep­
tion of the deity as pure form gives us any clue the latter 
choice seems more probable. 
Thus Aristotle's definition of individuality as a com­
posite of form and matter, of soul and body, appears to make 
no claims beyond the boundaries of physical existence. What 
is left after the decay of the "matter" of the body is pure 
6 7 Taylor, Aristotle, p. 61. See also Jaeger, p. 346. 
8̂Aristotle, On the Soul, p. 167; p. 177. 
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W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen and Co., 1930), 
p. 132. 
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form with no substantial existence as an individual being. 
The view of man that Aristotle1s schema suggests is thus 
man as a composite being of a form and a materia of poten­
tiality moving toward realization in actuality. God alone 
is fully actualized with no unrealized potentiality in his 
nature. Man as a composite, growing being moves on toward 
what seems to be pure actualization or "form" (De Physica II, 
70 
viii, 199b). 
The lack of a detailed formulation of the nature of exis­
tence after death in the two greatest Greek philosophers con­
tributes to the general Greco-Roman tendency to represent 
characters in the afterlife as veiled, ethereal. What re­
mains of the individual personalities is completely universal­
ized. Stripped of any accidental historical individuality, 
they become only abstracted shadows of their former selves. 
When Virgil1s Aeneas meets Anchises in the Elysium fields, 
71 
for example, Anchises exhibits only the qualities of a 
universal type of a father—affection, solicitude, and joy 
at seeing his son after a long separation. There is nothing 
to identify Anchises individually except that we know he is 
Aeneas' father. He is identified as morally superior 
because he is found in the Elysium fields, the "Happy Place;" 
but as we have already seen, the moral ranking is a 
standard result of the prescriptive view of history formulated 
70 Aristotle, De Physica, II, 177n. 
71 
Virgil/ Aeneid, p. 150. 
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by Greek thinkers and only contributes to universalization 
of the character. 
Virgil's Dido in the same work is represented as "a 
72 
wild-eyed, passionate ghost," still in the throes of her 
hatred for Aeneas. She does not speak; all that is left is 
the one passionate element of her nature which caused her 
downfall—now universalized into a symbol of the eternal 
relation in the Greek view between nature and destiny. 
Aeneas1 reaction to Dido is less romantic than it is com­
passionate. Virgil makes it clear that he pities Dido's 
fate; but he does not grieve over their former love: "None 
the less did Aeneas, hard hit by her piteous fate, weep after 
73 
her from afar, as she went, with tears of compassion.11 
The effect of the emphasis on destiny is once again to uni­
versalize the portrait of both characters, abstracting the 
fated qualities of their natures from the comparative richness 
of the description of their love-affair in earthly life. 
The characters in Homer's Odyssey exhibit the same empha­
sis on universalization, moral prescriptivism, and destiny. 
After his long delay with the sorceress Circe, Odysseus trav­
els to Hades on Circe's orders to seek further counsel from 
the spirit of Teiresias. Once there, he sacrifices a black 
ram and the spirits of the dead begin to seek him out. The 
first to appear is Elpenor, one of Odysseus' companions only 
72 Aeneid, p. 143. 
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Aeneid, p. 143. 
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recently killed on Circe's island. Elpenor gives Odysseus 
a quick account of his death/ stressing the fated destiny of 
74 
his life ("an evil doom of some god was my bane"), and then 
begs Odysseus for a proper burial. Elpenor1s entire speech 
reflects exactly the concerns of the universal type of a 
faithful retainer—his loyalty to Odysseus, his cruel fate, 
his ritualistic desire for burial lest he bring on the anger 
of the gods. Even his parting wish only strengthens the 
highly universalized impression we receive by reminding us 
one last time of the essential nub of his character—his com-
radeship-at-arms: "fulfill me this and plant upon the barrow 
mine oar, wherewith I rowed in the days of my life, while I 
75 
was yet among my fellows.11 
Odysseus' encounter with his mother exhibits the same 
kind of universalized character presentation. As in Aeneas' 
meeting with Anchises in the Aeneid. the universal parental 
qualities of affection, solicitude and grief over long sepa­
ration are evident. The mother recounts her death (caused 
by Odysseus' long absence), and gives him news of his wife. 
The most interesting aspect of her counsel is her account of 
man's state after death—of the nature of his existence in 
the afterlife: 
Ah me, my child, of all men most ill-fated, Persephone, 
the daughter of Zeus, doth in no wise deceive thee, but 
74 Homer, Odyssey, p. 164. 
75 Homer, Odyssey, p. 164. 
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even on this wise it is with mortals when they die. 
For the sinews no more bind together the flesh and the 
bones, but the great force of burning fire abolishes 
these, so soon as the life hath left the white bones, 
and the spirit like a dream flies forth and hovers 
near. But haste with all thine heart toward the sun­
light, and mark all this, that even hereafter thou may-
est tell it to thy wife.' 
The highly philosophical nature of this account of the body 
and its destruction with the didactic overtones of the admo­
nition to Odysseus to leave the dark world and tell his wife 
at the end heightens the dreadful aspect of this characteri­
zation and increases the effect of ethereality and impending 
doom, besides giving explicit voice to the Greek split between 
body and spirit. 
In summary, then, the Greek understanding of reality is 
controlled by philosophical and historical formulations which 
encourage an emphasis on the universal, the prescriptive, and 
the didactic in characterization. The Greek habit of separat­
ing substantive truth from historical actuality led to a uni­
versalized view of human character which discouraged the 
representation of character development in literature and 
tended to fix a character in time and space, to freeze him 
at a particular ethical and social level. Because of the 
prescriptive quality of the universalized man, it made char­
acterization, even historical characterization a natural 
vehicle for didactic instruction. Also, the tendency to view 
history as chaotic, as a repository of the accidental and the 
*76 Homer, Odyssey, p. 168. 
62 
mutable, led to an essential disunity in the earthly repre­
sentation of characters, who though ultimately subject to the 
Heraclitan axiom that a man's nature is his fate, yet become 
aware of that law only gradually, and only through great 
resistance to it. Human character is viewed almost as if it 
were on a planned trajectory, a trajectory of which the human 
agent is unaware until he recognizes its interrelation with 
his deepest self at its completion. In addition, because 
Greek philosophy discourages the notion of individualized 
existence after death, characters depicted in the afterlife 
are veiled and shadowy, symbolic apparitions of their former 
affections and recognizable as individual personalities only 
in virtue of the essential passions which governed their des­
tinies in life. Finally in both Aristotle and Plato we see 
what might be called an optimism: a certain reluctance to 
display real moral depravity in literature, a sympathy for 
the fated nature of humanity, a belief in the ultimate (and 
probably absolute and undifferentiated) union of the soul and 
universal truth in death. Plato, even though disillusioned 
with man's capacity to come up to an ideal, never actually 
lost his faith in the capacity of education to activate the 
will and produce good actions and character. Aristotle, on 
the other hand, saw more clearly the powerlessness of good 
intention in the face of man's passionate nature. Still, 
neither Plato nor Aristotle in this respect develops the deep 
recognition of the powerlessness of human will reached in the 
63 
Christian vision of man. Neither offers a solution to the 
problem of the weakness of the will beyond the exhortation 
to cultivate one's own power, the natural goodness one finds 
within the human personality. In both Plato and Aristotle, 
the view of human nature is always tinged with optimism, a 
faint hope that if the conditions are exactly right, man will 
be able, by the light of his own reason, to apprehend, to 
will, and to do the good. That such idealism should be tinged 
with the kind of disillusionment we noted in the later works 
is perhaps not as shocking as we might suppose. C. S. Lewis 
writes that cynicism and idealism in romantic literature 
about women are "twin fruits on the same branch," and we may 
profitably extend this bit of wisdom to the general Greek 
attitude toward the nature of man. 
All this tended to encourage the creation of highly 
abstract and universalized characters in literature. Where 
characters are individualized or historicized in any sense 
it seems to be either in virtue of comic representation of 
character or of the representation of moral lapses in the 
specific sense just described. Individuality is 
in fact defined less as a matter of personality—the 
particular physical, emotional and spiritual constitution of 
a given human being—than as human fault, the combination of 
defects which reveal the desperate weakness of a soul trapped 
in the sensual body, in the state of "potentiality," to use 
the Aristotelian term. In botn Aristotle and Plato, evil is 
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always a necessary part of historical existence; the "good" 
is beyond history, more real, more substantive than history 
and therefore more worthy of imitation. 
Two Classical Theories of Characterization 
The universalized portrayal of character which is 
encouraged by the Greek view of history directly affects 
theoretical formulation of the rules governing literary 
characterization, Plato and Aristotle handle the subject 
from slightly different perspectives, but with overall con­
clusions which encourage a universal over a historically 
actual representation of character. 
Scholars have long observed that Plato1s theory of poet­
ics is governed by a great anxiety about the moral effects of 
art based on his belief (1) that the artist is thrice removed 
from reality and (2) that he arouses the undesirable emotions 
and passions which it is the philosopher-lover's desire to 
77 
escape. In the Republic, Book III, for example, we find a 
denunciation of the passages in Homer which conjure up images 
of Hades or the afterlife on the grounds that such poetry 
78 
causes a morbid fear of death. The same suspicion of the 
bad moral effects of poetry crop up again in Book X of the 
Republic, where Plato distinguishes three levels of reality 
77 A. W. H. Adkins, From the Many to the One (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 160. 
7 8 
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and portrays the artist as imitator of the lowest type, 
i.e., an imitator of the actual conditions of life in the 
79 
empirical world. Illustrating this concept by means of the 
now famous example of an artist painting a couch, he dis­
tinguishes between the "ideal" couch beyond the sensible 
world and the particular couch of which it is an imperfect 
manifestation. The artist, painting the imperfect couch, thus 
produces in his work the "imitation of an imitation." Because 
of Plato's firm insistence on the knowledge of things as they 
are, i.e., knowledge of the imperfect actualities of exis­
tence , the artist as he presently exists is a man thrice-
removed from the truth and much closer to the base particu­
lars of historical existence than to the eternal realities. 
It is interesting that although Plato saw philosophy and 
not poetry as the ultimate repository of universal truth, he 
was not averse to an "ideal" conception of poetry which would 
have as its object the depiction of a strongly ideal yet his­
torical character. Imitation of the wise and strong histori­
cal character is allowed, but only on the grounds that wisdom 
and strength are ideal realities and thus legitimate subjects 
for imitation: 
If they (the guardians of the Republic) do imitate, 
they should imitate from childhood what is proper for 
their craft—men who are brave and temperate, pious, 
free and all things of that sort. 
79 Plato, Republic, pp. 393-396. 
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The problem is, according to Plato, that the wise and calm 
81 
character, being "nearly always the same and self-composed," 
is very difficult to imitate. Not only that, but he will 
likely not be well-received, even if a poet succeeds in con­
veying him, because the goodness of his character will be 
inherently alien to the imperfect men to whom he is presented. 
Plato concludes that the imitative poet as he exists in the 
present world is therefore "not naturally suited to imitate 
this part of the soul," but is rather naturally predisposed 
to imitate the "resentful and complex" character which is 
popular with the multitude. Immediately following, Plato 
makes a direct linkage between the imitative poet and the 
inferior part of the soul; and accuses the imitative poet 
of corrupting even the decent people with very few excep-
82 
tions. He specifies the direct moral effects of poetry as 
"fostering and strengthening" the inferior part of the soul; 
8 3 
what is unreasoning and idle, and the friend of cowardice. 
Thus the representation of character allowed by Plato's 
aesthetic has strong affinities with the Greek tendency to 
separate the eternal verities from historical actuality. The 
creation in history of literary characters on Plato's terms 
is practically impossible. If it were possible, the charac­
ters would be of such a wise and calm disposition that they 
81 
Plato, Republic, p. 405. 
^^Plato, Republic, p. 405. 
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would not incite the emotional participation from which imi­
tation of worldly character derives its appeal. But this is 
not possible, at least within historical life on this earth. 
In Plato's ideal theory of mimesis, there is no room for any 
imitation apart from imitation of an ideal which is separate 
from bodily life as it is experienced on earth. Since this 
kind of imitation is not possible on earth, poet-imitators 
84 
will be sent out of the Republic. 
Only one tiny loophole is left for an artistic represen­
tation of character which is less than the ideal. A good 
man, Plato writes, will normally be eager to imitate a good 
man acting firmly and sensibly. He will not be so willing 
to imitate misfortune, passion, or drunkenness because "he 
resents modelling and fitting himself into the shapes of the 
85 
worse." This disdain for the imperfect will be uniformly 
86 
true, "unless," says Socrates, "it be just a bit of fun." 
The rules which govern the "fun" are based on a strict con­
trol over the kind of defect in character which can be com­
ically represented. Plato makes a distinction, for example, 
in the Philebus, 48-50 between vice when it occurs in the 
87 
ideal man and vice when it occurs in the morally weak. The 
84 Plato, Republic, p. 196. 
8 5 Plato, Republic. p. 194. 
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first, he writes, may harm others, but the second is merely 
laughable. As Mary A„ Grant points out in her essay on 
88 
ancient Greek theories of the ridiculous, the writer of a 
pure comic genre, according to Plato, would be ridiculing 
only persons of a consistently weak moral nature, whose 
defects are themselves only slight. In so doing, Plato tends 
to fix the ethical standing of the comic character at a cer­
tain level of moral weakness which is laughable precisely 
because it is not harmful enough to be labelled morally 
destructive. Thus where we might most expect to see a theo-
ory allowing for an individualized view of character in 
the sense of a character who shares a realistic quota of 
human fault of both the serious and the less serious variety, 
we find instead a carefully delineated ethical type of a 
definitely fixed sort. Plato's view of comic character fol­
lows the general classical tendency toward ethical fixity 
even in the representation of low or mean characters. 
Ultimately, of course, Plato is not comfortable with the 
depiction of comic characters in any sense. In the Laws VII, 
89 
816-817, Plato writes that the virtuous man must of neces­
sity come into contact with the shameful persons and thoughts 
which produce comedy, because serious thought cannot be com­
prehended without its contrasting opposite. Still, the 
88 
Mary A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the 
Laughable (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), 
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virtuous man is never allowed to take an active interest 
in the subjects of comedy, because he is too close to real 
moral evil. No matter how innocuous a particular character 
fault may be, the threat of real evil looms just beyond it, 
and Plato cannot be entirely free from anxiety in its pres­
ence. Thus he insists in the Laws that "slaves and hired 
90 
strangers act our comedies for us." The serious citizen 
of the Republic cannot allow himself a model which is other 
than perfection itself. 
Thus Plato's theory of mimesis has ultimate moral impli­
cations for the artist. The action of mimesis can be applied 
to any successive level of reality—beginning with the highest 
kind of mimesis, imitating the eternal ideas, and moving 
successively down the scale to the imitation of an image of 
the virtues to the imitation of the sensible world, itself 
nothing more than a shadow of the highest reality. He who 
imitates the image farthest from the original and absolute 
Ideal is farthest from the truth. The poet, or imitator of 
an image of the truth, must bow to the philosopher-lover who 
has a more direct access to reality, and the status of art 
falls automatically below that of philosophy. 
Even the criteria for what is considered good art are 
determined by this standard of transcendent truth. The most 
beautiful art-object will not be the one which most perfectly 
90 
Plato, Laws, I, 97-99. 
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represents the world of sense, but the one which most per­
fectly mirrors the unchanging world of eternal verities„ The 
most poets can do in a general sense is to tell stories and 
create characters which will encourage the virtues of the 
ideal philosopher-lover. As Plato puts it in Book X of the 
Republic (600E): 
We may take it, then, that all the poetic company from 
Homer onwards are imitators of images of virtue and 
whatever they put in their poems, but do not lay hold 
on truth. 
The notion of poetic character for Plato is necessarily sub­
ordinate to the formation of the moral character of the 
philosopher-lover, the real aim of the Platonic world-view. 
While there are hints of a personalized view of the rational 
soul beyond the sensible world, as I have shown, this "per­
sonality" or "individuality" is of a different and rarer 
order than that exhibited by the human being in the process 
of historical life, where the possibility for evil passions 
and affections are built into the tri-partite "soul" of bodily 
existence. The separation between the two views of character, 
the "real" and the "shadow" human being, widens in Plato's 
later years and gives rise to a duality in both its good and 
evil aspects for an ideal portrayal of character whose ulti­
mate end is the moral edification of the audience to which it 
appeals. 
In his theory of mimesis, Aristotle allows only a bit 
more room for the representation of "historical" character. 
91 Plato, Republic, p. 400. 
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Consistent with his general philosophical orientation, Aris­
totle's aesthetic is built on the proposition that the 
products of the poetic art are a combination of form and 
matter which are given existence through the soul of the 
artist which shapes and forms the material of poems to a 
certain end or actuality. Thus Aristotle writes: Prom 
art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of 
92 
the artist" (Metaphysics VII, vii, 5). Art has an arti­
ficial origin in the soul of the artist which is different 
from the moving principle or form which is inherent in the 
matter of a natural form such as a tree. The form which 
gives shape to poetic matter arises in man's instinct for 
imitation, and can be defined as an imitation or a likeness 
of human nature. "Likeness" in the Aristotelian sense as 
defined by Elder Olson implies a "similarity of form between 
93 
things different in number, species, or genres." Thus 
poems are different in matter from the human reality they 
imitate, but similar in form. The form of a poem shapes the 
materia, i.e., the objects of imitation. The end of such 
a process is the final form of the imitation, and it is not, 
as in the Nichomachean Ethics, the initiation of a specific 
human activity, but in "products which persist beyond the 
92 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, p. 239. 
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ture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. xvi. 
72 
94 
actions which produce them." Poetics is what Aristotle 
would call a productive science—it aims at producing a 
finished product, a formal "actuality.11 This is why Aris­
totle sees an inherent kinship between the process of artis­
tic production and the self-contemplative activity of the 
Immaterial Cause. 
Aristotle is primarily concerned in the Poetics with 
reasoning back from the desired end-product to the means which 
were employed in making it. And the "end" to be achieved, in 
Aristotle1s terms, is always the imitation of some pattern 
of human experience—either things "as they were or are, or 
things as they are said and seem to be, or things as they 
95 
should be" (Poetics XXV, 1460b). The controlling principle 
of Aristotle's thought is the principle of imitation, and 
imitation can be of things either particular or general. 
Bywater's translation of Chapter 9 of the Poetics clarifies 
the point. Speaking to this very subject Aristotle writes: 
And if he (the poet) should come to take a subject from 
actual history, he is none the less a poet for that; 
since some historic occurrences may very well be in the 
probable and possible order of things; and it is in 
virtue of that that he is their 'maker.'96 
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Imitation can be of things either particular or general, 
either historical or ideal. 
But even when Aristotle writes that the imitation of 
things historical and particular is allowed, he makes it 
clear that they are regarded and treated as dramatic material-
that is, within the context of the controlling dynamis of the 
art-product: 
From all this it is manifest that the poet (which is to 
say, the maker), must be primarily a maker of plots 
rather than of verses, for he is a poet by virtue of 
the representing (mimesis) that he does, and the object 
he represents is actions. Even though he should happen 
to take a subject from history, he is none the less a 
poet on that account, for there is nothing to prevent 
certain historical events from being plausible and (dra­
matically) possible, and it is in relation to this 
aspect of them that he is their proper maker, or 
poet.®' 
Thus a particularized or historical view of character is 
never Aristotle's primary intention in the creation of an 
art-form. His first purpose in the Poetics is always an 
artistic imitation of the universally "probable and inevita­
ble" actions of men, just as his first concern in the develop­
ment of virtue is the exercise of virtuous action. It follows 
that for him, plot is the most important principle of the 
Poetics simply because it has to do with the universalized 
actions of men, and therefore serves as the organizing prin­
ciple, the soul or dynamis of the particular art-form 
98 
(Poetics VI, 1450b). Character and thought, in turn, are 
97 
Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Wheelwright, pp. 302-303. 
98 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe, p. 27. 
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the raw material of the plot, the objects of imitation, even 
as diction and music are the means of imitation and dramatic 
and theatrical technique are the manner. Character and 
thought, diction and music and theatrical technique thus 
form a hierarchy of the material substance of tragedy, all 
of which are subsidiary to the shaping spirit of plot, the 
dynamis, or soul of the work of art. 
Eric Auerbach has noted that this conception of the 
nature of mimesis is directly related to Aristotle's under­
standing of history. Aristotle, as we have shown, sees 
history or actuality as a chaotic jumble of raw material 
which must be shaped into something more ordered, rational, 
manageable. Man, a rational being, is the agent of this 
ordering. For Aristotle, chaos is external to man; man him­
self is rational and has the responsibility of ordering the 
historical actuality which surrounds him. Art in these 
terms is a correction of actual events, an order imposed on 
99 
chaos, a "happening superior to actual happening." Auer­
bach sees a significance in this for the Aristotelian concept 
of dramatic unity. If the "order" imposed on the raw mater­
ial of drama is essentially an order of incident or action, 
then the dramatic unity of a piece of art resides in the plot, 
and not in the characters: 
This is why Aristotle opposes the universality of 
poetry to the particularity of history...and expressly 
bases the unity of tragedy not on the hero, who can be 
99 Auerbach, Dante, p. 7. 
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assailed with disparate events, but on the rationalized 
fable which he declares can be independent of the 
character. -'-0(-) 
For Aristotle, the unity of a work of art is not in the 
representation of character, but in the plot, the dynamis, 
or soul of a work of art, that which allies it most closely 
with the universals. This is so because the material of 
character' in the making of an art-product can be histori­
cal, i.e., subject to the imperfection and evil which nat­
urally arises in the struggle of the individual soul toward 
potentiality. 
It is significant that Aristotle distinguishes in 
Poetics VI between the "errors and frailities" of human nature 
and its "vices and depravities." Evil in the latter sense 
seems to refer to the intentional evil of consciously bad 
conduct, while evil in the former sense seems to refer 
back to the imperfections which can occur in the struggle 
of the individual soul toward potentiality, the accidents 
which seem to arise in the very scheme of the process of 
growth toward actuality. Proper tragic character must exhibit 
exclusively the first type of evil. The poet must choose, in 
other words, a character in whom the accidental frailities 
of human nature and not acts of intentional evil are seen as 
the cause of misfortune. This insures a sympathetic audience 
response and discourages ethical judgments of the protagonist 
which could undermine the tragic effect. 
100 
Auerbach, Dante, pp. 8-9. 
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In a similar way, the comic character must be morally 
inferior, "not in the sense of being thoroughly evil," 
101 
(Poetics V), but only in the sense of illustrating the 
laughable foibles of human nature: 
Comedy, as we have said, is a presentation of men who 
are morally inferior—not in the sense of being thor­
oughly evil, but only in the sense of being ludicrous. 
For the ludicrous is a sub-division of the morally 
ugly, consisting in some defect or ugliness which does 
not produce actual harm and hence causes no pain to the 
beholder as a comic mask is ugly and distorted without 
causing pain....102 
Despite an apparently more relaxed attitude toward the rep­
resentation of comic character, Aristotle follows Plato 
rather closely in his own analysis. He too, for example, 
carefully delineates the exact ethical type of figure which 
produces comic effect and comments on the close relation of 
comic defect and moral evil. The recognition of the sub­
terranean connection between comic fault and substantive 
evil causes both Aristotle and Plato—especially Plato—to 
be somewhat chary of comic representation except within strict 
bounds. This comes from a basic Greek reluctance to display 
characters who are less than consistently noble. Even where 
a noble character is represented as hampered by a tragic flaw, 
such a defect, as we have shown earlier, is less the result 
of willful incorrigibility than of fate, and it is most def­
initely not laughable. From the strict bounds placed on the 
"^'''"Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Wheelwright, pp. 295-296. 
102 
Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Wheelwright, pp. 295-296. 
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kind of evil allowed in the representation of both tragic and 
comic character in Greek aesthetic theory, we may draw the 
conclusion that the Greek attitude toward comic characteriza­
tion tends to follow the Greek attitude toward tragic char­
acterization. Both kinds of character study portray one 
absolute level of ethical behavior. The absolutism of the 
comic figure in classical terms, his incapacity for growth 
and development, may be the one element which most clearly 
demonstrates the Greek tendency to fix characters into uni­
versalized types of various ethical ranks, a fact which 
obviously discourages historical individuality in characteri­
zation and encourages a fated notion of character. 
The fateful aspect in Aristotle's analysis of character 
representation may be a partial result of his treatment of 
evil in general. Because of the primacy of actuality to 
potentiality in Aristotle's system, he finally rejects the 
existence of evil principles in the sphere of the "Unmoved 
103 
Mover." If the eternal is not potential, but only actual, 
it can have no element of evil, because "evil cannot exist 
104 
apart from things"(Metaphysics X, ix, 3). Evil can only 
exist in individual beings, and it exists only in a particular 
103 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 465. Tredennick notes: 
"Aristotle reasons that actuality is a separate substantial 
existence, and is prior as a state to potentiality. Poten­
tiality is prior to evil in the moral scale, thus, whatever 
has a separate substantial existence is prior to evil." 
104 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 465. 
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sense. W. D. Ross explains the definition Aristotle gives 
to evil and its moral implications for man: 
Evil, in other words, is not a necessary feature of 
the universe, but a by-product of the world-process, 
something that casually emerges in the course of indi­
vidual things to reach the perfection that is open to 
them, and thus to approximate as nearly as they can to 
the divine life, to 'become immortal as far as they 
can.1 That they to a large extent fail is due to mat­
ter or necessity, but this is not an evil principle but 
a principle indifferent to good and evil.^^ 
In this view, man's responsibility for the evil in his nature 
is de-emphasized. Evil simply arises from matter because 
matter itself is of necessity a potentiality of the oppo-
106 
sites of good and evil (Physics, I, ix)„ Goodness of 
character, like evil, is part of individual man's necessary 
potential. To be virtuous or to be evil in Aristotle's view 
is simply to develop by good acts or evil acts the material 
capacity for good or for ill inherent in all men. 
G. R. G. Mure writes that in Aristotle's schema, man 
controls his conduct up to a certain point, but he can never 
completely control or analyze the given "materia" of his own 
being, and therefore cannot entirely determine his actions 
whether they be good or bad: 
Moral conduct is a man1s making of himself, and the 
stuff he fashions is never wholly his own creation. 
The line dividing a self which perpetually expands and 
contracts in a social and material medium, from circum­
stances which we choose to regard as external to it, 
105 
W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 
1933), p. 178. 
^"°^Aristotle, Physics, I, 93. 
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can never finally distinguish within the active life 
that commands our attention as a whole the agents of our 
own contribution, for which moral praise is due, from 
the gifts of fortune—or, if we prefer it, from the 
grace of God. 
Because Aristotle allows for the imitation of the individual, 
and because evil is a given "materia" or individual existence 
in his view, the representation of inferior beings in an 
art-product is allowable. But the representation of evil is 
kept within very strict bounds. It is never allowed such 
free reign in a given character that he degenerates to the 
point of true moral depravity, or "sin" in the Christian 
sense. What is emphasized instead is the "accidental" nature 
of evil, its fateful aspect. 
Consequently, Aristotle's specific discussion of the 
elements involved in constructing a character in the 
Poetics IX reveal a proportion of moral goodness and indi­
vidual frailty weighted on the side of the ideal, of the 
universalized good. As several critics have pointed out, 
character in the Poetics VI does not carry the sense of 
dramatis personae, but rather the sense of the moral ethos 
of a dramatic agent, the typically "good" qualities a tragic 
108 
agent must have. Even where Aristotle leaves room for a 
particularized or historical representation of character, 
107 
G. R. G. Mure, Aristotle (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1964), p. 145. 
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See Elder Olson "Introduction," p. xix; also Lane 
Cooper, Aristotle and the Art of Poetry (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1913), p. 22. 
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however, he defines character primarily in terms of a broad 
idealism, or what he calls a "moral ethos." This becomes 
clear when he enumerates the elements involved in the depic­
tion of "moral character" in the personages of tragedy: 
(1) The agent or personality should express moral 
purpose through his words and actions. 
(2) The agent must be "true to type," that is, the poet 
should have a sense of propriety and not, for exam­
ple, ascribe a quality of unscrupulous cleverness 
of or valour to a woman. 
(3) The character must be "true to life," (and Aris­
totle sharpens this by adding, "This is different 
from being good or true to type"). 
(4) The character must be consistent throughout (Poetics, 
XV, 1454a).109 
Although all the elements have to do with the artistic qual­
ities proper to the elevated "type" of the tragic character, 
the third item in the list stands out most sharply and seems 
to allow room for the presentation of unique personal quali­
ties which would "individualize" the character and make it 
"true to life." 
The commentators vary in their interpretation of what 
Aristotle actually means by "true to life." G. M. A. Grube 
interprets the passage to mean "like life"—and suggests that 
Aristotle might also mean "like the prototype of legend" in 
110 
the particular sense of the imitation of historical figures. 
Cooper and Butcher refrain from comment on this passage 
109 
Aristotle, Poetics, trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe, p. 55. 
^""'"^G. M. A. Grube, Aristotle on Poetry and Style (New 
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 29. 
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although Butcher's comment on the important Poetics IX, 1451b 
describing the universal nature of poetry—that the aim of 
poetry is "to represent the universal through the particular; 
to give a concrete and living embodiment of a universal 
truth," suggests that he, too, might interpret the passage 
to refer to the individualized representation of character. 
Crane, on the other hand, is more careful to emphasize 
the universal aspect of Aristotelian characterization. He 
describes the phrase "true to life" to mean that the poet 
must choose signs of the characteristics intended which will 
convey the effect that the person speaking or acting is a 
111 
"possible human being of a certain type," and that a 
character is "like life" in the sense of being an analogue 
or a complement to life. He thus follows Aristotle's earlier 
dictum about the more universal nature of poetry (Poetics IX, 
1451b) when Aristotle defines the "universal" as how a person 
of a certain type will on occasion speak or act according to 
112 
the law of probability or necessity. 
There is perhaps some truth in the idea that Aristotle 
may allow for an even freer more overtly "historical" inter­
pretation of his own phrase "true to life," but what we 
probably see in the third item of the list in the Poetics, 
XV, is a practical directive which naturally results from a 
111 Crane, p. 73; Fyfe concurs in Aristotle, Poetics, 
ed. Fyfe, p. 54, n.c. 
112 Aristotle, Poetics, ed. Fyfe, p. 35. 
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theory of mimesis which leaves room for the accidental rep­
resentation of what is. Aristotle's comments on character 
are generally governed by his definition of mimesis as the 
imitation of probable human action, and thus in his theory 
universalized or typical elements of characterization take 
precedence over individualized representation. The possi­
bility of producing a sense of historically actual life in 
a character arises only out of Aristotle's provision for an 
"accidental imitation" of real life. He cannot be said to 
support a theory of individualistic characterization which is 
formulated for the express purpose of exciting emotional sym­
pathy for that personality. It is true that an emotional 
response is within the legitimate limits of the theory pre­
scribed by Aristotle, but is there only as the natural end-
product of our participation in the dramatic form of the work 
of art as it unfolds. Audience identification with a par­
ticular personality is never as important as the form of the 
plot. Where such identification occurs, it is viewed only 
as a by-product of the real end of the poetic process, which 
is the creation of an aesthetic object; an artistic actuality. 
The representation of character must finally be "better than 
life." Aristotle puts it succinctly: 
Returning to the subject of character portrayal, we may 
remark that since tragedy is a representation of men 
better than ordinary, the example of good portrait 
painters should be followed. Their method is to produce 
a likeness of a man's distinctive features and beautify 
him at the same time.-*--^ 
113 Aristotle, "The Art of Poetry," in Aristotle, trans. 
Wheelwright, pp. 310-311. 
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Here we have an interesting combination of what is particu­
lar with what is universal. Aristotle does not disregard 
the historical likeness, and yet he is ultimately concerned 
with its beautification. Though his artistic theory begins 
with the imitation of the natural world, it openly ends in 
contemplation of the ideal. 
Thus in both Plato and Aristotle we see theories of 
mimesis which encourage the depiction of ideal types over his­
torically actual characters. In Plato, the ideal is avowedly 
more prescriptive, with an emphasis on the exemplary type of 
the philosopher-king. In Aristotle the depiction of the 
historical occurs only as an accidental by-product of the 
mimetic process whose main objective is always the imitation 
of a universally ideal action. In neither Plato nor Aris­
totle do we see specific allowance for the depiction of mean 
or comic characters within the scope of serious mimetic 
art. The sublime or grand style is reserved for depicting a 
character who is consistently illuminated, who expresses a 
moral purpose, and whose speech and manner is appropriate to 
his elevated station as protagonist of a serious piece of 
art. In Aristotle, concern with the elements of plot—with 
the production of smooth, uninterrupted connections between 
events, with the creation of a total dramatic action—takes 
precedence over concern with characterization. As a result, 
the elements of historical development of character and of 
the individual psychology of character receive less attention. 
84 
Although ancient aesthetic philosophers could not escape some 
acknowledgement of historical imitation, they yet emphasized 
to a far greater degree the production of an art-object which 
could stand apart from history, which had an order and an 
aesthetic unity which history could never hope to attain, 
and which took its final shape from the ideal realities 
beyond time. 
We can find variations of this same basic view in the 
poetics of the Latin classical ages as well. Early in the 
Ars Poetica, for example, Horace restates the classical doc­
trine of propriety: "Let each style keep the becoming place 
114 
allotted to it." Emphasizing the need for self-consistency 
in the depiction of a literary character, he advises the 
dramatist who brings a certain character back to the stage 
to portray the qualities which have been essential to the 
character's destined nature from the beginning: 
If haply when you write, you bring back to the stage 
the honouring of Achilles, let him be impatient, pas­
sionate, ruthless, fierce: let him claim that laws 
are not for him, let him ever make appeal to the 
sword. 
Horace's emphasis is on the typical aspects of Achilles' 
character^ the idea of a possible change or development in 
Achilles' nature is remote from his perspective on charac­
terization. 
114 Horace, Ars Poetica, in Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica, 
trans. H. Rushton Fairclouglj (London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd. , 
1936), p. 459. 
115 Horace, Ars Poetica, p. 261. 
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Horace also roots the creation of character in a recog­
nition of the various ages of man—which he proceeds to 
describe in detail, emphasizing the need for careful atten-
116 
tion to the type of character appropriate to each age. 
Attention to the suitability of characters to their age 
and station in life, in fact, seems to be what Horace means 
by a representation of real life: 
Your matter the Socratic pages can set forth, and when 
matter is in hand, words will not be loath to follow. 
He who has learned what he owes his country and his 
friends, what love is due a parent, a brother and a 
guest, what is imposed on senator and judge, what is 
the function of a general sent to war, he surely knows 
how to give each character his fitting part. I would 
advise one who has learned the imitative art to look 
to life and manners for a model and draw from thence 
living words. 
"If you want an approving hearer,...you must note 
the manners of each age and give a befitting tone to shift­
ing nature and their years. The child, who by now can 
utter words and set firm step upon the ground, delights to 
play with his mates, flies into a passion, and as lightly 
puts it aside, and changes every hour. The beardless youth, 
freed at last from his tutor, finds joy in horses and hounds 
and the grass of the running campus, soft as wax for molding 
to evil, peevish with his counsellors, slow to make needful 
provision, lavish of money, spirited, of strong desires, but 
swift to change his fancies. With altered desires, the aged 
spirit of the man seeks wealth and friends, becomes a slave 
to ambition, and is fearful of having done what soon it will 
be eager to change. Many ills encompass an old man, whether 
because he seeks gain, and then miserably holds aloof from 
his store and fears to use it, or because in all that he does, 
he lacks fire and courage, is dilatory and slow to form hopes, 
is sluggish and greedy of a longer life, peevish, surly, 
given to praising the days he spent as a boy, and to reprov­
ing and condemning the young. Many blessings the advancing 
years bring with them, many, as they retire, they take away. 
So, lest haply we assign a youth the part of age, or a boy 
that of manhood, we shall ever linger over traits that are 
joined and fitted to the age." Horace, Ars Poetica, pp. 464-65. 
117 Horace, Ars Poetxca, p. 477. 
86 
Here we see that the ability to create an appropriate 
character is rooted in the poet's own capacity to perceive 
the universal moral code—i.e., what is morally correct, 
appropriate, and suitable for an ideal character of any 
age. Thus Horace follows in the classical aesthetic mode of 
characterization first introduced by Plato and refined by 
Aristotle, an aesthetic which promotes a typical or uni­
versalized character presentation, and which gives its ulti­
mate allegiance to the universal ideals. 
Cicero, writing in the century preceding Christ's 
birth (c.80 B.C.), also exhibits the classical concern for 
communication of a moral ideal and for the appropriateness 
of style to subject matter. A clear emphasis on poetic pro­
priety in characterization can be found in Cicero's De Offi-
ciis, section 28: 
Now we say that the poets observe propriety when every 
word or action is in accord with each individual char­
acter. For example, if Aeneas of Minos said: 'Let 
them hate, if only they fear,' or 'the father is him­
self his children's tomb,' that would seem improper 
because we are told that they were just men. But when 
Atreus speaks those lines, they call forth applause., 
for the sentiment is in keeping with the character. 
The Ad C. Herennium Libri, a very influential work for the 
Middle Ages, whose authorship is usually attributed to Cicero 
119 
or one of his disciples, also contains forceful negative 
118 Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller (London: 
Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1951), p. 101. 
119 See Harry Caplan's "Introduction" to Cicero, Ad C. 
Herennium Libri: De Ratione Dicendi, trans. Harry Caplan 
(London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1954), p. xxvf. 
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examples of characters whose personal attributes are not con­
sistently developed with their moral characters and social 
120 
station. 
The word "propriety" itself seems to have a moral conno­
tation, and in fact Cicero in the De Officiis directly asso­
ciates it with moral rectitude and uses it as one of the 
primary characteristics of the moral man. The ability to 
observe poetic propriety in a work of art is thus related 
directly to the poet1s innate moral character and has much 
to do with his capacity for perceiving what is seemly and 
fitting for a given occasion. This is exactly what we see 
in Horace and only reinforces what we have been saying all 
along—that observance of classical form and of the distinc­
tions between styles is of essential importance to the class­
ical author, and goes back ultimately to his attachment to 
the Platonic ideals„ 
The distinctions on which Cicero bases his stylistic 
classifications are in themselves helpful for understanding 
his theory of characterization. It is significant-, for exam­
ple, that Cicero associates the type of narrative which has 
the most direct appeal to character with the low orcomic 
121 
mode. Cicero allows for the development of the comic form 
under the narrative type "argumentum" which is distinguished 
120 
See Cicero, Ad C. Herennium, p. 381. 
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See Cicero, De Inventione, trans. H. M. Hubell (Lon­
don: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1949), p. 56, n. c. 
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from both "fabula" (a narrative in which the events are not 
true and have no verisimilitude), and a "historia" (an ac­
count of actual occurrences remote from the recollection of 
our own age"), "Argumentum" as Cicero defines it is "a fic­
titious narrative which could have occurred"—i.e., a narra­
tive of verisimilitude. It is of two types—either "concerned 
with events or persons;" the second type, which gives atten­
tion to the conversations and mental attitudes of the charac­
ters, follows the fundamental comic pattern: 
This form of narrative should possess great vivacity, 
resulting from the fluctuations of fortune, contrast 
of characters, severity, gentleness, hope, fear, sus­
picion, desire, dissimulation, delusion, pity, sudden 
change of fortune, unexpected disaster, sudden pleasure, 
and a happy ending to the story.122 
The association of the comic form with a particular attention 
to and emphasis upon character delineation and verisimilitude 
receives further reinforcement in a passage defining "verisim­
ilitude" only a few pages later: 
The narrative will be plausible if it seems to appear 
in real life; if the proper qualities of the character 
are maintained, if reasons for their actions are plain, 
if there seems to have been ability to do the deed, if 
it can be shown that the time was opportune, the space 
sufficient, and the place suitable for the events 
about to be narrated, if the story fits with the nature 
of the actors in it, the habits or ordinary people and 
the beliefs of the audience. Verisimilitude can be 
secured by following these principles.123 
Here Cicero links the narrative form (argumentum) which gives 
the greater attention to verisimilitude and character 
122 Cicero, De Inventione, p. 56. 
"'"^Cicero", De Inventione, p. 61. 
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portrayal with lower or comic-romantic characterization— 
with the imitation of the actions of ordinary folk. The kind 
of categorization we observe here is consistent with the 
classical tendency to place a realistic or historical rep­
resentation of character at the bottom of the list of possible 
approaches to character. 
The treatment of the morally inferior character in Cicero 
also follows in the traditional Aristotelian mode. Cicero, 
like Aristotle/ often equates individuality with the depic­
tion of particularized vices or faults of character. He 
makes a careful point of the control which must be exercised 
by the poet in representing these individual vices: 
Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his 
own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only 
and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the 
object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. 
The fatality evident in the Greek view of character and 
closely allied with the classical understanding of propriety 
can also be observed in this same treatise. Cicero, writing 
on the given nature which is bestowed on each man at birth, 
advises against the pursuance of a moral career which is 
better or nobler than the fixed nature one has been given: 
"For it is of no avail to fight against one's own nature or 
125 
to aim at what is impossible of attainment." Here we see 
the classical emphasis on man's fated nature—his fixed 
124 Cicero, De Offxciis, p. 104. 
125 Cicero, De Officiis, p. 115. 
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destiny before birth and his consequent incapacity for sub­
stantial change in life. 
Cicero1s Orator, the latest of his rhetorical works, 
is important to the rhetorical tradition because it contains 
Cicero's classification of the three oratorical styles and 
exhibits the classical tendency to move away from particulars 
126 
and toward universals in discussion. Interesting, too, is 
the distinction Cicero makes between kinds of comedy when he 
describes the plain or "attic" style. A good orator will use 
both humour and wit; humour in a "graceful and charming nar-
127 
rative," and wit in "hurling the shafts of ridicule." 
2^20 See Cicero, Orator, trans. H. M. Hubell (London: Wm. 
Heinemann, Ltd., 1939), p. 311f„, for a discussion of the Pla­
tonic ideal and its usefulness for rhetoric. Cicero's treat­
ment of the three styles is as follows: "There are in all 
three oratorical styles; in each of which certain men have 
been successful, but very few have attained our ideal of 
being equally successful in all. The orators of the grandil­
oquent style, if I may use an old word, showed splendid power 
of thought and majesty of diction; they were forceful, versa­
tile , copious and grave, trained and equipped to arouse and 
sway the emotions; some attained their effect by a rough, 
severe, harsh, style, without regular construction or rounded 
periods; others used a smooth, ordered sentence-structure 
with a periodic cadence. At the other extreme were the ora­
tors who were plain to the point, explaining everything and 
making every point clear rather than impressive, using a re­
fined, concise style stripped of ornament. Within this class 
some were adroit but unpolished and intentionally resembled 
untrained and unskilful speakers, others had the same dryness 
of style, but were neater, elegant, even brilliant, and to a 
slight degree ornate. Between these two there is a mean and 
I may say tempered style, which uses neither the intellectual 
appeal of the latter class nor the fiery force of the former; 
akin to both, excelling in neither, sharing in both, or to tell 
the truth, sharing in neither, this style keeps the proverbial 
'even tenor of its way,1 bringing nothing except ease and 
uniformity, or at most adding a few posies as in a garland, 
and diversifying the whole speech without simple ornaments 
of thought and diction." (Cicero, Orator, p. 319f.) 
127 Cicero, Orator, p. 369. 
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Following in the Aristotelian tradition, Cicero puts careful 
limits on the kind of ridicule allowed in a "plain" speech„ 
Low farce is not permitted, nor "barbs aimed at misfortune, 
nor ridicule of a crime, lest laughter take the place of 
128 
loathing." Comedy of either sort is plainly banned from 
the two more elevated styles, i.e., the "grandiloquent" and 
the "tempered" styles, a fact which illustrates once again 
Cicero's strong attachment to the classical ideal. 
We find the same type of restriction put on comic 
rhetoric in Quintillian, a rhetor of the 1st century A.D. 
(born c. 35 A.D.). In Book IV of the Institutes of Oratory 
(II, 6, iii), Quintillian makes the Ciceronian distinction 
between wit and humour and carefully limits the extent of 
sarcasm allowed. He writes that an orator should "take care 
that his remarks do not end in exciting serious enmity or 
the necessity for a grovelling apology," and that an orator 
of good character will 
see that everything he says is consistent with his 
dignity and the respectability of his character, 
for we pay too dear for the laugh we raise if it 
is at the cost of our own integrity. ^ 
The rhetorical restrictions placed on comedy appear in 
some passages in Quintillian to stem from an older, more 
Platonic concern for the corruptive influence of comedy. 
12 8 Cicero, Orator, p. 369„ 
129 Quintillian, Institutio Oratorxa, trans. H. E. Butler, 
2 vols. (London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1933), 11:457. 
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Earlier in the Institutes, for example, (I, i, ix) , Quintillian 
writes that the comic orator or actor must not "ape the vices 
of the drunkard or copy the cringing manners of a slave, or 
learn to express the emotions of love, avarice, or fear," 
lest "he corrupt his mind, for repeated imitation passes 
130 
into habit." 
Although Quintillian does not treat characterization 
directly in the Institutes, his treatise still reflects the 
classical concern for propriety of style and character, and 
for the resultant restrictions on comedy and comic represen­
tation which we find in Cicero, Horace, and Aristotle. Taken 
together, these Latin rhetoricians represent a continuation 
and reinforcement of the basic tradition of characterization 
which we have more thoroughly analyzed in the case of Aris­
totle and Plato. The basic characteristics of this tradition 
involve a careful classification of character types with their 
respectively appropriate styles, a strong expression of 
moral purpose, especially in the high or tragic character, 
and a careful restriction, where it is allowed at all, on 
comic representation of character. Behind these basic char­
acteristics, as we have pointed out earlier, is a world-view 
which emphasizes stoic aloofness from history and which places 
the highest art in the universals outside history even as 
it defines the ideal man as one indifferent to historical 
130 
Quintillian, Institutio Oratoria, I, 183-185. 
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circumstance. (See Cicero's description of the ideal man, 
De Officiis, p. 69.) Such a view of history and its effect 
on mimetic theory contrasts sharply with the view which 
sprang up with the advent of Christianity only a few centur­
ies later. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF HISTORY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE 
LITERARY REPRESENTATION OF CHARACTER 
R. G. Collingwood describes the introduction of Chris­
tianity as the motive force behind a first-century revolution 
1 
in the leading ideas of Greco-Roman historiography. Because 
an understanding of the foundations of Christian thought is 
necessary for comprehension of the reasons behind a Christian 
presentation of character, I will attempt in this chapter 
to outline some of the basic differences between the Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian views of reality and their result­
ing effects on characterization. 
The Judeo-Christian view of history contrasts with the 
classical view in at least three major areas: the attitude 
toward the relation of truth and history, the understanding 
of the nature of historical study, and the characterization 
of the purposes of recorded history. Classical thought 
tended to assume that there was a fundamental separation 
between history, the changeable, mutable facts of everyday 
existence, and substantive reality, the unchanging world 
of the universals. Substantive reality could alone serve 
as the object of scientific scrutiny in the Greco-Roman 
sense because it alone was eternal, unchanging, and capable 
"Sr. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clar­
endon Press, 1946), p. 46. 
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of abstraction from transitory event. This philosophical 
conception led, as we have observed, to some serious restric­
tions on the definition and study of history, which can be 
viewed in the Greco-Roman sense only as an aggregate of per­
ceptions. Historical evidence could only be trusted if the 
data collected were the result of a first-hand experience. 
Not only did this pure "eyewitness" methodology restrict the 
facts which could be gathered, but it also limited the scope 
of the interpretation given such facts. Histories were 
confined to one nation, one culture, one limited time period. 
As a result, a universal view of history which encompassed 
all nations and peoples from the beginning of time was impos­
sible. 
In the Judeo-Christian view, all this changes. First, 
history, the world of changeable reality which the classical 
philosophers so carefully separated from "truth," becomes 
the receptacle, indeed, even the embodiment of truth. Christ, 
the source of meaning in Christian thought, is the Word made 
flesh, the God who enters history and gives it a significance 
and a unity impossible in the Greco-Roman tradition. History 
becomes important because it is the medium through which God 
reveals Himself to man. Morton Bloomfield comments on the 
emphasis given to history by Christianity: 
Christianity emphasizes the importance of history 
because it is based on revelation, wherein the time­
less melts into time and dignifies it. It believes 
that profound qualitative changes essential to human 
salvation have occurred and will occur in history.^ 
2 Morton Bloomfield, "Chaucer's Sense of History," JEGP 51 
(July 1951), 301. 
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The revelation of God to man in the life, death and resur­
rection of Jesus Christ became the cornerstone of the Chris­
tian view of history. 
The importance given to the historical life of Christ 
is of course a direct result of the Christian analysis of 
the problem of earthly evil. In the classical view evil was 
regarded as accidental, a by-product of the process of human 
maturation. Aristotle, we remember, defined evil as an acci­
dent of man's movement from potentiality to actuality. In 
the Christian view, however, evil is no longer regarded as 
an accidental missing of the mark, but as a defect intrinsic 
to man's basic nature, as an inevitable result of man's fall 
from grace. The fall itself was an historical event; the 
entire human race is unavoidably in the same predicament as 
a consequence of Adam's willful—and historical—disobedience. 
The fall is also all-inclusive; the possibility of hitting 
the mark (a possibility allowed to the privileged few in 
Greek philosophy), does not naturally exist in the Christian 
view. The problem of sin is a universal fact which requires 
a universal solution. It was the establishment of the basic 
unity of mankind in the sinful state of nature which brought 
about the need for a universal solution to the problem of 
history and which laid the grounds for a universal theory of 
history. In a passage from The Renaissance of the Twelfth 
Century, C. H. Haskins recognizes that although a conception 
of the basic unity of mankind was suggested by the geographical 
97 
breadth of the Alexandrine and Roman empires, classical phi­
losophers were unable to formulate an internal rationale 
for it: 
Indeed a universal history in the full sense had not 
been possible before the triumph of Christianity, for, 
while the worldwide supremacy of Rome might suggest 
general history in an external fashion, a sense of 
the fundamental unity of mankind was necessary to a 
really vital conception of universal history.3 
The formulation of a universal theory of history depended 
upon the formulation of a theory which defined man in terms 
of his fundamental and all-inclusive weakness. 
Besides making possible a universal theory of history, 
Christianity also lent a new respectability to historical 
fact and to the methodology of historical study. History 
had been viewed as cyclical; i.e., human events were seen as 
recurring in predictable cycles during successive historical 
ages. Although the occurrence of the particular event was 
itself random and mutable, and therefore unknowable, the 
universal truth which could be abstracted from the study of 
various changeable events never changed; and the most basic 
of the universal laws governing history was that events would 
4 
re-occur in their basic outline in the future. 
3 C. H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 227. 
4 The Romans were forced to modify this concept because 
of their belief that Rome was the ideal civilization, the 
culmination of what had been best in all nations up to the 
time of Roman domination. However, their understanding of his­
tory remained essentially cyclical in its conception, and 
without awareness of a comprehensive providential scheme 
which worked independent of their own national sense of mani­
fest destiny. As Jaroslav Pelikan puts it, "The fall of all 
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Christianity presented a different outlook on history 
altogether. History was not cyclical but linear, and histor­
ical events were thus unrepeatable. The linear notion of 
history sprang from the basic Christian belief that the 
Christ-event is utterly incapable of imitation. The incar­
nation, death, resurrection, and second coming of Jesus 
Christ, planned "before the foundations of the earth," gave 
each event in earthly history a structure and a center which 
added to their individual significance. Just as meaning 
accrues to each individual action when the total outcome of 
a drama is known, so meaning accrues to each event in history 
when it is placed within a pattern which defines it. As 
Ernest Tuveson has pointed out, the real significance of a 
particular event cannot be truly known until it is given 
meaning through a holistic pattern: 
The true nature of an event, even so great a one as the 
downfall of an empire, cannot be ascertained without 
knowing all that has gone before and without some idea 
of what is to come: the whole drama must be seen as it 
unfolds, and each suceeding event makes the action 
clearer, exactly as each action in a play; and history, 
like the play, has a crisis, a denouement, and an end. 
Its theme is moral—and to understand it, there must 
be an interpretation.^ 
previous civilizations did not necessarily indicate the 
fall of the Roman civilization, if Rome remained true to her 
traditional ideals." J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: 
A History of the Development of Doctrine, 2 vols. (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 1:37. 
5 Ernest Lee Tuveson, Milennium and Utopia (Gloucester: 
Peter Smith, 1942), p. 4. 
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Some early church historians followed a slightly different 
logic in their criticism of the cyclical idea. Celsus, an 
early second-century critic of Christianity, reiterates one 
popular Christian rebuttal to the classical position before 
attacking it; if cyclical historians are right, goes the 
Christian argument, then: 
...it is inevitable that Moses will always come out of 
Egypt with the people of the Jews, and Jesus will come 
again to visit this life and will do the same things he 
has done, not just once, but an infinite number of times 
according to the cycles.^ 
Augustine, too, wholly rejects the pagan notion of a repetitive 
pattern in history. The City of God contains a fervent denun­
ciation of the cyclical view of history and reveals Augustine's 
recognition of the depth of the issue: 
Far be it from the true faith that by these words of 
Solomon (Ecc. 1—"There is nothing new under the sun.") 
we should believe are meant those cycles by which they 
(i.e., philosophi mundi huius) suppose that the same 
revolutions of times and of temporal things are repeated 
so that, as one might say, just as in this age the 
philosopher Plato sat in the city of Athens and in the 
school called Academy teaching his pupils, so also 
through countless ages of the past at intervals which 
however great are nevertheless certain, both the same 
Plato and the same city and the same school and the 
same pupils have been repeated, as they are destined to 
be repeated through countless ages of the future. God 
forbid, I say, that we should swallow such nonsense 1 
Christ died once and for all for our sins: semel mortuus 
est Christus pro nostris peccatis.7 
6 Celsus 4:67 in Die Griechischen Christlichen Schrift-
steller, der ersten drie Jahrhunderte (Berlin, 1891), quoted 
by Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of 
the Development of Doctrine, I, 2 vols. (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1971), 1:37-38. 
7 St. Augustine, The City of God, Book XII, Chapter 14, 
as translated and quoted by C. N. Cochrane in Christianity 
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Augustine and other Christian writers ultimately took their 
basic position in this matter from the Scripture, which makes 
a continual point of the uniqueness of the Christ-sacrifice 
and its distinct separation from the Old Testament practice 
of an on-going sacrifice. One of the clearest of these 
scriptures is Hebrews 9:24-28: 
For Jesus is not entered into the holies made with 
hands, the patterns of the true: but into heaven 
itself, that he may appear now in the presence of God 
for us. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, 
as the high priest entereth into the holies, every year 
with the blood of others: For then he ought to have 
suffered often from the beginning of the world: but 
now once at the end of ages, he hath appeared for the 
destruction of sin, by the sacrifice of himself. And 
as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after 
this the judgment: So also Christ was offered once to 
exhaust the sins of many; the second time he shall 
appear without sin to them that expect him unto salva­
tion.® 
Thus the notion of a cyclical pattern in history was rejected 
out of hand by Christian theologians, and in its place was 
substituted a comprehensive interpretation of history which 
found its center in the historical actions of Jesus Christ, 
and which was bounded at the beginning by the Creation, and 
at the end by the Second Coming. All history was seen as 
either leading up to or away from the Christ-event. 
and Classical Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 484. 
For the complete text see St. Augustine, The City of God, 
Books VIII—XVI, trans. Gerald C. Walsh, S. J. and Grace Mon-
ahan, O.S.U. in The Writings of St. Augustine, 18 vols. (Wash­
ington: Cath. Univ. of America Press, 1952), VII:267-269. 
g 
The Holy Bible. Douay Version (Baltimore: John Murphy 
Co., 1914). Hereafter all references to Holy Scripture in 
this chapter will be taken from this version. 
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The results of such a comprehensive interpretation of 
history on historical methodology were immediate and far-
reaching. First, if history were unrepeatable, then each 
historical event had a unique character which could not be 
designated "universal truth" and abstracted from historical 
particulars for study. Instead, the new conception necessi­
tated scrutiny of particular events; and even events which 
had taken place in remote history were subject to historical 
investigation in both the empirical and the interpretative 
sense. Thus the methodology of the historian was broadened 
from an exclusive reliance on eyewitness report to include a 
new respect for the passing-on of secondary commentary and 
secondary empirical evidence. Second, Christians divided all 
history into sections using the major events of the Christian 
faith as markers. Thus history is divided into two major 
sections—before and after Christ, and into smaller periods 
designated by main events of Jewish history, for example, the 
Age of the Patriarchs, the Exodus, the Age of Judges, the Age 
of Kings, etc. This habit, combined with the new importance 
of the singular historical event in general, fostered a ten­
dency to further sub-divide history into epochs or periods 
which are marked off by historical events of significant 
magnitude to be designated "epoch-making." The modern ten­
dency to describe history in terms of "epochs" or ages is 
actually a result of the new Christian emphasis on the par-
9 
ticular historical event. 
9 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 52. 
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One of the earliest examples both of the emphasis on the 
central importance of the Christ-event and of the respect 
given historical fact in general is the Ecclesiastical History 
of Eusebius, one of the most widely read of early church his­
torians. Eusebius is the first Christian historian to estab­
lish the linear chronology of the Christian church and to 
make an attempt to synchronize it with secular history. In 
his major work, the histories of Greece and Rome are organized 
not by Greek and Roman chronology (the dates of the Olympiads, 
for example, or of Roman consuls), but by the central event 
of Christian history. Epochs are seen only in relation to 
that event, making possible what has now become standard 
historical procedure—the practice of looking at the long-term 
consequences of a thing rather than its immediate results. 
True to the Christian interpretation, he begins with "no 
other than the first dispensation of God touching our Saviour 
10 
and Lord Jesus the Christ, 11 and develops this theme, out­
lining the prophecies of Christ's birth and describing his 
ministry on earth, his death and resurrection. Eusebius 
intertwines these events with extra-Biblical material on 
Herod, Pilate, and other Roman leaders, narrating stories of 
how Tiberius Caesar received the news of Jesus' Resurrection, 
the manner in which Herod died, and even non-Scriptural anec­
dotes about Christ and "letters" from Jesus to his followers. 
"^Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, trans. Kirsopp 
Lake. 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1926), 1:7. 
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Throughout, Eusebius relies heavily upon secondary sources, 
demonstrating the new acceptability of second-hand accounts 
made possible by a universal view of history which necessi­
tates the historical study of the remote past. 
Jaroslav Pelikan notes the new emphasis on historical 
data, the new reliance upon particular fact in the universal 
interpretation of history. He mentions Eusebius' response to 
those who were attempting to propagate the faith solely by 
dialectical argument: 
To redress this balance, Eusebius composed historical 
works, first a Chronicle and then his Ecclesiastical 
History, both of which attempt to prove, by historical 
facts rather than by mere dialectical argument that 
Christianity and Christ possessed great antiquity and 
that the history of Christianity was a universal his­
tory. H 
Eusebius' own respect for history becomes apparent in his 
awareness of the revolutionary character of his works: 
To work at this subject I consider especially necessary, 
because I am not aware that any ecclesiastical writer 
has until now paid attention to this kind of writing; 
and I hope that its high value will be evident to those 
who are convinced of the importance of a knowledge of 
history.12 
The respectful attitude toward historical fact demonstrated 
by this passage contrasts vividly with the Greek antipathy 
toward historical "proof," and it is made possible by a his­
torical interpretation in which the central event is a marriage 
of the eternal and the mutable, the Divine Incarnation. 
11Pelikan, I, 40. 
12 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, I, 11. 
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The universal view of history promoted by the Christian 
faith also puts an entirely new light on the purpose of his­
tory. From the classical perspective, history was the busi­
ness of narrating the affairs and purposes of men. Because 
the observations of history focused on the contemporary event, 
history appeared in a flat perspective, with no meaning beyond 
the immediate meaning of the events narrated. Where universal 
meanings were given to history, such meanings were normally 
based on geographical considerations rather than on the con-
13 
cept of a divinely revealed plan. The classical historian 
was thus generally interested far more in the immediate out­
come of an event than in its long-term effects on future 
ages. What was important to the classical historian in 
describing the outcome of a battle, for example, was who won. 
The far-reaching effects of the battle on the flow of history 
was not a major consideration because there was no objective 
standard of purpose, besides national identity, against which 
the immediate outcome of the battle could be measured. His­
torical events, observed in piecemeal fashion, appeared chaotic 
to the early historian who often saw the study of history, 
as we have pointed out, mainly as a protection against the 
mistakes of the past. When even that rationale was weakened 
13 James W. Thompson has pointed out that the idea of a 
geographically-based "universal" history in this sense origi­
nated with the enormous conquests of Alexander the Great, and 
became an established form of historiography in the First 
Century, B.C. Examples of this genre include the Greek his­
tories of Alexander Polyhistor, Diodorus Sicilius, and Nich­
olas of Damascus» as well as the Latin historian Pompeius 
Trogus. See Thompson, A History of Historical Writing, 2 vols. 
(New York: MacMillan, 1942), 1:103. 
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by the sheer variety and volume of historical event, the 
study of history was characterized only as an aid to per­
sonal knowledge of self—a knowledge which was seen as a 
legitimate retreat from a basically disordered and chaotic 
flow of events. 
For the Christian historian, on the other hand, history's 
purposes are not centered in the individual perception of an 
event, but in a providential plan which originates outside 
history. A historian narrating a battle is no longer so 
much interested in the immediate outcome of the fight as he 
is in the fact that whatever the outcome, the acts of God 
are being worked out in history within the pre-ordained 
framework. The historian narrates everything from the know­
ledge that the sovereign will of God is being carried out 
through and sometimes despite the plans and purposes of men. 
Always in the back of his mind there is the great theological 
division—before and after Christ. As Collingwood puts it: 
"History, as the will of God, orders itself and does not 
depend for its orderliness on the human agent's will to order 
14 
it." The Christian idea of an objective plan behind and 
controlling history finds its clearest rationale in the con­
cept of revelation. It is Christ, the revealed Word of God 
who reveals or discovers the meaning of past history to man, 
and also what God is going to do in the future. A Christian 
14 Collingwood, p. 53. 
106 
historian knows what is going to happen because it has been 
revealed to him in the words of Christ. 
We might note here that the strong eschatological message 
of Christian history has led some scholars to criticize it 
for what they deem an over-emphasis on the providential work­
ing of God to the down-grading of human initiative. The 
danger of eschatological prediction, says James T. Shotwell, 
for example, is that it tends to bend the facts to fit the 
plan: 
...Whenever a theologian of any religion has attempted 
to justify the ways of God to man, he has the history 
rearranged so that its artificial character may con­
vince the reader that it was actually planned...we come 
upon this especially in the work of the Christian his­
torians. .. .1^ 
R. G. Collingwood also finds the Christian idea of history 
weighted far too heavily on the side of Providential control 
and sees the main result as a lack of emphasis on historical 
fact. Christian historians, he writes: 
...did not want an accurate and scientific study of the 
facts of history; what they wanted was an accurate and 
scientific study of the divine attributes, a theology 
based securely on the double foundation of faith and 
reason, which should enable them to determine a priori 
what must have happened and what must be going to happen 
in the historical process.-1-^ 
Shotwell is disdainful of interpretative history in this 
sense and even actively hostile to it. He writes later on: 
15 James T. Shotwell, An Introduction to the History 
of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 
p. 98n. 
"^Collingwood, p. 56. 
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If we went back to the medieval conception of history 
with all its error we should be exemplifying and has­
tening that downfall of civilization which some histor­
ians are perhaps prematurely, proclaiming. 
Although Shotwell and Collingwood rightly criticize 
what has no doubt come to represent a certain kind of his­
torical emphasis in Christendom, they have not accurately 
described the essential Christian position. Arguing from 
another perspective, C. N. Cochrane rejects any analysis of 
the Christian view of history which would seek to characterize 
it as derogatory toward the individual's substantial power to 
change and order history. He finds the definitive conception 
of Christian historiography in Augustine, whose balance of 
human initiative and divine necessity has since become the 
traditional Christian position. 
Augustine begins his analysis of Biblical history with 
the problem of Scriptural interpretation. Rejecting the 
rigid literalism of some Christian factions, Augustine yet 
never drifts into a purely allegorical or spiritualized 
interpretation of Scripture. He opts instead for a middle 
road in which he proclaims a thorough-going acceptance of the 
historical facts of Scripture without insisting that the 
scientific nature of these facts in any way establishes their 
truth-value. Augustine believes, for example, in a future 
in which the conversion of the Jews, the rise of the Anti-
Christ, and the Second Coming will inevitably occur because 
17 Collingwood, p. 56. 
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Scripture has predicted these events, but he never allows 
for the use of Scripture as a kind of "cosmic almanac" as 
Cochrane puts it, to predict exactly when and how events 
would occur. He writes in The City of God; 
Of course, what we believe is the simple fact that 
all these things are to be: but how and in what 
sequence the events are to occur we must leave to 
future experience, which alone can teach these truths 
so much better than human intelligence can at present 
understand. 
For Augustine, Scripture is both a repository of historical 
fact and a repository of value. Paradoxically, the value-
judgments of Scripture rest on the authority of a revelation 
which occurs in history. Thus both science and spiritual 
discernment must come into play in any interpretation of 
Scripture. A historical fact such as, 
And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the 
city of Nazareth, into Judea, to the City of David, 
which is called Bethlehem because he was of the 
house and family of David, (Luke 2:4) 
is subject to verification through scientific methods, but 
the value of that fact, its meaning in history, can only be 
determined through reference to an a priori authority which 
19 
establishes its value. 
For Augustine, then, the interpretation of historical 
fact is inextricably bound up in the definition and origin 
18 Augustine, The City of God, ed. Vernon J. Bourke, 
trans. Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius Zema, Grace Monohan, 
and Daniel J. Honan (New York: Image Books, 1958), p. 492. 
19 See Cochrane, p. 477. 
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of value in the universe. Faith and understanding or 
reason work together, and although faith is clearly super­
ior to reason in the hierarchy of Christian authority, one 
cannot operate without the other in the tangible world in 
which the historian exists. Augustine's paradoxical attitude 
toward the whole subject can be seen in one of his letters: 
The prophet says with reason, 'If you will not believe, 
you will not understand.' (is. 7:9). Thereby he 
undoubtedly makes a distinction between these two 
things and advises us to believe first so as to be 
able to understand whatever we believe.20 
For St. Augustine, prophetic or apocalyptic history in the 
Christian sense is a matter of a physical or historical con­
tent which is governed by a providential plan. Concurrently, 
the understanding of prophetic history must finally be a 
matter of both faith and reason. Christian insight, or 
sapientia, is a necessary prerequisite for apprehending the 
21 
facts of history. 
The idea of sapientia in itself has important implica­
tions for the Christian interpretation of history. First, 
in the Christian view, fortune or chance has no real 
place except as a handmaiden to a providential plan, which, 
however obscure, is surely and certainly working its way out 
in history. What is perceived as chance or 'fortune ' from 
the classical standpoint becomes in the Christian view a 
20 St. Augustine, "Letter 120" in The Writings of St. 
Augustine, trans. Sister Wilfrid Parson, S.N.D., 18 vols. 
(New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1953), X:149„ 
^Cochrane, p. 477. 
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matter of paradoxical truth, and thus all events finally 
show traces of the controlling hand of God. Second, there 
is an optimistic end to the plan of God for those individuals 
who recognize and believe it. In contrast to the pagan 
philosophers, Augustine saw no ultimate fatality in matter, 
for he believed in the Resurrection of the body. The paradox 
of this fact is of course that man may choose to accept or 
reject a belief in the Resurrection as he will. And the 
ultimate paradox is that only through the graciousness of 
Providence—only through God's love—is free will made possi­
ble. Augustine goes so far as to suggest in his essay on 
Free Choice of the Will (On Free Choice of the Will, III, 3) 
that "this power [free choice} will be mine all the more cer­
tainly because of the infallible foreknowledge of him who 
22 
foreknew that I would have it." 
We will leave the topic of the relation of free will and 
Divine Necessity for a later and more thorough discussion. 
What is important here is the Christian notion that history 
is controlled by a providence which is different in kind 
from the irrational forces or the combination of circumstance 
and human endeavor presented by pagan philosophy. This prov­
idence is seen in the Christian view as ultimately benevo­
lent. Nature is not perceived as governed by a fixed set of 
physical laws, but as subject to the Divine Logos which gives 
22 St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will m The 
Teacher: The Free Choice of the Will, Grace and Free Will, 
trans. Robert P. Russell (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1968), p. 173. 
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meaning to all history by breaking into the heretofore nec­
essary laws of sin and death„ Thus the Judeo-Christian 
view of history represents a radical departure from the 
classical perspective. The perception of the total unity of 
the human race in sin makes possible the expression of a 
universalized plan of salvation for mankind which involves 
all history. The concept of the Incarnated Logos, of the 
divine spirit which enters history and affects in a particu­
lar way the course of human events, gives rise to a new 
respect for historical facts and their result. However, the 
new respect for epoch-making event is offset, as critics have 
pointed out, by a Christian tendency to over-literalize his­
torical facts and to lose critical objectivity in the process. 
Augustine gives the most balanced explanation of the main­
stream Christian position on the subject, maintaining that 
the historical facts of Scripture should be subject to scien­
tific verification, but that final judgments made on the 
meaning of Scripture cannot be exclusively scientific, since 
scripture is primarily a repository of spiritual value and 
must ultimately be comprehended only as it is apprehended by 
faith. 
The purpose of history in the Christian view is just 
this apprehension of the universal plan of salvation on an 
individual level. Although history is a cosmic concern, the 
main thrust of Christianity has always been toward the indi­
vidual man. God saves individuals, not whole races, and he 
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deals with men personally rather than collectively. The 
personal character of the Christian philosophy shows up in 
Christian histories, where the purpose of history is no 
longer primarily directed toward the formation of the "eth­
ical man" as it was in classical history, but with the effect 
of the message of salvation on the life of individuals. 
Eusebius, in Book I of the Ecclesiastical History, for exam­
ple, states that his purpose in writing is to chronicle not 
only the history of the Jewish nation and the heresies which 
beset the early church, but also and primarily to describe 
the character of those who for its (the gospel's) sake, 
passed from time to time through the contest of blood 
and torture; furthermore the martyrdoms of our own time, 
and the gracious and favouring help of our Saviour in 
them all. (I. i? 2-5).^ 
We remember, too, the record of the effect of the gospel 
preached by Paulinus on Edwin of Northumbria as chronicled 
by Bede in the Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum, and 
the autobiographical history of St. Augustine's encounter 
with the Christian message in the Confessions. In each of 
these instances, the historian is not primarily concerned 
with ethical goodness or evil, in man, but with the immense 
change occurring in the lives of individual men as a result 
of their encounter with Christ. 
Christian respect for the plan of salvation as it is 
and will be worked out in history had a definitive influence 
on the literary representation of character during the 
23 Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, I, 7-9, 
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centuries which followed. Earlier in this study, we noted 
that the Greeks placed the substantive origins of character 
outside the immediate purview of history and emphasized 
those origins over the character's actions in history. As 
a result, the moral and physic 1 capacity of an individual 
was seen as essentially stationary throughout life. If devel­
opment seemed to occur, the movement was only apparent, not 
actual, and the assumption was that the character would, 
despite his seeming changes, reveal his true nature at some 
future point. 
By contrast, in the Christian view of the origins of 
man, there is no split between action and nature. The 
Platonic doctrine of the pre-existent and immortal soul is 
rejected by main-line Christianity, where each soul is seen 
as a unique part of the total man, freshly created at each 
individual conception. Tertullian quarrels with the Greeks 
on this issue and insists on the simultaneous origin of soul 
and body. Calling on the argument of the dual nature of the 
soul propounded by Stoic philosophers, he defends the Chris­
tian position on the union of body and spirit in man: 
Zeno, defining the soul as a spirit that is generated 
with the body, argues in the following fashion. Any­
thing that by its departure, causes a living being to 
die is a body. But, on the departure of this spirit 
which is generated with the body, the living being 
dies. Therefore, this spirit which is generated with 
the body is a body. But, this spirit of which we speak 
is the soul. Hence, we must conclude that the soul is 
corporeal.^4 
24 Tertullian, "On the Soul," in Tertullian: Apoloqetical 
Works and Minucius Felix: Octavius, trans. Rudolph Arbesmann, 
O.S.A., Sister Emily Joseph Daly, C.S.J., and Edwin A. Quain, 
S.J., (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1962), p. 188. 
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The orthodox Christian view of the subject of the immortality 
of the soul is stated in its definitive form by St. Ambrose 
in his treatise on the Resurrection (On the Passing Away of 
His Brother Satyrus—De excessu fratris sui Satyri). Ambrose 
separated the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul from 
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and solidified 
Christian thought on the point. As Pelikan puts it: "Res­
urrection meant the conferral upon the body of that deathless 
25 
life which the soul already possessed." 
It should be noted that there were some major challenges 
to this view, (notably in the writings of Origen, who pro­
pounded the old Platonic notion of the pre-existent soul and 
who did not believe in a literal resurrection of the body); 
however, this line of thinking was repudiated by the orthodox 
church all along and formally condemned in the sixth century 
26 
at the Second Council of Constantinople (A.D. 553). 
The result of the unified Christian conception of man 
offered by the Christian world-view was the possible depic­
tion of substantial change in a character within history. 
Whereas in the classical view, man was seen as originally 
composed of a "good" or "evil" character, the Christian view 
held out the possibility of movement from an active life of 
evil actions to a life of good through a conversion experience. 
It should be emphasized that the categories of good and 
25 
Pelikan, I, 52. 
26Pelikan, I, 277. 
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evil as I have used them here are not rigidly ethical in 
definition. The Christian conversion experience leads to the 
creation of a new man, but it is not simply a new ethical 
nature which has been implanted, but a new spiritual creature 
which has been born. The life of the spiritual man is not 
carried on primarily by means of a conscious adherence to 
moral law, but by means of faith in Christ, who represents 
the only perfect fulfillment of the moral law. St. Paul makes 
salvation by vicarious participation in the righteousness of 
Christ the essential ingredient of Christianity: 
What shall we say, then? shall we continue in sin, 
that grace may abound? God forbid. For we that are 
dead to sin, how shall we live any longer therein? 
Know you not that all we, who are baptized in Christ 
Jesus, are baptized in his death? For we are buried 
together with him by baptism into death; that as 
Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the 
Father, so we also may walk in newness of life. For 
if we have been planted together in the likeness of 
his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his 
resurrection. (Romans 6:1-5) 
Thus conversion may be defined as the recognition that power 
for an ethical life comes only through a conscious acceptance 
of the spirit of Christ, which empowers the believer for 
life in the world. The moral life is not primarily a matter 
of exercising the virtues but of being what one has become 
through Christ. Thomas Merton, the famed 20th-century 
Trappist, includes an excellent description of this central 
Christian concept in his devotional treatise, Life and Holi­
ness: 
Christian holiness is not a mere matter of ethical 
perfection. It includes every virtue, but is evi­
dently more than all virtues together. Sanctity is 
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not constituted only by good words or even by moral 
heroism, but first of all by ontological union with 
God 'in Christ.1 Indeed, to understand the New Testa­
ment teaching on holiness of life we have to understand 
the meaning of this expression of St. Paul's. The 
moral teaching of th>2 epistles always follows upon 
and elucidates a doctrinal exposition of the meaning of 
our 'life in Christ.' St. John also made it quite clear 
that all spiritual fruit in our life comes from union 
with Christ, integratbn in his Mystical Body as a branch 
is united with the vine and integrated in it (John 15: 
1-11). This of course does not by any means reduce 
virtues and good works to insignificance: but these 
always remain secondary to our 'new being.1 According 
to the scholastic maxim, actio sequitur esse, action 
is in accordance with the being that acts. 1̂ 
In literary terms, this understanding of conversion makes 
possible the representation of "lower" characters in serious 
as well as comic narrative. Where there is the possibility 
of a genuine spiritual rebirth, there is the possibility of 
substantial development of character, a development which 
takes place without destruction of the unique personality 
of the individual. In fact, the unique individuality of a 
given character may even be said to develop as the life of 
the character progresses. The explicitly Christian or 
New Testament understanding of the conversion experience 
(which involves a substantial development in character) is 
prefigured in Old Testament representations of the pattern 
of judgment-repentance-mercy-regeneration, the dialectic of 
interaction between God and man. Thus in the Old Testament, 
David is represented in the humblest of circumstances—even 
sinful and debased circumstances—and yet retains the nobility 
27 Thomas Merton, Life and Holiness (New York: Image 
Books, 1964), p. 57. 
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of his position as Judah's King, the ancestral forerunner of 
Christ himself, expressly because of his experience with the 
essential pattern of God's judgment and mercy. 
It is in fact the particularity of the Biblical narrative 
in regard to the utter depths of David's debasement in the 
affair with Bathsheba which strikes us so forcefully, and 
which so radically separates the Biblical view of character-
presentation from the classical view. The Biblical account 
not only presents all the distasteful facts leading up to 
David's sin—his inattention to duty, his lust, his callous 
disregard of Uriah—but seems constructed to focus on the 
kind of detail which illumines the darkest corners of David's 
mind during this period. One such detail comes particularly 
to mind. A few days after David has given Joab the order to 
send Uriah into the forefront of the battle, Joab receives 
word that Uriah has been killed and sends for a messenger to 
tell David the news. Preparing the messenger for what he 
knows will be the king's furious response to the bad news of 
the death of his best warriors, Joab tells the messenger to 
relay the message of Uriah's death: 
And he charged the messenger, saying: When thou hast 
told all the words of the battle to the king, If thou 
see him to be angry, and he shall say: Why did you 
approach so near to the wall to fight? knew you not 
the many darts are thrown from above off the wall? 
Who killed Abimelech the son of Jerobaal? did not a 
woman cast a piece of a millstone upon him from the 
wall and slew him in Thebes? Why did you go near the 
wall? Thou shalt say: Thy servant Urias the Hethite 
is also slain. (II Kings 11:19-21) 
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The messenger, following Joab's advice, later gives David a 
quick account of the warfare and without a breath relates the 
news of Uriah's death. David's reaction is a classic study 
in hypocrisy: 
Then said David to the messenger, Thus shalt thou 
say to Joab, Let not this thing discourage thee for 
various is the event of war; and sometimes one, sometimes 
another is consumed by the sword. (II Kings 11:25a) 
The contrast between the glimpse given us of David's normal 
reaction to bad news through Joab's dramatic projection of 
that reaction and David's actual response speaks loudly of 
David's secret joy over the obliteration of any obstacle to 
the satisfaction of his desire. Not another word is spoken 
concerning the brutal death of Uriah, one of his best and 
most loyal retainers. It is this kind of devastating por­
trayal of intentional evil which is unthinkable in the classi­
cal view. Oedipus' sin, although repugnant, is unknowing 
and blind; it is the result of forces beyond his control. 
But David's actions are deliberate, conscious; they reveal 
nothing but the blackest and most despicable intent to get 
and to possess what is not his own and to destroy everything 
in his path on the way to obtaining it. 
The fact that this low point in David's development can 
be portrayed with such candor is the result of the Biblical 
understanding of man as capable of great good or great evil, 
depending on the quality of his disposition toward God at any 
particular time in life. Despite the depravity of David's 
actions at this point, there always remains the possibility 
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of an about-face on his part, of repentance resulting from 
chastisement and mercy. The emphasis here is on the per­
sonal relationship of God with David and David with God. 
The relationship is a living thing, it is subject to process 
and even great extremes of change. It is significant that 
such a change, not only in David, but in God himself, is 
recorded almost immediately after David's terrible grief over 
the just death of Bathsheba's child. Once God has chastened 
David, He once again reaches out in love to touch the very 
relationship which caused the trouble: 
And David comforted Bethsabee his wife, and went in 
unto her, and slept with her: and she bore a son, and 
he called his name Solomon, and the Lord loved him. 
(II Kings 12:24) 
Sin, repentance, renewal, rebirth is seen to be a part of 
the Judeo-Christian pattern of characterization from the 
beginning. From the experience of this pattern, the individ­
ual develops. 
Not only can there be great extremes of good and evil 
portrayed in a given character in the Biblical view, and of 
extreme states of exalted happiness and profound despair, 
but there is allowance for the representation of great 
extremes of social position as well. David as shepherd-boy 
becomes the powerful king and prototype of the Christ born 
in a humble stall in Bethlehem. Peter, James and John are 
fishermen. Christ calls a tax collector as his disciple and 
feasts with sinners and prostitutes. This contrasts sharply 
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with the classical tendency to separate the social classes 
and to match grand or sublime action only with the aristo­
cratic character. From the classical perspective, the 
depiction of Christ's interaction with the lower parts of 
society would seem grossly inappropriate. 
Again, what makes this mixture of sublimity and humility 
ultimately possible is the Judeo-Christian emphasis on the 
Incarnation, on the entrance of the sublime into historical 
reality. And of course the Incarnation is part of a larger 
plan which embraces all of history. It is in fact that total 
plan which forms the framework into which the Scriptural char­
acters fit, and which makes possible their biographical indi­
viduality. From the classical perspective we noticed that 
horizontal continuity characterized the Iliad and the Odyssey— 
a continuous connection between stories which is almost 
seamless. In the Scriptures, on the other hand, the stories 
have little horizontal connection, but a great deal of verti­
cal connection, that is, the life of each of the great Bibli­
cal figures reflects one moment in God's on-going formation 
28 
of the world to his purpose. Specifically, the life of 
each great figure is a microcosm of such formation. God 
deals with each man by sending joy, trials, and suffering 
into his life at will until that man is conformed to the full 
image of godly individuality. The very extremes through 
which the characters move during the process of formation 
28 
See Eric Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of 
Reality in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1953), p. 17. 
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gives them their intense life, their intimate connection 
with historical reality. As Eric Auerbach puts it: 
The reader deeply feels how the extent of the pendulum 
swing is connected with the intensity of the personal 
history—precisely the most extreme circumstances in 
which we are immeasurably forsaken and in despair, or 
immeasurably joyous and exalted, give us, if we survive 
them, a personal stamp which is recognized as the pro­
duct of a rich existence, a rich development.29 
It is this very development, continues Auerbach, which often 
gives the Old Testament stories "even when legendary" a his­
torical character. 
A more literal combination of the humble and the sublime 
is not the only result of the Christian interpretation of 
history. Stylistically, too, there are great differences 
between the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian presentation of 
character. We noted in chapter one of this study that the 
Greek narrative style was characterized by a certain palpa­
bility, a certain outwardness of presentation, including 
fully externalized description, a uniform illumination of 
character, an extensive and carefully rhetorical expression 
of character thought and feeling, open character motivation 
and explicit relations between characters. All this was 
paralleled by a Greco-Roman tendency to place all events in 
what Auerbach calls the "foreground"—in a local and temporal 
present, and to extemporize the meaning of such events to 
such a degree that they lose much natural psychological ten­
sion. These characteristics, as we noted, tended to reinforce 
29 Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 18. 
122 
the production of universal type-characters rather than of 
historically individualized characters. 
In contrast, the Biblical style of narrative presenta­
tion is characterized by a certain obscurity and mystery— 
by a closed quality which has great suggestive power. In the 
episode from the life of David with which we just dealt, for 
example, the relations between the characters are not pre­
sented for us in a fully delineated fashion. The story of 
David's lust is presented in the sparest manner. There is 
not a superfluous detail, and little or no time spent on 
description of personal emotion. Discourse is direct and 
concrete. David's conversation is not the conscious effort 
of a polished rhetorician intended for didactic or splendid 
effect. It is the natural speech of a man caught in a com­
promising act, and only serves to reveal the depths to which 
30 
David has fallen. As a result, the passions, the jealousy, 
possessiveness, and murderous intent demonstrated by David 
grip us with a psychological intensity not to be realized in 
a reading of the Odyssey or the Iliad. 
The very abruptness and sketchiness of the narrative of 
David's fall into sin is a result, as we have pointed out, 
of the Biblical emphasis on the vertical, on the relation of 
the individual's life to the pattern of God's work in the 
world. Where the overall pattern of history has great impor­
tance and meaning, there is a tendency to skip over the parts 
30 Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 45. 
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of the narrative which do not relate to the central theme 
and to emphasize those which do. The very existence of the 
unexpressed actions and emotions which are going on in the 
interstices of the expressed events yields a suggestive and 
imaginative power far above what is produced from a fully 
externalized description of action. 
This objective suggestiveness can be observed espe­
cially in the narration of emotionally charged situations. 
It is evident, for instance, in the section where David dis­
poses of Uriah by means of his chief general, Joab. We 
remember that it is by implicit contrast with Joab's remark­
ably specific projection of David's reaction to the bad news 
of the battle and his admonition to the messenger that we 
get a real picture of David's motives when he actually re­
ceives the message. The technique is circuitous, indirect, 
and yet a devastating commentary on the state of David's 
intentions at that point in his development results. 
The imaginative suggestiveness of the Davidic narrative 
which arises from the Biblical emphasis on the vertical con­
nection of the individual and God is matched by great dra­
matic suspense, but it is once again a different and more 
personal order of suspense than that generated by the classi­
cal view. Whereas the Greco-Roman epics leaned more exclus­
ively on an allegorical-exemplary mode of expression, (that 
is, on the presentation of ideal characters who are sepa­
rated radically from lower, more debased character types), 
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the Biblical view permits the expression of historical 
reality—even sinful reality—as part of the universal plan 
of salvation. The consequent allowance for substantial 
changes in character and personality (from a sinful condition 
or a condition of willful escape from the will of God to 
voluntary acceptance of the Divine will or vice versa) con­
stitutes a major divergence from the classical pattern. Such 
a focus on individual development creates a different kind of 
suspense than that generated by the classical view of man. 
Whereas in the classical view, suspense is generated mostly 
by means of the plot, in the Christian view the suspense is 
more personally connected to the character of the individual. 
While we wonder what will happen to Hector in his fight with 
Achilles, our attention in the story of David is spotlighted 
on the inner changes which take place in his moral character. 
Another way of putting it is that we are never so concerned 
about a potential change in Hector's essentially good 
character, as we are about his active life and what that 
represents for the national destiny of Greece. The Biblical 
narrative of David, on the other hand, focuses on the changes 
in his character, and thus the suspense is generated from a 
different quarter. This is not to say that action or plot 
is unimportant in the Christian representation of reality; 
it is simply to say that these elements are usually subordi­
nated to a more evident concern for the potential character-
development of the individual. 
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The Davidic narrative and each event in it also gains 
meaning and intensity through its connection with the total 
plan of Israeli history. David is the king of the Covenant, 
the recipient of the promise given him at his kingly annoint-
ing, a promise which God ratifies again and again throughout 
his life. The covenant is always in the same basic form and 
is renewed at crucial points in David's individual history. 
One such point occurs in II Samuel 7, where Nathan the 
prophet has a vision concerning the future of David's Kingdom 
and tells David that if he and his offspring remain faithful 
to God, they will be established forever; in fact, there is 
even a promise of mercy if his progeny should fall away: 
And when thy days shall be fulfilled, and thou shalt 
sleep with thy fathers, I will raise up thy seed after 
thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I 
will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house 
to my name, and I will establish the throne of his 
kingdom for ever. I will be to him a father, and he 
shall be to me a son: and if he commit any iniquity, 
I will correct him with the rod of men, and with the 
stripes of the children of men. But my mercy I will 
not take away from him, as I took it from Saul, whom 
I removed from before my face. And thy house shall be 
faithful, and thy kingdom for ever before thy face, 
and thy throne shall be firm for ever. (II Kings 7: 
12-16) 
The same promise is repeated in Psalms 89:20-37, and 132:11 
and 12, and reaffirmed with Solomon in I Kings 6:11, and in 
I Kings 9:4, as it had formerly been renewed with Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and all the patriarchs before David. 
This promise, with its planned inclusion of future genera­
tions and its promise of mercy even in the face of sin, 
forms the background against which the Biblical characters 
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live out their lives. It is important because it demonstrates 
that the Judeo-Christian pattern of sin-mercy, and of a redemp­
tive lineage is not without grounds in the Old Testament. 
When the Fathers pick out Messianic prophecies in Isaish or 
in the Davidic narrative for purposes of showing foreshadow-
ings of Christ, their interpretation is not wholly an 
unrelated imposition on earlier material, but arises very 
naturally from themes and even specific prophecies intrinsic 
to Jewish history. 
It is this background, the historical framework out of 
which the Old Testament characters arise, which gives their 
lives such purpose and significance. All that is done by 
each character is done toward the fulfillment of a single 
goal—the establishment of God's Kingdom on earth. In the 
New Testament and through Christ, the meaning of the Kingdom 
of God on earth takes on even more revolutionary spiritual 
implications; but if at the time of David these implications 
are not clear, they are certainly pre-figured in God's con­
tract relationship with the nation of Israel. David's con­
stant reference to the universal plan of God gives his indi­
vidual life a meaning and significance it could not have 
in itself. 
In the New Testament, when Christ comes "from the House 
of David," the purpose of history is fulfilled, and the 
Judeo-Christian view of characterization takes on its defin­
itive form. Whereas David interacted with God through the 
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mouths of the prophets and in the inner mind of his spirit, 
the disciples interacted with Christ face-to-face. It is 
the significance of these face to face encounters with a 
historical Jesus which forms the basis of New Testament 
characterization and which exemplifies the most essential 
element of a specifically Christian understanding of charac­
terization. 
In these encounters, it is clearly evident that Jesus 
himself saw a man's reaction to his person and call as the 
crux of character. His meeting with the rich young ruler of 
Mark 10 is the definitive example of this, and also gives us 
another basis for comparison with classical characterization. 
As Luke records the incident, Jesus is questioned by a young 
man just as he is setting out toward Jerusalem for the last 
time. The ruler addresses Jesus as "Good Master" and Jesus 
is quick to react to this ethical flattery. "Why do you 
call me Good?" he replies, "No one is good but God alone." 
Jesus then gives the expected moral directive—"Follow the 
ten commandments"—and lists them. .The man answers that he 
has kept the commandments from his youth. The Scriptural 
account of Jesus' reply cannot be paraphrased: 
And Jesus looking on him, loved him, and said to him: 
One thing is wanting unto thee: go, sell whatsoever 
thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have 
treasure in heaven; and come, follow me. (Mark 10:21) 
The stark and yet loving penetration of this statement, its 
absolute claim on the man's life, its insight into the real 
conflict area of the man's heart, reveal with clarity the 
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seriousness of the decision Christ requires of every man. 
The poignancy of this particular rich man1s unwillingness 
to respond ("At that saying his countenance fell, and he 
went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions"—Mark 10:22) 
is further highlighted by contrast with other incidents where 
the same claim is made and the response is utterly different: 
And when he was passing by, he saw Levi the son of 
Alpheus sitting at the receipt of custom; and he 
saith to him: Follow me. And rising up, he fol­
lowed him. (Mark 2:14) 
While the claim of God is powerfully evident in the Old Tes­
tament, the dramatic reality achieved in these New Testament 
encounters has a historical validity which is unmatched 
anywhere in the sacred writings by virtue of the actual 
presence of Jesus. His claim is absolute and individual; 
it becomes the central focus for characterization in the 
Christian view of history. 
The influence of the Biblical view of characterization 
is found in early Christian literature as well. Eusebius, 
for example, re-relates the story of the beheading of the 
apostle James at the court of Herod first told by Clement of 
Alexandria. When James testifies, his prison attendant is so 
moved at hearing him witness to the faith that he confesses 
to being a Christian himself. Eusebius relates this charged 
moment very succinctly, but it is evident that the guard's 
decision to stand for Christ is the element in Clement's 
story he considers worthy of the emotion portrayed: 
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So they were both led away together; and on the way 
he asked for forgiveness for himself from James. And 
James looked at him for a moment and said, 'Peace be 
to you,' and kissed him. So both were beheaded at 
the same time.31 
Thus it is not the nobility of a given character or the 
innate good or evil of his nature which is emphasized in the 
Christian view, but spiritual decision: the act of choosing 
or not choosing sacrificial identification with Christ. 
The same emphasis on decision is evident in Bede1s char­
acterization of Edwin of Northumbria, who was one of the first 
early British rulers to be converted to Christianity. It is 
obvious that Bede's first concern is with Edwin's possible 
Christian influence over a large section of Britain, and 
his narrative of that conversion takes full advantage of the 
dramatic possibilities inherent in such a situation. 
Edwin's first encounter with Christianity occurs when 
he marries Ethelberga, the daughter of the Christian King, 
Ethelbert. In order to obtain her, Edwin must make certain 
religious concessions—he must allow his wife to practice 
her faith freely, he must allow her to maintain a Christian 
Chaplain, etc.—to all of which he readily agrees. Bede 
records the first sign of his openness to the new faith at 
this point: 
He (Edwin) also professed himself willing to accept 
the religion of Christ if on examination, his adviser 
decided that it appeared more holy and acceptable to 
God than their own. 2 
31 Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, I, p. 12. 
32 Bede, A History of the English Church and People, trans. 
Leo Sherley-Price (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 115. 
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Edwin does not accept the faith immediately, however, even 
after he is preserved from the poisoned dagger of an assassin 
and after he wins a victory through the prayers of Paulinus 
the Chaplain over the West Saxons. In fact, Bede chooses 
this point in the narrative to increase suspense by includ­
ing a glimpse of the King's inner state of mind: 
But he (Edwin) wished first to receive a full course 
of instruction in the Faith from the venerable Paulinus, 
and to discuss his proper course with those of his coun­
sellors on whose wisdom he placed most reliance. For 
the King was by nature a wise and prudent man, and 
often sat alone in vilest converse with himself for 
long periods, turning over in his inmost heart what he 
should do and which religion he should follow.33 
Bede then relates further attempts by various influential 
Christians in Edwin's life to persuade him to the faith. 
Pope Gregory writes a personal letter to Edwin entreating him 
to give up idol-worship; immediately after, he writes to 
Ethelberga, the Queen, exhorting her to teach her husband 
the commandments of God and to "melt the coldness of his 
heart" through spiritual encouragement. 
The final incident leading up to the King's conversion 
involves a vision the King once had while in exile during the 
early years of his youth. Pursued by Ethelfrid, a neighbor­
ing king, Edwin flees over most of Britain and finally takes 
refuge at the court of Redwald, an old friend. When Redwald 
is bribed by Ethelfrid to kill Edwin, and finally agrees to 
the murder, Edwin hears about it and refusing to escape, waits 
"^Bede, p. 117. 
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for his death. While Edwin waits, a stranger approaches and 
asks him three questions about his situation: If he were 
saved from destruction what reward would he give to his 
benefactor? If his benefactor then promises him kingship, 
great power and victory over his enemies, how would he show 
his gratitude? After Edwin assures the stranger of his ample 
gratitude for both promises the stranger asks a third ques­
tion which again directly hints at Edwin's coming conversion: 
If the man who can truthfully foretell such good for­
tune can also give you better and wiser guidance for 
your life and salvation than anything known to our par­
ents and kinsfolk, will you promise to obey him and 
follow his salutary advice?34 
After asking this question and receiving Edwin's promise of 
submission to such guidance, the stranger lays his hand on 
Edwin's head and tells him that when he experiences this same 
sign (the laying-on of hands) he should remember the vision 
and his promise. Bede then relates the story of Edwin's 
deliverance from death as a result of a change of heart in 
Redwald (who is persuaded by his wife that loyalty to friends 
is a more precious possession than gold), and his subsequent 
rise to power. 
Bringing the story up to date with the recounting of 
this earlier vision, Bede then relates the final incident in 
Edwin's conversion. In the midst of one of his philosophical 
reveries, the king is approached by Paulinus, who has received 
the sign of Edwin's vision through a spiritual insight of 
"^Bede, pp. 124-25. 
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his own. Laying his hand on the King's head, he reminds the 
King of his promise. Even at this point, it requires the 
further reasonable counsel of one of the king1s chief hench­
men to fully persuade him in a passage which has become 
famous in English literature: 
Your Majesty, when we compare the present life of man 
on earth with that time of which we have no knowledge, 
it seems to me like the swift flight of a single sparrow 
through the banqueting-ha11 where you are sitting at 
dinner on a winter1s day with your thanes and coun­
sellors. In the midst there is a comforting fire to 
warm the hall; outside, the storms of winter rain or 
snow are raging. This sparrow flies swiftly in through 
one door of the hall, and out through another. While 
he is inside, he is safe from the winter storms; but 
after a few moments of comfort, he vanishes from sight 
into the wintry world from which he came. Even so man 
appears on earth for a little while, but of what went 
before this life or of what follows, we know nothing. 
Therefore, if this new teaching has brought any more 
certain knowledge, it seems only right that we should 
follow it.35 
After such a sustained dramatic build-up, Bede's narration of 
the King's response seems almost anti-climactic: 
In short, the king granted blessed Paulinus full 
permission to preach, renounced idolatry, and pro­
fessed his acceptance of the faith of Christ.36 
All this only serves to reveal once again the Christian 
emphasis on spiritual decision in characterization, and on 
the great potential for drama which is inherent in the Chris­
tian view of reality. Bede, as we see here, generally shows 
a much greater literary flair than Eusebius for exploiting 
the dramatic possibilities leading up to conversion. 
3~*Bede, p. 127. 
36Bede, p. 127. 
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It is in fact the emphasis placed on decision in the 
Christian world-view which reveals an even more profound 
contrast with the classical view of characterization. We 
recall that in the classical analysis of man there was no 
satisfactory answer to the problem of a fated innate nature. 
Plato, we remember, could never finally condemn man for the 
evil in his nature because of his sympathy for the fact that 
few human beings are born with the intellectual or moral 
substance to attain Eudaimonia, the desired state of harmony 
with the universals (see Chapter II). The capacity for reason 
and passion, he suggests, is conferred on every individual by 
the gods in given measure. Aristotle's answer seems at first 
paradoxical—he does not wish to absolve man entirely from 
responsibility for his actions, and yet he cannot ultimately 
explain why one man is good and another evil. Finally, 
his sense of the power of accident in the life of historical 
man results in an emphasis on the fated nature of man. 
The result of the Greek emphasis on a fixed view of 
human nature, as we have seen, is first, a softening of the 
idea of eternal judgement, and second, a reduction of the 
dramatic force of important choices made in the life of a 
given character. Then, too, we recall that Aristotle's sense 
of the power of accident helped to foster the defeatist notion 
of an uncontrollable disorder intrinsic to historical real­
ity. This in itself tends to encourage the sense of deter­
minism which generally governs the Greek understanding of man. 
The result of all this, as we pointed out, is an essen­
tial disunity in the Greek literary character, who finds his 
true nobility in fighting all his life against what is 
actually his destiny—what is most truly himself. Thus 
there is an essential disunity of character within history. 
It is true that the individual is reunited with his own deep­
est self at the instant of death, but we are not at all sure 
what form this individuality takes in the afterlife, or 
whether it exists at all. In any case, within history, 
within the physical life of the body, the individual's per­
sonality is divided, his character split by the power of an 
unwished-for destiny. 
Although the Christian writer struggles, too, against 
the tyrannical presence of accident and fate in the universe, 
he ultimately resolves the problem through a belief in the 
freedom of man to determine his own destiny. This belief is 
based originally on Scriptural grounds, but the philosophical 
basis for such grounds have been expanded and developed by 
two of the greatest Christian apologists, St. Augustine 
(A.D. 354-450) and St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-1274). 
St. Augustine approached the problem of free will from 
the presupposition that free will is something good because 
it comes from God. The question follows that if free will is 
good, and if it comes from God, then why can men abuse it? 
Augustine answers that simply because something can be used 
for evil, it is not necessarily intrinsically evil. For exam­
ple, the fact that the body possesses eyes and hands does not 
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mean they must be used for evil. The faculties themselves 
are neutral. How, then, does the possibility of evil in man 
arise? Although the possibility of evil can be said to be 
due to God, writes Augustine, the actuality is solely man's 
37 
responsibility. Man has a capacity to be evil, but he 
does not have to be evil. He can go contrary to the will of 
God because the soul can voluntarily choose the lesser over 
the higher good. Since man can will to want and desire the 
good, it follows that he does not have it because he does 
not will it. The mind which wills the true good cannot be 
forced to be a "slave of passion." Augustine concludes: 
Whatever, therefore, is the equal of mind, or superior 
to it, will not make it a slave to lust because of its 
own justice, provided the mind is in control and is 
strong in virtue. On the other hand, anything inferior 
to the mind cannot do so because of its own weakness, 
as we have learned from what we already agreed upon. 
We are faced with the conclusion, then, that nothing 
else can make the mind the companion of evil desire than 
its own will and free choice.3° 
To the objection that the soul is driven by natural impulses 
over which it has no control, Augustine replies that impulses 
do not exist apart from the soul, but that they arise from the 
movement of the soul toward this good or that evil. If such 
is the case, then the soul makes its own impulses, and if it 
capitulates to evil, it does so willingly. To the further 
37 See Roy W. Battenhouse, ed., A Companion to the Study 
of St. Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 
pp. 115-124, for a short characterization of Augustine's 
argument. 
38 St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will . p. 93. 
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objection that if God may be said to have caused the possi­
bility of evil, then it necessarily follows that he is the 
author of actual evil as well, Augustine answers that fore-
39 
knowledge does not imply causation. "There is a distinc­
tion, " as David E. Roberts puts it, "between events that 
happen by necessity and those that happen through human 
will, and unless God's foreknowledge apprehends this dis-
40 
tinction, he is not omniscient." Thus Augustine makes a 
strong case for human free agency based on a careful under­
standing of the relation between God's permissiveness and 
His foreknowledge. 
For Augustine, human sin is not the result of a posi­
tive cause, but of a negative unwillingness to will the good. 
Even though all men have weaknesses and problems as a result 
of the fall, no man is fated to sin, 
Since, despite their ignorance and difficulty, He 
CGodJ has not withdrawn from them the freedom to ask 
and seek and strive, but is ready to give to those 
who ask, to show the way to those who seek, and to 
open to those who knock.41 
Thus God's condemnation of mankind is a just condemnation, 
for man falls through his own free will. It is only after 
the fall that man is unable to reverse his condition without 
the grace of God. As Augustine puts it, "Any excuse that men 
39 St. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, p. 172. 
40 David E. Roberts, "The Earliest Writings," in Batten-
house, p. 119. 
41 
St. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, pp. 217-218. 
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are wont to allege on grounds of ignorance is taken away 
42 
from those who know the commandments of God." 
But by the same token, Augustine refuses to acknowledge 
a defense of free will in man which leaves no place for God's 
help in leading a good life. He does not sidestep the Pauline 
analysis of Romans 7:16 ("For I know that there dwelleth not 
in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. For 
to will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is 
good, I find not."), but acknowledges the need for man to seek 
the grace which helps in overcoming the law of sin and death: 
"Man's free will is not enough unless he is given the victory 
by the Lord in answer to his prayer that he be not led into 
43 
temptation." The pattern presented by the Christian under­
standing is typically a both/and cc.nbination of two extremes: 
on the one hand is the irrefutable fact of man's free will and 
God's just condemnation for his wilfully sinful acts; on the 
other hand there is the paradoxical fact of grace, in which man 
recognizes his depravity and yet seeks God's help in overcom­
ing it. 
The extremes of judgment/grace evidenced in this kind 
of a model are a part of the Biblical understanding of man's 
relation with God from the beginning. In Leviticus 6, for 
example, we find a stringent denunciation of sin even when 
it is a result of moral ignorance. 
42 St. Augustine, Grace and Free Will, p. 255. 
43 St. Augustine, Grace and Free Will, p. 261. 
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If any one sin through ignorance, and do one of those 
things which by the law of the Lord are forbidden, and 
being guilty of sin, understands his iniquity, He 
shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the 
priest, according to the measure and estimation of the 
sin: and the priest shall pray for him, because he 
did it ignorantly: and it shall be forgiven him, 
Because by mistake he trespassed against the Lord. 
(Leviticus 5:17-19) 
Augustine clearly recognizes the paradox he is handling. 
Among the many passages in his essay on grace and free will 
which reveal his understanding of the problem, perhaps the 
simplest is in Chapter 5: 
When God says: 'Turn to me....and I will turn to you," 
(Zacho 1:3), the one part, namely that we turn to Him, 
apparently pertains to the will, while the other, 
namely, that He Himself will also turn to us, refers 
to His grace.44 
At the end of this particular section, Augustine muses that 
it is all finally a mystery—and if we are tempted to dis­
pute with God over the problem of evil, the fate of an unbap-
tized baby, or any other prickly theological issue, we 
should remember to walk only according to the light we have 
received: "...and God will disclose to you this mystery also, 
if not in this life, at least in the next, for 'there is noth-
45 
ing concealed that will not be disclosed.1" For Augustine, 
it was useless to imagine a perfect world in which the will 
is exercised in accordance with a right desire for the good. 
It is better, he writes, to see the world as it actually is, 
as the best of all possible worlds, and to see everything 
44 St. Augustine, Grace and Free Will, p. 261. 
45 St. Augustine, Grace and Free Will, pp. 306-307. 
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contributing to a providential end, than to suggest that God 
46 
might have done it differently. 
St. Thomas' explanation of the doctrine of free will has 
much in common with the Augustinian argument. St. Thomas, 
too, founds the notion of free will on man's freedom to 
strive after an ultimate good. The highest good is God; in 
seeking Him, man may be sidetracked by various incomplete 
47 
"goods." Thus Aquinas' definition of what constitutes a 
"good" or a "bad" action follows Augustine's very closely— 
a good action is one which fosters attainment of the final 
good, and a bad action is one which is incompatible with 
this attainment. 
From this point on, Aquinas' arguments closely parallel 
the paradoxical line of thought already set forth by St. Augus­
tine. In the Summa Theologica I., Q. 6 art. 4, St. Thomas 
follows the Augustinian emphasis on the freedom of the will, 
making a distinction between the immediate act of willing and 
the "act of the will commanded by it." He insists that though 
the "commanded act of the will" may be corrupted, the pure 
or immediate act of willing cannot be violated by compulsion: 
"... it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act that 
48 
it should be subject to compulsion or violence." 
46 St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will, p. 160. 
47 See F. C. Copleston's full explanation of this aspect 
of Aquinas' theology in A History of Medieval Philosophy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 188-189. 
48 St. Thomas, "Summa Theologica" in Introduction to St. 
Thomas Aquinas, ed„ Anton C. Pegis (New York: Modern Library, 
1948), p. 486. 
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On the other hand, in his understanding of grace, St. 
Thomas insists with Augustine that "without grace men do 
nothing good when they think or will or love or act" (Summa 
49 
Theoloqica II, Q. 109, art. 2). He explains that when 
natural man was in an uncorrupted state he naturally pre­
ferred the love of God above all other things. In the fallen 
state, however, he is sick, and like a sick man is able to 
perform some constructive acts but unable to fulfill his true 
potential. He therefore needs the "help of grace healing 
his nature to raise his eyes to the ultimate good" (Summa 
50 
Theoloqica II, Q. 109, art 3). 
If man, then, is incapable in his corrupted nature of 
fulfilling his true potential, how much is left for him to 
do at all? Can he even prepare himself for the reception 
of grace? Here St. Thomas, like St. Augustine, can only 
restate the paradox of free agency in man, the extent to 
which free will is actually free to seek God on its own. His 
comment on John 15:5 (where Christ declares that without 
him, man can do nothing) demonstrates his double vision of 
49 St. Thomas, "Summa Theologica," ed„ Pegis, p. 655. 
St. Thomas and St. Augustine are sometimes compared on the 
issue of grace, with St. Thomas characterized as the champion 
of the doctrine of utter depravity, and Augustine as the 
champion of an unfalien free will in man. It is easy to see 
how such a characterization occurs, because there is a 
decided emphasis in each apologist on the side with which 
they are often identified. On careful reading of both phi­
losophers, however, it can be demonstrated that they are 
remarkably similar in their paradoxical view of the problem 
of grace and free will. 
50 St. Thomas, "Summa Theologica," ed. Pegis, p. 655. 
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the issue: "Hence when a man is said to do what is in him 
to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is 
51 
moved by God" (Summa Theoloqica, II, Q. 109, art. 6). St. 
Thomas thus finally places the responsibility for freedom of 
the will on the movement of God's grace within the indi­
vidual. And yet, while God "predestines" grace to be accessi­
ble to all hearts "God will have all men to be saved and to 
come to the knowledge of the truth" (I Tim. 2:4), the human 
agent can refuse the grace without which he can do nothing. 
Thus the grace of God has a certain necessity, but it is "not 
a necessity of coercion," as St. Thomas puts it, but of 
52 
"infallibility" (Summa Theologica II, Q. 112, art. 3). 
That is, if God's grace is not rejected when it is presented, 
it will infallibly come to fruition in the individual. St. 
Thomas does not end this particular discussion of the problem 
of grace with an acknowledgement of the final obscurity of 
the doctrine of divine grace, but the paradoxical nature of 
his lengthy discussions on the subject seem to indicate the 
same deep recognition of ultimate mystery which is expressed 
in Augustine. 
Boethius, who forms the philosophical bridge between the 
early Christian era and the Middle Ages, has perhaps the 
clearest explanation of Christian concept of freedom, and a 
statement of his position offers a good summary of the 
51 St. Thomas, "Summa Theoloqica," ed. Pegis, p. 663. 
52 St. Thomas, "Summa Theoloqica," ed. Pegis, p. 676. 
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Christian view at this point. The message of the Consolation 
of Philosophy is that in order to be truly free, a man must 
submit his will to the divine will, accepting the earthly 
destiny which is his. In other words, man's liberty is found 
53 
in voluntary enslavement to the perfect Will of God. 
Etienne Gilson has an illuminating comment on this tradi­
tional Christian idea: 
Will is free only brcause man is endowed with a reason 
capable of knowing and choosing. The better a man 
uses his reason, the freer he is. God and the superior 
intellectible substances enjoy a knowledge so perfect 
that their judgment is infallible; their liberty is 
therefore perfect. As to man, his soul is all the 
freer as it patterns itself on divine thought; it is 
less free when it turns away from God to the knowledge 
of sensible things, and still less so when it allows 
itself to be governed by the passions of the body it 
animates. To will what God wills, and love what he 
loves, is the highest form of liberty; it is therefore 
happiness.^4 
For Boethius, as for St. Thomas and St. Augustine, 
liberty cannot be viewed in isolation from the hierarchy of 
Divine Love within which it is defined. True freedom is not 
only a matter of free willing, but of freely willing to "love 
God and to serve Him forever." Such willing, paradoxically, 
is not possible in a fallen state without the grace of God. 
As we pointed out earlier, however, although man cannot 
attain a love of God without grace, he is capable of refusing 
grace and thus of cutting himself off from ultimate happiness. 
53 See Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Rich­
ard Green (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp. 91-96. 
54 Etienne Gilson, A History of Christian philosophy in 
the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 102. 
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Judgment is an irrefutable fact in all the patristic fathers, 
and the possibility of eternal damnation a substantial fact. 
The scriptural declaration: "And as it is appointed unto all 
men once to die and after this the judgment;" (Hebrews 9:27) 
echoes in a wrathful pronouncement near the end of Augustine1s 
City of God (Book 19, Chapter 28): 
The doom in store for those who are not of the City of 
God is an unending wretchedness that is called "the 
second death, 1 because neither the soul, c:ut off from 
the life of God, nor the body, pounded by perpetual 
pain, can there be said to live at all. And what will 
make that second death so hard to bear is that there 
will be no death to end it.55 
Here, unlike descriptions of judgment in classical legend, 
there is no loophole, however small, for a second chance at 
life. Once the choice has been made in life it becomes a 
man's destiny for eternity. 
The fact of free will with its awesome alternatives 
gives the individual a tremendous freedom and power in the 
Christian view of man—a power not nearly so evident in the 
classical vision, where a character's ultimate destiny is seen 
to be a latent part of his innate nature from the beginning. 
We have seen that the very dramatic quality of Greek tragedy 
springs from the illusion of free will in a character created 
by the seeming reversals of the fateful circumstances govern­
ing his life. In the Christian view of man this dramatic 
quality is no illusion, but a reality—the choices the indi­
vidual makes in regard to the true good have a substantial 
55 St. Augustine, City of God, ed. Bourke, p. 482. 
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effect on his life in the present and on his life after death. 
Unlike the characters of Greek legend, Biblical characters 
are not carried along by an external destiny, but rather 
decide their own destiny in life. 
The Christian insistence on the existence of free will 
in man makes possible the presentation of a unified portrayal 
of personality in history. Man no longer fights against 
what he unconsciously senses to be his real character, 
his real fate, until capitulation at death, but he con­
sciously takes his destiny in hand, and in the midst of the 
conflicts of life, decides the character and the fate which 
will fill out his life on earth and his life in eternity. 
Man's actions in history thus become important to a degree 
unimaginable in the Greco-Roman mind, because man works out 
his destiny in history, in the throes of the conflicting in­
fluences of good and evil. Thus, as Auerbach puts it: 
The drama of earthly life takes on a painful, immod­
erate, and utterly unclassical intensity, because it 
is at once a wrestling with evil and the foundation 
of God's judgment to come.^ 
Perhaps nowhere in the New Testament does the intensity 
of the struggle of decision show up more strongly than in the 
Biblical account of Jesus' meeting with Nicodemus in John 3. 
The scriptural narrative is characteristically suggestive; 
the barest details of the circumstances of the encounter are 
given. Nicodemus is briefly described as a Pharisee and a 
56 Eric Auerbach, Dante; Poet of the Secular World, 
trans. Ralph Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1929), p. 14. 
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"ruler of the Jews." He comes to Jesus at night expressing 
wonderment at the miraculous signs Christ performs, and 
commenting that such signs can only be from God. Jesus 
responds by focusing the conversation on his own position 
as intermediary between heaven and earth and on his authority 
to speak of heavenly things, as one sent from heaven 
(John 3:11-13), and as one who testifies through the quality 
of his earthly actions that what he says is true (John 3: 
16-21). All this is done with a characteristically objective 
quality, a capacity for simply stating the facts, for putting 
the onus of response directly on the recipient of the message. 
After assuring Nicodemus of the ultimately benevolent pur­
poses of God in sending His Son ("For God sent not his Son 
into the world to judge the world, but that the world may be 
saved through him"), Jesus makes explicit the alternatives 
set before man: "He who believes in him is not judged; but 
he that doth not believe is already judged, because he be­
lieves not in the name of the only-begotten Son of God" 
(v. 18). After this straightforward declaration of the con­
tent of God's judgment on the unbeliever, Jesus concludes by 
enlarging on the basic moral problem which keeps them from 
experiencing the light of grace: ("And this is the judgment, 
because the light is come into the world and men loved dark­
ness rather than the light; for their deeds were evil", 
John 3:19). 
Jesus' conversation is pointed without being overwhelm­
ing; powerfully explicit, yet without the didacticism which 
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characterizes most religious discussion. He does not accuse 
Nicodemus personally of the moral darkness which keeps a 
man from the light, but simply points up the fact that this 
is usually the major barrier. We can only assume that the 
message, in combination with the fact that Nicodemus comes 
to Jesus at night, under cover of the very darkness which 
gives Christ's brief comments such metaphorical power, will 
have a profound effect on Nicodemus. The suggestive power 
of the situation and Christ's insight into the basic moral 
conflict in Nicodemus1 soul, recalls the tension preceding 
the unvoiced decision of the rich young ruler. 
We are not told Nicodemus1 response, but a later inci­
dent gives us an inkling of the internal conflict he exper­
iences as a result of Jesus' words. The account comes four 
chapters later in John 7. Jesus has come to Jerusalem for 
the Jewish Feast of Tabernacles and has been preaching openly 
once again concerning his mission as one sent from God to 
perform the deeds of light which prove his authority and 
his origin in the Father—basically the same message as He 
had given to Nicodemus earlier in his ministry. The Phari­
sees, Nicodemus among them, send officers to arrest Jesus, 
but by the scriptural account they are so impressed with his 
authority ("Never did man speak like this man," John 7:46) 
that they leave him undisturbed and come back to the Jewish 
leaders empty-handed. 
Miffed at this challenge to their own authority, the 
Pharisees tongue-lash the officers for being led astray by 
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the fickle-minded hero-worship of a crowd and for wavering 
in their allegiance to traditional Jewish authority: 
The Pharisees therefore answered them: Are you also 
seduced? Hath any one of the rulers believed in him, 
or of the Pharisees? But this multitude, that knoweth 
not the law, are accursed. (John 7:47-49) 
Nicodemus, who has remained silent throughout this exchange, 
and who has evidently continued to keep his own encounter 
with Jesus a secret, is obviously galvanized by the pointed 
question: "Have any of the authorities or the Pharisees 
believed in him?" Stung by the powerful message of Jesus' 
earlier challenge, he attempts an indirect defense of Jesus 
by raising a legal point: "Does our law judge a man without 
first giving him a hearing and learning what he does?" 
(John 7:51). But this defense, feeble as it is, reflects 
only Nicodemus1 continued personal conflict with the person 
of Jesus. One intuits that he does believe, that he is 
secretly and profoundly attached to the person of Christ, but 
is by the same token without the moral courage or conviction 
to openly testify to that fact. He cannot speak, and his 
half-hearted attempt at bringing some justice to bear on the 
situation is put down mightily by the biting sarcasm of the 
other Pharisees: 
They answered, and said to him: Art thou also a Galilean? 
Search the scriptures, and see, that out of Galilee a 
prophet riseth not. (John 7:52)57 
57 Oxford Bible Scholars characterize the tone of this 
verse as "Sarcasm, expressing the contempt of Jerusalem aris­
tocrats for Galilean peasants." Note on John 7:52 in the 
Oxford Annotated Bible (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1965), p. 1296. 
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My reading of these two incidents is, of course, an inter­
pretation of what the scripture presents as bald narrative 
fact. But the facts do speak, and the characterization of 
Nicodemus which arises from the bare report given in Scrip­
ture is of a different order from that found in classical 
portraits. Nicodemus is a man who knows the truth about 
Jesus ("No One can do these signs that you do, unless God 
is with him", John 3:2), and who is yet without the moral 
courage to acknowledge Jesus before men. Afraid to reveal 
his own real attraction to Jesus and his own conflict over 
Christ's claim to absolute authority, he consistently hides 
his struggle. What remains with us in regard to the charac­
ter of Nicodemus is an impression of great internal conflict— 
great respect for the raw authority of Christ's claims strug­
gling against great fear at the thought of identification 
with a Galilean peasant who at the time was undermining the 
very foundations of his own culture, a great attraction to 
Jesus on the one hand countermanded by fear and doubt on the 
other. Above all, we are left with an impression of profound 
moral failure once we realize that Nicodemus is not going to 
reveal his respect for and perhaps even belief in Christ, 
once we realize he is not even going to reveal his struggle. 
The quality of secrecy in Nicodemus, his inability at the 
moment to make an open confession of his inner mind, is rein­
forced by the omnipresent physical metaphor of night, conceal­
ment, and darkness with which he is so effectively associated. 
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And yet, in the scriptural account there is no sugges­
tion of external judgment made on Nicodemus. We are not even 
told his final choice. What we do know is that he is in 
great conflict over it. The incidents are related with such 
Spartan purity that they raise our consciousness of his con­
flict to an almost unbearable intensity. This is the Bibli­
cal method of characterization—a decision for or against 
the person of Christ or the love of God placed in high 
relief, abruptness, suggestiveness, use of direct dis­
course, preoccupation with internal conflict and choice, 
great suspense—and looming behind it all, a claim to the 
universalized interpretation of history which lends such 
intensity to the particular historical moment. 
We see at least some of these characteristically Bibli­
cal elements in St. Augustine's description of his own 
encounter with Christ in the Eighth Book of the Confessions. 
It is significant that Augustine prefaces the now-famous 
description of his conversion with a long discussion of the 
conflict in his divided will. The following passage is only 
a short excerpt from a tortured monologue which runs for 
several pages: 
As for me, when I deliberated upon serving the Lord my 
God, as I had long planned to do, it was I myself who 
willed and I myself who did not will it. It was I 
myself. I neither willed it completely nor did I 
refrain completely from willing it. Therefore I was 
at war within myself, and I was laid waste by myself. ° 
5 8 St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine (New 
York: Image Books, 1960), pp. 197-98. 
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Augustine goes on to describe the gradual strengthening of 
his will both through preliminary trials and encouraging 
visions of future spiritual joy. In this conflict we see 
the general Christian preoccupation with decision and with 
the tension and psychological suspense which accompanies 
it. Just before his final capitulation to the Divine Will, 
Augustine relates a deep experience of contrition, the same 
emotion so clearly evidenced by David immediately before his 
own restoration to favor with God. Like the narrator of the 
Davidic story, Augustine never avoids fairly open descrip-
59 
tions of his early "drunkenness, rioting and impurities," 
and thus demonstrates once again in his own developing char­
acter the Christian pattern of sin-repentance-mercy-renewal, 
the Christian willingness to reveal both the debased and 
exalted aspects of individual character. Augustine also 
makes it clear that he sees his own experience in the context 
of the Judeo-Christian perspective—he makes constant ref-
60 
erence to Creation (Book 13: Chapters 19-24), to his link 
61 
with Adam and sin (Book 8: Chapter 10), to various events 
62 
in Christ's life (Book 13, Chapter 19), to the fact of God's 
63 
control over all of history (Book 11, Chapters 9-11). 
59 St. Augustine, Confessions, p. 202. 
^^St. Augustine, Confessions, pp. 350-355. 
61 St. Augustine, Confessions, p. 198. 
6 2 St. Augustine, Confessions, p. 350. 
6 3 St. Augustine, Confessions, pp. 284-286. 
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While large similarities exist between the elements of 
Scriptural characterization and the Augustinian approach, 
there is fundamental contrast in the mode of presentation 
stemming from the difference between the objective nature of 
Scriptural revelation and the subjective nature of an indi­
vidual response to that revelation. Augustine's personal 
account of his conversion is deeply moving, but has not the 
existential majesty of the Scriptural record. His account 
is necessarily personal, emotional. While the narrator of 
David's story describes great extremes of emotion, the 
account itself lacks the deep outpouring of inner emotion 
which we see in Augustine. The Scriptural record is bare, 
factual, concise to the point of starkness. But, as Auerbach 
has pointed out, it is that very starkness which gives it such 
power—which has the power to draw out, in fact, the kind of 
psychological response we see in Augustine. One might even 
say that Scripture forms the objective truth for which Augus­
tine is the subjective mirror. This of course is the prob­
lem of comparing any piece of Christian literature with the 
Scripture. When it is done, one is really comparing what are 
properly responses to the standard of truth with the standard 
itself. Nevertheless, the major elements which have been 
demonstrated an intrinsic part of a specifically Christian 
presentation are there—most especially the emphasis on 
conflict and choice, the willingness to present human char­
acter in both its good and evil aspects and the emphasis 
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on individual salvation within the total scope of the Divine 
plan of history. 
The characteristics we perceive here only lend emphasis 
to our earlier observation that Christianity encourages a new 
respect for earthly history, for a conception of reality 
which allows depiction of the divine in the human, of the 
sublime in the humble. In contrast with the classical ten­
dency to formulate philosophies of escape from the chaotic 
world of experience, Christian philosophers exhort man to 
total immersion in earthly destiny following the example of 
Christ, who in utter humility subjected himself to earthly 
happening. According to Augustine, salvation itself depends 
on such an attitude of humility. In the essay on free will 
he described the fate of the proud man: 
Since they have not sought God through the lowly 
entrance of humility, which the Lord Jesus Christ has 
shown us in His own life, and have been unforgiving 
and proud during life, they will be placed on his left 
side where He will say to them: 'Depart into ever­
lasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his 
angels' (Matthew 25:41).64 
The result of the Christian emphasis on man's recogni­
tion of his limitations, on his call to total immersion in 
earthly happening, on his responsibility to choose the love 
of God over the love of lesser goods, is not only an intensi­
fication of man's awareness of the value and drama of his­
torical life, but an intensification of his awareness of his 
64 St. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, p. 192. 
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rational individuality, his capacity for free choice. In 
addition, the breakdown of the classical barrier between 
universal truth and historical reality allows for depiction 
of characters who can be at some points in their personal 
histories weak, sinful, even ridiculous, and at other points 
noble and praiseworthy. Once Christian philosophers began 
to comprehend the great paradox of sin and mercy, of exalta­
tion through humiliation and suffering, they opened up the 
possibility of depicting a character who was at once saint 
and sinner; who could act in sin and be renewed through 
repentance; who could undergo the severest earthly humilia­
tion and suffering and yet be exalted beyond earthly measure. 
In all this, the classical distinctions between the 
vulgar and the sublime, between the comic and the tragic, 
between high society and low disappear, and what is left is 
an emphasis on the fully historical man, one capable of 
development and of great extremes of emotion and behavior. 
This fluctuation can perhaps be most clearly seen in the New 
Testament character of Simon Peter, who was born a fisherman 
and died an apostle and who, in the course of his development, 
demonstrates the wildest extremes of foolishness and profound 
insight. On the one hand, Peter is the impulsive and uncon­
scious braggart, swearing loyalty to a Christ who knew his 
weakness, and later miserably despairing over his betrayal 
of the one he loved best; on the other hand he is the clear­
headed warrior of faith depicted in the Acts, preaching the 
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gospel and exercising his responsibility for the early 
church with great authority and faith. 
In sum, the Christian understanding of history is seen 
to encourage a new concern for the development of particular 
individuals within the scope of a well-defined interpretation 
of history. Maurice de Wulf reminds us once again that the 
real basis for the new emphasis on the individual is the 
Christian understanding of personal salvation: 
...Christianity places upon each soul purchased by 
Christ's sacrifice an inestimable worth, and it fur­
nished the poor and the rich and the great and the 
small with the same standard of value.̂ 5 
Though the Biblical definition of salvation remained the 
foundation for the value attached to personhood in Christen­
dom, the Fathers of the Church enlarged and expanded upon the 
concept until it became one of the great themes of feudal 
66 
society. The general discussion of the worth of the indi­
vidual received further definition in the many and thorough 
treatments of the issue of individual existence in the after­
life to be found in the Fathers. 
In the following section of this study, I will discuss 
first the general definition of the individual which is tra­
ditionally popular during the medieval period and second, the 
concept of personal immortality which rounds out the Christian 
notion of personality. 
65 Maurice de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in 
the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1922), p. 34. 
^^De Wulf, pp. 34-56. 
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It was Boethius who articulated the first real statement 
of the principle of individuation in the Middle Ages. In its 
general outlines, Boethius' philosophical approach to the 
problem follows in the Aristotelian tradition. First, he 
demonstrates that general concepts cannot be substances 
(i.e., the concepts of "genera" and "species" are common to 
groups of individuals and thus cannot themselves be indi-
67 
viduals). Second, he points out that it does no harm to 
draw abstract notions about man and animals (such as "genera" 
68 
and "species") from concrete individuals. He then concludes 
that "universals subsist in connection with sensible things, 
but we know them separate from bodies." Thus Boethius devised 
a way of talking about universals and individuals without 
69 
separating them from each other in a given concrete instance. 
Boethius' definition of the human person follows on his 
explanation of the problem of universals and particulars. A 
person, though he may participate in the general species of 
man and in one or more sub-species, is primarily an individual 
substance: 
Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and 
these rational, and if every nature is a substance, 
existing not in universals, but in individuals, we 
have found the definition of person: viz: 'the 
6 7 Boethius, The Theological Tractates, trans. H. F. 
Steward and E. K. Rand (London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 
1918), pp. 85-86. 
68 
Boethius, p. 87. 
69 See E. Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in 
the Middle Ages (New. York: Random House, 1955), pp. 98-99. 
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individual substance of rational nature.essences 
indeed can have potential existence in universals, 
but they have particular substantial existence in 
particulars alone. For it is from particulars that 
our comprehension of universals is taken. 
Here the Greek pattern of using the universal to interpret 
the particular is reversed. In the Christian view, the con­
crete, the individual is what is real, and "substance" no 
71 
longer refers to universal truth, but to historical reality. 
The same emphasis on historical reality is continued in 
Aquinas, whose definition of individuality is heavily influ­
enced by Boethian notions. St. Thomas, however, spends more 
time elaborating the content of the essential quality of 
"rationality" which is identified by Boethius: 
...in a more special and perfect way, the particular 
and the individual are found in the rational substances 
which have dominion over their own actions: and which 
are not only made to act, like others, but which can 
act of themselves, for actions belong to singulars. 
Therefore also the individuals of rational nature have 
a special name even among other substances, and 
name is person (Summa Theoloqica I, 29, art. 1). 
In this passage, St. Thomas associates rationality directly 
with the concept of free choice, suggesting that one of the 
essential qualities of the individual personality is the 
capacity for rational choice. In his commentary on the 
Thomistic passage just quoted Gilson notes that the concept 
70 Boethius, pp. 85-86. 
71 Boethius1 understanding of substantial reality is 
reinforced by his explanation of the dual nature of Christ, 
who was historically God/Man in a single person. (Boethius, 
p. 118) 
72 St. Thomas, Summa Theoloqica, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, 2 vols. (New York: Benziger, 
1947), 1:156. 
this 
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of personality has its roots in the patristic understanding 
of rational individuality as free agency: 
The essence of personality is one with that of liberty; 
on the other hand, liberty has its root in rationality 
and since it is this very rationality that lies at 
the basis of the subsistence of the soul, and the sub­
sistence, therefore of the man, it follows that, in us, 
the principle of individuality and the principle of 
personality come back in the end to the same thing. 
In the Thomistic view, God is the most perfect "person," 
because He is the most perfectly rational, and therefore per­
fectly free, Being. Man, created by God, takes his value 
from God. A given human personality has worth because it is 
created in the image of God and contains within itself the 
capacity for accepting or rejecting the transforming power 
of God's love. As Gilson points out: 
Christian personalism...has its roots in the meta-
physic of the Exodus; we are persons because we are 
the work of a person; we participate in his personal­
ity even as, being good, we participate in his per­
fection; being causes, in His creative power; being 
prudent, in His providence, and, in a word, as being 
in His Being.74 
Individuation, then, depends primarily on man's capacity for 
free choice, a choice which is rooted in every rational being 
and which derives ultimately from the Trinitarian Person of 
the Godhead. 
A proper assessment of the place of the human body in 
the idea of personality is equally important to the Christian 
73 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936)^ pp. 201-202. 
74 Gilson, p. 205. 
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definition of individuality. It is the physical body which 
enables the separate existence on which the expression of 
love depends. Boethius was the first to suggest that sub­
stantial existence was not found in forms, but in sensible 
75 
objects, and Aquinas develops this thought, working out a 
description of the interaction of mind and body and of body 
and soul which expresses the indivisibility of matter and 
spirit in the human personality. Unlike the Platonists, 
St. Thomas believed that man was neither a pure intelligence 
(like an angel) nor a "spirit in a corpse," but rather an 
76 
"organic composite of mind and body." Because man's general 
77 
knowledge is incomplete without reference to particulars, 
the mind's knowledge must be rooted in the physical world. 
The body and its sensory apparatus are thus necessarily a 
part of thought and thus bound up with mind. As Carre'puts 
it, "the mind expresses itself in sensation as well as thought 
...thus men's minds are individualized because bodies are nec-
78 
essarily a part of particular existence." 
75 / 
Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 39. 
*7 6 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, I, p. 77; see Chapters 79-100, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English 
Dominican Fathers, 2 vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers, 
1924), 11:244; also Anton C» Pegis, "Introduction" in 
Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Pegis (New York: 
Modern Library, 196 ), p. xxiii. 
77 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 201. 
78 
Carre, p. 79. 
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Here one can see a definite contrast with the Classicism 
which preceded Thomas. In extreme Platonist thought, the 
mind is separate in essence from sensory experience, and it 
is separate not only in the sense that it is capable of 
abstraction from sensory experience, but in the sense that 
it contains, in and of itself, ideas which are prior to 
79 
sensory experience. In the Christian view the things of 
the spirit can only be known through sensible bodies. The 
relation of mind,soul and body is wholly integrated into 
"one living, sensing, feeling, desiring, willing and thinking 
80 
organism," and the supreme revelation of God to man is made 
in the flesh. 
At first, this notion of the indivisibility of body and 
spirit may seem incompatible with a theory of personal immor­
tality, since it follows that if soul and body are one, then 
when the body dies, the soul must pass out of existence also. 
But St. Thomas solves this by arguing that the soul when 
separated from the body by death continues on as immortal 
but not in a natural state, since it is by definition the 
81 
form of a body. Thus there can be no complete human person 
without a body. Aquinas1 insistence on the final indivisibil­
ity of soul and body is most clearly evident in his explanation 
79 Carre, p. 80. 
80 
F. C. Copleston, p. 188. 
81 See Chapters LXXX and LXXXI in St. Thomas, Summa Con­
tra Gentiles, II, 228-229. 
I 
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of the meaning of Christ's death and resurrection. Replying 
to those who interpret the resurrection as a purely spiritual 
phenomena he writes: 
On the contrary, Augustine says: 'The one death of 
our Saviour namely, that of the body, saved us from 
our two deaths, that is of the soul and the body'.... 
Hence Christ's death is said to have destroyed in us 
both the death of the soul, caused by sin, according 
to Romans 4:25: 'He was delivered up (namely unto 
death) for our sins:' and the death of the body, con­
sisting in the separation of the soul, according to 
I Cor. 15:54: 'Death is swallowed up in victory.' 
(Summa Theologica II, Q. 51, art. 3)°^ 
The final form of redemption according to St. Thomas is a 
form which includes the reunion of the incorruptible soul 
and the resurrected body. Thus the doctrine of the insepa­
rability of sense and spirit in life and in the resurrected 
afterlife is seen to be an integral part of the Christian 
conception of human personality. 
The same insistence on the immortality of the human 
personality in its totality is paralleled in St. Augustine. 
Augustine was greatly influenced by the Platonic notion that 
83 
man is a "soul that uses a body," but we find it necessary 
to argue that he never took this literally, but rather, with 
Etienne Gilson, as a "forcible expression of the transcendent 
84 
superiority of the soul over the body." The soul, although 
82 
St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, II, 2297-2298. 
8 3 
See Anton C. Pegis, "Introduction," in Introduction 
to St. Thomas Aquinas, p. xxi; also E. Gilson, History of 
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 74. 
84 Gilson, pp. 20 and 74; St. Augustine writes in his 
essay on The Immortality of the Soul, that "...The soul is 
affected prior to the body by those highest and eternal 
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superior to the body because immortal, remained in indissol­
uble union with it in life, as can be seen in Augustine's 
description of this union: 
The entire soul is present at one and the same time, 
in the single parts, and it experiences sensation as 
a whole at one and the same time, in the single 
parts.85 
While he insisted on the inseparability of the hierarchy of 
soul and body in life and thus consistently rejected gnostic 
dualism, Augustine yet saw the same problem St. Thomas would 
deal with some 700 years later. If the union of soul and 
body is indissoluble, then why does the body die and the soul 
live on? Augustine's answer is that the Fall of Man has 
defaced the union of soul and body, making it imperfect in 
life. The body of man has, as a result of the Fall, become a 
86 
prison from which man desires to escape. But it is not the 
fact of the body which is the evil principle operative after 
the all, but the fact that man now takes his desires and 
principles, and by the same token, the soul is more greatly 
affected in proportion to the superiority over the body. 
This nearness is not one in space, but in the order of 
nature. In this order, then, it is understood that a form 
is given by the highest being through the soul to the 
body—the form whereby the latter exists, in so far as it 
does exist. Hence the body subsists through the soul and 
exists by the very fact that it is animated...." St. 
Augustine, The Immortality of the Soul in The Immortality 
of the Soul. The Magnitude of the Soul. On Music. The 
Advantage of Believing. Faith in Things Unseen, in The 
Writings of St. Augustine, trans. Ludwig Schopp. 18 vols. 
(New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1947); 11:43. 
85 St. Augustine, The Immortality of the Soul in The 
Writings of St. Augustine, II, 47. 
86 St. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, pp. 212-214. 
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ideals from the body, reversing the proper hierarchy. As 
Gilson puts it: "It is that error, not the body, which is 
the soul's tomb and the evil from which it has to be lib-
87 
erated." 
The Fall of Man as here described, can only be recti­
fied in Augustine's eyes, by a progressive and conscious 
turning of the soul upward toward heavenly things. He 
describes degrees of the soul's power—animation, sensation, 
art, virtue, tranquility, approach and contemplation—and 
refers to the first three as "The soul's power in the body," 
the next two as "the soul's power in itself," and the last 
88 
two as "the soul's power before God." Thus the soul passes 
through three stages—matter, spirit, and God, in a progres­
sive ascent towards the truth. It would seem by this descrip­
tion of the process of gradual purification that Augustine is 
happy to leave behind all connection with the physical body. 
But while describing what seems a suspiciously Platonic 
movement, he writes movingly about the resurrection of the 
body: 
We shall also see that this corporeal nature, in obed­
ience to the divine law, undergoes so many changes and 
vicissitudes that we may hold even the resurrection of 
the body to be so certain that the rising of the sun, 
after it has gone down, is not more certain to us.®^ 
87 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, p. 78. 
go 
Ludwig Schopp, "Introduction" to The Magnitude of the 
Soul in The Writings of St. Augustine, II, 59-149. 
89 St. Augustine, The Magnitude of the Soul, m The 
Writings of St. Augustine, II, 143. 
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It is only as the soul ascends to the truth that it sees the 
90 
certainty of a bodily resurrection. Later, Augustine does 
venture to say that these new bodies, whatever their sub­
stance, will be something very different from what we per-
91 
ceive as bodies now. Finally he refuses dogmatism on the 
subject: 
On these matters, I confess that I have not yet read 
anything which I think satisfactory either to learn 
or teach....it will be better for us to assert which 
we do not doubt—that the inner man will see God, as 
it alone is now able to see charity....92 
Thus Augustine does not espouse a Platonic doctrine of 
absorption into the One, but instead firmly reiterates his 
belief in the Christian principle of bodily individuation 
even after death. The accent is not so much on an escape 
from the body or from the "tyranny of the Many," as Plato 
saw it, but on an escape from the old nature of man, that 
corrupted nature which must die in all its aspects—physical, 
90 Augustine xs explicitly careful not to go beyond the 
bounds of Christian tradition in ascribing a purely "spirit­
ual" content to the term "body." In his Letters he writes: 
"But we must take thought not to venture into what is con­
trary to custom by saying that through the glory of resur­
rection the body puts off not only its mortal and corrup­
tible state, but even the very state of being a body and 
becomes a spirit." St. Augustine, Letters 131-164, in 
The Writings of St. Augustine, trans. Sister Wilfrid Par­
sons S.N.D., 18 vols. (New York, Fathers of the Church, Inc., 
1953), XI:219. 
91 St. Augustxne, Letters 131-164 xn The Wrxtxngs of 
St. Augustine, XI, 223-224. 
92 St. Augustine, Letters 131-164 xn The Writings of 
St. Augustine, XI, 236-237. 
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mental and spiritual—before it can be transformed into the 
"newness of life" made possible through Christ's death and 
Resurrection. 
It is on this basis that Augustine formulates his theology 
of personal immortality. Man in life is to be dying to his 
old self in order to be formed in the total and individual 
image of Christ, who came in the body. Thus Augustine's 
interpretation of I John 3:2, "Dearly beloved, we are now the 
sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We 
know, that, when he shall appear, we shall be like to him; be­
cause we shall see him as he is," testifies to his belief in 
a physical rebirth based on the acts accomplished by the Word 
made Flesh: 
Hence it is clear that the full likeness of God will 
then be realized in the image of God when it shall 
receive the full vision of Him. And yet it is possible 
to see in these words of John the Apostle a reference 
to the immortality of the body. For in this, too, we 
shall be like God, but only the Son, because He Alone 
in the Trinity took a body, in which He died, rose 
again, and which he brought to higher things.93 
Human nature for Augustine is most human when it has been 
redeemed in all aspects of its humanity, when it has been 
conformed completely to the image of God: "And when this 
nature, the most excellent in created things, is justified 
93 St. Augustine, The Trinity in Writings of St. 
Augustine, trans. Stephen McKenna C.S.S.R. 18 vols. (Wash­
ington: Catholic University of America Press, 1962), 
445-446; see also Augustine, "Letter 118" in Letters 83-130, 
The Writings of St. Augustine, trans. Sister Wilfrid Par-
1 sons, S.N.D. 18 vols. (New York: Fathers of the Church, 
Inc., 1953), XVIII:275f. 
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from its impiety by its own creator, it is transferred from 
94 
a deformed form into a beautiful form.11 
Augustine's theology of the individual is seen to be 
consistent with both Aquinas and Boethius in its essential 
drift. In Boethius, a philosophical basis for a theory of 
individuals is presented; in Augustine and Aquinas the scrip­
tural bases of that theory are explored and illumined. In 
all three, the emphasis falls on man as an individual person, 
capable of a relationship with his Creator based on rational 
choice and love. Man's essential nature is seen as "excel­
lent above all creation," but defaced by sin. Still, his 
original image is capable of transformation by grace into an 
individual reflection of the image of God. 
The importance of the concept of individual existence, 
of person in this redeemed sense, forms the basis for the 
Christian view of man and society operative during the Middle 
Ages. For Aristotle, as Maurice de Wulf points out, the state 
was an end in itself to which the individual was subordinated, 
and the primary function of education was to create a good 
citizen. For the Christian philosopher, on the other hand, 
the prime duty of education is to make men aware of their 
worth as persons in the sense just described, to impress on 
them their privileges and responsibilities as transformed 
souls. 
9 4  .  . . . . .  St. Augustine, The Trinity, m Writings of St. Augus­
tine, XVIII, 418. 
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This emphasis on the importance of the individual in 
society occurs throughout the major literature of the medieval 
95 
period. In the De Civitate Dei 12, 21, 1, Augustine makes 
the ethical growth of the individual man the essential ingred­
ient for both personal happiness and the furtherance of the 
96 
goal of human destiny. St. Thomas echoes Augustine in the 
De Regimine Principium (lib. I, cap. 14) that "The end of the 
group is necessarily the end of each individual who composes 
97 
the group." Dante also reiterates the subordination of 
state to individual in a famous passage from the De Monarchia: 
Wherefore it is also evident that although consul or 
King may be lord of others with respect to means of 
governing they are servants with respect to the end of 
governing; and without doubt the monarch must be held 
the chief servant of all.98 
The constant emphasis on the importance of the individual 
throughout the philosophical works which directly influence 
the Middle Ages has led Maurice De Wulf to comment on a cur­
rent tendency to characterize the Medieval period as defi­
cient in a recognition of the true worth of the individual: 
95 St. Augustine, The City of God: Books VIII-XVT, 
in The Writings of St. Augustine, VII:282-288. 
96 L. Schopp, "Introduction" to The Happy Life, m 
The Happy Life. Answer to Skeptics. Divine Providence and the 
Problem of Evil. Soliloquies in The Writings of St. Augustine, 
trans. Denis J. Kavanagh, Ludwig Schopp, Robert P. Russell, and 
Thomas Gilligan, 18 vols. (New York: Cima Publishing Co. , 1948), 1:21. 
97 Quoted by Maurice De Wulf in Philosophy and Civiliza­
tion in the Middle Ages, p. 227. 
QO 
Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia, trans. Aurelia Henry 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1904), p. 46. 
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Nothing is more false than the judgment which finds 
credit among so many historians, that one must await 
the Renaissance to see human personality appraised at 
its true worth. There are few philosophers who have 
accentuated the metaphysical, the psychological, and 
the moral and the social value of the individual so 
much as did the Scholastics. And just as the 13th 
Century is a century of striking personalities, it is 
also a century of discussions on all the problems which 
the questions of personality raises.^ 
Thus we see that an insistence on the integration of the indi­
vidual both before and after life is a cornerstone of Chris­
tian thought. Given that fact, what specific influence does 
it have on the presentation of character in the period? 
One area in which the Christian emphasis on the inte­
grated individual appears is the literary representation of 
characters after death. We remember that Homer and Virgil 
tended to represent characters in the afterlife as veiled, 
ethereal, stripped of any accidental historical individual­
ity. Anchises exhibits the typical characteristics of a 
universal father; Dido remains a fixed symbol of her passion­
ate nature; Elpenor embodies the type of the faithful retainer 
whose destiny was fated from the beginning. 
In contrast, the afterlife characters in the greatest 
of the Christian epics, Dante's Divine Comedy, not only seem 
vitally aware of the moment in which they created their own 
destiny, but demonstrate personalities of far greater indi­
viduality. This is not to say that Dante does not use his 
characters as universalized examples of a particular sin or 
virtue he might want to bring to our attention, but that in 
99 De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle 
Ages, p. 277. 
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addition to the typical aspect of characterization there 
is a much greater expression of personality, as well as a 
great awareness of human free agency. 
The narrative of Dante's encounter with Francesda da 
Rimini and her lover Paolo illustrates both aspects of char­
acterization. In the Inferno after being introduced by 
Virgil to a number of medieval and classical figures guilty 
of the sin of lust, Dante expresses a wish to speak to a pair 
whom he sees drifting on the wind. Virgil tells him to summon 
the two "by the love which impels them." When the pair ap­
pears, it is Francesca who does all the talking. Hailing 
Dante as "benign" and "gracious" for visiting "us who stained 
100 
the earth with blood," (Canto V, 1. 90), she returns his 
courtesies with a formally gracious remark which, however, 
bears the mark of the damned: 
If the King of the Universe were friendly to us/ we 
would pray to Him for your peace/ since you pity our 
perverse evil. (Inf. V, 91-93) 
Francesca then explains that she was in effect caught by 
the adulterous love which caused her death, an explanation 
which initiates an outburst of pity from Dante. 
In even this first part of the encounter two contrasts 
with the Greek view of characterization are evident. First, 
the irrefutable fact that Francesca is damned without possi­
bility of salvation or of any "second chance" comes through 
"'"^Dante, Ailighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans. H. R. 
Huse (New York: Rinehart Press, 1954), pp. 28-32. Here­
after all line references will be taken from the same edition. 
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in the conditional tone of her initial rejoinder to Dante— 
"If the King of Heaven were friendly...we would pray for 
your peace" (italics mine). There is no question of Frances-
ca's state or of her chances for redemption, a fact which 
reflects the orthodox Christian view of judgment. Second, 
Francesca's initial explanation of her fall into love is 
marked by a typically classical rationale which emphasizes 
the fated nature of her acquiescence: 
Love that exempts no one beloved from loving caught 
me so strongly with his charm that, as you see, it 
still does not leave me. (Inf. V, 11. 102-104) 
Here it is clear that Francesca avoids mention of her own 
responsibility in the matter of her sin, putting the blame 
rather on the overpowering strength of the feeling of 
romantic love. 
The end of the encounter, when Dante delicately asks 
about the immediate cause and occasion of Francesca's sin, 
reveals the new self-consciousness evident in Christian 
characterization and the Christian tendency to highlight one 
historical action, an action which can fill out eternity. 
Francesca, drawn out completely by Dante's compassion, tells 
Dante that she and her lover had been reading a novel about 
Lancelot's love for Guinevere, and suddenly overcome with 
passion, submit to their feelings for one another. The poig­
nancy of the story, the description of mounting desire, and 
afterwards the weeping Paolo and Dante's profoundly sympathetic 
reaction (overwhelmed with pity, he faints) all serve to give 
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this part of the encounter great dramatic intensity. It is 
an intensity further enhanced by the Christian conception of 
the awesome responsibility put on human beings in historical 
life. 
To those critics who are tempted (as for example H. R. 
Huse seems tempted in his gloss on the passage in Inf. V, 
pp. 28-32), to have too much sympathy for Francesca and Paolo, 
a sympathy which would contermand the Christian view of divine 
retribution and put the blame less on Francesca and Paolo 
than on the overpowering nature of the circumstances which 
led to their capitulation, we must point out Dante's own con­
trolled frame of reference and the subtle personal touches 
which make his outwardly charming portrait of Francesca 
slightly suspicious. We remember that at the beginning of 
Canto V, when Dante moves into the second ring of Hell, he 
learns from Virgil that carnal sinners are condemned "who 
subject their reason to desire" (Inf. V, 11. 37-39). This 
initial lesson forms the general background for Dante's later 
encounters with the shades who are guilty of lust, and we may 
take it as setting the tone for Dante's encounter with Paolo 
and Francesca. 
In this light, Francesca reveals a character which is 
less than sterling. Mark Musa points out that despite her 
charm, she shows a certain self-centeredness, reflected first 
in the self-conscious hunger for appreciation exhibited in 
her gratitude for the Pilgrim's expression of compassion, in 
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her equally self-conscious mention of her birthplace and in 
her almost too anxious desire to present herself with the 
101 
ladylike composure she possessed in life. Then, too, we 
remember Virgil1s comment when Dante wishes to speak with 
the two lovers—that one affectionate entreaty will "impel 
them" to come—thus suggesting the power which inordinate 
desire—in this case desire for the slightest show of affec­
tion—still possesses over them. Musa also suggests that 
Francesca's constant reference to her inseparable bond with 
Paolo is indicative of one aspect of their divine punishment, 
and not as some critics have suggested, a glowing declaration 
of the triumph of love over hell. Inseparable togetherness, 
Musa points out, could be "the bitterest aspect of their 
102 
punishment. " 
Thus it is clear that Dante puts some subtle restrictions 
on his characterization of Francesca to make us indirectly 
wary of her plenteous charm. It is not a directly didactic 
lesson which we learn—the character of Francesca is too rich, 
Mark Musa, Advent at the Gates: Dante's Comedy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 21-27. 
We might point out that though self-consciousness may be a 
part of what is revealed in Francesca1s mention of her 
birthplace, the obvious reason for her reference to Ravenna 
is that it is the place "where the Po descends with all its 
tributaries to find peace"—the peace which is forbidden to 
those overcome with desire—thus forming an ironic contrast 
with her would-be prayer for Dante1s peace only six lines 
earlier. 
102.. Musa, p. 32. 
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in some respects too admirable for that—but it is a lesson 
nonetheless, a lesson woven into the encounter through the 
personality of Francesca herself. Perhaps not only Dante the 
Pilgrim but Dante the Poet was a little entranced by the 
courtly charm of his own story. As Marianne Shapiro puts it, 
Dante seems at the same time to "reject the morality" of the 
chivalrous ideal in this story, and to "embrace its aes-
103 
thetic possibilities." We might suggest in addition 
that part of Dante's fascination with the story of Francesca 
and Paolo is the individual personality of Francesca herself— 
her femininity, her graciousness, her refined unwillingness 
to repent, in other words, Christian concern for the redemp­
tion of an utterly unique personality. In any case, the 
Christian view of history, the Christian emphasis on the indi­
vidual can be seen to inform this particular Dantesque 
encounter on all levels. 
The character of Francesca is not the only example of 
the influence of the Christian view of history on Dante1s 
Comedy. Eric Auerbach has pointed out the individuality 
of the characterization of Farinata degli Uberti and Guido 
Cavalcanti, and ties them directly to the Christian view of 
man. One, Farinata, confronts Dante with immense disdain, 
"as if he had scorn for Hell" (Inf., X, 1. 36). Cavalcanti, 
on the other hand, weeps and looks around anxiously for his 
103 Marianne Shapiro, Woman Earthly and Divine in the 
Comedy of Dante (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1975), p. 81. 
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son, whom he believes to have suffered his own fate (Inf. X, 
11. 52-72). The two figures, Auerbach points out, each accept 
damnation in a wholly individual way, and yet both are "fixed" 
104 
in judgment, with no chance of further development. Para­
doxically, however, it is that very fixity which intensifies 
the meaning of the choice they made in earthly life, and 
which focuses our attention once again on the most essential 
attribute of human individuality in the Christian view— 
man's free agency before God. While the characters in the 
Inferno are now fixed in judgment, they at one time freely 
chose what has become their destiny, and while their perso­
nalities are now stunted and deformed as a result, they 
reveal traces of their earlier, fully human stature. The 
characters of Cavalcanti and Farinata are fixed in judgment, 
but their individual forms are not destroyed. They were 
created after the image of God and vestiges of that image 
still remain. 
In summary, then, the Christian understanding of reality 
is controlled by a universal interpretation of history which 
allows for a combination of earthly reality with spiritual 
truth, the beauty of personality defaced but not entirely 
obliterated by the judgment of Hell. Because of the concept 
of original sin, the Christian understanding of the fall of 
man, no man, unless redeemed in the specifically Christian 
sense, can serve as a universal prescriptive ideal. In the 
104 Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 192. 
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Christian view, men are creatures who develop and who at a 
given point in their history make a decision for or against 
the person of Christ which determines their own condition 
in eternity. Thus it is more difficult to use a given his­
torical man as an ideal in the classical sense, for one indi­
vidual will have experienced extremes of sinfulness and good­
ness at varying points in his history. Such a character 
offers an uneven exemplum at best. 
A Christian view of character will focus the attention 
of the reader less on the character-as-ideal than on the 
character as an example of God's interaction with men in a 
living relationship, with the underlying purpose of encourag­
ing such interaction in the reader's life. Christ himself is 
not presented primarily as a classical ideal in the scrip­
ture , but as the great Lover of men1s souls, with whom there 
is the possibility of spiritual union in earthly life. A 
truly Christian characterization will not tend toward overt 
moralization, toward presentation of an ethical ideal, 
but toward such a presentation of character as will encourage 
an encounter with the living Christ. Dante, in the incident 
with Paolo and Francesca, uses the technique of presenting 
characters who are damned because they put human love before 
the Love of God, and thus choose their own doom. But the 
presentation is not overtly didactic. In fact, Dante seems 
to go to great pains to create a character in Francesca who, 
though damned, is capable of projecting great human charm and 
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beauty. Her appeal is partly an illusion, as we have pointed 
out, but it is also partly a result of the Christian belief 
that man is made individually in the image of God, and that 
this image is not totally effaced, even in Hell. Dante's 
characterization, though a powerful admonishment to the 
reader, is yet marked with the stamp of divine love. The 
characters are both universal symbols of perverted love and 
concrete personalities in whom we recognize the end result of 
a forfeiture of real liberty—the liberty as stated and 
restated by the Fathers, to love God and serve Him forever. 
It was Francesca1s refusal to seek the truest freedom in life 
which has led to her present situation. It is through her 
present situation that Dante appeals to us to take note of 
our own salvation. The heavy emphasis on human responsibil­
ity and Dante's attempt to confront the reader with his own 
need for decision become evident through its cosmic setting— 
a setting which, though within Dante's artistic vision, is 
yet presented as historical, as an inevitable future fact. 
The drama which arises from this set of affairs springs both 
from the Christian analysis of the essence of personality as 
rational choice, and from the universal Christian conception 
of history. The possibility of a fully realized personality 
after death and the possibility of a real judgment, of an 
eternally fixed location in heaven or hell, puts a great deal 
of importance on the choices made in this life. The choices 
a man makes, in fact, determine his eternal end, and create 
life-situations of unsurpassed drama. 
.1 
I 
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When the same set of historical presuppositions become 
part of the substrata of a work of art, the characters take 
105 
on a comparable dramatic intensity. This intensity is 
enhanced by the fact that each character1s choice and resul­
tant fate is a part of the total working of universal history, 
of the total destiny of the world. As Collingwood has pointed 
out, the Greek response to earthly happening after Aristotle 
tended to be totally rationalistic. Historical reality was 
viewed as a matter of evil and escape was possible only 
insofar as one participated in what could be ordered and con­
trolled. The need to order, to create something which could 
be controlled, is the real reason for Aristotle's separation 
of art and history, xiistory is chaos in Aristotle's eyes; 
there is no ultimate goal, no universal plan. Art, on the 
other hand, and in particular, the movement of the plot, can 
be ordered and harmonized, can be patterned and controlled 
by the human creator. Thus it is given a superior place in 
Aristotle's hierarchy of value, a place closer to the dis­
passionate harmony of the eternal verities. 
In Christianity, however, the emphasis is on the indi­
vidual character. A man is seen as part of a total plan which 
he may not perceive as ordered but in which he is neverthe­
less called to participate. He meets this circumstance not 
by escaping history or by trying to order it or to rise above 
it through art, but by immersing himself in it and making 
105 
Auerbach, Dante, p. 132. 
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the choices which determine his destiny. He is not left alone 
in the process—he has the objective light of Revelation in 
the Scriptures and the inner light of the Spirit—but his 
choices are often made in the teeth of terrifyingly adverse 
circumstances which offer no assurance of an ultimate good. 
The difference between the death of Christ and the death 
106 
of Socrates is the classic illustration of this contrast. 
Socrates dies in dignity, surrounded by friends, secure in 
his convictions, serenely accepting the death which he chooses. 
Christ dies a bloody, excruciating death, surrounded mostly 
by enemies and crying out despairingly at one point, "My 
God, my god, why hast thou forsaken me?" Auerbach comments: 
The story of Christ is more than the parousia of the 
logos. In it, the idea is subjected to the problematic 
character and desperate injustice of earthly happen­
ing. 107 
Only in the Christian view is a thorough melding of the change 
and decay of history and the immutability of the Divine made 
possible because only in Christianity has the Word become 
flesh. For the first time the door is open for creation 
of a literary character who can be portrayed in less than 
classical dignity, who can be at once saint and sinner. Peter 
begins a fisherman and ends the Rock of Christ's church. Noah 
makes a covenant with God and later lies naked and drunk in 
his tent. David commits adultery and is restored to God's 
Auerbach, Dante, p. 12. 
107 Auerbach, Dante, p. 13. 
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grace. The unpredictability of the state of such men greatly 
intensifies the potential dramatic suspense which envelops 
their stories. 
This representation of character reality is a far cry 
from that careful selectivity and categorization, the more 
static view of characterization, which marks the Greek per­
spective. In the one, God is the controller of destiny and 
the interaction between the human and the divine will is the 
essence of the dramatic situation. In the other, interaction 
with the Divine is not excluded, but, as W. P. Ker puts it, 
"the Olympian background is secondary." In the one, there is 
a rough, psychologically suggestive presentation of character 
growing out of an emphasis on the unpredictable and existen­
tial quality of human choice; in the other there is a smooth, 
psychologically externalized presentation of character with 
few motivational surprises and a consequent emphasis on fate. 
In the one there is a definitive description of individual 
afterlife, including two widely divergent possible destinies; 
in the other, the emphasis is less on the difference between 
wrath and beatitude after earthly life than on the stark dif­
ference between life and death itself. 
These basic differences in character representation 
spring from a basic difference in historical perspective. 
In the Christian view, a character cannot be abstracted from 
the universal objective plan of history revealed in Christ 
and demanding a human decision with the possibility of 
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salvation or damnation; in the Greek view, a character 
has an immediate historical location, but it is not part of 
a definitive historical pattern. The characters have no 
ultimate say about their own destinies and no definitive 
assurance of an individual afterlife; there is less chance 
for portrayal of character development because of the empha­
sis on the fated essence of the pre-existent soul and because 
of a tendency to avoid the depiction of debased characters 
in other than a comic role. Accident, not Divine love, is 
the motive force behind historical reality. Characters tend 
consequently to be flattened, universalized, not without 
drama, but without the intensely personal kind of drama 
exacted by the Christian view of reality. 
108 See Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, v (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1958), 12, on this point. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLASSICAL AND ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES ON FIGURATIVE 
EXPRESSION IN THE EXEGETICAL TRADITION AND THEIR 
RELATION TO LITERARY CHARACTERIZATION 
In the preceding chapter, an attempt was made to demon­
strate the consistent emphasis on historical individuality 
which forms the basis for the Judeo-Christian view of man and 
society in the Middle Ages. We saw that the Judeo-Christian 
definition of man is grounded in an understanding of reality 
as a combination of the earthly and the divine within a total 
historical plan which finds its fulfillment in the Incarna­
tion, Death, Resurrection and Second Coming of Jesus Christ. 
Throughout we saw how various elements of that view—includ­
ing the mixture of the humble and the sublime, the pattern 
of repentance/faith, the emphasis on character development 
and the act of decision, and the view of individual judgment 
and the afterlife—influenced the presentation of character 
in both Old and New Testaments and in well-known Christian 
literature of the patristic and medieval periods. 
There is yet another facet of characterization, closely 
related to the philosophical elements dealt with in Chapters 
II and III, which is important to a thorough grasp of the 
differences between the classical view of characterization 
and the Christian view—the question of figurative expression 
and how it is apprehended by each world-view. In fact, it may 
be that the differences between the two views of reality 
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are most clearly defined in terms of that aspect of charac­
terization which has to do with the approach each takes to 
the problem of symbol and allegory. 
In the centuries directly preceding the Middle Ages, 
the distinction between the two major perspectives on figu­
rative expression is most clearly manifested in a theological 
disagreement over the nature of the literal text of the Bible. 
The exegetical tradition thus represents an important source 
for a discussion of the problem of medieval symbology. In 
its simplest form, the exegetical argument revolves around 
the basic issue of the nature of Biblical Revelation: should 
the historical record of the Old and New Testaments be seen 
purely as a material springboard into the elevated realm of 
moral and spiritual truth, or should it be seen as having 
worth as a material reality, which also serves as a symbolic 
allegory of future historical and spiritual event (specifi­
cally, as De Lubac puts it, of "the advent of the kingdom of 
God both within and beyond history")? This issue became a 
focal point for Biblical exegesis: and exploration of the 
arguments presented on either side will provide insights 
directly relevant to an understanding of the poetic tradi­
tions which in the Middle Ages make possible the creation of 
either a "historically realistic" or a "typical" character 
in the literature of the period. 
Although there is little disagreement among scholars 
over the fact of exegetical influence in the Middle Ages, (the 
sheer authority of the medieval church insured its influence 
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on all aspects of medieval literature), the exact nature 
and extent of that influence—and of its actual connection 
with aesthetic theory—is often in dispute. E. Talbot 
Donaldson, for example, sees no important connection between 
the patristic exegetes and literary theory in the period, 
and although he admits some exegetical leanings in Dante and 
St. Thomas, his general attitude is that the Fathers of the 
Church were "less expert at devising rules for poets than 
1 
they were at devising rules for Christians." On a level 
more specific to our study in this chapter, C. S. Lewis 
writes that "the exegetical tradition is less important for 
the understanding of secular allegory than is sometimes sup-
2 
posed." 
On the other hand, Robert Hollander takes issue with 
this attitude, commenting that Lewis' statement in this pas­
sage is "one of the few badly thought-out moments in his 
3 
imposing corpus of criticism." R. E. Kaske, in accord with 
Hollander's general objection to the position taken by Lewis 
insists on the relevance of the exegetical tradition to almost 
E. Talbot Donaldson, "Patristic Exegesis in the Crit­
icism of Medieval Literature: the Opposition," in Critical 
Approaches to Medieval Literature, ed. Dorothy Bethurum 
(New York: Columbia University Press, I960), p. 3. 
2 C. S. Lewis, Allegory of Love (London: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1936), p. 48, n. 2. 
3 Robert Hollander, Allegory in Dante's Commedia (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 61. 
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4 
all aspects of medieval thought. Kaske cites Chaucer's and 
Langland's frequent references to the general apparatus of 
Biblical commentary, and reminds us of "the thousands of 
exegetical allusions in medieval art, homiletic literature 
and medieval liturgy." Moreover, Kaske sees a definite but 
"indirect" exegetical influence on medieval poetic theory, 
an observation to which Charles Donahue gives assent in his 
5 
analysis of the issue. Finally, B. G. Koonce points up the 
direct relevance of the exegetical tradition to our own study 
in this chapter, warning against scholarly disregard for this 
type of study: 
Although one must be cautious in applying scriptural-
exegetical meanings to the imagery of secular poetry, 
to ignore them is to overlook a key—sometimes the only 
one—unlocking the hidden content of poetic symbols.6 
Following Kaske, Hollander, Donahue, and Koonce, I see 
every reason to consider the exegetical tradition important 
to a study of the kind which will be attempted in this chap­
ter. While the direct influence of the exegetical influence 
(except in the case of Dante) is arguable, the indirect 
influence of the exegetical tradition on all sides must be 
assumed. 
See R. E. Kaske, "Patristic Exegesis: The Defense," 
in Bethurum, pp. 27-60. See also Beryl Smalley, The Study 
of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1964), and English Friars and Antiquity in 
the Early XlVth Century (New Yorks Barnes and Noble, 1961). 
5 Charles Donahue, "Summation: Patristic Exegesis," in 
Bethurum, pp. 61-82. 
^B. G. Koonce, Chaucer and the Tradition of Fame: 
Symbolism in the House of Fame (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1966), p. 7. 
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Although I cannot attempt in this chapter to define the 
exact nature and scope of exegetical influence on medieval 
literature, it will be useful to mark the presence or ab­
sence of some of the philosophical elements which were iden­
tified earlier as fostering either a "historically realistic" 
or "typicalized" variety of characterization. In addition 
to providing philosophical material which informs either one 
or the other view of characterization up to the time of 
Chaucer, exegetical commentary provides an essential body of 
material for focusing on the problem of figurative expression 
in the Middle Ages—an issue which can be demonstrated to be 
of great relevance to an understanding of characterization 
during the period. 
That two major kinds of exegesis exist, and that they 
have affinities with either a Christian-sacramental or Clas­
sical conception of reality seems to be a rather common notion 
in contemporary scholarship on the issue. Charles Donahue, 
for example, identifies what he terms the "Greek-allegorical 
tradition of exegesis," and the "sacramental" or Hebraic-
Christian practice of typological exegesis, thus seeing the 
two traditions of exegesis as a direct expression of two 
7 
definite philosophical orientations. Eric Auerbach in the 
essay "Figura" in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature 
also identifies the Christian sacramental view of reality 
7 Charles Donahue, "Summation: Patristic Exegesis," 
Bethurum, p. 64. 
185 
directly with the figural or sacramental method of 
orthodox exegesis, and the Greek-Platonic view with strict 
allegorical exegesis: 
We may say roughly that the figural method in Europe 
goes back to Christian influences, while the allegorical 
method derives from ancient pagan sources, and also that 
the one is applied primarily to Christian, the other 
to ancient material. Nor shall we be going too far 
afield in terming the figural view the predominantly 
Christian-medieval one, while the allegorical view, 
modelled on pagan or not inwardly Christianized authors 
of late antiquity, tends to appear where ancient, 
pagan, or strongly secular influences are dominant.® 
Donahue and Auerbach are supported in this analysis of the 
9 
major streams of the exegetical tradition by Henri de Lubac, 
10 11 
Jean Danielou, and H. F. Dunbar. 
g 
Eric Auerbach, "Figura," in Scenes from the Drama 
of European Literature, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1959), p. 63. 
^Henri de Lubac, Exegese Medievale: Les Quatre Sens 
de 1'Ecriture, 2 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1959), I, seconde 
partie: 140. 
"^Jean Danielou, Les Figures du Christ dans I'Ancien 
Testament (Paris: Beauchesnes et ses fils, 1950), p. 52; 
also Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Baker, 
2 vols. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 11:255. 
"^H. F. Dunbar, Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its 
Consummation in the Divine Comedy (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1861), pp. 6-7. It is significant that other impor­
tant literary critics, including John Ruskin and Robert Worth 
Frank, see the general literary distinction in figurative 
method specifically pointed out by Danielou, De Lubac and 
Dunbar, running throughout literary history. However, these 
critics do not have nearly as profound a grasp of the root 
cause of the distinction as do the aforementioned critics. 
Ruskin, for example, distinguishes sharply between symbol 
and what he calls "personification," disparaging "personifica­
tion" on the grounds that it is "far less noble" than sym­
bolism: 
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Basically, the difference between the two traditions 
involves a distinction between the sacramental view of sym­
bol which finds its incarnational meaning in Christ and its 
historical referrent in the Scriptural narrative and which 
manifests itself in medieval exegesis in an emphasis on the 
historical-literal level of the text, and a classical or 
Greek view of symbol, in which the symbol serves as the 
abstract sign for an intellectual system which has no fixed 
objective content, and which manifests itself in a disre­
gard for the literal-historical level of the text. 
This distinction between a symbol-allegory and a pure 
allegory of personification may be what is behind Dante's 
classification in the Convivio when he distinguishes between 
the "allegory of the theologians" and the "allegory of the 
12 
poets." While the allegory of the poets is defined by 
Symbolism is the setting forth of a great truth by an 
imperfect and inferior sign, while Personification, 
the bestowing of a human or living form upon an abstract 
idea...is in most cases a mere recreation of the fancy. 
(John Ruskin, cited by Bertrand H. Bronson in "Personi­
fication Reconsidered," ELH 14 (Sept., 1957), 166 ). 
The insinuation here is that allegory is an expression infer­
ior to, even rather bloodless when compared with symbolism. 
Robert W. Frank applies the same basic distinction made by 
Ruskin to a discussion of allegory and character per se. He 
describes two types of allegory, one which he identifies as 
"personification allegory" in which "characters and details 
are abstraction and have only one meaning," and one which 
he calls "symbol-allegory," in which "characters and signif­
icant details are concrete and have a second meaning." 
(Robert W. Frank, "The Art of Reading Medieval Personifica-
tion-Allegory," ELH 20 (Dec., 1953), 237). 
12 Dante, Convivio, trans. William Walrond Jackson (Ox­
ford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. 73-74. 
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Dante as "a truth hidden under a beautiful fiction," the 
allegory of the theologians is an allegory based solidly 
13 
on historical fact. 
Some critics, of course, see no distinction between the 
Greek exegetical tradition and the Christian. Edwin Hatch, 
for example, makes no distinction between the two schools 
of allegory we distinguish here, and sees all Christian 
exegesis as a simple continuation of the Greek allegorical 
tradition: "The earliest methods of Christian exegesis were 
a continuation of the methods which were common at the time 
14 
to both Greek and Greco-Judean writers...." J. W. H. Atkins 
also seems to see no need to distinguish between kinds of exe-
15 
gesis. Though both Hatch and Atkins make valuable contri­
butions to any study of the exegetical tradition on a general 
level, their analysis fails by not taking into account the 
profound distinction in the kinds of influence exerted by 
the exegetical tradition noted by De Lubac, Auerbach, and 
Danielou. 
The distinction made by these critics can be seen to 
be directly relevant to characterization. Where the historical 
13 See Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," trans. Charles 
Singleton in Dante Studies, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1957), 1:86-87. 
14 Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages 
upon the Christian Church (London: William Norgate, 1890), 
p. 66. 
15 J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The 
Medieval Phase (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 
passim. 
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basis of a piece of literature is de-emphasized or ignored, 
the imitation of concrete historical details or character 
portrayal will tend to disappear or become only minimal 
adjuncts to the portrayal by personification of an abstract 
idea. In other words, the allegorist who has an intellec­
tually abstract idea to get across must not, in the words of 
Robert Hollander, "be caught and drawn by a world that offers 
him the occasion for mimesis," but must instead "reduce his 
16 
subject matter to its intellectual frameworks" 
The process of creating a literary character by deduc­
tion from a pre-existing idea or philosophical system of a 
predominately rationalistic nature is basically what we are 
defining here as the Greek or classical view of figurative 
expression. It springs from the Platonic conception of 
mimesis which has as its first object the eternal world of 
ideals and thus tends to foster a universalized, non-realistic 
presentation of character. On the other hand, in the Judeo-
Christian view the created world is not only a fit and proper 
subject of imitation, but actually constitutes in itself a 
physical manifestation of truth. From the true Judeo-
Christian perspective, the representation of dramatically 
realistic character in literature finds its legitimate 
rationale in the Christian understanding of the nature of 
the material universe and the purpose of history. 
"^Robert Hollander, Allegory in Dante's Commedia , p. 5. 
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Of course, the fact that we distinguish here between 
two basic kinds of figurative expression (and consequently 
two basic approaches to characterization) does not mean that 
a given artist or theologian cannot legitimately employ both 
in his own literary productions. Charles Singleton has noted 
that Dante1s characterization of Beatrice in the Vita Nuova 
is an entirely more "historical" portrayal than his represen­
tation of Lady Philosophy in the Convivio, and even speculates 
that Dante was well aware of the nature and theological impli-
17 
cations of the difference. Referring to the Convivio, 
Dante himself writes: 
Theologians, indeed, do not apprehend this sense in 
the same fashion as poets, but inasmuch as my inten­
tion is to follow here the custom of poets, I will 
take the allegorical sense after the manner which 
poets use.-'-® 
Singleton suggests that Dante abandons the Convivio precisely 
because he recognizes that the figure of Lady Philosophy has 
not the foundation in history which is necessary for indicat­
ing to men the way of salvation: 
. . . a disembodied Lady Philosophy is not a machina 
which can bear the weight of lifting man to God, because, 
in her, man finds no part of his own weight. Lady Phi­
losophy did not, does not, will not, exist in the flesh. 
As she is constructed in the Convivio, she comes to 
stand for Sapientia, for created Sapientia standing in 
analogy to uncreated Sapientia which is the Word. Even 
so, she is without flesh. And only Word made flesh can 
lift man to God. If the allegory of a Christian poet 
17 Singleton, Dante Studies, I, 92-93. 
18 Dante, Convivio, p„ 73. 
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of rectitude is to support any weight, it will be 
grounded in the flesh, which means grounded in history— 
and will lift up from there.19 
If Singleton is correct in this analysis, then Dante not only 
consciously employs two different kinds of allegory in his 
own work, but places the second type of allegory—that is, 
an allegory grounded in the historical and physical universe 
(the allegory of the theologians )—far above the allegory 
of the poets. This is not to say that Dante disparages the 
allegory of the poets, the "beautiful lie" of the Convivio, 
but that his first allegiance is always to a figurative 
expression which is grounded in particular reality. Like 
Augustine, he finds much truth in the Platonic conception 
of reality, but "that the Word was made Flesh and dwelt among 
v  2 0  us I did not find there" (Confessions VII, ix). 
In light of all these considerations, the material 
treated in this chapter should (1) reinforce the contrast 
between the Greek/classical and Judeao-Christian views of 
reality in terms of the philosophical ideas espoused by each 
view; (2) offer an overview of their manifestation in the 
exegetical tradition from the Homeric Age up to the time of 
Chaucer; and (3) show the specific relevance of the contin­
uing contrast between the two views to the understanding of 
figurative expression (and thus to the understanding of 
19 Singleton, Dante Studies, Ir93. 
20 St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. 
John K. Ryan (New York: Image Books, I960), p. 169; Single­
ton, Dante Studies, 1,93. I am indebted to Singleton for 
pointing out this reference. 
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characterization) demonstrated by each. Such a discussion 
should contribute significantly to a study of the aes­
thetic theories directly affecting Chaucer which will be the 
subject of the following chapter. 
The early Greek exegetical tradition differs from the 
Judeo-Christian on several counts. First, as Felix Buffiere 
points out, the Greek tradition is marked by a general tendency 
to regard the narrative level of the allegory, the actual 
literary "word" of the story, as a fantasy which serves as 
a metaphor for cosmological, divine, or moral truth: 
. . .a l'exterieur se deroule, fastasmagorique, une 
aventure divine ou humaine; mais l'interieure cache 
le drame de notre destinee, la forme de 11univers ou 
le visage re"el de la divinite'. 21 
Second, the classical allegorical tradition as a whole shows 
a definite movement from physical or cosmological interpre­
tations of myth toward interpretations which have a moral 
and philosophical bent. Geffchen, for example, points out 
that the earliest manifestation of the Greek gods was a direct 
identification of the god with his earthly form: Haephistos 
22 
is both god and fire; Scamander is both god and stream. 
Later, there is movement toward a genuinely allegorical 
approach with the development of an analogous correspondence 
^Felix Buffiere, Les Mvthes d'Homere et la Pensee 
Grecque (Paris: Society d*Edition, Les Belles Lettres, 
1956), p. 44. 
22 Joseph P. Geffchen, "Allegory, Allegorical Interpre­
tation," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James 
Hastings , 13 vols. (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1913), 
I, 327; see also Jean Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods: 
The Mythological Tradition ; Its Place in Renaissance Humanism 
and Art (New York: Harper and Row, 1953). 
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rather than a direct identification between the literary-
text and the physical elements which it represented. Thus 
elaborate physical cosmologies, explanations of the natural 
order, sprang up around the corpus of Homeric myth. Geffchen 
comments on this kind of allegorizing, naming Theagenes of 
Rhegium (b. 525 B.C.), and Metrodorus of Lampsac (b. 430 B.C.) 
(both disciples of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaxagoras) 
23 
as the most "physical" of the early allegorists. 
The specific method of many early physicalists is often 
to scrutinize one section of Homeric myth, developing an 
allegorical explanation from one strong image contained in 
that section. One of the favorite vehicles of the early 
allegorists, for example, is the story of Hera in Homer1s 
Illiad (XV, 18f). For being disobedient to Zeus, Hera is 
chained by her son Haephistos, and suspended in space with 
an anvil tied to each foot. In both Cornutus1 Theologia 
Graeca, Chapter 17, and in The Life and Poetry of Homer 
(Pseudo-Plutarch), this particular myth is explained as an 
allegory of the four elements. The two anvils are the two 
heaviest elements, water and earth, which are held in place 
by the air (Hera) which supports them. Zeus, who gave the 
command to suspend Hera, represents the ether or purer air 
which is above Hera. The golden chain around Hera's hands, 
placed there by Haephistos, the god of fire, represents fire, 
24 
or the junction of air and ether. 
^Geffchen, p. 327. 
0 A v 
Buffiere, pp. 115-116. 
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It is not surprising that Plato objected to these 
physical allegories strenuously, and under his influence, 
and the influence of the Stoics, Greek allegorical interpre-
25 
tations took a much more philosophical and moralistic turn. 
It is worth noting that an "ethical" interpretation of Homer 
was not an entirely new phenomenon, and Geffchen points out 
that Theagenes of Rhegium, the earliest known allegorist, 
interprets the battle of the gods in the twentieth book of 
the Iliad on two levels: the one purely physical, the other, 
ethical. Thus the movement toward the ethical realm of 
interpretation should probably be characterized more as a 
new emphasis on the ethical side than as a new kind of 
26 
interpretation altogether,, 
The emphasis on moral interpretation in the tradition 
of Greek exegesis extends, writes Buffiere, from Antisthenes 
to Proclus and is greatly influenced by the Aristotelian 
School, which tended to reduce gods and goddesses into con­
cepts of either vice or virtue for purposes of moral instruc-
27 
tion. Later, Neoplatonist exegetes of the Third Century 
follow in the same mold and produce elaborate moral and philo­
sophical systems from Homeric material. One of the most 
25 
Seznec, p. 90* 
26 ^  Buffiere, p. 116. 
27Buffiere, pp. 585-86. 
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famous examples of this kind of exegesis is The Cave of the 
Nymphs by Porphyry, who was probably heavily influenced 
by Numenius, Cronius and especially Plotinus, other well-known 
Neoplatonists. Porphyry, according to Buffiere, treats 
Homer only as "a pretext," an occasion to expound the beliefs 
of Plato and Pythagoras on the Platonic theory of the genera-
28 
tion of souls. In Pythagoras' interpretation, the Cave 
of the Nymphs is a mythical explanation of the eternal cir­
cuit of souls between earth and heaven. Porphyry's inter­
pretation follows this general bent. On the narrative 
level, the grotto is full of amphorae, craters, rich garments 
and fabrics of every description, and clouds of bees, which 
fly in and out of the amphorae. The grotto has two entran­
ces—one north, for humans, and one in the middle, the 
entrance for the gods, which man is forbidden to use. 
Porphyry uses this description as the basis for his 
allegorical commentary. For him, the grotto is a "fantasy 
of Homer's imagination." The corners of the grotto, where 
the shape of the cave is obscured in darkness, is seen as 
symbolic of the dark powers of the spiritual world where the 
distinction between form and matter becomes obscure. (This 
in itself, notes Buffiere, is based on the Aristotelian dis­
tinction between matter and form and even resembles the cave 
of the Republic, where Plato himself makes the grotto an 
allegory for the earthly world and for the "dark materiality" 
28 s Buffiere, p. 420. 
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of the sublunary world.) The nymphs of the grotto are 
the divinities who seek regeneration in the world; the bees 
who fly in and out of the amphorae are souls also—incarnated 
souls who want to return to their proper spiritual home. 
Although they participate in the carnal pleasures of the 
physical earth, they finally demonstrate their desire to go 
back to their true country. It is evident that this kind 
of allegorizing shows definite Platonic overtones, and illus­
trates in both its form and its philosophic content the Greek 
tendency toward abstraction, toward movement away from the 
concrete, and historical to the proper home of universal 
truth. 
The myth of Circe in Homer's Odyssey has also been a 
favorite subject of Neoplatonic exegesis and in the commen­
taries of Eustathius, Porphyrus, Numenius, and Cronius it 
becomes an allegory of the soul as prisoner of the body. 
This idea, Buffibre points out, is a Pythagorean common­
place which is echoed again in the commentaries on the 
story of the union of the etheral Aphrodite with the bloody 
30 
and brutal Ares. 
It is interesting to note that in many of the Neopla­
tonic commentators there are historical-literal interpreta­
tions of the same myths which receive the moral-philosophical 
treatment. The early Peripatetic philosophers saw the given 
29 . x Buffiere, p. 428. 
OA 
Buffiere, p. 33. 
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literary facts of the Iliad and the Odyssey as essentially 
historical. However, the literal-historical tendency is 
gradually displaced by the tendency to regard the word of 
the text only as a vehicle for philosophical truth. Some­
times this movement can be seen in the work of single commen 
tators. Cronius, for example, first sees Homer's grotto as 
a literal place, and later resorts to a pure moral allegory 
because of his new conviction that the details of the grotto 
are "too bizarre" not to suggest some supernatural influ-
32 
ence. There is a similar movement in the writings of Por­
phyry, who at first takes the description of souls entering 
the bodies of beasts as literal fact and later revises his 
interpretation, renouncing the early literalistic version 
and adding a purely philosophical interpretation of his own. 
The movement from physical interpretations to moral, from a 
historical regard for the text to an emphasis on moral or 
philosophic meanings of what comes more and more to be 
regarded as a fantasy, is seen to be characteristic of 
early Greek exegesis. 
The movement away from a historical view of the text 
was also encouraged by the problems of morality which the 
literal level presented. Commentators from the early begin­
nings of the Greek exegetical tradition spent a great deal 
"^Buffiere, p. 585. 
"^Buffiere, p. 420. 
"^Buffiere, p. 519. 
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of time trying to excuse the conduct both of the great war-
heroes of Homeric legend and of particular gods and god­
desses. How could the Homeric characters function as moral 
exempla if their actions were patently immoral according to 
the literal text? Out of this question grew the tradition 
of an elaborate moral allegory whose primary purpose was to 
give a sound moral commentary explaining the only "apparent " 
sins of the Homeric characters. Jean Seznec mentions 
Sallust, a friend of the Emperor Julian and a defender of 
the allegorical method who in his treatise On the Gods and 
the World, selects the divine tales with the most obscene 
surface morality and gives them "pious, philosophical" expla-
34 
nations. Many Greek commentators, in fact, use the expres­
sion "healing" to refer to their allegorical explications. 
Buffiere comments: 
La preoccupation apologetique qui anime souvent les 
allegoristes se reflate dan l'expression "guerison," 
d'Homere; L1exegese de Metrodore, le disciple d'Anaxa-
gore, avait ce but, nous dit Diogene Laerce: "guerir 
les fables homeriques en leur otant tout ce qui de 
l'abord, peut sembler immoral, par transposition dans 
le champ d1allegorie."35 
Thus many Greek exegetes saw their task as one of healing 
the immoral Homeric fables with allegory. 
The primary examples of this kind of allegorizing center 
around the person of Ulysses in Homer's Odyssey. Ulysses is 
generally regarded as a type of the ideal man. As such, it 
34 Seznec, p. 84. 
35 Buffiere, p. 51. 
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becomes necessary in the eyes of the commentator to defend 
him from all attacks—especially from those who saw his con­
stant prevarication as a moral fault. Anthisthenes, one 
early Neoplatonic exegete, is among Ulysses' staunchest 
defenders. He writes that Homer never meant to put Ulysses 
in a bad light by making him appear a liar, and explains that 
Ulysses1 dissembling is only a matter of his being expert at 
changing his conversational tone in order to better coiranuni-
36 
cate with his hearers. Ulysses is also much excused on the 
grounds of his intelligence and piety. In an early retran-
scription of Aristotle, one commentator makes an effort to 
defend Ulysses from charges of having mocked Poseidon by 
inferring that Poseidon was unable to heal Polyphemous' eye. 
Ulysses, writes the Scoliast, did not say Poseidon could not 
heal; he said he would not heal, and these are two separate 
things. Also, he goes on, the Cyclops was a brute who 
37 
deserved Ulysses' correction. 
In the Circe episode, Ulysses is defended from attacks 
of immorality primarily by allegorists who see the incident 
as an allegory of the soul which is unwittingly encased in 
carnal flesh (Circe) before realizing and seeking its true 
38 
home in universal wisdom and truth (Penelope). In addi­
tion, the whole Circe episode is seen by commentators as a 
3 6 
Antisthenes, in G. Dindorf, Scholia Graeca in Homeric 
Odysseum (London: Oxonii, 1855), cited by Buffiere, 
pp. 368-69. 
"^Antisthenes, cited by Buffiere, 371. 
38 n 
Buffiere, p. 591. 
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movement from a preoccupation with science to a preoccupation 
with philosophy. Thus Ulysses becomes a representative of 
the individual soul's retreat from the confusion of the ex­
terior world into the calm eternality of the inner life. 
"Circe" is always seen as a necessary first step in the pro­
cess of movement toward man's true home, and therefore what 
might be construed as a fault on Ulysses part has a logical 
rationale. 
Thus the treatment of sin or immorality in serious 
Greek exegetical literature is seen to be consistent with the 
Greek understanding of moral evil presented in the first 
chapter of this dissertation. In the earlier chapter we saw 
that the Greek view of reality promotes a fated view of 
human nature which ultimately discourages the depiction of 
moral depravity. The emphasis in Greek literature is gen­
erally on an ideal man who furnishes an abstract example of 
moral good. In the Greek exegetical tradition we find the 
same emphasis. It is not that infractions of the moral law 
in the Homeric heroes are completely ignored (commentators, 
for example, did recognize that Ulysses himself sees his own 
faults—cf. Oddyssey XVIII, 1. 138), but that every effort 
is made to reduce the power of such infractions to tarnish 
the larger-than-life character who is presented. Buffiere 
points out that even where there is actual recognition of 
moral weakness, there is still a specific attempt made to 
elevate the hero. In the Life and Poetry of Homer, for exam­
ple, the author writes that Hector, in facing the battle-lines 
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trembles, but trembles less than his own men. In the 
Greek view, the hero is always one notch higher than the 
purely human; his weaknesses are generally either ignored 
or elaborately explained in rationalistic terms. 
Thus the early Greek allegorical tradition is marked 
by some familiar characteristics, all of which are seen to 
be factors in encouraging the ideal type which is so basic 
to the original philosophic tradition; (1) a tendency to see 
the literal level of the text as a fantasy which serves 
only as a metaphor for physical or philosophic truth; and the 
related assumption that interpretation of the spiritual mean­
ing is an activity for higher and more spiritually advanced 
exegetes; (2) a consequent drift away from physical interpre­
tations of the earliest allegorists to the moral and rational­
istic allegory of later centuries; (3) a tendency to see 
allegory as a means for obscuring or excusing moral weakness 
in heroic character. Thus the early Greek exegetical tradi­
tion may be said to contain elements which reflect the 
larger philosophical perspective of the Greeks and which con­
sequently encourage the presentation of universalized or 
typical characters in the sense we have defined it in this 
study. 
Although we do not have the space to deal with it in 
depth, the classical Latin approach to allegorical interpre­
tation exhibits many of the same characteristics we have 
39 Buffiere, p. 309. 
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shown to be intrinsic to Greek exegesis. We will take only 
two examples. 
In the Ars Poetica, Horace includes an allegorical inter­
pretation of the Orpheus story: "While men still roamed the 
woods, Orpheus, the holy prophet of the gods, made them shrink 
from bloodshed and brutal living: hence the fable that he 
40 
tamed tigers and ravening lions." In Horace 1s interpreta­
tion, Orpheus becomes a heroic "prophet of the gods" who has 
the moral function of controlling evil violence. It is clear 
from even this short passage that Horace interprets the 
Orpheus myth didactically and idealistically, drawing an 
isolated moral lesson from a story whose outer form is less 
important for Horace than the inner lesson which it contains. 
We find a similar illustration of this kind of allegori-
zation in Cicero's De Officiis, Book III. Cicero takes the 
Platonic allegory of a man in a certain kingdom who finds a 
ring on a dead man's finger which has the power of making 
him visible and invisible. Using it, he debauches the queen, 
murders her, and gains the kingdom. Cicero interprets the 
story allegorically to mean that a wise man would not cover 
up "anything that savours of greed or of injustice, of lust 
41 
or of intemperance.11 He goes on to criticize "certain phi­
losophers" who tend to make too much of the fact that Plato's 
40 Horace, Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica (London: Wm. 
Heinemann, Ltd., 1936), p. 479f. 
41 Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller(London: 
Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1951), p. 305. 
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story is fictitious or imaginary. Cicero writes scornfully: 
"As if he (Plato) affirmed that it was actually true or even 
possible!" Immediately after, he denounces the same philoso­
phers for insisting that the literal level of the story be 
historically "possible," when what is really important is the 
42 
moral lesson to be learned. Thus the Latin approach to 
allegorical exegesis can be seen to conform in its outlines 
to some basic elements in the tradition of Greek exegesis— 
in particular, a de-emphasis on the literal level of the text 
and a related stress on the moral truth of which the text 
is a discardable sign. 
Charles 0. Bigg has pointed out that the Neoplatonic 
exegetical tradition through Peripateticism and Stoicism 
directly influenced the school of allegory flourishing at 
43 
Alexandria, Egypt, in the first and second centuries. This 
highly influential center of Jewish and Christian learning 
produced the Jewish exegete Philo, who later greatly influ­
enced the Christian Alexandrines, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, 
and Athanasius and later the work of St. Ambrose and Hilary 
of Poitiers. A short survey of Philo's allegorical method 
and of two of the important Christian Platonists who were 
influenced by him will reveal many of the same characteris­
tics demonstrated by the earlier Greek exegetical tradition, 
42 Cicero, De Officiis, pp. 306-7. 
43 Charles O. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexan­
dria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 29. 
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besides providing a necessary background for one major stream 
of allegory which flourished during Chaucer's day. 
Philo, the most famous of the great early figures asso­
ciated with Alexandria, affords a good example of the Greek 
tendency to regard the literal text only as a convenient, 
but ultimately discardable vehicle for the transmission of 
abstract moral truth. He regarded the literal level of 
Scripture as inadequate to the task of communicating the 
nature of God, and this led him to write voluminously on the 
reasons why God gave such a poor representation of himself in 
44 
Scripture. Philo's predisposition toward a movement away 
from the literal text, to a totally "spiritualized" view of 
Scripture, can be clearly observed in his exposition of 
Exodus 22 and 23. He writes: 
What is the meaning of the word 'Ye shall not with bad­
ness mistreat the widow and the orphan?' The word 
'mistreat' is used properly in some cases and improp­
erly in others. It is used properly in reference to 
deeds of badness which are peculiar to the soul and 
improperly in others, in which harm is done to posses­
sions and bodies. Accordingly, Scripture did not men­
tion the latter evils, as not being great misfortunes 
at all, but knowing the harm of badness overturns entire 
lives from their foundations, it first says that one 
should not be to anyone a teacher of folly or licen­
tiousness.^ 
Here Philo almost completely disregards the literal level of 
meaning, except as a vehicle for the "real" or underlying 
truth and substitutes in its place his own allegorical 
44 Geffchen, p. 329. 
45 Philo Judeaus, Questions and Answers on Exodus, trans. 
Ralph Marcus (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), p. 39. 
204 
interpretation of "mistreatment." On the basis of the Scrip­
tural injunction not to mistreat widows, he builds a justi­
fication for the building of schools for the moral education 
of the young. 
Philo's interpretation of Genesis 21, the Biblical rec­
ord of the conflict between Abraham's two wives, Sara and 
Hagar, reveals again his preoccupation with moral education 
and provides a further illumination of his separation of the 
literal text and its spiritual meaning. For Philo, Hagar in 
her flight from Sarai and Abraham is the type not only for 
secular culture and education, but also for those who wish 
to escape the "stern and gloomy life of the virtue-seekers" 
and to stay in that 
life which is as yet unable to hold the heights of 
the generic and imperishable, still clinging to the 
particular and specific region in which the lower is 
preferred to the higher.46 
The symbol for those preliminary studies which are rooted 
in secularism and sense-perception is the "Sophist Ishmael," 
son of Hagar. Sarah, whose change of name from "Sarai" to 
"Sarah" represents in Philo's mind a change from a state of 
personal sovereignty and virtue to a state of universal 
sovereignty and virtue, becomes the type for those who have 
left secular culture to seek the imperishable—for those who 
have "ceased from the manner of women," "died to the pas-
47 
sions," and gone on to the "generic form of happiness." 
46 Philo Judeaus, Philo on the Cherubim, trans. F. A. Col-
son and G. H. Whitaker, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1929), 11:112. 
47 Philo Judeaus, Philo on the Cherubim, 11:13. 
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The symbol for this life of happiness is Isaac, "whose heart 
is in the pursuit of no childish sports, but those which are 
divine." In a similar manner in the treatise "Questions and 
48 
Answers on Exodus," Philo draws a parallel between marriage 
and the movement of the soul. He characterizes the minds of 
men as being in a state of "womanly corruption in marriage" 
while they are yet resting with sense-perception and passion. 
But, he goes on, when souls become divinely inspired, from 
being women, they become virgins, throwing off the womanly 
corruptions which are found in sense-perception and passion 
and following after and pursuing the genuine and unmated 
virgin, the veritable wisdom of God. 
In the Philoan interpretation a radical distinction is 
made between secular education and philosophy, body and spirit. 
What is emphasized is the importance of the passage for the 
reader's ongoing journey from sense-perception and passion 
to the life of the mind; the types "Sarah" and "Hagar" have 
been completely allegorized into identifiable philosophies. 
The focus of our attention is obviously to center on Philo*s 
doctrine of the soul's gradual disentanglement from sense and 
its movement toward spirit and idea. Thus the concep­
tion of allegory in Philo is rooted in the Platonic under­
standing of salvation as a movement from the bondage of sense-
perception to the freedom of intellectual apprehension. 
48 Philo Judeaus, Questions and Answers on Exodus, 
p. 38. 
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Clement, member of the later Christian "School of Alex­
andria ," demonstrates the strong Hellenic influence which 
stems directly from Philo. In Clement, an interesting mix­
ture of Greek and specifically typological allegory can be 
seen in Clement1s explanation of the Old Testament King who 
saw Isaac "playing" with his wife Rebecca, and who as a result 
confronts Isaac with the fact that she is his wife, and not 
just the "sister" she has been introduced to be. Clement 
takes this story as an allegory of "a wisdom above this world 
looking down upon the mystery signified by such childlike 
playing." He goes on to exult over the moral and spiritual 
lessons to be learned from the allegory: 
Rebecca means 'submission.' 0, what prudent playing! 
Rejoicing joined to submission with a king as audience 
The Spirit exults in such merry-making in Christ, 
attended with submissiveness. This is in truth child-
likeness. 49 
Given the context of the verse, which suggests that Isaac's 
"playing" with his wife has a more sexual connotation than 
Clement wishes to recognize, the interpretation he gives 
offers a good example of a highly Platonized allegory which 
yet contains a good deal of Christian content. The Hellenis­
tic overtones of this exegesis are reinforced by a comment 
which immediately follows the passage, in which Clement draws 
a parallel between the same Biblical story and Greek alle-
gorism: 
49 Clement of Alexandria, Christ the Educator, trans. 
Simon P. Wood (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1953), p. 22. 
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Heraclitus tells us that his Zeus, too, indulges in such 
a pastime. Indeed, what occupation is more becoming a 
wise and perfect man than to play and rejoice at the 
celebration of a solemn religious festival with sub­
missive reception and performance of what is holy?^0 
The combination of Christian content and Greek moral allegory 
is a striking characteristic of the Alexandrines, who con­
stantly demonstrate, according to Bigg, a predisposition 
51 
toward making "reason the judge of revelation." 
In fact, the Christian understanding of salvation by 
vicarious participation in the suffering and death of Christ 
is often partially obscured by later Alexandrines, who lean 
coward a rationalistic conception of virtue. Clement, for 
example, defines virtue as "a disposition of soul attuned 
to the dictate of reason in the whole course of life," and 
comes close to identifying Christ himself with the reasonable 
mind: 
Now if it is in its relationship with reason that dis­
obedience is the origin of sin, is it not necessarily 
true that obedience to reason or the Word which is 
what we call Faith, is the very substance of what 
is called a person's duty?^ 
Clement retains the Christian perspective by later assuring 
us that he means man's duty is to cultivate a will which is 
"in conformity and united through his life with Christ and 
God and properly directed to eternal life," but illustrates 
the whole proposition with the ancient Greek metaphor of the 
50 Clement, Christ the Educator, p. 22. 
"'"'"Bigg, p. 80. 
52 Clement, Christ the Educator, p. 89. 
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stallion horse, whose "passion" is uncontrolled by the 
"reason" of virtue. 
A rationalistic conception of virtue can quickly lead 
to hierarchies of beliefs in which some men are deemed 
more moral and virtuous than others. This exactly what 
we see in Clement, who follows the Philonian tendency to 
divide the mortal life of the believer into two parts: 
(1) the life of the ordinary believer, which is marked by 
faith, fear, hope and obedience to moral law and discipline, 
and (2) the life of the "true seeker," characterized by a 
life of love, righteousness, knowledge, serene and reason­
able convictions and spontaneous moral activity, where the 
life of the believer and of Christ are so united that the 
Will of God and the believer's will do not conflict. As 
Clement puts it, a kind of elemental moral purity is necessary 
5 3  
to the "higher" kind of insight. From the orthodox Chris­
tian perspective on the working of grace in the believer, 
of course, this doctrine has overtones of heresy. 
The Greek emphasis on moral purity in Clement appears 
also in his understanding of sin and judgment, which he tends 
to view, along with other Alexandrines, from a rather san­
guine perspective. Bigg makes the point that though the 
Alexandrines believed that evil could become second nature, 
so that demons could be deemed incapable of repentance, they 
"^Bigg, pp. 118-119. 
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refused to fix the point of irremediable damnation. Clem­
ent himself refused to believe in an active evil—that is, 
he considered evil to be manifested not in false motives or 
beliefs, but in evil acts. He thus did not believe in orig-
55 
inal sin in the orthodox sense. Both Clement's method of 
exegetical interpretation and his desire to interpret the 
wrath of God in a more tolerant light than it appears in 
Scripture can be seen in the following commentary on Deu­
teronomy 32:23-25, (I will spend my arrows among them. They 
shall be consumed with famine and by the bite of birds, and 
the bending of their back shall be incurable; I will send 
the teeth of beasts upon them, with the fury of creature 
that trail upon the ground. Without, the sword shall destroy 
their children and there shall be fear in the storehouse): 
Really then, the Divinity is not angry as some suppose, 
but when He makes so many threats He is only making 
an appeal and showing mankind the things that are to 
be accomplished. Such a procedure is surely good, 
for it instills fear to keep away from sin.*^ 
The emphasis of this passage is clearly on the mercy of God 
and demonstrates a trait which is to be found in at least 
two other early exegetes. Gregory of Nanzanian regarded the 
question of the possibility of salvation after death as 
57 
open, and Gregory of Nyssa, a revered fourth-century church 
leader openly attests to it: 
54 
Bigg, p. 112. 
"'"'Bigg, p. 112. 
56 Clement, Christ the Educator, p. 61. 
57Bigg, p. 344. 
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For Him (God) the one goal is this the perfection of 
the universe through each man individually, the ful­
fillment of our nature. 
Charles Bigg notes that this same idea is also proclaimed 
5 9  
in Gregory's Oration on I Cor. 15:28, and Father Danielou 
in Les Figures du Christ dans I'ancien Testament also comments 
generally on the Alexandrine belief in a final purification 
of the entire human race. 
The sympathetic tolerance of human nature demonstrated 
by this kind of exegesis, its preoccupation with God's mercy 
over His judgment, demonstrates the typical Alexandrine char­
acteristics of a retreat from emphasis on the depravity of 
man and a centering on his capacity for moral growth. The 
redemption which Christ accomplished is seen not so much as 
a restitution for man's original position before the Fall, 
but as the gateway to the possibility of a new moral right­
eousness in life greater than anything Adam could ever have 
60 
known. Harnack comments: 
Clement cannot imagine that Christian faith, as found 
in tradition, can of itself produce the union of intel­
lectual independence and devotion to God which he 
regards as moral perfection.61 
58 
St. Gregory of Nyssa, "On the Soul and Resurrec­
tion," in Ascetical Works, trans. Virginia Woods Callahan 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1967), 
p. 267. 
59 Bigg, p. 344. 
^Bigg, p. 60. 
^Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, 
6 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1958), 11:325. 
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According to Harnack, Clement is too much of a Greek philos­
opher to promote a doctrine of salvation apart from intel­
lectual striving, and believes that the goal of moral perfec­
tion is reached only "through knowledge." 
In Origen, the most influential of all the Alexandrines, 
we do not find an emphasis on the possibility of human per­
fection through knowledge alone. Origen's view on the nature 
of the relationship between God's grace and man's contribu­
tion on first observation is a balanced one, reminiscent of 
St. Augustine: 
It is then neither in our power to make progress apart 
from the knowledge of God, nor does the knowledge of 
God compel us to do so unless we ourselves contribute 
something towards the good result....nor does the power 
of God by itself fashion a man for honour or dishonour, 
but God finds a ground of difference in our will, as 
it inclines to be better or worse. 
However, even in this passage we find seeds of the platonic 
doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, a doctrine which 
promoted the idea that souls were generated with either an 
"honourable" or a "dishonourable" inclination from the 
63 
first. Forced by the "predestined" quality of this belief 
into a defense of the mercy of God, who creates both types 
of soul, Origen puts a great deal of energy into the doctrine 
of the "all-in-all," which implies the salvation of the entire 
human race and lifts the notion of eternal judgment out of 
the picture altogether: 
0 2 Origen, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth 
with an Introduction by Henri de Lubac (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1966), p. 210. 
6 3 Origen, On First Principles, p. 206. 
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And He will be all things in each person in such a 
way that everything which the rational mind, when pur­
ified from all the dregs of its vices and utterly 
cleared from every cloud of wickedness can feel or 
understand or think, will be all God and that the 
mind will no longer be conscious of anything besides 
or other than God, but will think God and see God and 
hold God and God will be the mode and measure of 
ever^ movement and in this way God will be all to 
Thus Origen himself did not admit complete depravity in 
human nature, and even leaves room in his theology for 
volitional repentance after death. In the On First Prin­
ciples I. 6. 3 and II. 6. 6, for example, he leaves the 
salvability of evil spirits an open question, and later on 
is forced into admitting at least the theoretical possil>il-
65 
ity of the devil's salvation. Charles Bigg writes that 
Origen is finally careful to state that although evil spirits 
will not be judged they will be burnt up in the fire of puri­
fication and thus will never reach the state of "bodily resur-
66 
rection" which those in the Kingdom of God attain. However, 
Origen seems to make a point of the continued existence of 
the devil and death in the next life, though "the hostile 
will which proceeded not from God but from itself will come 
67 
to an end." 
64 
Origen, On First Principles, p. 248. 
65 
Origen, On First Principles, pp. 56-7; pp. 251-252. 
For an excellent discussion of the controversy surrounding 
this Origenian doctrine, see Henri de Lubac, "Introduction" 
to Origen, On First Principles, pp. xxxix-xl. 
66 . 
Bigg, p. 344. 
6 7 Origen, On First Principles, p. 250. 
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Thus in Origen, as with the other Alexandrines, there is 
tendency to take the doctrine of sin and the consequent 
wrath of God rather less seriously than those further within 
the orthodox mainstream. 
The consistent emphasis on God's mercy over His wrath 
is matched in Origen by another discernibly "Alexandrine" 
quality—an inclination to view the historical level of 
Scripture with some suspicion. There is no doubt that Ori­
gen of all the Alexandrines viewed the literal level of the 
text as historical fact where it obviously records an event, 
as for example the carrying of Joseph's body to the Promised 
Land during the Exodus, or the existence of Solomon's temple. 
But Origen's acceptance of the literal level is carefully 
controlled by the metaphor which governs his scriptural 
exegesis. He divides the three-fold sense of Scripture into 
the "flesh" of Scripture, or the obvious meaning of the lit­
eral test, the "soul" of Scripture, or the moral sense, and 
the spiritual sense of Scripture, "which has a shadow of 
69 
things to come." Some passages of Scripture have no "body, 
but only a moral or spiritual sense, (such as the 10 Command­
ments, or the commands of Jesus), some have only a historical 
sense (such as the existence of the city of Jerusalem) and 
some have both (The Exodus prefigures Christ). 
68 Origen, On First Principles, p. 294. 
69 Origen, On First Principles, p. 276. 
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There is obviously a graded hierarchy here, with the 
spiritual sense receiving the most attention and worth. This 
is borne out by the fact that Origen connects the three 
70 
types of believers. The literal is specifically for the 
simple believer, who can know "only the obviousthe second 
or moral level is for the man "who has made some progress" 
and the third or spiritual level is for the "perfect" man, 
who is "like those mentioned by the apostle, who seeks "the 
71 
wisdom that hath been hidden." Origen's hierarchy shows a 
much greater regard for the spiritual and moral sides of the 
texts than for the literal level. His admonition to the 
reader is to search the literal text for rational impossibil­
ity and then to look beyond to the spiritual connotation: 
At other times even impossibilities are recorded in 
the law for the sake of the more skillful and inguir-
ing readers, in order that these, by giving themselves 
to the toil of examining what is written, may gain a 
sound conviction of the necessity of seeking in such 
instances a meaning worthy of God.^2 
Origen's explanation of the story of creation, for example, 
leaves hardly any room for historicity —even historicity 
of a certain kind—and it is worthwhile to guote him in 
full: 
Now what man of intelligence will believe that the 
first and the second day, and the evening and the 
morning existed without the moon and stars? And that 
the first day, if we may so call it, was even without 
70 Origen, On First Principles, p. 276. 
71 Origen, On First Principles, p. 276. 
72 Origen, On First Principles, p. 287. 
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a heaven? And who is so silly as to believe that God, 
after the manner of a farmer, planted a paradise east­
ward in Eden, and set in it a visible and palpable 
tree of life, of such a sort that anyone who tasted 
its fruit with his bodily teeth would gain life and 
again that one could partake of good and evil by 
masticating the fruit taken from the tree of that 
name? And when God is said to 'walk in the Paradise 
in the cool of the day,' and Adam to hide himself 
behind a tree, I do not think anyone will doubt that 
these are figurative expressicns which indicate cer­
tain mysteries through a semblance of history, and not 
through actual events.' 
What concerns us here is not that Origen exhorts the reader 
to a certain freedom in interpreting the literal level of 
the Scripture. In fact, his explanation of how to read the 
Scripture makes much practical sense. The problem is a 
too-strict delineation of the realm of historico-literal 
truth from the realm of spiritual interpretation which goes 
with it. This is hard to pinpoint, but, as we pointed out 
earlier, it manifests itself primarily in Origen's Platonic 
tendency to radically separate the historical from the spir­
itual, to have such a strong reaction to the "literal impos­
sibilities" of the text that it drives him to seek explana­
tions which are of a purely spiritual character. As Father 
74 
Danielou points out, for Origen the primary function of 
the Holy Spirit i^s, to reveal the mysteries of Scripture in 
their unveiled and uncorrupted purity, which means going 
beyond the body of the text to the spiritual meaning. The 
73 Origen, On First Principles, p. 288. 
74 / Jean Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Cul­
ture , p. 287. 
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results of this method of interpreting Scripture, writes 
Danielou, are two-fold: First, the Bible (as the book which 
contains the mysteries of God) becomes more important than 
the historical reality of incidents it relates; and second, 
the institutions, events, and people of Old Testament history 
do not function as literal types of other institutions, events 
and people to follow, but they become "symbols of an invis­
ible reality, which can just as easily be past or present 
75 
or future." Thus the firm linear-historical base of Chris­
tianity is transformed into a Neo-platonic understanding of 
75 
symbol, what Danielou calls "Hellenized gnosis." 
Danielou also comments on Origen's habit of opposing 
spirit and body as it contrasts with the orthodox Pauline 
view which sees flesh as transformed rather than repudiated 
by the spirit. He comments that in St. Paul, the Greek 
A. /* 
phrase T A (that which is given life of the spirit) 
is contrasted with (that which is dead to the 
spirit); that is, the phrase "carnal" does not refer strictly 
to the body, but to "that which is left to its own lost and 
77 
sinful state, whether this be the body or the soul." In 
Origen, however, the body is characterized as definitely of 
a lower order than the intelligible world of the spirit. 
75 * Danielou, p. 287. 
*7 
Danielou, p. 287. 
^Danielou, p. 288; see also St. Augustine, On Chris­
tian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1958), p. 21. 
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Danielou comments: 
This is a Platonist conception which came into exe­
gesis with Philo and the Gnostics, and is the medium 
whereby gnosis became linked to Scripture and in the 
end came to be regarded as its true meaning.^8 
Thus Origen, although his inclusion of the typological method 
of exegesis puts him within the Christian tradition, still 
demonstrates strong Greek influences which affect his regard 
for the historical factuality of Scripture and consequently 
79 
his understanding of symbol and allegory. 
This, in fact, is true of all the Alexandrines. Charles 
Bigg has speculated that the Alexandrine inability to ground 
its exegesis in historical reality may simply be a conse­
quence of the fact that the Christian idea of historical 
80 
development had not yet had time to sink in. It may also 
be the result, Father Danielou points out, of the pervasive 
influence of Gnosticism in the first and second centuries, a 
philosophy which crept into allegorical exegesis through the 
81 
influence of Philo and Marcion. It will prove valuable to 
digress for a moment to sketch the broad outlines of this 
movement, which is of great importance in the history of 
exegesis. 
78 ' Danielou, p. 288. 
79 John Austxn Baker comments on Origen1s method of 
allegorical exegesis, writing that in his works allegory 
becomes a method of using scripture to change the already 
existing outline of the Gospel message. John A. Baker, 
"Postscript," in Danielou's Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture, p„ 504. 
80 Bigg, p. 186. 
Q1 f 
Danielou, p. 197. 
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Gnosticism is based on a dualistic theory of the universe 
which grew out of the gnostic inability to accept traditional 
82 
explanations of the problem of suffering and evil. Bigg 
writes that the Gnostics created the theory of dualism out 
of the argument that if Adam had been created perfect, he 
would not have sinned; but since he did sin, God must have 
created imperfection; to do this, He Himself, or part of Him, 
83 
must have been imperfect. The idea that God is in some 
sense the author of evil is discussed and refuted by Ireneaus, 
another important early Christian exegete in the Five Books 
84 
Against Heresies. As a result of this reasoning, the 
Gnostics posited two gods in the universe; one, the demi-urge, 
which ruled the evil or negative forces in the world, and 
one, God, who ruled the forces of good. 
The understanding of the nature of Christ is directly 
affected by this Gnostic dualism. Irenaeus points out that 
the Valentinian Gnostics believed in two Christs, one the 
son of God, and one the son of the demi-urge. Christ the son 
of God is a pure spirit who rules the spiritual world of the 
Pleroma; Christ the son of the demi-urge is the historical 
85 
or material body who was born of Mary. In the Gnostic 
82_. Bigg, p. 56. 
83„. , Bigg, p. 110. 
84 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, trans. John 
Keble (London: James Parker and Co., 1872), pp. 103-104. 
85 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, pp. 21-22. 
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scheme, Christ is stripped of all humanity and is seen less 
as Redeemer than as Enlightener. Individual salvation is 
viewed in terms of initiation into a knowledge of the divine 
element which constitutes true selfhood. Such initiation 
occurs by a process of intellectualization in which the 
spirits of the blessed gradually lose all matter and pass 
86 
into the Pleroma, or invisible heaven. The actual means 
of this process is self-knowledge. In the Gnostic view, 
knowing God is knowing self, and everything—including crea­
tion and all cosmic processes is centered in the individual 
gnosis, the inner revelation of self-hood. R, M. Grant quotes 
Monomius, an early Gnostic, on this point: 
Abandon the search for God and the creation and other 
matters of a similar sort. Look for him by taking 
yourself as the starting-point. Learn who it is within 
you who makes everything his own and says, "My; god, my 
mind, my thought, my soul, my body. Learn the sources 
of sorrow, joy, love, hate. Learn how it happens that 
one watches without willing, rests without willing, 
becomes angry without willing, loves without willing. 
If you carefully investigate these matters you will 
find them in yourself.^ 
86 
Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 21. 
Ireneaus explains Valentinian Gnosticism: "Next, that 
all spiritual persons putting off their animal souls and 
becoming intellectual spirits, are to enter within the 
Pleroma, incomprehensibly and invisibly, and to be assigned 
as the Brides to the Angels which are about the savior; and 
the Demi-urge also, for his part is to pass into the region 
of his mother, Wisdom, that is, in the intermediate state; 
that the souls also of the righteous will themselves be 
refreshed in the place of the Middle State; for that nothing 
animal finds place within the Pleroma." 
87 Monomius in Hippolytus, Ref. VIII, 15, 1-2, cited by 
R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 9. 
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There are two things of note about this passage; one Grant 
88 
refers to as its "passionate subjectivity," and the second 
is its emphasis on contemplation or self-knowledge. The 
final product of this contemplation is a man undisturbed by 
passions and immune to worldly confusion, the man whom Adolph 
Harnack characterizes as "free from the world and master of 
himself, who lives in God and prepares himself for eter-
89 
nity." 
The basic Gnostic doctrine of the demi-urge and the 
emphasis on subjective revelation as the highest spiritual 
state colored Gnostic exegesis of Scripture. Because of the 
often wrathful characterization of God presented in the Old 
Testament, and because of their belief in the ultimately 
merciful character of the deity, Gnostics saw the Old Tes­
tament as a product of the demi-urge and criticized it for 
its cruelty and vengefulness, its "code of imperfect and 
88 Grant points out that one of the problems in defin­
ing exactly what Gnosticism is, arises from this very subjec­
tivity, which caused a proliferation of Gnostic mythologies 
and sects. He compiles a list of various Gnostic sects, 
naming Valentinians, Marcionites, Basilidians, Peratokoi, 
Phrygians, Docetists, Haimatitoi, Canites, Ophites, Simonians, 
and Entychites. The variety of beliefs and practices is evi­
dent. It is interesting to note that St. Ireneuaus felt the 
same frustration in his own attempt to define Gnosticism. 
He writes: "But whereas they differ from each other both in 
doctrine and in the mode of teaching, and those who are more 
recently among them, affect daily to find something new, and 
to bear fruit such as no one every thought of; it is hard to 
write out all their opinions." Grant, p. 9. 
89 Harnack, History of Dogma, 1, 232-233. 
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and transient morality.11 This led them to exalt the New 
Testament as being the only part of Scripture worthy of 
serious discussion, simply because it fit more easily into 
the radical Gnostic understanding of the character of God, 
and because it could be made to conform with the radically 
spiritual allegorizing of Gnostic exegesis. 
Marcion, though characterized by both Harnack and Barnes 
as "no Gnostic in the strict sense," yet exhibits such heavy 
Gnostic influence to serve as a good example of the main 
91 
doctrinal heresies of Gnosticism. The root of Marcion 
Gnosticism, according to Harnack, can be found in Marcion's 
exclusive reliance upon a Paulinian conception of the Gospel. 
Through a highly subjective and selective use of the Pauline 
Epistles, Marcion constructed a theology which excluded the 
Old Testament as "opposed to, and a backsliding from, the 
92 
truth." Marcion thus rejected all prophetic interpretation 
of the Old Testament and placed it in sharp contrast to the 
New Testament in his major work. This antithesis of the Old 
and the New Covenants fostered the dualism which is so evi­
dent in other Gnostic writings. Marcion saw the New Testament 
Jesus as merciful and loving, and the God of the Old Testament 
90„. c_ Bigg, p. 57. 
91 See Timothy David Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical 
and Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 124; 
Harnack, History of Dogma, I, 266. 
92 Harnack, History of Dogma, I, 268. 
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as "a being who united in himself the whole gradation of 
attributes from justice to malevolence, from obstinacy to 
93 
inconsistency." The dualism evident here is matched by 
his belief that the pure and good God of the Spirit deliv­
ers only the souls of the redeemed, not the bodies, and the 
related proposition that Jesus did not assume flesh, but 
only took on an apparent body which manifested no signs of 
normal physical development. Marcion's disbelief in the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, his rejection of matter as evil, 
and his radical separation of the Old and New Testaments on 
the basis of his belief in two separate creators forms an 
adequate summary of the essential Gnostic perspective. 
The radically spiritual nature of Gnosticism and its 
commitment only to a carefully selective and allegorized use 
of the Old Testament led Gnostic philosophers to disparage 
the earliest historical records of the Hebrews and to charac­
terize spiritual progression mainly as a movement away from 
the sensual Demi-urge (represented by the Old Testament 
record) and toward the higher way of spiritual ecstasy 
enjoined by the New. Suspicion of the Old Testament and of 
any system based on what they regarded as the uncertain grounds 
of history led the Gnostics to see the Scriptures only as a 
series of abstract signs of their own system of philosophy. 
An example of this type of allegory and of the intricate 
mythology which it spawns can be found in Ireneaus1 description 
93 Harnack, History of Dogma, I, 270. 
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of the relation between the world of the demi-urge and the 
real or spiritual world of the Pleroma. Christ, say the 
Gnostics, only suffered in the body of the demi-urge: 
It remains that what suffered, according to them, was 
the animal Christ, and he who by the Economy was mys­
teriously framed, that his mother might exhibit by him 
the pattern of the Christ who is above, of him who was 
extended upon the Cross, and who gave to Achamoth her 
essential form. For all things here, they say, are 
types of the things there.94 
Thus the correspondence between the Christ of the Demi-urge 
and the true spiritual Christ is purely a matter of analogy; 
there is no sacramental or symbolical view of allegory 
here. The relationship between the sign and the spiritual 
reality is parallel but separate and the historical pattern 
is presented as clearly inferior to the heavenly truth it 
represents. 
This view of symbol and its function forms a clear con­
trast with the historical-figural approach taken by orthodox 
Christian exegetes, as Danielou has observed: 
The correspondences which this £The Gnostic3 approach 
sought to establish were no longer those between the 
various stages of the history of salvation, but those 
between the visible and invisible worlds—indeed on 
this basis the New Testament itself was to become of 
value simply as an allegory.95 
This theory of vertical correspondence between the visible 
and invisible worlds is very far from the orthodox Christian 
94 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 22. 
95 Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 
p. 221; Henri de Lubac makes a similar point: "Mais Cl'alle-
gorie Philonienne} n'y aurait encore la qu'un parallelisme 
de methode, fonde' sur la presomption d'une certaine analogie 
de structure." Exeqese Medievale, II, seconde partie, 174. 
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view, where historical types of the Old Testament become 
the essential foundation for the fulfillment of history rep­
resented in Christ. In the Gnostic view, a privately 
defined system of knowledge and a predisposition toward the 
higher contemplative life become the means of salvation; 
in the orthodox Christian view, salvation is achieved only 
through the objective revelation of Christ contained in the 
New Testament record and prefigured in the testimony of the 
Old Testament prophets. As Danielou puts it, Clement, Ori-
gen, Ambrose, and Gregory of Nyssa are representatives of a 
line not of orthodox Bibliocal typology, (that is, of the 
Scriptural system of types whereby one historical event is 
destined to establish hope in another historical event), 
but of "Une philosophie de l'homme exprimee d'une maniere 
96 
allegorique." 
The Gnostic idea that the Old Testament, because of its 
sensual historical base and its representation of the 
cruelty of God was inferior to the New and not a valuable 
part of the Christian theory of salvation, pervaded the 
ancient world, influencing such important figures as Philo, 
97 
Origen, and Clement. Thus we may speculate that at least 
part of the Alexandrine preoccupation with a highly spirit­
ualized allegory may be a result of Gnostic influences coming 
96 / Danielou, Les Figures du Christ dans I'Ancien Tes­
tament , p. 45. 
97 • "Introduction," to Danielou, Les Figures du Christ 
dans I'Ancien Testament, p. xii. 
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through Philonic exegesis. Whatever the case, the School 
of Alexandria, with its inclination to move beyond the lit­
eral text into a world of spiritual meaning, with its tol­
erant view of human evil and Divine judgment, its emphasis 
on the mystical rather than the redemptive function of 
Christ, and its tendency to make moral good a prerequisite 
for salvation, reflects some of the basic perspectives of the 
Greek-Platonic view of reality. Though the Christian Pla-
tonists of the second and third centuries demonstrate much 
orthodox doctrine, that doctrine is Hellenized, profoundly and 
openly in the case of Clement, less obviously but just as 
certainly in the case of Origen. 
In addition, the Alexandrine School promotes an exegesis 
which is decidedly Philonic in nature, that is, it is an 
allegorical approach which makes use of the literal text 
primarily as a springboard into an upper-story moral 
truth or system of truths which is seen as separate from his­
torical reality. Thus it finally encourages a definition of 
reality which inclines toward the abstract and spiritual over 
the concrete and historical. 
It is not difficult to see that the basic elements of 
Alexandrine doctrine would not encourage a historical rep­
resentation of character in the true Biblical sense outlined 
in Chapter III. The lesser regard for the body of the 
literal text and the Platonic understanding of symbol alone 
would tend to reduce the importance given historical detail 
226 
in the Christian view, and Platonic emphasis on moral virtue 
would tend to encourage the creation of ideal rather than 
historically real characters in the Biblical sense. More­
over, the sympathetic view of judgment also lessens the 
chances for creation of true dramatic suspense in the Chris­
tian view. Thus in the Alexandrine school of exegesis we 
do not find an environment conducive to the dramatic presen­
tation of historically real characters. 
In contrast, the earliest Christian exegetes, Justin, 
Ireneaus, Tertullian, Hippolytus and later John Chrysostome, 
are much closer to the mainstream of orthodox Christian tra­
dition. Their method is concrete and Hebraic; their use of 
allegory historical-sacramental rather than Platonic. Doc-
trinally, the orthodox exegetes form a clear contrast with 
the Alexandrine School. In fact, most of the earliest exe­
getes write with the specific purpose of clarifying their 
differences with the Gnostic view of reality which so heavily 
influenced the Alexandrine School. The writing of Justin, 
Ireneaus, Tertullian and St. John of Chrysostome, if they 
were not written specifically against the Marcionites or Val-
entinians, all contain direct refutations of some Gnostic 
heresy. The contrast with the Alexandrine School is most 
clear on the doctrinal issues of judgment and sin, free will 
and grace, and Christology. The early Christian expression 
of these issues forms a necessary background for the orthodox 
understanding of allegory and symbol. 
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The doctrine of original sin in the earliest Christian 
exegetes reveals a fundamental contrast with later Alexandrine 
doctrine. Whereas the Alexandrines de-emphasize the notion 
of original sin and judgment through their preoccupation with 
the "spiritual" Christ of mercy represented in the New Tes­
tament, and through their belief in the salvability of all 
mankind, orthodox Christian exegetes present a much stricter 
view of human nature and eternal judgment. 
Tertullian, (155-220 A.D.) for example, sees Hell both 
as a temporary "repository" for souls of evil men before the 
Resurrection of the dead, and as a permanent place of punish­
ment after the Last Judgment, "when the body also will pay 
98 
or be paid in full." His belief in eternal punishment, not 
simply in a short time of fiery "purification" appears in 
the image of a volcano which "burns, but continues to 
99 
exist," and which visibly foreshadows the eternal state 
of the evil man. St. John Chrysostome also uses a visible 
metaphor to express his orthodox conception of Doomsday, 
referring to the earthly tribunal "where judges both punish 
the wicked and honor the just publicly," as an image of the 
next world where the wicked will "have greater shame," and the 
100 
good "more brilliant glory." Ireneaus, writing about 
98 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, in Tertullian: Apolo-
getiqal Works and Minucius Felix Octavius, trans. Rudolph 
Arbesmann, Sister Emily Joseph Daly and Edwin A. Quain (Wash­
ington: Catholic Univ. of Am. Press, 1962), p. 293. 
^Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 99. 
"'"^^John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John the Apostle 
and Evangelist, trans. Sister Thomas Acguinas Goggin, 2 vols. 
(New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1960), 1:459. 
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180 A.D., exhibits the same belief in eternal punishment and 
decidedly emphasizes the union of body and spirit at the 
Last Judgment and in eternity: 
And therefore, when the number is complete which He 
hath foreordained within himself, all who are enrolled 
for life will arise with their very own bodies, with 
their very own souls also and their very own spirits, 
wherein they have pleased God. But those who deserve 
punishment will go away into the same, having also 
themselves their own souls and their own bodies, where­
in they fell from the grace of God.101 
This passage also illustrates the fact that in the orthodox 
Christian tradition there is a close relationship between 
eternal judgment and the doctrine of grace and free will. 
If heaven and hell truly exist, then man must choose in life 
which destiny will be his. The existence of a heaven and 
hell implies that real choices must be made in life. 
The early fathers reiterate the importance of free will 
throughout their writings. St. Ireneaus, for example, stres­
ses the original freedom of the rational mind in a passage 
which utilizes the Biblical image of wheat and chaff: 
But the wheat and the chaff, being inanimate and irra­
tional, were naturally made such, whereas man, being 
rational and therein like unto God, created free in 
will and in his own power, is the cause unto himself 
why he should become in one case wheat and in another 
chaffo102 
We find the same emphasis in St. John Chrysostome, who writes 
103 
that "evil men are destroyed by their own wickedness alone." 
"*"°"''St. Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 198. 
102 St. Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 317. 
103 St. John Chrysostome, Commentary, I, 81. 
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Again, arguing against those who say it is impossible not to 
sin he writes more emphatically still, "Free will is com-
104 
pletely responsible for everything." Later, St. John even 
directly refutes the entire notion of fate on the grounds of 
the existence of free will and a final resurrection and 
judgment writing that "If there is a resurrection and a judg­
ment, there is no such thing as fate, even if some contend and 
105 
endlessly put forth vigorous arguments that there is." 
Paradoxically, however, neither John nor Ireneaus see 
free will as operative apart from the mysterious working of 
grace. Grace is an element in the orthodox Christian doc­
trine of free will which keeps it distinct from all relig­
ions where willed morality is the means of salvation. God's 
love in bringing man back to repentance is always placed 
before man's capacity to keep the moral law, and this results 
in a new dignity for the common man, whose character is 
judged by his capacity for faith rather than his moral or 
social standing. John Ghrysostome shows himself well aware 
of the variety of men who will constitute the Kingdom of God, 
and makes it clear that character in the sense of moral up­
rightness has nothing to do with redemption: 
What would be comparable to this loving kindness? A 
King who has been made of the same clay as we does not 
deem it fitting to enroll in the royal army his fellows, 
men who share the same human nature with him, if they 
are slaves, though often they are superior to him in 
104 St. John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, 313. 
105 St. John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, 459. 
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character; but the only-begotten son of God has not 
considered it unworthy to enroll in the number of his 
family tax-collectors, and charlatans and slaves and 
persons less honorable than all these, and even the 
unsound in body with countless infirmities—Such is 
the power of faith in Him, such the greatness of His 
Grace. 
The stress in this passage on the grace of God as it is sim­
ply received, and not as it is merited, forms a decided con­
trast with the Alexandrine tendency to make salvation 
dependent on overt moral action. 
While the early Fathers stress the importance of unmer­
ited grace in their understanding of redemption, and while 
they inclusively demonstrate adherence to the doctrine of 
original sin, none of them seem to take this doctrine to mean 
that man is without any trace of the divine image. In the 
writings of Tertullian, for example, sin is both the result 
of a hereditary evil passed down from generation to genera­
tion, and of the machinations of the devil in historical 
life. Even though this evil is hereditary, it is not seen 
as originally intrinsic to human nature, but as a "corrup­
tive" influence which does not, even in the sinful state, 
completely obliterate the human nature it defaces: "There is 
some good in the soul, the remains of that original, divine, 
and genuine good which is its proper nature. That which comes 
107 
from God is overshadowed, but not wholly extinguished." 
This understanding of sin as a blight on an essentially good 
John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, 100. 
107 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 273. 
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creation also influences Tertullian's view of the body. 
Unlike the Alexandrines, Tertullian retains no tinge of the 
Gnostic tendency to attribute evil to the body and good 
only to the spirit. He sees redemption in terms of a "wed­
ding" between the regenerated spirit of man and his body, 
which is "no longer the slave of the soul, but the servant 
108 
of the spirit." Redemption is thus a restoration, through 
Christ's triumph over evil, of the spirit, soul, and body of 
man back to the kind of godly union which was man's condition 
before the Fall. 
The theme of the restoration of the "blessed marriage" 
of body and spirit runs throughout the orthodox exegetical 
tradition and forms the basis for a major and continuing 
contrast with Alexandrine exegesis. In Ireneaus, Tertullian 
and St. John, this understanding of the "restored" unity of 
body and spirit is based on the unified nature of Christ, 
who was both God and also fully man. St. John Chrysostome, 
for example, refutes the Marcionite notion that Christ had 
no infancy, and no real physical development in Homiles 3, 
109 
6, and 66 of his Commentary on St. John. Ireneaus, too, 
contrasts Gnostic disbelief in the Incarnation with the ortho­
dox view, arguing that if Christ is not true man, his suffering 
110 
and death is without meaning. Tertullian's insistence on 
108 Tertullian, Apoloqetical Works, p. 273. 
109 St. John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, 
33-35 and 72; II, 33. 
110 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 231: See 
also p. 294: "And it comes to this, whether one say that He 
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the Incarnation of Christ, who was born "as one who is man 
and god united," is perhaps the most explicit of all: "The 
flesh, provided with a soul is nourished, matures, speaks, 
111 
teaches, acts and is^ Christ." 
Tertullian's belief in Christ's bodily incarnation lays 
the foundation for his later insistence on a proper respect 
for bodily sensation and for the general relation of body and 
112 
spirit in man. At one point he makes bodily sensation the 
crux of his interpretation of Christ's life and ministry. 
Speaking to the problem of the Gnostic separation of sense 
and spirit he writes: 
On this pernicious principle Marcion denied that Christ 
had a real body and was but a phantom or ghost. No, 
His Apostles really and truly perceived him with their 
senses. They saw and heard him at the transfiguration; 
they tasted the wine changed from water at Cana in Gali­
lee. Thomas believed when he touched the wound in His 
side. Finally, listen to the words of St. John: 'What 
our hands have handled of the Word of life.1 The witness 
of St. John is false if we cannot believe the testimony 
of our eyes, our ears, and our hands. 
The effect of this emphasis on the union of matter and 
spirit is felt in one of the most important issues of Biblical 
appeared but in shew as man not being man; or that he was 
made a Man, taking to him nothing from mankind. For if he 
received not from man the substance of flesh, He was nei­
ther made Man, nor the Son of Man: and if He was not made 
the same that we were, He did no great thing in that He suf­
fered and endured. 
111 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 64. 
112 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 215. 
113 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 218. 
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exegesis—the nature of the relation between the Old and New 
Testaments. 
In fact, belief in Christ's Incarnation becomes the 
basis for the orthodox exegesis of Scripture and for the 
orthodox understanding of the nature of symbol and allegory. 
Whereas the Gnostics had seen the Old Testament as the 
inadequate and undependable "flesh" of revelation for which 
the New Testament was the totally exalted and dependable 
"spirit," Ireneaus, Tertullian and St. John see a profound 
union between the two testaments based on their unified con­
ception of the godhead. The Old and New Testaments are not 
controlled respectively by the material "demi-urge" and the 
truly spiritual "God of mercy," but they are inextricably 
connected, each finding its fulfillment in the other. In 
the Five Books Against Heresies Ireneaus offers a clear state­
ment of the orthodox view: 
Since undoubtedly there is one God, who as He guided 
the patriarchs along His own providential ways, so He 
justified the circumcision by faith and the uncir-
cumcision by faith. For as in those who came first 
we were prefigured and foretold, so they in their turn 
are completely drawn out in us; i.e., in the Church, 
and receive the reward for their labors.H4 
In this passage we see the clear and necessary relation of 
the Old Testament to the New. The Old Testament is a figure 
of the New; it is there to give us a physical picture of the 
fulfilled reality of the New. in one other place Ireneaus 
114 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 379. 
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compares the Old Testament to a seed which is now being "har-
115 
vested" under the New Dispensation. 
John of Chrysostome sees the relationship in much the 
same way. Following Paul, he compares the Old Testament story 
of the healing which proceeded from the brass serpent with 
the healing brought through Christ, ("In the former the 
uplifted serpent healed the bites of serpents; in the latter 
the crucified Jesus healed the wounds inflicted by the 
spiritual dragon"), and later shows the Old Testament tem­
ples to be a type of the New Church, just as the Old Testa-
116 
ment figure of Isaac is a type of Christ. In the Adversus 
Marcionem IV, Tertullian also insists that the Old and New 
Testaments were inspired by God and that there is a necessary 
relation between them. His explanation of one specific aspect 
of that relation reveals a clear grasp of the nature of Old 
Testament law and its relation to the New. Speaking to an 
incident in the New Testament where the Pharisees confront 
Jesus with the fact that Old Testament law allowed divorce, 
Tertullian reveals his clear grasp of the relation of Old 
and New Testaments as first outlined by Christ. Jesus solves 
the problem of the laxness of the Old Testament moral law by 
answering that permission for divorce had not been the ideal 
from beginning, but Moses had permitted it as a result of the 
hardness of their hearts. Because Christ came to take away 
115 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 383. 
^"^St. John Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, 
255-256. 
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that hardness and to put in "a heart of flesh," he naturally 
would replace the original ideal and not allow divorce except 
117 
in the case of adultery. Thus Tertullian synthesizes Old 
and New Testaments, insisting that any inconsistency between 
the ideals represented in each is a result of man1s sin rather 
than God's original plan. 
As further fuel for his argument, Tertullian goes on in 
the Fourth Book of the Adversus Marcionem to cite examples 
of fulfilled Old Testament prophecy, which he uses as con­
clusive proof of the divinity and mission of Jesus Christ. 
Ireneaus and Chrysostome follow suit, Chrysostome in his 
summary of the meaning of recapitulation and of fulfillment 
118 
of prophecy in Christ, and Ireneaus in his restatement of 
119 
the significance of the patriarchs and prophets. 
The early orthodox exegetes, in fact, put the prophetic 
relation of Old and New Testaments at the center of their 
message. This focus on prophecy and fulfillment is not 
117 This part of the Adversus is retold by John, Bishop 
of Lincoln, in The Ecclesiastical History of the Second and 
Third Centuries Illustrated from the Writings of Tertullian 
(London: Francis and John Rivington, 1845), pp. 472-473. 
118 Chrysostome, Commentary on St. John, I, p. 138— 
"Anticipating the dispensation which was going to be fulfilled 
in the New Testament, the types sketched it in outline, like 
patterns, and Christ, when He came, executed the design." 
119 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 377, "And 
so far indeed He was by his Patriarchs and prophets prefig­
uring and foretelling things future, exercising beforehand 
His part in God's ordained ways, and training his heritage 
to obey God and to be strangers in the world and to follow 
his word and fore-signify what is to come. For with God, 
nothing is void or without significancy." 
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without Biblical rationale. The wide attention given to Old 
Testament prophecy and its fulfillment in the New is given 
its original authority in the teaching of Christ, who made 
the fulfillment of Messianic prophecy the heart of his 
message to humankind. In Mark 12:10-11; Matt. 12:19; 12:34-35; 
and 21:42; John 7:38; and 13:18, Jesus constantly interprets 
his own mission in terms of Old Testament Scripture. Perhaps 
the most dramatic example of this is found in Luke 4:18f., 
where Jesus at the very onset of his ministry reads a pro-
120 
phetic passage from Isaish 61, then closes the roll, hands 
it to the minister, and says "This day is fulfilled this 
121 
scripture in your ears." J. Danielou comments on Christ's 
use of Messianic prophecy, writing that the backbone of 
Christian proof during the first three centuries was: "Christ's 
presentation of himself as the realization of the eschatologi-
cal event proclaimed by the prophets and adumbrated by the 
122 
institutions of the Old Covenant." 
Of course, the actual exegetical practice of contrast­
ing the Old and New Testaments was begun by St. Paul, whose 
120 "The spirit of the lord is upon me, wherefore he 
hath annointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, he hath 
s nt me to heal the contrite of heart, to preach deliv­
erance to the captives and sight to the blind, to set at 
liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year 
of the Lord, and the day of reward." 
121 Holy Bible: Douay version (Baltimore: John Murphy 
Company, 1914). Hereafter all citations in this chapter 
refer to the same edition. 
122 Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 
p. 198. See also H. F. Dunbar, Symbolism in Medieval 
Thought, etc., p. 201. 
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typological explanation of Galatians 4 became the primary 
model for later orthodox Christian exegetes. The respective 
analysis of the Galatians passage, and its Old Testament 
counterpart in Genesis 21, in fact, offers us a chance to 
contrast Alexandrine allegorization with the "figural" or 
typological understanding of allegory. We remember that Philo 
Judeaus1 interpretation of Genesis 21 revealed his preoccu­
pation with moral education, provided an example of his ten­
dency to separate the physical and the spiritual, and in gen­
eral demonstrated the Platonic idea of salvation as a gradual 
disentanglement from the senses and a movement toward the 
world of universal truth. In this view, the spiritual mean­
ing of events is stressed without reference to a larger his­
torical context which has its center of meaning in Christ. 
The Pauline interpretation takes on a completely dif­
ferent character. In Galatians 4 Hagar and Sarai are not 
types of "body" and "spirit," as they were in Philo, but of 
two covenents—one the covenant of the Old Mosaic Law and 
the other the covenant of the New Law—Grace in Christ: 
Which things are said by an allegory. For these are 
the two testaments. The one from Mount Sina, engender-
into bondage; which is Agar, for Sina is a mountain in 
Arabia, which hath affinity to that Jerusalem which 
now is, and is in bondage with her children. But that 
Jerusalem which is above is free: which is our 
mother. (Galatians 4:24) 
It is important in this study that we understand the 
meaning of the word "allegory" in the Pauline sense. The 
passage just quoted follows a long section on "sonship" 
under the New Covenant. We were under the Old Law, Paul 
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writes, "as children under tutors and governors." The Old 
Covenant exercises its control externally by imposing 
restraints on man's nature; but under the redemption wrought 
by Christ we receive "the full adoption of sons,"—an inward 
Spirit which is engendered in us and controls from within: 
"And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His 
Son into your hearts crying: Abba, Father," (Galatians 4:6). 
In other words, through Christ1s redemptive act, we receive 
not only the state of redemption but the "power to become the 
sons of God" as well. Essential to this understanding is the 
fact that the redemption effected by Christ originates in 
God. It is not the conscious, self-willed journey of a mind 
from a reliance on sense perception to the realm of spirit, 
but it is a salvation begun in the spiritual promise of God 
and fleshed out in human history. The human mind of Abraham 
and the barren Sarah plot to fulfill the promise which God 
had given them nearly ten years before and produce a child 
not "after the spirit" but "of the flesh." The spiritual 
promise of God produces a "child of the spirit" born nat­
urally, but conceived, initiated by an act which transcends 
physical law as we know it. Hagar is thus a type of "mother" 
for those who would go back to a reliance on outward form— 
to a tutor-student relationship rather than a father-son 
relationship. 
In my view, the comparison with Philo at this point is 
a striking one. In Philo, the soul itself journeys from a 
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realm of secular education where the sense-perceptions 
are his tutor to the realm of spiritual education, where 
Philosophy is his teacher. Even though the tutor itself 
is replaced by one qualitatively higher, the relationship is 
still one of master to pupil. In Paul the entire metaphor of 
relationship changes to a new plane—from teacher-student to 
father-son. Also, significantly enough, the head of the rela­
tionship is not "Philosophy"—a collection of abstract ideals, 
but a person—God, who is now Father by virtue of the Spirit 
of His Son in our hearts. Thus Paul asks—and the rhetoric 
is revealing: "But now, after that you have known God, or 
rather are known by God, how turn you again to the weak and 
needy elements which you desire to serve again?" (Galatians 4:9) 
In the liaison of Hagar and Abraham we thus find the type of 
the Old Law—the endeavor to fulfill God's ideal through 
worldly elements (cf. Gal. 4:3). In the literal and yet 
miraculous liaison of Abraham and his aging wife we find the 
type for a New Law—the fulfillment of God's ideal through 
the "Spirit of God's Son" which lives in the believer and 
allows him to participate in a new ideal altogether—a per­
sonal relationship with God, a relationship established by 
virtue of Christ's death and resurrection. Paul insists upon 
the historicity of both the prefiguration and the fulfilled 
event, stressing in particular the bodily Resurrection of 
Jesus in time: 
And if Christ be not risen again, your faith is in vain 
for you are yet in your sins. Then they also which are 
fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life 
240 
only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most 
miserable. (I Cor. 15:17-19) 
The center of the Pauline interpretation of Old Testament 
history is the Word made flesh, Jesus Christ. "Allegory" is 
S 
defined not in the sense of the Old Greek t/ // O ̂ ° c ̂  
("undermeaning"), the incorporeal meaning underlying the sur­
face fiction, but in the sense of one literal event itself 
prefiguring the incarnated person of Christ, another literal 
event in history. Thus "allegory" as understood by Paul has 
an incarnational value; the words of allegory represent 
literal facts which are themselves prefigurations of the 
historical Incarnation. 
The early church Fathers follow in the Pauline tradi­
tion. Ireneaus, we note, has the same 'substantial view of 
prophecy. Not only does he see Old Testament events as 
actual events which prefigure other actual events in the New; 
but New Testament prophecy, such as the prophecy of human 
renewal in Revelation 21:5 and 6, also points to actual his­
torical events in the future. Ireneaus has a very substan­
tial view of this eschatological prophecy: "For since men are 
real, the renewal of them must be real; yea, and it must not 
go out into things which are not, but go forward in things 
123 
which are." Ireneaus evidently wishes to be clear about 
the actual historicity both of the events which have taken 
place and of the events which will occur for purposes of 
123 Ireneaus, Five Books Against Heresies, p. 536. 
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counteracting Gnostic and Platonic tendencies to over-
spiritualize Scripture. 
Tertullian also rejects the Gnostic tendency to build 
an abstract philosophical system from the discarded literal 
body of the text, and to take the spiritualized construct 
as the truth. In the same vein he scornfully comments on 
the results of this kind of interpretation: 
No wonder, then, if the talents of the philosophers 
have distorted the Old Testament. Men of their breed 
have even adulterated this new little dispensation of 
ours with their own ideas to match the opinions of 
the philosophers and from the one way they have split 
many bypaths and blind alleys.124 
Both Tertullian and Ireneaus objected strenuously to the kind 
of allegorization which resulted in a private system of 
mythology. No allegory, they felt, could be genuine unless 
submitted to the objective revelation of Scripture. 
Allegorizing is to be conducted only along the lines 
which Scripture itself allows and what it allows is a kind 
of allegorization which is based, as both De Lubac and 
Danielou have shown, on Christ's attention to and Pauline 
exegesis of, Old Testament prophecy. This kind of allegory 
is rooted in the unified person of Christ. It is not meant 
to demonstrate a mere correspondence between Old and New 
Testaments, or a connection between an abstract spiritual 
intelligence and the life of the individual Christian, but 
it is rather a kind of spiritual elan, which animates the 
124 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 116. 
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whole of the Biblical message. It is an allegorical exegesis 
"dans la foi," a means of interpretation which finds its 
125 
expression in the Incarnation. 
Tertullian seems to grasp the allegorical spirit which 
we define here. In the Apologetical Works, he points out 
the improper use of allegory in support of a philosophical 
system of abstract thought: 
Can't you catch a gleam there of the heretical teach­
ing of the Gnostics and the Valentinians? This is where 
they get their distinction between the bodily senses 
and the intellect which they use in their interpreta­
tion of the parable of the wise and foolish virgins 
(Matt. 25:1-13). Thus the five foolish virgins are said 
to be the senses, who are foolish because so easily 
deceived, while the wise virgins typify the intellect, 
which can perceive the secret and supernal truth hidden 
in the fulness of God. Here then, is the source of all 
their heretical ideas, and their aeons and genealogies. 
Thus they divide sensation from intelligence sepa­
rating it from its spiritual source and again, they 
separate sense and knowledge from its animal source, 
since that cannot in any wa^ perceive what is spiritual. ̂-26 
Thus Tertullian suggests that an improper use of allegory is 
ultimately an outgrowth of the Greek habit of separating 
sensation and spirit, body and soul. His conclusion is 
two-fold: (1) Intellect is not superior to sense because the 
instrument through which a thing exists is not inferior to 
the thing itself. (2) Intellect must not be considered to 
be separate from the senses because the agent by which a 
thing exists is united to it. 
12 5 ' n • s De Lubac, Exeqese Medievale, I, premiere partie, 355. 
126 Tertullian, Apologetical Works, p. 220; Danielou writes 
that Hippolytus of Rome, another well-known fourth-century 
exegete, also objects to the Gnostic allegorism "which searches 
for symbols of its own at every turn." Cited by Danielou, 
Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, p. 261. 
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In this analysis, Tertullian exhibits exactly the spirit 
/ 
which DeLubac describes as the elan vital of Scripture. At 
base, typology, "the demonstration of the figure of future 
127 
events in the events of the past" is a sacramental view of 
reality based on the significance of the union of historical 
events in the Old and New Testaments and ultimately on the 
significance of the union of God and Man in Christ. As 
Danielou puts it, when we deal with typology, with the "alle­
gory of the theologians" in this sense we are "in a different 
world of thought concerned more with the theology of history 
128 
than with exegesis of the text." 
St. Augustine follows Tertullian, Ireneaus and Chrysos-
tome in his insistence upon the historical reality of Scrip­
ture and upon the typological character of Old Testament 
events. In The Trinity, xv, ix, 5, he writes: 
But where the apostle speaks of the allegory, he finds 
it not in the words, but in the deed; for he pointed 
out that by the two sons of Abraham, the one by a slave 
girl and the other by a free woman, that he was not 
speaking figuratively, but of something that also took 
place....129 
Here following in the orthodox tradition, Augustine empha­
sizes the historical factuality of the Scriptural account as 
12 *7 _/ Danielou, Les Figures du Christ dans l'Ancien Tes­
tament , p. 4. 
128 Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 
p. 204. 
129 St. Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 
pp. 471-72. 
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necessary to proper exegesis. This is borne out again in the 
Sermons, 2, 6, where Augustine admonishes readers of the 
Scripture to believe what is read "to have actually taken 
130 
place," lest they run the risk of "building in the air." 
Earlier we saw that in Tertullian, Ireneaus, and Chrysos-
tome, a concern for preservation of the literal level of the 
text was an important factor in their understanding of 
the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. Both 
levels were regarded as historically true and as forming a 
unified and consistent whole, the Old Testament creating the 
historical pattern or figure which was then historically 
fulfilled in Christ. Augustine exhibits the same under­
standing: 
For we are all aware that the Old Testament contains 
promises of temporal things, and that is why it is 
called the Old Testament; and that the promise of 
eternal life, and the kingdom of Heaven belongs to the 
New Testament: but that in these temporal figures 
there was the promise of future things, which were to 
be fulfilled in us, on whom the ends of the world are 
come, is no fantasy of mine, but the interpretation 
of the apostles.... (Against Faust, 4, 2)"1 
Here we see a tri-faceted view of allegory: first, the Law 
of the Old Testament is an unfulfilled type for the work of 
Christ; second, the Incarnation and work of Christ is both 
the fulfillment of the Old Law and a typological promise of 
the end of history, and the Last Judgment; third, the future 
130 St. Augustine, Sermons, cited by Auerbach, "Figura," 
in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, p. 39. 
131 St. Augustine, Against Faust, cited by Auerbach, 
"Figura," in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, 
p. 41. 
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occurrence of these events is the final fulfillment of the 
promise which Jesus left. 
Although Augustine bases his theory of allegory on 
this tri-partite view of typology he includes a fourth level 
of ethical interpretation, which superficially resembles 
the Greek method. This he delineates in De Genesi ad Lit-
teram i, i: 
In all the holy books there are those things which are 
to be looked for which are indicated as having to do 
with eternity, those which foretell future events, 
and those which command or advise what we are to 
do.132 
This fourth sense of allegory, or the tropological sense, 
in combination with the literal text, the events to which the 
text points, and the future events to which those events 
point, constitute an extremely popular approach to the 
133 
exegesis of Scripture in following generations. Thus 
Augustine, although insisting on a historical interpretation 
of Scripture, and on the necessity of seeing Old Testament 
events as a prefiguration of those of the New, nevertheless 
incorporates a non-historical sense into his schema which 
resembles the old ethical interpretations given by the Greek 
allegorists. It should be remembered, however, that Augus­
tine's ethical injunctions grow out of and are rooted in the 
132 St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, cited by Auer-
bach, "Figura," in Scenes from the Drama of European Litera­
ture , p. 42. 
133 See G. R. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval 
England (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961), pp. 56-109, for an excel­
lent discussion of the use of the four-fold method with exam­
ples . 
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facts of Biblical history. Thus the two lines of allegory 
which we are tracing remain distinct. 
Nearly six centuries later, Thomas Acquinas reiterates 
Augustine's four-fold view of allegory, adding a more com­
plete explanation of the functioning of the ethical por­
tion of the allegory. For Acquinas, too, the literal sense 
is not the text of Scripture, but the event which is figured 
by the text. It is worthwhile to quote him in full: 
The author of Holy Writ is God in whose power it is to 
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can 
do) but also by things themselves. So whereas in every 
other science things are signified by words, this sci­
ence has the property that the things signified by the 
words have themselves also a signification. Therefore 
that first signification whereby words signify things 
belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. 
That signification whereby things signified by words 
have themselves also a signification is called the 
spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and 
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a three­
fold division. For, as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) 
the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius 
says (Cael. Hier. i) the New Law itself is a type of 
what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things 
of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, 
there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things 
done in Christ or so far as the things which signify 
Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the 
moral sense; But so far as they signify what relates 
to eternal glory there is the anagogical sense.-'-^ 
Here Aquinas once again defines allegory as the connection 
between the Old Testament event signified by the literal 
text, and its relation to the prefigured historical event of 
the New Testament—more explicitly, the life, death and 
Resurrection of Christ and his future coming. It is only 
134 St. Thomas Acquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province, 2 vols. (New York: 
Benziger Bros,, Inc0, 1947), I?7, 
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when allegory is thus grounded in the saving act of Christ 
that it becomes moral. Joseph Bryant understands this to 
mean that Christians are not bound by the Old Law, which has 
been fulfilled by Christ, but are instead under obligation 
only to the allegory of the New Law, which is the "figure" 
for Christian action. He concludes: "This is simply another 
way to saying that Christians live by Christ and reject utterly 
the attempt either to live directly by ultimate truth or by 
135 
any other symbol of it." 
Thus St, Thomas goes directly back to Early Christian 
and Augustinian doctrines, drawing out in explicit detail the 
composite tradition of symbol-allegory and reiterating once 
again its basic incarnational difference—even in ethical 
application—from the tradition of Greek interpretation. 
At this point, a reassessment and some illustrations are 
in order. We have, in the course of this chapter, distin­
guished the symbolic or sacramental view of allegory which 
is found in the orthodox Christian tradition of exegesis 
from the tradition of Greek/Platonic exegesis which is begun 
in the early allegorical treatment of Homer and Virgil and 
which is characterized by a sanguine view of sin and judgment 
(demonstrated in the recurrent doctrine of the "salvability 
of all mankind"), a de-emphasis on the concept of free will, 
and a dualistic view of the nature of Christ. We have seen 
135 Joseph Bryant, Hippolyta's View (Knoxville: Univ. 
of Kentucky Press, 1961), p. 8. 
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that this tradition was carried on in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
centuries by the Alexandrine tradition of exegesis which was 
in turn greatly influenced by Gnostic doctrines which rein­
force the Classical separation of body and sense and promote 
a doctrine of salvation which is based more on the believer's 
capacity for mystical experience and moral action than on the 
saving grace of Christ. 
These beliefs generally go hand in hand with a radically 
subjective view of the content of faith and result in an alle­
gorical method which begins with an abstract intellectual sys­
tem and views the fictive vehicle only as a means of indi­
cating that system. When applied to the process of character 
presentation this method results in a "personification alle­
gory" in which the material reality of the literal figure is 
completely subservient to the intellectual system which dom­
inates it. As H. F. Dunbar puts it, "where the whole inte­
rest is in a definite and preconceived abstraction, the 
validity of the letter is in reality of no material impor-
136 
tance." Thus historical realistic detail and individua­
lized, developing personalities will not be of primary con­
cern in the creation of a character formed in the spirit of 
Greek exegesis. 
The Romance of the Rose, which lies squarely within the 
tradition of secular personification-allegory springing from 
early Greek exegesis and continuing up through Statius, 
136 Dunbar, Symbolism in Medieval Thought, etc., p. 280. 
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Prudentius, Fulgentius and the School of Chartres, offers 
scores of illustrations of this kind of characterization. 
In the figure of Jean de Meun1s Famine, for example, we 
find a classic model of personification-allegory. Famine 
is described as "long and lean, weak and hollow;" her eyes 
are "hard and hollow," her face "pale," her lips "dry," and 
her cheeks "soiled with dirt." She "tears out the very 
grass with cutting nails, with hard teeth," but "finds the 
grass very sparse." She is "Poverty's chambermaid," and 
the "mistress and nurse'' of Larceny'1 (The Romance of the 
137 
Rose, 11. 10163-10187). 
The allegory here is transparently clear—Famine is 
the universal type of human want and the Dreamer is to avoid 
her by not being slothful. There is no energy spent on the 
individualized personal detail which would give the charac­
ter of Famine personal substance. Famine is not one hungry 
person individually brought to life; she is an abstract 
caricature of all hungry people. She serves Jean as a useful 
vehicle for the concept of Hunger but she is not herself a 
flesh-and-blood character of personal proportions. What is 
important for Jean de Meun is the intellectual and moral 
framework of his allegory—he has no reason, as Hollander 
puts it, for being "caught and drawn by a world that offers 
137 Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, The Romance 
of the Rose, trans. Charles Dahlberg (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), p. 181. 
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him the occasion for mimesis?" he is concerned far more 
with the moral lesson which is behind his characterization— 
that Poverty will lead man to Hunger if he is idle (lines 
139 
10187-10205). Thus his characters, created in the spirit 
of personification-allegory, will not require the degree of 
concreteness on the literal level exacted by the orthodox 
view of allegory, because the emphasis is not on the mater­
iality of the symbol itself, but on the abstract lesson 
which it conveys. 
Fulgentius, an African bishop of the Alexandrine school 
(d. 532), offers an even more obvious example of this ten­
dency toward abstract idealism in characterization. In the 
Prologue to the Mythologies, Book I, Fulgentius carries on a 
conversation with the mythological figure Calliope, the epic 
Muse. Calliope, approaching the just-awakened Fulgentius, 
is clearly described as a supernatural being; her god-like 
aloofness from the mortal Fulgentius is reflected in her 
scornful mien and her unwillingness to melt his human gaze: 
Her maidenly temper advanced towards me, a riot of 
flowers, bedecked with copious ivy, determined in 
aspect and with a heavy bundle of insults in her mouth, 
her ironic eye darting with such penetrating sharpness 
that it showed even the deeply concealed thoughts of 
her mind at the writings of a drunken reveler. The 
two sides of the Muse balanced one another, for on her 
more stately right side, aided by a certain majesticity, 
she had displayed pearls of starry whiteness over the 
top of her exalted brow; a moon-shaped crescent, its 
138 Hollander, Allegory in Dante's Comedia, p. 5. 
139 Jean de Meun, The Romance of the Rose, p. 181. 
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points studded with rare gems, held in place her white-
tipped diadem, and, covered in an azure robe, she twirled 
a hollow globe of glass tapering down to a small piece 
of bone. My eyesight was so stirred by the exalted 
contemplation of this heavenly vision when, tall as she 
was and penetrating in her gaze, she had scarcely pushed 
her thumb at the door. With a delicate withdrawal of 
one side my elusive companion avoided my human gaze 
by a half-concealing veil. Her silvery hair gleamed 
white as snow, and the frown on her much wrinkled brow 
betokened that she had learnt something distasteful to 
her. Her entrance was slow and awesome in its weighty 
deliberation.140 
When Calliope speaks, Fulgentius learns that her scorn is 
for poets who fall into sentimental laments, overblown ora­
tory and comedy, thus failing to reach "the golden eloquence 
of Plato and the syllogistic brevity of Aristotle." She 
exhorts Fulgentius to take in what the Muses will tell him 
and then allow himself to rise above his mortal sphere to the 
realm of pure philosophy: 
Now, therefore, once you have absorbed the message in 
your mind, unlock its recesses and allow what you 
assimilate to enter your ear-tubes. But let fade the 
whole mortal nature which is yours, so that the full 
span of what is concentrated to strict philosophical 
proportions may take up residence in those recesses.141 
Not only are the classical Greek overtones of this passage 
unmistakable—the attitude toward comedy; the homage paid to 
Aristotle and Plato—but the allegory—and the meaning of 
the allegorical figure of Calliope—are transparently clear. 
The "flesh-and-blood", or historically realistic, aspect of 
the characterization of Calliope is deliberately obscured; 
140 Fabius Planciades Fulgentius, "The Mythologies," in 
Fulgentius the Mythographer, trans. Leslie George Whitehead 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 47. 
141 Fulgentius, Fulgentius the Mythographer, p. 47. 
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she is made to seem larger than life, to take on the epic 
proportions of the genre she symbolizes, to be the agent of 
a philosophical truth. 
We can see this same tendency toward universaliza-
tion in the character of Lady Philosophy in Boethius, 
whose description and function are very similar to those 
of Fulgentius1 Calliope. In both figures, historically 
realistic detail is de-emphasized in favor of the creation 
of an idealized type-figure who functions as the symbol 
of an intellectual system which the student-dreamer is 
to assimilate. The allegorical method in each instance 
is a case, as Frank puts it, of "this for that," of this 
type-figure as a sign for that specific system of truth— 
a system which usually has at least some Platonic content. 
In the orthodox Christian view of allegorical exe­
gesis we have an entirely different emphasis. The Chris­
tian view of allegory has its original roots in the under­
standing of Old Testament prophecy/New Testament fulfillment 
first expressed by Christ and formally applied by St. Paul. 
We have traced this line of exegesis through the orthodox 
tradition of the first, second, third and fourth centur­
ies as it is expressed in Irenaeus, Tertullian, Chrysostome, 
and St. Augustine, and how it reappears through the influ­
ence of St. Augustine in St. Thomas Aquinas. We have seen 
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that the orthodox approach to exegesis is grounded in a 
world-view which emphasizes human free will, and promotes 
a strict understanding of sin and judgment. We have fur­
ther seen that the orthodox solution to the problem of evil 
is not, contrary to Gnostic or Alexandrine conceptions, 
an escape from evil matter to a pure world of spirit, 
but the redemption of the material, physical universe 
through the restored union of spirit and sense. This 
restoration is achieved through the life and death of 
Jesus Christ, who in the orthodox view is the ultimate 
expression of the union of matter and spirit. The Incar­
nation becomes the doctrine most central to the typolog­
ical exegesis of Scripture, which finds its sacramental 
understanding in the relationship between prophetic history 
and fulfilled history. 
The Christian view of reality fosters a sacramental 
view of symbol in which the symbol itself becomes the 
manifestation of an infinite truth which cannot be known 
apart from it. Thus the materiality of the symbol, its 
concreteness, its finiteness, becomes a means for reach­
ing a truth which cannot be intellectually grasped. The 
literal expression of a character becomes in Dunbar's terms 
"an embodiment of what is infinite," and takes on an impor­
tance foreign to the Greek-allegorical method. Charac­
terization in this sacramental Judeo-Christian understanding 
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becomes a means for expressing the truth of the Incarna­
tion, through which it finds its ultimate justification. 
A view of characterization based on objective historical 
reality will pay great attention to the truthful represen­
tation of history; the characters created in the spirit 
of such a method will reflect its inherent respect for 
bodily life and its concern for historical truth on both 
an individual and universal level. 
This does not mean that a character created in the 
Judeo-Christian spirit which we describe here must be a 
historical figure, (although he can be), but that he must 
be regarded as a historical figure, and that he must in 
turn draw the reader1s attention to the universal plan of 
salvation revealed in the Scriptures and manifested bod­
ily in Christ. That is, in order to be interpreted accord­
ing to the focus of the sacramental "allegory of the theo­
logians ," a character will, through the power and truth of 
his literal representation invite acceptance as a histori­
cally concrete being while yet pointing us to the universal 
context through which his historical existence finds expres­
sion and meaning. Gregory the Great puts it succinctly: 
142 
"Allegoria est machina per quam anima levatur ad Deum." 
142 
Gregory the Great, Promemium ad Super Sanetica Can-
ticorum Expositio, cited by H. F. Dunbar, Symbolism in 
Medieval Thought, etc., p. 269. 
255 
In making these general contrasts between the two alle­
gorical methods, we must be careful to note that within the 
mainstream of orthodox exegesis, it is obvious that there 
are natural limits to the importance given the literal-
historical level, particularly with reference to the par­
ables and commandments of Jesus. Some of the words of 
God are not specific historical events, but merely a word 
requiring obedience to a particular statute or lesson. 
Even so, within the orthodox tradition, words of command 
and admonishment are much more likely to be related to a 
historical center, as Augustine's summary of the orthodox 
approach to Biblical exegesis reveals: "...in these pro­
phetic stories, some are merely relations, yet they are 
adherent unto those that are significant and in a manner 
linked to them" (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, xvi, 
143 
2). Augustine's statement acquires added meaning in 
Walsh and Monahan's translation of the same passage: 
We investigate these hidden meanings of Divine Scrip­
ture as best we can, some finding symbols with more, 
others with less success. However, what is certain to 
all men of faith is, first, that these things were not 
done and recorded without some prefiguring of what 
St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, cited by Hollander 
in Allegory in Dante's Commedia, p. 23. 
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was to come, and second, that they are to be referred 
only to Christ and his church, which is the City of 
God concerning which, from the beginning of the human 
race, there has been no lack of prophecy which we now 
see completely fulfilled.I44 
Augustine's qualification puts an objective control on all 
truly orthodox exegesis. Whether or not there may be or 
appear to be a purely Platonic or highly spiritualized under­
standing of passages of Scripture in a particular exegetical 
text, all interpretations should ultimately be related to 
the historical fact of the Christ-event. If they are not, 
they are not truly within the centrally orthodox tradition. 
The contrast between literary characters created and 
received according to the focus of the sacramental "allegory 
of the theologians" (that method of Biblical analysis espoused 
by orthodox christian interpreters) and those created accord­
ing to the focus of the "allegory of the poets" (or personi­
fication—allegory) has been observed by a number of impor­
tant critics. Henri de Lubac, for example, makes an interest­
ing observation concerning the allegorical method of Alain 
de Lille, whon he regards as directly within the Greek-Platonic 
tradition of personification-allegory. Alain's work, he 
writes, is double in meaning, but it does not have as its 
principal sense a meaning which is truly historical in a 
dramatically realistic way. This observation applies in a 
unilateral way to the whole Platonic tradition: 
"*"^St. Augustine, City of God, trans. Gerald G. Walsh 
and Grace Monahan (Washington: Cath. Univ. of Am. Press, 
1952), p. 489 (Italics mine). 
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Lepopee Alain present m^me un caractere tout a fait 
an-historique et en ce sens, non Biblique—par quoi 
d'ailleurs, elle est d1allure plus metaphysique et moins 
profoundment Chretienne.^S 
In a similar manner, (as we already noted in the introduction 
to this chapter), Charles Singleton sees a radical differ­
ence between the figure of Lady Philosophy in Boethius1 
Consolation of Philosophy and Dante's Beatrice in the Divine 
Comedy. Etienne Gilson also insists that Dante's complex 
historical characters are qualitatively different from the 
figures of personification-allegory. That Dante employs both 
in the Divine Comedy should not, Gilson suggests, deter us 
from distinguishing sharply between the two. Though we should 
not hesitate, he comments, to assign Geryon of the Inferno 
the abstract qualities of greed and fraud wherever he appears, 
we cannot legitimately treat the figure of Virgil in the same 
way simply because on the narrative level his actions and 
character have "the resilient, varied, often unpredictable 
146 
unity of those of a concrete living being." Dante's fig­
ures do often have association with abstract of typical 
meanings, but their fictive natures are too rich and complex 
to serve merely as signs for abstract ideals. Beatrice, 
although she has association with the concept of Revelation, 
147 
Wisdom, Truth, the Churcn, and/or the Contemplative Life, 
"*"4~'De Lubac, Ex^qese Medievale II, second partie, p. 206. 
146 Gilson, Dante, p. 294. 
147 See Edward Moore, Studies in Dante; Seconde Series 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), pp. 79-151, for an excel­
lent discussion of the different theories regarding Beatrice. 
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is not primarily any one of these, but the living individual 
which Dante creates. Edward Moore points out that Dante seems 
to take pains to add historical detail to his narrative in 
the mention of Beatrice's exact age and dates, in the ref­
erence to her father and friend in the Vita Nuova, in the 
representation of her literal death in the Purgatorio, and 
in her assignment to a definitive place in heaven along with 
other historical characters. Even Geryon, although he does 
not have the fleshly reality of Beatrice or Virgil, is placed 
within a Christian schema which embraces the whole of his­
tory. Dante centers on the historical essence of his fic-
tive beings, on their individual reality, and this is the 
starting-point for any association or meaning they have beyond 
history. 
We must remind ourselves at this point that in referring 
to the historical essence of Dante's characters, we are 
not insisting that they be either imitations of historical 
figures or that Dante himself considered his own characteriza­
tions as historically real. What we are saying is that Dante 
treats the figures of Dante, Virgil, Beatrice, Cato, Ulysses, 
etc., as historically real and as participants in a historical 
plan which includes and reaches beyond earthly history. It 
is his understanding of, and commitment to the Christian 
vision of man which makes this fictive reality possible. 
As Singleton puts it: The fiction of the Divine Ccmedy is 
148 
that it is not a fiction." 
148 Charles Singleton, "The Irreducible Dove," Comparative 
Literature 9 (Spring, 1957), 129. 
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Perhaps the clearest example of Dante's capacity for 
stressing both the historical life of a character and his 
place in the universal plan of Christian history is the figure 
149 
of Statius in the Purqatorio XXI and XXII. Dante estab­
lishes Statius1 historical identity immediately with a clear 
mention of his literary productions. The scene which follows 
has been noted by many critics as a masterpiece of dramatic 
realism—Statius, not recognizing his mentor in Virgil, 
seeks the reason for Dante1s knowing smile when he involun­
tarily praises the great Latin poet. Virgil, however, for­
bids Dante to reveal his identity to Statius, who asks why 
Dante is smiling. Dante, caught in the middle of Virgil's 
modesty and Statius' question, experiences an extremely human 
moment of social embarrassment, until Virgil releases him 
from silence. This subtle bit of realistic human drama sets 
the scene for a far greater drama on the Christian level— 
the story of Statius' conversion to Christianity. This 
story, in keeping with the Christian method of characteriza­
tion we have outlined in this study, gains much in psycho­
logical truth and dramatic suspense through the historical 
reality of the literal action. 
Other aspects of this episode reinforce the historical 
reality of Statius' reactions on the literal level. In 
keeping with the Christian understanding of character as a 
process of development containing within itself the possibility 
149 Dante, The Divine Comedy, trans. H. R. Huse (San 
Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1954), pp. 265-274. 
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of substantial change, Statius describes his own conversion 
to Christianity in terms of a progression. He is first 
attracted to Christianity through his own pagan studies of 
history and poetry. His thirst after the everlasting kingdom 
hinted at in Virgil's Fourth Eclogue leads him to associa­
tion with the new preachers of the word, the martyrs of the 
early faith. Statius finds these martyrs to be kindred spirits 
and is drawn into belief. His conversion causes a real change 
in his behavior and perspective, which he describes as an 
enlightenment of his total being. The content of this 
enlightenment is definitely orthodox in nature, a fact 
which Virgil makes clear in his insistence on the insuf­
ficiency of good deeds in the working of grace: "It does 
not appear that you as yet had faith, without which good 
150 
deeds are insufficient" (Purqatorio, XXII, 11. 59-60). 
This represents a clear departure from the theological orien­
tation of the Romance of the Rose, where Nature offers a 
decidedly rationalistic concept of the way to salvation: 
But I know very well that it is quite true that how­
ever the heavens work to give them those natural ways 
that incline them to do those things that drew them to 
this end, obedient to material that goes about to 
bend their hearts in this way, even so, they can, 
through teaching, through clean, pure nourishment, by 
following and good company that is endowed with sense 
and virtues, or through certain remedies, provided they 
are good and pure and also through goodness of under­
standing, they can, I say, obtain another result, pro­
vided that, like intelligent people, they have bridled 
their natural ways. For when a man or woman wants to 
150 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 271. 
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turn his spirit away from his own nature, against his 
good and against right, Reason can turn him back, pro­
vided that he believes in her alone (Romance of the Rose, 
11. 17064-17077).151 
The Statius episode in Dante has no such overtones of classi­
cal humanism. Man finds salvation through the painful process 
of repentance and faith, and Statius' characterization is 
utterly tied up with the definition of reality which informs 
the Christian understanding of history. 
In fact, this entire episode, permeated as it is with 
Statius' devotion and respect for Virgil, glows with a 
warmth and human color not to be found in the tradition of 
personification—allegory which springs from the Greek vision 
of reality. Dante himself seems uncannily aware of the 
humanity of his figures. As Statius bends to embrace Vir­
gil, the older poet warns him that such affection is not pos­
sible between the shades of the underworld. Statius, reply­
ing, seems to catch the essence of our reaction to Dante's 
masterful characterizations: 
Now you can understand 
The greatness of the love that warms me 
For you when I forget our emptiness 
And consider a shade as a solid thing. 152 
(Purqatorio XXI, 11. 133-36) 
Almost, we feel, does Dante persuade us that his beings are 
real, that this episode in the Purgatorio did, or will happen, 
is happening. His characters, like the shades of this 
episode, are always on the verge of transforming themselves 
151 Jean de Meun, Romance of the Rose, pp. 286-287. 
152 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 269. 
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into "solid things" through the great power of divine and 
human love which permeates every aspect of Dante1s celestial 
vision. 
Dante1s capacity for creating the illusion of histor­
ical reality in his characters can be seen to have strong 
affinities with the orthodox exegetical tradition which we 
have described in this chapter. Although he cannot be said 
to have written historical truth in the same way that the 
writers of Holy Scripture wrote historical truth, Dante 
clearly creates his characters in the spirit of the orthodox 
strain of exegesis which begins in the words of Jesus and 
St. Paul and runs through Tertullian, Ireneaus, and Augustine 
up to Aquinas. Dante's figures first invite our total par­
ticipation in their reality on a literal level. If their 
meaning then widens into an infinity beyond earthly history, 
it is only after they have had a thorough grounding in the 
particulars of earthly existence. In Dante we catch a glimpse 
of eternity, but we see it only through the summa of the 
created world. As such, his poetic creations represent 
a continuation of that emphasis on the literal level of the 
text which we see in the earliest orthodox exegetes, men for 
whom the truth of the Incarnation was the source of all 
meaning. 
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CHAPTER V 
CLASSICAL AND CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES ON MEDIEVAL LITERARY THEORY: 
RESULTING EFFECTS ON THE PROBLEM OF FIGURATIVE 
EXPRESSION IN CHARACTERIZATION 
In the preceding chapter I have attempted to trace the 
Greek-Platonic and Judeo-Christian perspectives on reality 
through their manifestation in the exegetical tradition from 
the first century up to the age of Chaucer. At the end of the 
chapter I demonstrated how the two different understandings of 
allegorical interpretation which result from the two perspec­
tives affected the presentation of character in two influen­
tial works of the medieval period, particularly in regard to 
the emphasis placed on historical realism on the literal 
level of the text. More generally, I noted the continuing 
presence of philosophical and theological elements which seem 
to go hand in hand (as demonstrated in chapters II and III), 
with either the Greek-Platonic understanding of reality or the 
orthodox Judeo-Christian perspective. 
In this chapter I will attempt to assess the extent to 
which elements from either the Greek-Platonic or Judeo-Christian 
perspectives on reality manifest themselves in the tradition 
of literary criticism which informs the Middle Ages, especially 
as it relates to the medieval understanding of characteriza­
tion, and more particularly to Chaucerian characterization. 
The study will cover representative authors from four major 
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groups of theorists leading up to the age of Chaucer. These 
will include the literary theorists of the early Christian 
period (involving Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, Macrobius, 
Statius, Bede, Isidore and others); the Neo-Platonic theo­
rists of the twelfth century including most of the artists 
associated with the School of Chartres (Bernardus Silvestris, 
William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Bernard of Tours, 
John of Salisbury, Alain de Lille, and Hugh of St. Victor); 
the poetic theorists of the later 12th and 13th centuries 
(Matthew of Vendome, John of Garland, Goeffrey of Vinsauf, 
Evrard of Bethune, and Gervaise de Melkley); and those theo­
rists and artists most immediately relevant to Chaucer (Dante, 
Boccaccio and Ovid). 
In the first three chapters of this study I have devel­
oped a rationale for the method of analysis employed in this 
chapter. In accordance with that rationale, analysis of the 
theories will be carried on with an eye to isolating the phil­
osophical and allegorical elements, both explicit and implicit, 
which have been shown to bear directly on the approach to 
characterization taken by certain medieval artists and theo­
rists. It has been demonstrated in Chapter II that the Phil­
osophical and allegorical elements involved in a Greek-Platonic 
perspective (except in the case of comic characterization, 
which, where allowed at all, is governed by careful theoret­
ical restrictions) tends to foster a universalized or "typi-
calized" character whose historical reality is unclear. It 
has been demonstrated in Chapter III, on the other hand, that 
! 
! 
! 
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the philosophical and allegorical elements which inform the 
Christian view of reality offer a solid basis for the creation 
of character which has a three-dimensional quality, what we 
have referred to earlier as a sense of felt historical life. 
The analysis will be carried on within the framework of the 
comparison between the classical and Christian views of 
characterization which has been operative throughout this 
dissertation. 
The following questions should serve to define the broad 
areas covered by the analysis and to summarize the specific 
issues which are relevant to this study: 
1. What is the view of history represented in the 
theory? Is there an awareness, for example, of a 
providential plan in history despite the working of 
chance? Is earthly history taken seriously at all 
as material for what is considered the good life? 
How is salvation understood? Is there an emphasis 
on salvation in the Christian sense of a commitment 
to the person of Christ, or is salvation consid­
ered more in the Greek sense of a gradual throwing 
off of bodily individuality? 
2. In this light, what is the extent of the notion of 
individuality which is operative in this theory? 
Is there evidence of the Christian understanding of 
the essential union of spirit and body in man and a 
consequent emphasis on man's actions in historical 
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life as important to his nature? Or is there more 
of an emphasis on the character's innate nature, 
on his "pre-existent essence?" In other words, is 
fate emphasized over free will? is man seen as a 
rational being, capable of choices which define and 
affect both his historical and his eternal destiny? 
Or is he viewed as a static moral essence which is 
essentially incapable of development? What is the 
consequent view of dramatic conflict and character 
motivation revealed by this theory? (Is the essence 
of dramatic conflict seen to be the character's 
attempted escape from his inevitable destiny (Greek 
view) or in his free choice or rejection of the 
person of Christ (Christian view)? What J.s the 
resulting view of judgment which the theory might 
display? Does it, in emphasizing real moral choice 
and real moral evil, assume a real judgment (Chris­
tian view), or does it de-emphasize judgment and 
soften the orthodox position? On a more particu­
lar level, is there any evidence that the theorist 
treats the elements of characterization (dress, ges­
ture, verbal patterns, etc.) as a means for the 
enhancement of character motives in action? Or 
does the theorist view dress, rhetorical gesture, 
etc., only for rhetorical effect—as a means of 
enhancing the universal type of character which 
is being described? 
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3. In conjunction with the Christian understanding 
of human nature and the possibility of sinful 
behavior in the most sterling character, does the 
theory allow for presentation of extremes of good 
and evil behavior in one character? Does it allow 
for the depiction of substantial development of 
character, or is all characterization static, with 
no mixture of style allowed? In this light, what 
is the view of comic characterization held by the 
theorist? 
4. Finally, what can be gleaned from the theory about 
the author's view of allegory and symbol? How impor­
tant is the literal level of the narrative? Is 
there an objective referent for the allegory or 
symbol used, and what is the content of that refer­
ent? 
It will be evident that not all the questions formu­
lated here can be applied with equal success to each theory 
treated in this chapter; however, application of even a few 
of the questions to relevant material should yield useful 
information for assessing the general philosophical orienta­
tion of the theory described, an orientation which has been 
shown to be relevant to characterization. 
It will also become apparent that the study of the 
medieval critical tradition involves some problems unique to 
the period. J. W. H. Atkins has pointed out, for example, 
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that there is some truth to the belief that "intellectual 
conditions during the Middle Ages were such as to militate 
against the adoption of a critical attitude toward life in 
1 
general." The authority of Rome and Scripture, the uncertain 
state of the vernacular, the predominance of logical studies 
in the medieval curriculum and (what Atkins refers to as the 
"most serious" problem)—the relative ignorance of the 
classics, all serve to retard the critical acumen of the 
Middle Ages. In addition, the critical tradition, along 
with other great western literary traditions is still in the 
process of formation. Great changes in literary theory and 
practice are taking place on all sides: the changeover from 
a quantitative system of versification to accentual-syllabic 
forms, the development of "courtly love," and the gradually 
increasing stature of the vernacular. Through all of this, 
the critical tradition is also in the process of development. 
But, as Atkins points out, critical theory is usually found 
scattered in other material of a predominately literary or 
2 
philosophical nature. Often, as we pointed out in Chap­
ter IV, theory is closely, even inextricably, intertwined 
with the exegetical tradition, and must be approached through 
that perspective. Buried in material of this sort, theoret­
ical criticism is difficult to find and more difficult to 
"*"J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The 
Medieval Phase (Cambridge: The University Press, 1943), 
p. 1. 
2 Atkins, p. 5. 
269 
assess. Formal treatises on rhetoric or poetry, although 
they have some manifestation in Bede, Alcuin, and the gram­
matical tradition, do not appear in force until the 12th 
century, when Matthew of Vendome writes the Ars Versificatoria 
(c. 1175). Most of the critical theory in the Middle Ages 
exists as commentary which is, as Atkins put it, "casually 
introduced" into other material. 
The medieval habit of incorporating critical theory into 
philosophical, literary, and theological material of varying 
sorts can facilitate the kind of study I attempt here. The 
physical proximity of statements which reveal the philosoph­
ical orientation of the author with the actual critical 
comment of characterization following close after can be 
illuminating. In addition, the philosophical statement 
itself can often be as illuminating for the study of charac­
terization as explicit commentary on the subject. 
One of the purposes of the analysis attempted in this 
chapter will be to assess the nature of Christian and clas­
sical influences on the literary theory of the day. J. W. H. 
Atkins has commented that a great many of the classical lit­
erary doctrines represented by Cicero's De Inventione, the 
Pseudo-Ciceronian Ad Herrenium, Quintillian1s De Institutio 
Oratoria, Aristotle's Rhetoric, and Horace's Ars Poetica are 
funnelled into the middle Ages through a predominately Chris­
tian line of exegetes and encyclopedists, including Isidore, 
Bede, and Augustine. In fact, Atkins regards the Roman tra­
dition as weak in itself (there is little evidence to suggest, 
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for example, that Aristotle1s Poetics were known in Europe 
before the 15th century, and Chalcidius1 fourth-century 
translation of Plato's Timaeus is the only pure Platonic 
document available), and as having little influence in the 
face of the overpowering authority carried by the exegetical 
tradition. Not only were Greco-Roman documents scarce, but 
the classical works which were cherished, according to Atkins, 
"stood nearest in spirit to Christianity, and were therefore 
3 
of use for doctrinal purposes." 
4 
Atkins1 argument, as he himself points out, has most 
weight when one is describing the early Christian tradition. 
Even so I have demonstrated earlier in this study that even 
in its earliest stages the exegetical tradition was not free 
from classical influence and that a distinction between the 
classical and Christian approaches to life and literature are 
evident even within the larger orthodox tradition from the 
earliest centuries on. A study of literary theory with a 
focus on characterization from the time of Macrobius and 
Augustine reveals a Greco-Roman tradition which, in its 
substance, is alive and flourishing side-by-side with orthodox 
Christianity right up to the age of Chaucer. Chaucer himself 
reflects the continuing conflict of the two world-views, and 
analysis of the critical traditions which affected him can 
give a great deal of insight into that conflict, and into 
its effect on his own approach to characterization. 
3 Atkins, p. 14. 
4 Atkins, p. 9. He comments that secular humanism has a 
positive value attached to it by the time of Chaucer. 
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Platonism in various forms comprised a large part of the 
classical tradition which informed the Middle Ages. In addi­
tion to Chalcidius' fourth-century translation of Plato's 
Timaeus, Platonic influences sift into the medieval period 
primarily through the Platonized treatises of Apuleius 
(De Platone et Eius Doqmate, De Mundo), Pseudo-Apuleius 
5 
(Asclepius), Boethius, Martianus Capella, and Macrobius. 
These treatises later became major sources for the Chartrian 
Platonism of the twelfth century. 
Martianus Capella 
Of the early Neo-Platonic rhetorical treatises, those 
of Boethius, Macrobius, and Martianus Capella have the great­
est influence on Chaucer. Although most scholars date Mar­
tianus' De Nuptiis Philoloqiae et Mercurii et De Septem 
Artibus Liberalibus according to the terminal year of 
6 
A.D. 439 when the Vandals took Carthage, Lou Conklin sug­
gests that Martianus probably lived and wrote much earlier; 
Conklin gauges as early as the last half of the third century 
and the first part of the fourth, based on Martianus' use of 
the name Byzantium in reference to Constantinople, whose name 
7 
was not changed until 330 A.D. If Conklin is right, 
5 Ernst R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin 
Middle Ages. trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1953) p. 108. 
^Lou Conklin, "Introduction" to Martianus Capella, The 
Fifth Book (De Rhetorica) of the De Nuptiis Philoloqiae et 
Mercurii et De Septem Artibus Liberalibus, trans. Lou Conk­
lin (Master's Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 
1928), p. 1. 
7 . . Conklin, "Introduction" to Martianus Capella, De Nuptiis, 
pp. 6-7. 
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Martianus is the earliest of the three most important car­
riers of Platonism during the dark ages. 
Martianus has received wide attention for his general 
role as preserver of classical antiquity in European schools 
of the fifth through the eleventh centuries (especially in 
Brittany, France and Ireland), for his role as probable 
originator of the concept of the seven liberal arts (the med­
ieval quadrivium and trivium), and for his later importance 
to the twelfth-century School of Chartres and the allegorical 
traditions of the later Middle Ages. Some scholars believe 
that Martianus was probably a lawyer who had something to do 
with the proconsul's office in the city of Carthage, and who 
taught and wrote about the rhetoric of his profession on the 
8 
side. Others, taking into account his turgid Latin style, 
hold that Martianus was a poor farmer who happened to have 
received enough of an education to compose his masterpiece 
the De Nuptiis, but who lacks the polish of earlier rhe-
9 
toricians. Martianus modelled the De Nuptiis primarily 
after Varro and Cicero, although there are traces of Petron-
ius, Apuleius, Priscian, Solinus, Euclid and Quintillian in 
10 
the work. Structured according to Varro's Satires, the 
Q 
Martianus Capella, "The Quadrivium of Martianus Capella," 
translated and introduced by William Harris Stahl, with a 
study of the allegory and the verbal disciplines by Richard 
Johnson with E. L. Burge in Martianus Capella and the Seven 
Liberal Arts, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1971), 1:17. 
9 Conklm, "Introduction" to Martianus Capella, De Nup­
tiis , p. 1. 
"^Conklin, "Introduction"to Martianus Capella, De Nup­
tiis . p. 13. 
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De Nuptiis is written in the form of a Menippean Satura 
(partly in verse, partly in prose), and is divided into nine 
books, of which the first two cover the marriage of Philology 
and Mercury, and the remaining seven, the seven liberal arts. 
It will be helpful to summarize the general content of the 
allegory here. 
In the first book, Mercury announces his desire to 
marry, but refuses the first set of prospects offered him. 
Virtus suggests that he go to Apollo for help, and Apollo 
chooses Philology as his proper bride. Virtus, Mercury, and 
Apollo then set out to gain permission from Jupiter for the 
marriage. Jupiter, unable to make up his mind on the issue, 
refers the matter to an assembly of married gods and goddesses. 
With the exception of Discordia and Seditia, who are barred 
from the proceedings, the gods (all allegorical figures) 
agree to the marriage with the stipulation that Philology 
must be made immortal. Jupiter commands that all the gods 
be present at the ceremony, and the first book ends. 
In the opening of the Second Book, Philology attempts 
to find out whether or not her marriage is suitable by reckon­
ing up the numbers connected with her name and Mercury's. 
The solution is favorable and she goes to her mother Phron-
esis for preparation. The Muses then begin to sing, and 
Philology takes her place. The Three Graces appear and kiss 
the bride; the first on her forehead; the second on her mouth, 
the third on her breast (grace will be upon her sight, her 
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tongue, her spirit). Athanasia informs Philology that Jupi­
ter says she must be carried to the gods in a royal litter, 
but that she cannot be so carried until a heavy load is re­
moved from her heart. Philology rids herself of the burden 
by reading a script which she has under her arm. She then 
drinks the cup of immortality given her by Apotheosis, and 
is carried toward the place of Jupiter. Juno Pronuba acts 
as her guide the rest of the way. When they arrive, Philo­
logy takes her place with the Muses and Mercury stands by 
the side of Pallas. Phronesis presents the wedding gifts 
and reads Poppaean Law. Phoebus arises and brings seven 
handmaidens (the seven liberal arts) from Mercury's servants 
as attendants to the bride. Each of the handmaidens presents 
11 
a digest of the art she represents to her gods. 
On a philosophical level, the shape of Martianus1 alle­
gory reveals the Neo-Platonic influence which drifts in from 
his sources. For Martianus, communion with the gods and 
immortality are won only as man cultivates the seven liberal 
arts which alone have the power to lift him to classical 
ideals of concord and propriety and finally to the realm of 
the eternal verities. The union of learning (Philology) 
and eloquence (Mercury) is a symbol of this goal? man attains 
salvation as he gains and exercises knowledge of the trivium 
and the quadrivium. Stahl compares this conception of salva­
tion with the Christian view: 
"'""''Taken from Conklin's summary, "Introduction" to Mar­
tianus Capella, De Nuptiis, pp. 9-12. 
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...whereas the Christian attains salvation by faith, 
trust in God's mercy, and love manifested in deeds,— 
none of which virtues demand intellectual gifts—the 
men who in Martianus1 system attain immortality are 
(with the exception of Hercules) men whose wisdom in 
matters of religious lore, agriculture and technology, 
or the seven arts, has benefitted mankind. The idea 
that an untutored peasant, by the mere quality of his 
love for God and His creatures, may attain sanctity and 
eternal bliss, is alien to Martianus; immortality in 
his eyes is earned by fame won through service, not by 
love or innocence alone.^ 
The understanding of salvation presented by Martianus in 
the De Nuptiis thus elevates the arts and their cultivation 
to a position of great authority where they receive the 
suprahuman sanction of the gods themselves. Such a view of 
the arts and salvation as we shall see later, vies with the 
Christian understanding during the centuries leading up to 
Chaucer. 
Martianus1 thoroughly classical understanding of the 
process of salvation is matched by an equally classical con­
ception of the nature and power of destiny in the life of 
man. Stahl points out that in early sections of the De Nup­
tiis men are aided or impeded by fate in their attempt to 
achieve immortality (Sections 11-15, 21-22, 32, 88). Fate, 
in turn, directs the decisions of the gods (18, 64-65, 68-69). 
Man may strive to influence the fates through intellectual 
prowess, but his own destiny rests ultimately on their whim. 
Although this fatalistic philosophy is most evident in the 
early books of the De Nuptiis, we find an echo of the view 
12 Stahl, "Introduction" to Martianus Capella, The 
Quadrivium, p. 88. 
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in the fifth book under the section dealing with "kinds of 
proof." Martianus describes the type "proofs deduced from 
effects" in terms of an example which reveals the old clas­
sical attitude toward destiny: 
Proof is deduced from effects when there is some uncer­
tainty in a case, as when the existence of fate is 
proved by the fact that men stay alive even when they 
are unwilling to. For fate is the source of life and 
death, and the ability to live or die is determined 
by des'-iny. (Section 494)13 
Thus Martianus explains the concept of "proof deduced from 
effects" through an example clearly based on common accep­
tance of the notion of destiny. Stahl points out that this 
fatalistic conception of universal processes precludes the 
suggestion of initiation into a mystery or of Divine inter-
14 
cession which are found in the Christian perspective. 
Martianus also follows a typically classical pattern in 
his discussion of the function of moral character in the 
process of declamation. In section 545, Martianus exhorts 
lawyers and advocates to gain the good will of the jurors "by 
our portrayal of the facts of character—either that of our­
selves , or our opponents," and goes on to elaborate on the 
usefulness of the rhetorician's reputation in advancing a 
15 
case. This recognition of the function of information on 
the moral standing of a given character, and especially of the 
13 Martianus Capella, The Quadrivium, p. 74. 
14 Stahl, "Introduction" to Martianus Capella, The 
Quadrivium, p. 89. 
15 Martianus Capella, The Quadrivium, p. 109. 
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rhetorician himself, may be seen as a later version of the 
classical emphasis on the character of the poet and the rhe­
torician which we see in Horace and Cicero (Stahl points out, 
however, that Martianus does not seem to have the same degree 
of emphasis on personal moral conduct which we see in the 
16 
earlier rhetoricians). 
Martianus' explanation of the kinds of narrative also 
17 
follows closely on his classical models. Robert Hollander 
points out that the categories of section 550 and 551 are 
modelled after the pseudo-Ciceronian Ad Herrenium. In those 
sections, Martianus distinguishes between history, fable, 
argument, and civil or judicial evidence: 
History is like Livy; fable is neither true, nor 
like truth as for instance, 'Daphne turned to a tree;1 
argument, in this connection is not fact, but contains 
things which could be facts, as in comedy, 'a father 
is feared,' or 'a prostitute is loved;' judicial narra­
tion is the exposition of actual deeds or of deeds 
which have the semblance of truth. 
Later in this study we find the same distinction between his­
tory and fable, and argument or comedy and legal evidence in 
Macrobius, who elaborates on them in far greater detail. 
Unlike what we will see in Macrobius, Martianus does not go 
on to explicitly defend the use of imaginary setting and 
character as proper vehicles for ideal truth. However, from 
"^Stahl, p. 897. 
17 Robert Hollander, Allegory in Dante's Commedia (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 258. 
18 Martianus Capella, The Quadrivium, p. 111. 
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his own use of a fabulous setting and allegorical characters 
in the De Nuptiis, we may assume that his idea of what con­
stitutes a "truthful representation" implicitly coincides 
with that of Macrobius, whose Saturnalia and Commentary on 
the Dream of Scipio are analyzed in the following section. 
Macrobius 
We have already noted that of the early Neo-Platonic 
allegorists, the works of Boethius, Macrobius and Martianus 
Capella have the greatest influence on Chaucer. Of the three, 
William Harris Stahl rates Macrobius, apart from Chalcidus, 
19 
"the most important source of Platonism in the Latin West." 
Stahl's refusal to consider Boethius in this assessment is 
perhaps a result of his observation that Macrobius represents 
a purer brand of Neo-Platonism than the highly Christianized 
Boethius. Macrobius, although he probably lived during the 
Christian reign of the emperor Honorius, makes not a single 
reference to Christianity in any of his works. Because of 
his reputed position as an official in the court of a Chris­
tian emperor, Stahl thinks Macrobius may have been a Christian 
20  
with "strong pagan influence" when he wrote the Commentary. 
However, if this is true, Macrobius yet shows no signs of 
that "inward Christianization" of which de Lubac speaks in 
his study of allegory in the Middle Ages. E. R. Curtius, 
19 William Harris Stahl, "Introduction" to Macrobius, 
Commentary on the Dream.of Scipio (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1952), p. 10. 
20 Stahl, "Introduction" to Macrobius, Commentary, p. 7. 
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in fact, designates him a "pagan Neo-Platonist" and makes no 
21 
reference to his Christian office. 
Macrobius1 Neo-Platonic world-view is demonstrable in 
both of his major works, the Commentary on the Dream of 
Scipio (written about 410 A.D.) and the Saturnalia, (written 
sometime after the Commentary). We have shown in earlier 
chapters that the understanding of history put forth by a 
given author has much to do with his conception of individual 
salvation. If earthly history is seen as something good, 
or at least redeemable (as in the Christian view) then there 
is the possibility for a substantial redemption of the indi­
vidual personality in history. If earthly history is viewed 
as something evil, and the body as something to be rejected, 
then the redemption of the individual consists in escaping 
from earthly history and rising up to a state of undifferen­
tiated communication with the eternal ideals. 
We remember, too, that in the Christian view of history, 
salvation consists in an encounter with and a decision for 
or against the person of Jesus Christ. In the classical view 
it consists in a "good moral life" or a gradual ascent from 
the body through moral goodness to the universals. (Although 
morality is part of the orthodox Christian message, it must 
follow rather than precede the inner conversion effected by 
faith in Christ.) The relative emphasis on morality, and 
the definition of "salvation" as a gradual ascent toward 
21 Curtius, p. 443. 
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moral purity in the Greek-Platonic view results in a de-
emphasis on historical choice and a greater accent on fate 
as the governing force in the universe. It also results in 
a more sanguine view of judgment in the afterlife? where 
there is a weakening of the concept of the autonomous will, 
there is a concurrent rise in doctrines which proclaim the 
"salvability of all" as Origen put it. The results of all 
this for characterization, we remember, is that characters 
which spring from the soil of Greek philosophy tend to have 
some sort of didactic purpose. Following as they do in the 
Greek tradition of idealized characters created for the pur­
poses of moral instruction, the characters follow exemplary 
and typicalized patterns of personality and action. They 
can thus be said to have less historical life than charac­
ters created out of a Christian frame of reference, where 
the emphasis is not on ideality, but on a specific individual's 
interaction with his creator. 
In Macrobius, although there is no direct reference to 
characterization, we find substantial evidences of the general 
Greek philosophy in regard to history and art. In the first 
place, Macrobius' conception of the relation between God and 
man is conceived of in terms of the typical archetypal pat­
tern, and follows the Neo-Platonic definition of the Nous: 
God, who both is and is called the First Cause, is alone 
the beginning and source of all things which are which 
seem to be. He, in a bounteous outpouring of His 
greatness, created from Himself Mind. The Mind, 
called nous as long as it fixes its gaze upon the 
Father, retains a complete likeness of its creator, 
but when it looks away at things below creates from 
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itself Soul. Soul, in turn, as long as it contem­
plates the Father, assumes his part, but by diverting 
its attention more and more, though itself incorporeal, 
degenerates into the fabric of bodies.22 
We have here not only the Neo-Platonic notion of archetypes, 
but a hint of the typical Neo-Platonic distrust of the body. 
The idea of an escape from the prison of the fleshly shell 
is scattered throughout Macrobius—usually in conjunction 
23 
with a gradual attainment of moral perfection. in fact, 
the idea of salvation is tied up in the effort to become 
morally perfect. Eternal reward, writes Macrobius, comes 
only as the result of a life of virtuous duty. He quotes 
Paulus1 advice to Scipio on a life of duty as prerequisite 
to ascent into the afterlife: 
But Scipio, cherish justice and your obligations to 
duty, as your grandfather here and I, your father, have 
done; this is important where parents and relatives are 
concerned; but it is of utmost importance in matters 
concerning the commonwealth. This sort of life is your 
passport into the sky to a union with those who have 
finished their lives on earth, and who, upon being 
released from their bodies, inhabit that place at 
which you are now looking, meaning the Milky Way.24 
This passage, besides defining salvation in terms of a 
gradual moral ascent to the universals, contains the famous 
"star-imagery" which became a standard medieval metaphor 
for heaven. 
22 Macrobius, Commentary, p. 143. 
"^See Macrobius, Commentary, pp. 74-77; 92-93; 120-121; 
124-125; 129; 144-145. 
24 Macrobius, Commentary, p. 93. 
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Macrobius continues on with the Neo-Platonic concep­
tion of salvation later, even going so far as to define the 
death of the soul as life in the body, and true life as 
contemplation of the eternal verities. 
It is interesting that the Neo-Platonic notion of the 
corruption inherent in bodily life is a theme running through­
out the works of Philo, the Greek exegete who had such influ­
ence on the Christian Platonists of Alexandria (see Chap­
ter IV of this dissertation). One scholar, E. E. Robbins, 
has connected Macrobius directly with the Pythagorean Arith-
25 
metical tradition which comes down from Philo. We might 
add that Philo's understanding of the disjunction of body 
and spirit and his whole allegorical approach form a direct 
link as well. Immediately after his statement on the tainted 
life of the body, in fact, Macrobius identifies this idea 
with the Platonic and Pythagorean traditions he later goes 
on to explain in Chapters X-XV. 
The most comprehensive statement of the medieval atti­
tude toward suicide occursin Macrobius in the context of 
this thoroughly Neo-Platonic world-view. To commit suicide, 
writes Macrobius, is to restrict severely the time needed 
in life for moral purification: "We must therefore use the 
span of life allotted to us in order to get a greater oppor-
26 
tunity of purification." 
25 
See E. E. Robbins, "Arithmetic m Philo Judeaus," 
Classical Philology 26 (October, 1931), 345-361. 
•2 6 Macrobius , Commentary, p. 141. 
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The whole idea of the soul as an entity which, in its 
union with the flesh, becomes tainted and requires a gradual 
disassociation with the flesh for salvation gives way to 
another notion which we have seen throughout the Classical 
tradition—the notion of the "perfectibility of all mankind." 
The idea of judgment in Macrobius, as in Origen and Clement, 
is restricted to a period of purification, where the soul 
blackened as it is, receives cleansing and finally attains 
the same perfection as all other souls. This notion is evi­
dent in the following passage, where Macrobius again cites 
the Grandfather's advice to Scipio on the "dutiful life" 
and the consequences of a life lived on a purely sensual 
level: 
Indeed, the souls of those who have surrendered them­
selves to bodily pleasures, becoming their slaves, 
and who in response to sensual passions have flouted 
the laws of Gods and of men, slip out of their bodies 
and hover close to the earth, and return to this 
region only after long ages of torment.27 
The idea of a "temporary hell," also prevalent, as we pointed 
out earlier, with the Christian Platonists at Alexandria, is 
reinforced by an earlier statement by Macrobius to the effect 
that hell and traditional stories of punishment are "merely 
allegories and figures representing the distress of the souls 
28 
of wretched mortals on earth." 
What can be gleaned from the Commentary about Macro­
bius 1 approach to allegory and figure also follows in the 
27 Macrobius, Commentary, p. 244. 
28 Macrobius, Commentary, p. 15. 
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classical tradition. Macrobius makes the creation of a 
properly ideal character the backbone of his argument for 
the use of allegorical fiction in expounding philosophical 
truth. Replying to those critics who denounce the use of 
"imaginary character, event, and setting" because it is not 
a straightforward representation of the truth, Macrobius 
writes that one must make a distinction between the kinds of 
fiction allowable. One group of artists, he comments, uses 
fables "in order to gratify the ear only;" another group 
29 
uses them in order to "encourage the reader to good works." 
The second main group is also subdivided by Macrobius 
into two smaller groups; one in which both the setting and 
plot are fictitious (for example, Aesop's Fables) and one 
in which the argument of the story is true, but is carried 
30 
out in a fictitious style. Of this second type of "vir­
tuous fiction," Macrobius allows only a "decent and dignified 
conception of holy truths, with respectable events and char­
acters ," and denounces any allegory which presents the gods 
as adulterers and malefactors of every sort. Here we see 
the same emphasis on ideality which was evident in early 
classical commentaries on Homer. Unlike some of those com­
mentaries , however, Macrobius does not go to great lengths 
to cover up or heal indecent fables of the gods, but simply 
exhorts the literary artist to the creation of morally blame­
less character in the first place. 
29 
Macrobius, Commentary, p. 84. 
30 
Macrobius, Commentary, p. 85. 
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Macrobius' only mention of comedy in the Commentary 
comes in this same section and his attitude toward it reveals 
a weaker but still discernibly Platonic attitude. Although 
he is not as harsh on comedy as Plato, he yet places it in 
his first and inferior main grouping—those fables written 
only for gratification of the ear—and later relegates it to 
the "children's nursery" because such forms are unworthy to 
31 
bear philosophical truth„ This attitude, we may speculate, 
has something to do with the fact that comedy in the classical 
view, although not specifically harmful within certain lim­
its , still depicts human error in a way not totally accep­
table to a theorist solidly within the Platonic tradition. 
When dealing with the highest philosophical mysteries— 
those ideals completely untainted by the human error depicted 
in comedy and beyond comprehension even through allegorical 
fiction—Macrobius writes that only analogy and simile are 
appropriate for their transmission to ordinary mortals. The 
highest truths, in fact, can only be known by revelation to 
"eminent men of superior intelligence;" others must satisfy 
32 
their desire for truth by going through dramatic ritual. 
In this idea we see more than a trace of the old Platonic 
idea of a moral hierarchy in which only the best man can 
receive enlightenment in the highest sense. We see this 
same attitude in the Saturnalia, where Macrobius seems to 
31 
Macrobxus, Commentary, p. 84. 
32 Macrobxus, Commentary, p. 87. 
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see himself as reasonably far up on the scale of moral—and 
thus poetic—comprehension. Speaking of Virgil's Aeneid he 
writes: 
But we, who claim to have a finer taste, shall not suf­
fer the secret places of this sacred poem to remain 
concealed, but we shall examine the approaches to its 
hidden meanings and throw open its inmost shrine for 
the worship of the learned. (Saturnalia I. 24. 13)^3 
The Macrobius criterion for distinguishing the three kinds 
of literary form (i.e., the pure fable, gratifying only to 
the ear; the mixed fable which draws men toward virtuous 
behavior under a guise of pleasing fiction; and the pure 
truth, which is received only through mystic enlightenment 
and transmitted to others only by means of simile and anal­
ogy—for example Plato's comparison of the Idea of the Good 
with the Sun) is at base a philosophical one founded on his 
understanding of the moral hierarchy of literary styles, 
and, as we have seen in Horace and Cicero, on the moral char­
acter of the artist himself. 
The very conception of allegorical poetry in Macrobius 
also follows the classical pattern—that of an inner philo­
sophical truth covered by a veil of fiction for the pur­
poses of hiding the inner truth which only the morally blame­
less man is fit to receive. Macrobius' exegesis of Virgil 
in the Saturnalia follows the Greek-allegorical approach in 
this sense—the works of Virgil are read and explicated in 
33 
Macrobius, Saturnalia, trans. Percival Vaughan 
Davies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 
p. 156. 
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34 
terms of their didactic content. In sum, Macrobius demon­
strates those philosophical aspects of the classical world-
view which we have shown in earlier chapters to be relevant 
to characterization. In his approach to allegorical method 
we have an explicit mention of characterization which is 
viewed in light of the didactic which Macrobius sees as the 
35 
purpose of all poetry. Literary characters in Macrobius' 
view best serve the individual and the national interest when 
they are conceived as ideal moral exempla. Macrobius' 
concept of characterization can thus be said to run well 
within the classical critical tradition. 
St. Augustine 
Written within a decade of Macrobius' Commentary, Augus-
tins's well-known De Doctrina Christiana, (begun 395, finished 
c. 427) despite some Obvious Platonic influences, forms a 
significant contrast in both its philosophical orientation 
and its approach to allegory with the former work. 
The central doctrinal contrast between these two impor­
tant critical works has to do with the attitude taken toward 
the physical body. Whereas in Macrobius "flesh" is defined 
as the earthly matter of the body, something to be repudiated 
34 
Curtius, p. 445. 
35 R. H. Greene agrees. See his comment on Macrobius 
in "Alan of Lille's De Planctu Naturae," Speculum 31 (Oct., 
1956), 656: "Macrobius justifies the use of fiction as a 
legitimate and apt means by which the lover and teacher of 
truth can establish extramundane ideals and sanctions for 
virtue among men." 
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if one is to reach the contemplation of the eternal verities, 
in Augustine the "flesh" is defined only as that part of the 
whole nature of man which is corrupted by sin. The physical 
body is not inherently evil, but only the "unconquered habit 
36 
of the flesh." In fact, Augustine speaks directly to the 
problem raised by those who seek God through a studied neg­
lect of the body: 
Those who seek to do this (i.e., extinguish bodily 
passions) perversely war on their bodies as though they 
were natural enemies. In this way they have been de­
ceived by the words, 'The flesh lusteth against the 
spirit; and the spirit against the flesh; for these are 
contrary to one another.1 For this was said on account 
of the unconquered habit of the flesh against which the 
spirit has a concupiscence of its own, not that the body 
should be destroyed, but that its concupiscence, which 
is its evil habit, should be completely conquered so 
that it is rendered subject to the spirit as the 
natural order demands.3' 
Here we see that Augustine's understanding of the nature of 
man is not built on a rejection of the body, but on a con­
ception of the proper subordination of body to spirit. Thus, 
"The spirit does not resist the body in hate, but in a desire 
38 
for dominion." In other words, only the concupiscent 
desires of the body are evil. The physical flesh itself is 
not evil, because man was made in the image of God and will 
be restored to his primal state at the Last Judgment, when 
all flesh will experience a bodily resurrection. According 
3 6 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robert­
son (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 21. 
37 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 37. 
38 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 21. 
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to the Augustinian view, of course, dominion over the con­
cupiscent desires of the flesh is achieved only through the 
new birth or the conversion experience, which is based on 
the saving action of Christ in history (see On Christian 
Doctrine, Chapters XIII, XIV, XIV), and will only be com­
pleted at the Resurrection when "the body will thrive in 
39 
complete peace, immortally in subjection to the spirit." 
It is interesting that Augustine makes this basic Chris­
tian theology central to his understanding of the three 
styles. Though closely following the popular classical 
definitions, in Augustine's hand the doctrine of the three 
styles receives some interesting new elements. First, Augus­
tine interprets Cicero: 
To these three things—that he should teach, delight, 
and persuade—the author of Roman eloguence himself 
seems to have wished to relate three other things when 
he said, "He therefore will be eloquent who can speak 
of small things in a subdued manner, of moderate things 
in a temperate manner and of grand things in a grand 
manner.'40 
Augustine goes on to describe each style: the subdued style 
through the example of St. Paul's typological explanation of 
41 
the relatively unadorned Sarah-Hagar story in Galatians 4; 
the moderate style in terms of a greater number of verbal 
ornaments (to illustrate this category, Augustine cites the 
42 
rhetorically balanced cadences of Romans 12: 3f )•, and 
39 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 21. 
40 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 145. 
41 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 146. 
42 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 150. 
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the grand style, 
not so much in that it is adorned with verbal orna­
ments , but in that it is forceful with emotions of 
the spirit....it is carried along by its own impetus, 
and if the beauties of eloquence occur they are 
caught up by the force of the things discussed and 
not deliberately assumed for decoration. 
For this style, Augustine uses the example of St. Paul in 
II Cor. 6:2-11: "Behold now is the acceptable time: behold, 
now is the day of salvation." 
Thus Augustine builds his entire description of the 
three styles and their relative importance on their ability 
to persuade the hearer: and for Augustine, that persuasion 
can be said to have only one end—the conversion of those 
who hear to the Christian faith. This is clear not only 
from his selected examples, but also in his discussion of 
the character of the orator, which follows closely on the 
previous section. As in Horace, Quintillian and Cicero, 
Augustine puts great stock in the moral conduct of the speaker, 
but from a specifically Biblical perspective: 
However, the life of the speaker has greater weight 
in determining whether he is obediently heard than any 
grandness of eloquence. For he who speaks wisely and 
eloquently, but lives wickedly, may benefit many stu­
dents, although it is written, he 'is unprofitable 
to his own soul.'44 
The speaker's ability to persuade the hearer to conversion is 
what is foremost in Augustine's mind here, a fact which is 
again evident from his references to Jesus' comment in 
43 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 150. 
44 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 164. 
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Mark 8:36: "For what shall it profit a man if he gain the 
whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?" 
It is interesting, too, that Augustine's attitude 
toward art in general is far more relaxed than the typical 
classical humanist, who often tends to see training in the 
arts as a necessary prerequisite to moral enlightenment. In 
contrast, Augustine makes much over his belief that although 
training in rhetoric can be helpful in Scriptural exegesis, 
it is not necessary to have rhetorical training in order to 
45 
use the colors of rhetoric, nor, in his opinion, is it 
46 
necessary for one to be eloquent in order to be wise. 
Later, Augustine writes that eloquence and rhetoric are "not 
in themselves good to pursue," and that "we do not hold them 
to be of such importance that we would wish mature and grave 
47 
men to spend their time learning them." 
Augustine's more Biblical treatment of the arts, is also 
reflected in his approach to characterization. In the De 
Doctrina we do not find the classical concern for presenting 
45 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 103. 
46 cf. chapter III, 29, Augstine, On Christian Doctrine, 
p. 103: "And not only examples of all these tropes are found 
in reading the sacred books, but also the names of some of 
them like alleqoria, aenigma, parabola. And yet almost all 
of these tropes, said to be learned in the liberal arts, find 
a place in the speech of those who have never heard the lec­
tures of grammarians and are content with the usage of 
common speech." 
47 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 117. 
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exemplary figures in a morally flattering light. Throughout 
the discussion of the character of David in chapters XIX-
XXIII, Augustine makes no attempt to gloss over David's moral 
irresponsibility. In fact, he defends the depiction of 
David's sin on theological grounds: 
If he (the believer) reads of the sins of great men, 
even though he can see and verify in them figures of 
future things, he may put the nature of the things 
done to this use, that he will never hear himself 
boast of his own virtuous deeds and condemn others 
from the vantage of his righteousness when he sees in 
such men the tempests that are to be shunned and the 
shipwrecks that are to be lamented....The sins of these 
men have been recorded for a reason and that is that 
the lesson of the apostle may be everywhere momentous, 
where he says, 'He that thinketh himself to stand, 
let him take heed lest he fall.' There is hardly a 
page in the Holy Books in which it is not shown that 
God resists the proud, but to the humble offers grace.48 
In this passage it is clear that Augustine sees reason for 
including the sins of great men in Biblical history. If 
they can fail, he suggests, so can we. The repeated emphasis 
on man's capacity for evil—even in those characters usually 
considered Biblical heros—indirectly reinforces the orthodox 
case against reliance on any inherent strength for salva­
tion, and forms the assumption underlying Augustine's under­
standing of character presentation. It also signals a 
radical departure from the classical tendency to downplay 
or shut out the evils or accidental errors inherent in the 
character of exemplary literary figures. Augustine's under­
standing of character evidences the Christian practice of 
presenting extremes of character in one individual. This 
48 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 99. 
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harks back to the Christian belief that man is capable of 
great extremes of good and evil and of great and substantial 
change (i.e., conversion or a fall from grace) within a given 
lifetime. 
It is interesting that in the De Doctrina Christiana, 
discussion of the representation of evil characters is 
carried on in the context of a discussion of the possible 
49 
approaches to the literal text. While commenting on the 
"miserable servitude" of those persons who cannot get beyond 
the literal meaning of such words as "sabbath" and "sacri-
50 
fice," Augustine yet warns against the opposite trap of 
treating what is meant to be taken literally in a figurative 
51 
sense. He then establishes a test for ascertaining whether 
or not a particular passage of Scripture is literal or fig­
urative : 
And generally this method consists in this: that what­
ever appears in the Divine Word that does not lit­
erally pertain to virtuous behavior pertains to the 
love of God and of one's neighbor; the truth of faith 
pertains to a knowledge of God and of one1s neigh­
bor .52 
This passage could be taken to suggest that only the exem­
plary or virtuous actions of Biblical characters are accep­
table as encouraging "virtuous behavior" or the "truth of 
49 
See Chapter III, 5, Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 
pp. 84-88. 
50 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 83. 
51 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 87. 
52 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 88. 
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faith" in believers. But again, Augustine makes it very clear 
that this is not the case, insisting that even the actions 
of sinful Biblical characters are profitable for our edi­
fication in the faith. Although careful to insist on the 
proper use of the representation of evil men in Scripture, 
(i.e., such representation should ultimately serve as a 
warning to us—and therefore as an aid to faith), Augustine 
is never squeamish about the literal level of Biblical his­
tory. 
He drives home this point by insisting that the Biblical 
narrative should not be taken on an allegorical or spir­
itual level alone, even when it offends the contemporary 
reader's cultural sensibilities. The best allegorical approach 
takes into full account both the literal and the allegorical 
levels: 
Therefore although all or almost all of the deeds which 
are contained in the Old Testament are to be taken fig­
uratively as well as literally, nevertheless the reader 
may take as literal those performed by people who are 
praised, even though they would be abhorrent to the 
custom of the good who follow the divine precepts after 
the advent of the Lord .53 
Augustine's emphasis on the preservation of the literal level 
in this passage represents the opposite point of view from 
those classical exegetes who found it necessary to heal 
the moral errors of the classical heros with an abstract and 
completely spiritualized interpretation. Earlier (in Chap­
ter III, p. 49) we pointed out Augustine's concern for the 
53 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 98. 
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preservation of the literal text in The Trinity, the Sermons, 
the Contra Faustum, and the De Genesi ad Litteram. Now we 
see that same concern demonstrated in his most obviously 
"rhetorical" treatise. 
Throughout the De Doctrina Christiana, then, we find 
the same strong emphasis on historical presentation of 
reality that we found in other Augustianian writings and in 
the earliest orthodox exegetes. Although not as elaborately 
explained as in other passages, there are examples of the 
54 
typological exegesis of Scripture as well. In sum, while 
Augustine adheres to the classical rhetorical agenda (general 
philosophical statements, discussion of the three styles, 
treatment of allegory), his treatment of this material is 
entirely Christian in approach. The strong emphasis on the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, the presentation of good and 
evil in character, the careful attention paid to the histor­
ical level of the text, even where morally distasteful—all 
these elements play an important part in establishing the 
background out of which a historically realistic literary 
figure may develop. 
Bede 
Bede, the great English scholar of the 7th and 8th cen­
turies deserves mention, along with his famous pupil Alci ..n, 
as a transition-figure in the history of the English critical 
tradition from the opening of the 8th century through the 
54 
See XX, 39, and XXI, 45, in Augustine, On Christian 
Doctrine, p. 146; p. 153. 
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Carolingian Age. His treatise On the Metrical Arts is highly 
technical with few of the philosophical pronouncements which 
fill large portions of the rhetorical works of Macrobius 
and Augustine. Bede draws heavily from the Latin grammarians 
for his theories and is indebted to Fortunatus, Sedulius, 
Juvenius, Manitius, and Donatus for the main outlines of his 
55 
ideas. The De Metrica is interesting from the perspective 
of this study for its interesting blend of elements from both 
the classical and Christian approaches to poetry. On the 
classical side, there are the long and arduous discussions 
of syllables, meter, rhythm, kinds of verse and contrasts 
with older forms of verse. On the Christian side, there is 
Bede's voluminous use of Biblical examples and his stated 
purpose—to "strive to imbue you with the divine writings and 
the ecclesiastical statutes, also wisely to instruct you in 
the metrical art, which is not unknown in the sacred Scrip-
56 
tures." This statement of purpose, as Robertson points 
out in the Preface to Chaucer, constituted an authoritative 
word on the treatment of classical literature in the Middle 
Ages. Incorporated into canon law by Gratian, Bede1s approach 
57 
to the subject was often imitated. 
55 
See Ruby Davis, "Introduction" to Bede, De Arte Met­
rica (Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, June, 1925), 
p. xxiii. 
56 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, p. 77a. 
57 
See Robertson, Preface to Chaucer (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1963), p. 19a. 
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An example of the interesting blend of classical and 
Christian material which often occurs in Bede can be found 
in the last chapter (XXV) of the De Arte Metrica, just before 
the dedication of the De Schematibus et Tropibus which fol­
lows. It is noteworthy that while Bede uses both classi­
cal and Biblical examples for his explanation of the kinds 
of poetry, he yet keeps the distinction between pagan and 
Christian literature clear, usually referring in general 
terms to "them" and "us." In the Greek view, writes Bede, 
there are three forms: (1) active or imitative, (2) exposi­
tory, (3) common or mixed. Bede distinguishes between the 
three kinds on the basis of the intrusion of the narrator 
into the basic action. In the first category, active or immi 
tative poetry, "speaking personnages are introduced without 
58 
the intervention of the poet." For this category, Bede 
uses the Song of Songs as an example. In the second category 
or expository poetry, "the poet himself speaks without the 
introduction of any personage." The examples Bede selects 
for this group are "the three whole books of the Georgics, 
and the first part of the fourth, as well as the verses of 
Lucretius, and the like," alongside, "among us," the Proverbs 
59 
Ecclesiastes, and the Psalms. In the third type, common or 
mixed poetry, "the poet himself speaks and speaking person-
60 
ages are introduced." Examples for this category include 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, P. 76a. 
59 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, P- 76a. 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, P. 77a. 
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The Iliad, the Odyssey:, the Aeneid, and "among us" the story 
61 
of Job. While Bede here demonstrates a respect for Classi­
cal literature, Biblical examples dominate the material, and 
the distinction between the Sacred Scripture and pagan poetry 
remains implicitly clear. 
Bede1s fundamentally Biblical approach to the subject of 
poetry reminds us of St. Augustine's approach in the De Doc-
trina Christiana. Both of them espouse a similar goal—Bede 
to encourage a fellow-deacon to "expend labor on the perusal 
of those writings in which we believe we have eternal 
62 
life," and Augustine to inform fellow-Christians on the 
kinds of rhetoric most useful for persuasion to the faith. 
The goal of both rhetoricians is the acceptance and deepen­
ing spiritual awareness of the Christian faith among both 
believers and non-believers. 
Then, too, Augustine and Bede are strongly influenced 
by Christianity in their approach to figurative expression. 
Both men see the analysis of classical tropes as useful pri­
marily for the discussion of classical literature, and both 
demonstrate an understanding of Biblical typology which in 
turn influences their approach to the literal level of the 
text. In the De Schematibus et Tropibus, Bede defines a 
tropic locution as what is made "when the manner of speaking 
is changed from its proper meaning to a figurative resemblance 
61 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, p. 77a. 
6 2 
Bede, De Arte Metrica, p. 76a. 
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63 
(or imitation)." He insists that the Bible is the prece­
dent for the use of figurative language, despite classical 
64 
claims to the contrary, and proceeds to analyze the various 
figures of speech used in the Scriptures. 
For the purpose of this study, the most significant dis­
cussion concerns the figure aestismos, or as Bede defines it, 
"a many-faceted trope, and of numerous virtues, for aestismos 
is thought to be whatever dictum that lacks rustic simplicity 
and is polished with elegant urbanity." ("Aestismos est tro-
pus multiplex, numerosa virtutis: nam iter f <£ <• ££ o S 
putatur quidquid dictum simplicitate rustica caret, et satis 
65 
faceta urbanitate expolitem est." Bede's explanation of 
this figure is essentially an explanation of his understand­
ing of the typological approach to Biblical exegesis. He 
begins the discussion by distinguishing what is an allegory 
in deed (that is, a Scriptural passage which constitutes 
0 3 
Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in Patroloqiae 
Latinae cursus completus, ed. Jean-Paul Migne, 221 vols. 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontifici, 
1844-64), XC:175. (Hereafter this series will be referred 
to as PL): "Solet iterum tropica luc tio reperiri, quae fit 
translata dictione a propria significatione ad non propriam 
similitudinem, necessitas aut ornatus gratia." 
64 
"Sed ut cognoscas (dilectissimi fili) cognoscant item 
omnes, qui haec legere voluerint, quod sancta Scriptura 
caeteris omnibus scripturis non solum antiqitate, quia divina 
est, vel utilitate, quia ad vitam ducit aeternam, sed et 
antiquitate, et ipsa praeeminet positione dicendi idea 
placuit mihi, collectis de ipsa exemplis, ostendere quia 
mihil hujus modi schematum, sive troporum valent pretendere 
ullis saeculis eloquentiae magistri, quod non ilia praeces-
serit." Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in PL, XC, 175. 
65 Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in PL, XC, 184. 
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historical fact) from an allegory of word alone. According 
to Bede, an example of an allegory-in-fact is contained in 
the Genesis account of the Abraham story where it is written 
that Abraham had two sons, one from a serving-maiden, and 
one from a free woman. This historical fact, writes Bede, 
who is imitating St. Paul's exegesis of the same passage in 
Galatian 4, makes allegorical reference to the two dispensa­
tions expressed in the Old and New Testaments. 
In contrast, the allegory in word employs a general 
metaphor, and not a historical deed, to announce either a 
future historical fact relevant to the Kingdom of God or a 
tropological or anagogical meaning. In this case, Bede uses 
the example of Isaiah 11: "There shall come forth a rod 
out of the root of Jesse and a flower shall rise up out of 
its root." He interprets this passage to mean that "through 
the Virgin Mary the Lord Saviour was born through the root 
of David" (quo significatur de stirpe David per virginem 
66 
Mariarn Deominum Salvatorem fuisse nasciturum). It is evi­
dent from this example, that an "allegory of word" may refer 
to a future historical fact or a tropological or anagogical 
meaning. Bede even states this a few sentences later: 
Likewise, again, the allegory of the word or of the 
deed figuratively denotes sometimes a historical 
fact, sometimes types, sometimes tropological matter 
(that is, a moral reason), and sometimes an anagogy 
(that is, a leading of the senses to higher things). 
^Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, PL, XC, 185. 
301 
Item allegoria verbi, sive operis, aliquando histori-
cam rem, aliquando typicam, aliquando tropologicam, 
id est, moralem rationem, aliquando anagogen, loc est, 
sensum ad superiora ducentem, figurate denuntiat.6*7 
Similarly, writes Bede, one historical fact in Scripture may 
through allegorical extension indicate another historical 
fact which will take place in the future. Thus, writes Bede 
"History is figured through history." ("Per Historiam namque 
68 
historia figuratur.") Here Bede is clearly describing the 
"allegory of the theologians" familiar to Biblical exegetes 
from the earliest Christian centuries, in which the first 
and literal sense is historical and the second or allegorical 
sense is also historical. His example makes this quite 
clear: 
Often, in one and the same matter, the historical and 
verbal senses (the mystical sense of Christ or the 
Church), the tropological sense and the anagogical 
senses are all figuratively intimated. For example 
'the temple of the Lord,' according to history, is 
the temple of Solomon; according to allegory it is the 
Lord's Body, concerning which John said 'Destroy this 
temple and in three days I will raise it up again;1 
(John II) or of His Church, of whom it is said, 'For the 
temple indeed is sanctified by God, which is you.' It 
is understood through tropology as being some of the 
faithful to whom it is said in I Cor. II: 'But don't 
you know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit 
which is in you?' The 'Temple of the Lord' through 
anagogy is the dwelling of heavenly joy to which he 
aspired who said, 'blessed are they who dwell in your 
house, Lord, for age after age they will praise you.' 
Likewise is to be taken Psalm 147: Praise God, Jerus­
alem, Praise your god, Sion; for He has strengthened 
the latches of your gates and blessed your sons in 
you; Concerning the terrestrial city of Jerusalem, 
the Church of Christ, the spirit of the elect, and the 
6 7 Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in PL, XC, 185. 
68 Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in PL, XC, 185. 
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celestial kingdom; according to history, according to 
allegory, according to tropology, and according to ana-
gogy, it can rightly be received and understood. 
(Nonnunquam in una eademque re, vel verbo, historia 
simul et mysticus de Christo vel Ecclesia sensus, et 
tropologia, et anagoge, figuraliter intimatur, est: 
templum Domini, juxta historiam, domus quam aedificavit 
Solomon; juxta allegoriam, corpus dominicum, de quo ait 
Joan II: Solvite templum hoc, et in tribus diebus 
excitabo illud, sive Ecclesia ejus, cui dicitur, Tem­
plum enim Dei sanctum est, quod estis vos per tropolo-
giam, quisque fidelium, quibus dicitur I Cor. II; An 
nescitis quia corpora vestra templum est Spiritus sanc-
ti, qui in vobis est? per anagogen, superni gaudii 
mansiones, cui aspirabat qui ait: Beati qui habitant 
in domo tua, Domine, in saeculum saeculi laudabunt te. 
Simili modo quod dicitur Psalmo CXLVII: Lauda Deum 
tuum, Sion: quoniam confortavit seras portarum tuarum, 
benedixit filiis tuis in te; de civibus terrene Jerus­
alem, de Ecclessia Christi, de anima quo que electa, 
de patria coelesti, juxta historiam, juxta allegoriam, 
juxta tropologiam, juxta anagogen, recte potest accipi.^9 
Thus Bede clearly allows for a typological exegesis of Scrip­
ture which is grounded in historical fact and parallels the 
allegorical approach of Tertullian, Augustine, and Jerome 
before him. 
Bede1s orthodox approach to typology in the De Schemat-
ibus et Tropibus is particularly interesting in terms of the 
light it sheds on the famous passage in the Commentary on 
Ezra, in which Bede describes the allegorical interpretation 
of Biblical Literature as: 
...a stripping off of the bark of the letter to find a 
deeper and spiritual meaning in the pith of spiritual 
sense. (Confidens vero adjustore et consolatore Jesu 
Christo quia donet nobis propitius, retecto cortice 
literae, altius aliud, et acratius in medulla sensus 
spititualis invenire....^0 
69 
Bede, De Schematibus et Tropibus, in PL XC, 186. 
70 
Bede, "Praefatio," In Esdram et Nehemiam Prophetas: 
Allegorica Expositio, PL XCL, 808. The translation is by 
Atkins, English Literary Criticism, p. 49. 
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Charles Donahue has noted that this interpretation of the 
literal level of Scripture fostered an incorrect understand­
ing of the letter as "chaff" and the spirit as "kernel" 
71 
which clashes with the Augustinian view. However accurately 
this may describe the meaning derived from the passage by 
some of Bede's interpreters, this analysis cannot be applied 
to Bede himself. Though he cannot be said to emphasize the 
importance of the historicity of the literal narrative as 
openly as Augustine, it is certain from the passages just 
cited that where there is a clear historical reference in 
Scripture, Bede does not discard it in favor of a "spiritua­
lized meaning," but uses it as the basis for additional alle­
gorical meanings which often have historical content in them­
selves—"Per historiam namque historia figuratur." It is 
unfortunate that the passage in the Commentary on Ezra is 
often used as the definitive description of Bede's approach 
to allegory when a review of his allegorical method reveals 
a typology very close to Augustine in both spirit and manner— 
including an attitude toward figurative expression which dis­
plays a high regard for the literal-historical level of the 
text. 
The School of Chartres 
For nearly three centuries following the death of Bede 
and Alcuin, there is a gap in critical studies due to the 
71 
Charles Donahue, "Summation: Patristic Exegesis," in 
Critical Approaches to Medieval Literature, ed. Dorothy Bethu-
rum (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 74. 
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political turmoil surrounding the Viking invasions and the 
Norman Conquest and its consequences. During this time (9th 
through the 11th centuries) many of the early educational 
centers were destroyed by Danish invaders, and despite the 
work of Alfred, who translated Boethius, Orosius, and Bede, 
and offered the first defense of the vernacular, many of the 
ancient manuscripts were lost. Even in France there was a 
long period of decline in the liberal arts due partially to 
the dampening effect of the Cistercian monasteries in Nor-
72 
thern France. However, the study of the liberal arts con­
tinued at Orleans and Tours, and it was from these centers 
that a new movement began to develop which had as its primary 
aim the assimilation of classical culture and Christian 
theology. This movement came to be associated most closely 
with the Cathedral School at Chartres, and produced and influ­
enced a number of important medieval artists and critics: 
among them, Bernardus Silvestris, Alain de Lille, Jean de 
Hanville, Guillaume de St. Thierry, and the later literary 
theorists John of Garland, Matthew of Vendome and Goeffrey 
of Vinsauf. 
Influences on the School of Chartres derive from Chal-
cidius1 translation of Plato's Timaeus and the early Platoniz-
ing allegorists Martianus Capella, Macrobius, Guillaume de 
72 Wmthrop Wetherbee, Platomsm and Poetry in the 12th 
Century; The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 5. 
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de Conches and Boethius, who supply the Chartrians with key 
elements in much of their philosophy. Nevertheless, the 
School of Chartres developed its own particular brand of 
Platonic thought and it will be worthwhile to outline some 
of their doctrines here before going on to analyze those 
elements which bear directly on characterization in the rep­
resentative treatises of John of Salisbury and Alain de Lille. 
First, Chartrian thought is characterized by an emphasis 
on cosmology. The cosmos is viewed as the measure of man's 
mind and spirit; to know the causes of cosmological relations 
is to know something about man. Second, the way to know­
ledge of mankind is through knowledge of the liberal arts, 
which reveals to the soul her relation to the cosmos and her 
73 
responsibility to it. Boethius and Martianus Capella are 
the philosophical proponents of these doctrines and the Char­
trians set them forth poetically. 
Chartrian theology does not depart from orthodox solu­
tions to the problem of the amalgamation of Christian and 
classical thought when it identifies the Aristotelian concept 
74 
of the Efficient, Formal and Final Cause with the Trinity 
and when it compares the absolute Being of Platonic philosophy 
with the I Am That I Am of the Scriptures, an analogy first 
^See Wetherbee, pp. 21-22. 
74 See John of Salisbury, Frivolities of Courtiers and 
Footprints of Philosophers: Being a Translation of the First, 
Second and Third Books and Selections from the Seventh and 
Eighth Books of the Policraticus of John of Salisbury, trans. 
Joseph B. Pike (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1938), pp. 230-2 31. Hereafter referred to as Policraticus. 
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75 
noted by Augustine in the De Civitate Dei 9.10. But Char-
trians departed from tradition in their treatment of the 
World Soul, which, from a Platonic perspective, they equate 
with the Holy Spirit and define as a link between the sen­
sible and spiritual world and as an expression of God's love. 
Orthodox theologians took issue with this definition of the 
Holy Spirit because, in Wetherbee1s words, it "suggested too 
radical a separation among the Persons of the Trinity" and 
applied "indifferently" to the whole creation "what was meant 
76 
to apply to man alone." 
The world-Soul, or the Nous, in fact, was a concept which 
applied neither to the realm of philosophy, nor to the realm 
of theology, but to what Wetherbee calls "a sort of tertium 
77 
quid," a middle ground between the two. It is from this 
ground, explains Wetherbee, that such immensely popular alle­
gorical figures as Nature and Genius develop in the Middle 
Ages. Chartrians viewed the universe as ordered according to 
a series of hierarchies which grew less and less substantial 
as they drew closer and closer to the eternal ideals. The 
relations between the ideal and the real sphere was one of 
analogy, where countless similarities could be drawn between 
78 
the divine order and earthly life. This fact, Wetherbee 
points out, encouraged a strong subjective and imaginative 
75 
See Wmthrop Wetherbee, p. 31. 
^Wetherbee, p. 32. 
77 
Wetherbee, p. 34. 
78 
Wetherbee, p. 35. 
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element in Chartrian thought and led to an emphasis on the 
intuitions of the philosophic mind, an emphasis not unlike 
that which we observed in the early Alexandrine exegetes. 
This resulted in an introverted attention to the progress of 
the intuitive mind as it moved upward through the various 
"divine analogies" toward absolute truth. Within the total 
working of such a schema, Nature was viewed as a kind of 
autonomous force which governed the cosmos, making sure that 
the ordered analogies of which it was composed kept within 
their limits. 
It is out of such a strongly Platonized understanding 
of the world-order that writers such as John of Salisbury, 
Guillaume de Conches, Bernard Silvestris and Alain de Lille 
find inspiration for their allegories—and derive at least a 
partial philosophical basis for their critical approach to 
literature. 
Alain de Lille (1128-1202) 
Alain de Lille, the twelfth-century poet who wrote both 
the De Planctu Naturae (c. 1176 or before) and the Anticlau-
dian (c. 1178) is perhaps the most famous representative of 
the School of Chartres. Known to the Middle Ages, along with 
Albertus Magnus as doctor universalis for the depth and scope 
of his knowledge, Alain was born c. 1128 at Lille and later 
79 
studied and taught at Paris. There he came under the influ­
ence of the writings of Gilbert de la Porree, Bernard 
79 See Curtius, p. 117. 
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Silvestris, Bernard of Chartres, and Thierry of Chartres, 
80 
all noted teachers and writers of the Chartrian tradition. 
Alain's major works both contain elaborate allegorical 
narratives which serve as vehicles for his particular brand 
of Chartrian Platonism. Because they are important for an 
understanding of Alain's thought, a summary of the allegories 
will be included in the discussion of each work. The 
De Planctu Naturae begins with a man lamenting the present 
state of the cosmological order. Nature's natural sexual 
chastity has been threatened by the "monster of sensual love" 
81 
and the philosopher laments the passing of the old values. 
A vision representing Nature descends and comforts the ph-
losopher. She speaks of the natural order and harmony of 
the universe and compares herself with her more powerful 
sister, Theology. When the dreamer asks why she is weeping 
and why her garments are rent, she replies that the "beastly 
sensuality" of men is the cause both of the condition of her 
garments and of her sadness. She comments that Mankind "com­
mits monstrous acts in its union of genders, and perverts 
the rules of love by a practice of extreme and abnormal irreg­
ularity," and afterward cites several examples from classical 
myth of perverted sexuality—Helen's adultery, Pasiphae's 
lust, and Myrrha's unnatural lust for her father. 
80 
Alain de Lille, The Anticlaudian of Alain de Lille, 
trans. William Hafner Cornog (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1935), p. 32. 
81 "AlasI Whither has the loveliness of Nature, the beauty 
of character, the standard of Chastity, the love of virtue 
departed?—Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. Doug­
las M. Moffatt (Hamden: Archon Books, 1972), p. 1. 
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The dreamer then asks why Nature denounces only Mankind 
when the gods are also guilty of much licentiousness. In 
this, Nature chides him for "giving faith to the dreaming 
82 
fancies of poets," and exhorts him to follow philosophy, 
the "saner" treatment. Nature then goes on to explain the 
story of the Fall in terms of an allegory in which Venus and 
her son Cupid become the allegorical sign of harmony in 
grammar and rhetoric. She draws a comparison between the 
faithless union of Venus and Antigamis, which produces the 
illegitimate son Mirth and the lawful union of Hyman and 
Venus to produce the harmonious Cupid. 
After this, Nature bewails the condition of the world. 
("The evening of faith lies upon the world and the night of 
83 
the Chaos of falsehood is everywhere.") When the dreamer 
asks for a specific enumeration of the evils of which she 
speaks, Nature replies with a list of vices: Disunity, Har­
lotry, Gluttony, Avarice, Effeminacy, Pride, Envy, and 
Flattery. She then presents an allegory of virtues, showing 
84 
how these vices may be subdued and appoints Genius as over­
seer of the task of making war on those men who are not obey­
ing Nature's precepts. Truth and Falsehood then contend in 
85 
Genius for the depiction of the Truth and after a struggle, 
82 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 39. 
83 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 58. 
84 
Alain de Lille, Complaint, pp. 75-94. 
85 
Alain de Lille, Complaint, pp. 92-93. 
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he finally pronounces anathema on 
whoever turns away the lawful cause of love, or is ship­
wrecked in gluttony, or swallows greedily the delirium 
of drunkenness, or thirsts in the fire of avarice, or 
ascends the shadowy pinnacle of insolent pride, or suf­
fers the deep-seated destruction of envy, or keeps 
company with the false love of flattery.86 
Nature's position having been preserved the dreamer's vision 
ends. 
Alain's allegory includes a great many Platonic elements 
which reveal themselves at every turn in the narrative. One 
of the earliest examples of the kind of analogical thinking 
exhibited by the Chartrians occurs at the onset of Nature's 
dialogue with the dreamer when Alain pauses to explain 
Nature's ability to physically communicate with him: 
When she saw that I had returned to myself, she depic­
ted for my mental perception the image of a real voice, 
and by this brought into actual being words which had 
been so to speak, archetypes ideally conceived.^ 
Here the Chartrian habit of conceiving the sensual order as 
a reflection of the divine archetypes is strikingly evident. 
Later, Chartrian overtones come out again when Nature speaks 
of the union of the body and the spirit in very Platonic 
terms. Alain speaks of Nature ordering the senses in prepa­
ration of the body's union with spirit: 
So would the material part of the whole body, being 
adorned with the higher glories of nature, be united 
the more agreeably when it came to marriage with its 
spouse the spirit, and so would not the spouse, in 
disgust at the baseness of its mate, oppose the marriage. 
Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 93. 
87 
Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 24. 
88 
Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 24. 
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Even in a description of the harmonious union of body and 
spirit, the Platonic hostility toward fleshly life is evi­
dent. It is interesting, too, that a Platonic emphasis on 
rationality can also be demonstrated. Nature herself makes 
rationality the principle of order and opposes it to lust, 
the chief enemy of Alain's rationalistic world view. Moral 
didacticism, a key characteristic of Platonic and Chartrian 
thought, is evident in the final description of the battle 
of the vices and the virtues at the end of the Complaint. 
Even the allegory of Mirth, the illegitimate offspring 
of Venus and Antigamis, demonstrates the old Platonic animos­
ity toward Comedy. Comparing Cupid with Mirth, Nature com­
ments : 
In the former shines his father's culture and courtesy, 
in the latter glooms the grossness of his father's bru­
tality. The former dwells by gleaming springs, silvery 
in white splendors; the latter continuously frequents 
places cursed with perennial barrenness. The latter 
pitches his tent on the desert plain; the former is 
pleased with the wooded valley. The latter without 
cease spends the night in taverns; the former continues 
days and nights under the clear sky. The former wounds 
those whom he spears with golden hunting-spears, the 
latter lances those whom he strikes with iron javelins. 
The former intoxicates his guests with a nectar not 
bitter; the latter ruins with the sour drink of 
absinthe.89 
Here Alain's moralistic suspicion of the kind of content 
which characterizes comedy reveals itself in his personifi­
cation of Mirth as a cruel and licentious man, seeking to 
poison and destroy his adversaries with ugly words of satire 
and obscenity. Earlier Alain makes the contrast between 
89 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 54. 
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chaotic Mirth and the harmonious order of exalted rhetoric 
even clearer by associating the proper use of rhetoric 
directly with Love, or the personifications of Cupid and 
90 
Venus. 
Perhaps the most classical aspect of Alain's allegory 
can be seen in Nature's understanding and use of poetic fic­
tion in itself, which she communicates to the dreamer during 
their first conversation together: 
Can it be that thou dost not know how poets expose 
naked falsehood to their hearers with no protecting 
cloak, that they may intoxicate their ears, and, so to 
speak, bewitch them with a melody of honeyed delight; 
or how they cloak that same falsehood with a pretense 
of credibility, that, by means of images of objective 
things they may mold the souls of men on the anvil of 
dishonorable assent; or that in the shallow exterior 
of literature the poetic lyre sounds a false note, but 
within speaks to its hearers of the mystery of loftier 
understanding, so that, the waste of outer falsity cast 
aside, the reader finds, in secret within, the sweeter 
kernel of truth?9! 
It is clear, first of all, that in Alain's view, poetry, 
which employs as its vehicle the objects of sensual experience, 
is not on the same level as the more exalted discipline of 
philosophy. The correspondence between the poetic sign 
and the inner spiritual meaning is purely a matter of analogy. 
Alain sees the allegory and its meaning as separate, and the 
poetic narrative is presented as clearly inferior to the 
heavenly truth it represents. The separation of the concrete 
body of the text and its spiritual meaning reminds us of the 
90 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 51. 
91 Alain de Lille, Complaint, pp. 39-40. 
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radical separation of the sensual and the abstract which we 
found in the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, and which 
resulted ultimately from their misinterpretation of the 
orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation. 
Alain, of course, is not completely averse to the use 
of poetic fiction, and even fiction which has historical 
elements, if it depicts "in secret within, the sweeter kernel 
92 
of truth...." Yet, he is angered by poets who degrade the 
gods by speaking of them idly and vainly and who depict 
their adulteries and misconduct, sins which according to 
Alain cannot be imputed to the character of God. Alain's 
displeasure with the moral evil in some poetic representation 
reflects the purist quality of Platonic thought—its belief 
that nothing which has any concourse with earthly sensuality 
is quite so unstained as the eternal ideals. When Alain 
does use good or morally pure poetry, he tends to use 
it in a very classical sense—that is, he uses it to cover 
up indelicate matters which are too debased for a straight­
forward explanation. Thus Nature describes the Fall of Man 
in terms of sugar-coating it with poetry in order to express 
what is too unholy in acceptable form: 
For as I make my beginning in a loftier and nobler 
style, and desire to weave the line of my story, I do 
not wish as before to explain my principles on a dead 
level of words, nor yet to pollute unholy subjects with 
new profanities of speech, but rather to gild with the 
golden ornaments of chaste words matters of shame, and 
to deck them in the various colors of beautiful expres-
sion.yj 
92 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 40. 
93 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 42. 
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Although the theological meaning of his allegory contains 
the orthodox story of the Fall, Alain's whole approach to 
the subject has great affinities with the classical refusal 
to depict sinful or debased action, and the parallel prac­
tice of healing debased topics with ornamental coverings 
of allegory for purposes of making it palatable to the reader. 
Even where Alain's understanding of Christianity seems 
to reflect a very orthodox content, the very language he 
employs is often very classical in idiom. The contrast he 
makes between Nature and Theology, while it emphasizes the 
powerlessness of Nature to offer grace to the Christian, yet 
couches the superiority of the grace-giving Theology in very 
Platonic terms. Nature admits that she can comprehend only 
the "first birth," while Theology alone is capable of compre­
hending the "second" birth. Nature "attains faith by reason," 
Theology "attains reason by faith;" Nature "barely sees things 
that are visible;" Theology "comprehends in their reflection 
things incomprehensible;" Nature "almost like a beast walks 
94 
the earth;" Theology "serves in secret heaven." Thus 
while Alain's content reveals glimpses of orthodox Christian 
doctrine, his basic approach to the topic remains heavily 
influenced by the Classical tradition. What we seem to have 
in Alain, then is a Christianity very much watered-down by 
the classical philosophy and literary perspective which we 
have earlier seen sifting down through the Platonized theology 
of the Alexandrine exegetes. 
94 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 30. 
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Alain's essential attachment to a pagan-humanistic ideal 
becomes even more clear in his masterwork, the Anticlaudian 
(written c. 1178). The Anticlaudian narrates the story of 
Nature's wish to rectify her previous mistakes by creating 
a perfect man. She commissions Prudence to journey to God 
to obtain the soul of the man, which is beyond her power to 
create. Prudence takes her seven handmaidens, the seven 
liberal arts, and fastens them to her car, which is drawn by 
five horses representing the five senses and which is con­
trolled by the Charioteer, Reason. The chariot moves up 
through the heavens until it is unable to proceed any fur­
ther and is aided by Theology, who conducts Prudence into 
the presence of God. Overcome by his splendor, she faints, 
and is revived by Faith. Having presented her petition to 
God, who grants her request, Prudence returns to Nature's 
court with the new soul, and Nature and her court proceed 
to endow it with gifts. Fortune, mother of Nobility, is the 
last of the court to give her gift. The news of the newly-
created man reaches Alecto, the fury, who calls together the 
vices for battle against the man. The new man subdues all the 
vices, one by one, and triumphs. ("Virtue rises, Vices Succumb, 
95 
Nature triumphs.") 
In the Anticlaudian Alain exhibits the same attachment 
to the Chartrian-Platonic ideals which we saw in the De Planctu 
Naturae. In the opening pages of his poem, Alain describes 
95 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 24. 
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it as written for those who "will not permit the quickened 
substance of their reason to rest among base imaginings, 
96 
but dare to aspire to the intuitions of forms divine," 
thus reiterating the Platonic aspiration toward the ideal. 
A specifically Chartrian Platonism shows up in Alain's fas­
cination with the Nous which he sees as the primary agent in 
a very Platonized conception of creation. God sends out 
Nous to search for a model of the ideal human mind patterned 
after the deity: the sequence which follows reveals the 
Chartrian understanding of the relation between the divine 
idea and the human soul very clearly: 
This form the Nous presents to God that He might 
fashion a soul after its pattern; then He selects a 
seal, giving a form to that soul according to the 
traces of that form, imprints by the model an appear­
ance such as the ideal demands; the image usurps the 
entire resources of the original and the figure bespeaks 
the stamp. 
Here the basic Chartrian concept is of the Nous as the order­
ing principle of Nature, working by means of a reflected 
image of the Mind of God. The same basic concept inherent 
l 
in Alain's description of the paintings which adorn the house 
of Nature. As reflections of the divine ideals, these paint­
ings "turn shadows of things into things and transform sepa-
98 
rate lies into one truth." Alain goes on to make specific 
reference to Plato whom he represents as living in the house 
96 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 48. 
97 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 128. 
98 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 54. 
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and as "evincing the very secrets of things in the profound 
mind of heaven and seeking to discover the intention of 
99 
God. 
All these evidences of Platonic doctrine in Alain's 
philosophical approach are counterbalanced by several ref­
erences to more central orthodox doctrines—including Luci-
100 
fer's Fall, the Augustinian doctrine of cupidity as the 
101 102 
root of all evil, the ascendancy of faith over reason, 
and several explicit references to the Incarnation and aton-
103 
ing action of Jesus Christ. However, most of these doc­
trines are expressed through an allegorical veil, and many 
are given a decidedly Platonic twist. The union of soul and 
body, for example, is accomplished only through the mediat­
ing forces of Concord, and traces of a Platonic disdain for 
the body remain in Concord's description of her function: 
"Unless my tie binds souls to bodies, the spirit, disdaining to 
dwell in these houses, deserting the penitentiaries of the 
104 
flesh would return to its proper places of origin." While 
this allegory is descriptive of the Christian doctrine of the 
union of spirit and flesh, the language is yet Platonic and 
99 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 55. 
"'"^Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 98. 
"'"Ala in de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 98. 
102 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 117. 
103 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 116. 
104 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 71. 
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detracts from the full force of the sacramantal liaison. 
Even Alain's description of Christ's Incarnation emphasizes 
to an almost immoderate degree the "loathsomeness" of the 
105 
body. Winthrop Wetherbee has noted the deeply-rooted 
Neo-Platonic perspective of the poem in just these terms. 
Commenting on the general character of the Anticlaudian, 
with special reference to Alain's allegorical expression of 
the Incarnation in the creation of the ideal man, Wetherbee 
observes: 
Its character is Neo-Platonic and it is only imper­
fectly linked with the idea of a single, pivotal 
intervention of the divine in human history.... ̂6 
Alain's very approach to the subject of allegory is in 
itself revelatory of his essentially classical orientation: 
Yet the substance is two-fold, one a narrative; the 
other of mystic significance....And, just as the mean­
ing is wrapped around the material, so the significa­
tion of the allegory shines through the material.107 
While he is careful to verbalize the close relation of the 
narrative and its mystic significance, the nature of the rela­
tion is less one of true sacramental union than a close, but 
still distinct joining of the two levels of meaning. Though 
Alain does not pay particular attention to the indispensa-
bility of the literal level of the text, we may gather from 
his general philosophical position that material substance 
is always regarded as inferior—even greatly inferior—to 
105 
Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 116; aee also p. 130. 
"'"^Wetherbee, p. 218. 
107 Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 51. 
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the spirit. Moreover, from the fabulous nature of his own 
allegory, we may gather that "historicity" or "realism" of 
any kind is of a very secondary concern. In fact, where the 
historical narrative is distasteful or immoderate or a depic­
tion of evil, Alain regards the use of a fabulous narrative 
as far superior to the method of straight historical realism. 
Speaking of the evils resulting from the Fall, we remember, 
Alain comments that he wished "to give these monstrous vices 
a cloak of well-meaning phrases." 
These facts and their relevance to Alain's specific 
approach to the problem of characterization are most clearly 
evident in his descriptions of some of the more important 
allegorical figures in his poem. The figure of Reason, 
for example, has particular significance in this regard. Not 
only is Reason described in terms of the exemplary qualities 
which we have come to expect in the description of such a 
figure—"peaceful," "mature," "wise," but she is holding a 
triple mirror which serves as an occasion for Alain to explain 
once again the gradual ascent of the good soul from the base 
particulars of substance to "the origin of the world, the idea 
of the globe, the pattern, aspect, cause, first beginnings, 
108 
the end." In a similar manner, Alain uses the figure of 
Concord to reiterate the classical doctrine of propriety: 
Form figure, mode, class, degree, becomingly fit the 
parts and perform their obligated functions. Thus the 
united members agree in the place of harmony, for in 
none is a discordant relationship seen.109 
•j r\o 
Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, pp. 63-64. 
•^•^Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 69. 
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We remember that in traditional classical theory where rea­
listic portrayal of character—including historical detail 
and common behavior—is allowed, it is usually allowed 
only in the presentation of comic figures. Even there it is 
carefully restricted. Earlier in the De Planctu Naturae, we 
noticed evidences of this same attitude in Alain's allegori­
cal depiction of the adulterous marriage of Venus and Antiga-
mus. In the Anticlaudian there is a similar passage. Nature, 
endowing the perfect soul with human gifts, places restric­
tions on the amount of mirth he is allowed to express. The 
perfect man can laugh, but his merriment must be dignified 
and moral, fitting Alain's allegorical personification: 
Laughter is present—not he, however, to whom malig­
nant ridicule gives abortive birth, whom envy bears 
from within or the outward form of false love engen­
ders or lewdness portrays with fickle brain: but 
having much dignity, temperately branding the face, 
deforming the features with no immoderate laughing. 
Thus Alain's understanding of mirth contains a very classical 
appeal for restraint and moderation. The classical tendency 
to preserve the dignity of its characters at all costs is 
indicative of Alain's commitment to the ancient belief 
that only what is morally exemplary should be presented to 
the reader. This notion, as we have shown, is rejected by 
Christian theorists on the grounds that depiction of fully 
historical characters—both evil and good—not only finds 
precedent in the Scriptures, but serves as a realistic warning 
"'""''^Alain de Lille, Anticlaudian, p. 131. 
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to the believer of the past and present bounty of God's grace 
in his own life. A truly historical presentation of man 
is possible in Christianity because of the Christian's view 
of the grace of God. Man is saved while a sinner, totally 
apart from any merit he may contrive. When redemption is 
accomplished, it is accomplished in history. In the classi­
cal view, man, through a philosophical-moral progression, 
strives upward toward the eternal verities. 
In Alain, where we find a combination of the two view­
points, the Christian doctrine evident is orthodox, but in an 
application to literary theory and practice, falls back into 
111 
the old classical patterns. 
John of Salisbury 
An older contemporary of Alain, John of Salisbury, 
wrote the Policraticus c. 1159 while secretary to Thomas a 
Becket at Canterbury. John's Chartrian influence came early 
in his career as a student at the cathedral school at 
Chartres, where he was directly influenced by William of 
C. S. Lewis, Allegory of Love (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 98-106, and E. R. Curtius, 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, pp. 117-122, 
are in essential agreement with my contention that Alain 
is strongly influenced by the pagan-humanist tradition. 
In terms of his approach to figurative expression, this 
means that Alain's allegory is only an allegory of spir­
itual content rather than an allegory of real sacramental 
method. Affected at crucial points by his attachment to 
an ultimately classical world-view, Alain's approach to 
characterization fosters a universalized or typical 
character on all counts. 
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Conches and Gilbert de la Porree. Later, suffering a 
necessary absence from England after the murder of his friend 
and mentor Thomas, John, nearing the end of his own life, 
accepted a post as Archbishop of Chartres under the French 
King Louis VII, a position which he held until his death 
in 1180. 
The mixed influence of John's association with the ortho­
doxy of Becket and the Platonism of the School of Chartres 
reveal themselves in the Policraticus. The doctrinal content 
of John's work is more substantial in volume and in ortho­
doxy than Alain's, and perhaps as a result, John's theoretical 
conception of figurative expression changes slightly from 
Alain's. However, this does not seem to affect the actual 
presentation of his allegorical figures 
What can be demonstrated of John's perspective on the 
orthodox faith which is relevant to his approach to figurative 
expression? John's references to the Incarnation, a central 
doctrine of Christianity, and the basis for the Christian 
attitude toward historical reality have only a slightly Pla­
tonic character. Whereas Alain de Lille often referred to 
the gross sensuality of the body and its loathesomeness, 
John is content to emphasize in less dramatic but no less 
forceful terms the immense gulf between flesh and spirit, and 
to assure the believer of his final absorption into "spirit." 
112 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 3. 
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Describing the complete rebellion of body from spirit at the 
Fall of Adam, he comments: 
...in no way-can the two be harmonized without the 
intervention of the grace of Him who hath made both 
one and shall make flesh to be absorbed by spirit at 
the judgment of the elect.113 
Though "Platonized" to a degree this passage represents an 
essentially orthodox position on the Incarnation which is 
114 
restated at other points in the Policraticus. 
John1s orthodoxy is also apparent in his treatment of the 
doctrine of free will and the possibility for judgment. We 
remember that in the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, and 
in the classical allegorists of the third, fourth, and fifth 
centuries there is a tendency to de-emphasize free will and 
to regard all humankind as ultimately "salvable" if only a 
process of purification—both within and without the body— 
is carried on for a time. Traces of this doctrine are 
nowhere to be found in the Policraticus. Instead, John 
includes a very clear restatement of the Augustinian position 
on this issue in Book II, Chapter 20: 
For neither was it impossible for man not to sin because 
God had foreknowledge that he would sin nor was the 
Lord ignorant that he would sin because he had the power 
not to sin....So we see that, exercising complete free­
dom of will, he had the power to sin or not to sin, for 
by no harsh dispensation, no compulsion of fate, no 
spur of stipulation, nor yet by any fault of nature was 
he urged on to sin, and this as indubitable cause 
plunged man almost of his own free will into death. 
But because in wrongdoing he allowed the reins of 
113 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 402. 
114 See John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 77 and 
throughout. 
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discretion to slip from his hands, he lies prostrate, 
overwhelmed to such a degree that by the righteous judg­
ment of God he is now unable to abstain from sin when he 
so desires, because he did not will to abstain from it 
when he had the power.H5 
This doctrine of free will is then made the cornerstone of 
John1s attitude toward judgment: 
Behold, freedom of will is preserved herein, seeing that 
by saying, "If you be willing," or "if you refuse," He 
promises to all' punishment or reward—either the one or 
the other; not as a result of the irrevocable judgment 
or destiny of God, but in accord with each one's des­
serts . 116 
There is no equivocating in this passage—John's position on 
the issue is clear. 
John's adherence to orthodox tradition in his treatment 
of free will and judgment is no less apparent in his under­
standing of grace. Alain de Lille's tendency, despite his 
insistence on the mediating power of grace in the process 
of salvation, is to view salvation in terms of the soul's 
moral progression from earthly substance to a mystic commun­
ication with the universals. Despite the needed intervention 
of Theology, Nature is seen as having a great deal of say in 
the creation of the "perfect man." John rejects the Platonic 
rhetoric used by Alain, and substitutes a solidly orthodox 
understanding of grace and morality: 
Yet I do not enlarge the fringes of corrupt nature nor 
raise the phylacteries against grace as though nature 
possessed any good which it did not receive; since it is 
certain that without grace we can do nothing. 
115 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, pp. 99-100. 
"'""'"^John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 12; see also the 
section on the judgment of Judas, p. 132. 
H^John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 155. 
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In this passage it is clear that corrupt human nature has not 
even the smallest power to make a moral action without the 
redeeming power of grace; and the metaphorical language em­
ployed is taken straight from Matthew 23:5, the central issue 
of Jesus' controversy with the "natural morality" of the Phar­
isees. Thus John's doctrinal position in the Policraticus 
appears to be much more solidly orthodox than Alain's posi­
tion in the De Planetu Naturae and the Anticlaudian. 
This more orthodox position on doctrinal matters, however, 
does not seem to have affected his classical view of the sub­
ject of mirth and comedy. Like Alain, John strives for mod­
eration of mirth. Discussing the comportment of the ideal 
man he writes: 
It is pleasant and not the least unbecoming for a man 
of honor to indulge occasionally in reasonable mirth, 
but it is disgraceful to lower personal dignity by 
excessive indulgence in it.l-^ 
Later on, John associates the irreligious man with the low 
comic characters of Petronius, thereby demonstrating the 
classical tendency to make a connection between comedy and 
the evil character. In Book VIII chapter 3, John himself 
uses the comic characters of Terence1s play The Eunuch to 
make a number of moral points on the excesses of evil men, 
their greed and immoderation. Thus John, true to the clas­
sical tradition, seems to allow depiction of the stock comic 
character when it is jised to a moral end. There is no evidence, 
however, that he has the profound grasp of the extremes of 
118 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 38. 
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good and evil allowed by the Christian definition of con­
version and evidenced in the works of Augustine and Dante, 
for example. 
Still, John's position is more within the Christian main­
stream than Alain de Lille, and this manifests itself most 
clearly in his approach to the problem of figurative expres­
sion. John's attitude toward the use of the literal level 
of the text, for example, is revelatory of a new awareness 
of historicity in the text. First, John makes the orthodox 
contrast between Scripture, which "provides the letter not 
only with words, but with reality itself," and "liberal stud-
119 
ies" where "not things, but words merely have meaning." 
The new sensitivity toward the historical validity of Scrip-
120 
ture causes a slight softening in John's attitude toward 
the inclusion of historically realistic material in the nar­
rative. Analyzing the communication of truth in literary 
discourse, John writes: 
The serious is to mingle with the trivial, the false 
with the true in such a way that all may logically con­
tribute to the attainment of the supreme truth. Let us 
cause no disquiet if some of the accounts which are 
written here are found to be stated differently else­
where; since even historical facts in the confusing 
119 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 264. 
120 With reservations: Regarding what he sees as histor­
ical contradictions in Scripture, John writes: "I do not 
care to run the risk of formulating truth. My intention is 
merely to share ungrudgingly with my readers for their bet­
terment what I have read in different writers. Even the 
Apostle does not say: 'What things soever were written are 
true,' but 'what things so ever were written were written 
for our learning.'" John of Salisbury, Policraticus, 
p. 216. 
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vicissitudes of events, are discovered to be contradic­
tory, yet they are serviceable for the principal harvest, 
that of utility and rectitude.121 
Even though suspicious of too strong a concern for historical 
facticity in the text, John here allows the retelling of a 
historical fact if it contributes to the moral formation of 
the believer. This slight softening of Alain's position, 
which is a whole-hearted acceptance of the classical tradi­
tion of "perfuming" the depiction of vice "with the odor of 
122 
sweet words," is a reflection of John's more orthodox doc­
trinal stance. 
Despite the slight interest in the literal level evinced 
by John in his general treatment of narrative form, when 
describing the proper approach to characterization per se 
he is definitely within the Platonic tradition of personifi­
cation—allegory. Quoting Ovid's description of the personi­
fication of Envy 
Her face is pale, her body shrunk, the eyes awry, her 
teeth all foul and black; Her breast is green with gall 
and tongue spread o'er with venom. Never does she 
smile save at the sight of other's woes; she never sleeps. 
Alert with sleepless cares; Unwelcome, too, the sight of 
man's success and at the sight she pines away; she rends 
while rent herself; she is her self-made torturer.-^3 
John comments on Ovid's method of characterization: 
The description is no less true although the author per­
sonifies an abstract idea, since in this the essence of 
the fiture which is named sarcoqraphia consists in the 
121 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, pp. 215-16. 
122 Alain de Lille, Complaint, p. 42. 
123 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 288. 
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fact that it clothes with poet's license abstract ideas 
with bodily form*^24 
The poetic method described here is explicitly that of per­
sonification—allegory. Thus we see that while the orthodox 
aspects of John's theological position slightly affect the 
attention he pays to the historical element in narrative, 
his basic stance toward characterization is unaffected. 
Hugh of St. Victor 
Hugh of St. Victor, writing in the opening quarter of the 
12th century, reveals philosophical roots which place him 
still further within the orthodox Christian mainstream. The 
Didascalicon, written in Paris during the 1120's, is influ­
enced by Plato's Timaeus and Macrobius1 Commentary, and yet 
has strong affinities with the Orthodox tradition—especially 
125 
as regards his approach to allegory. 
Platonic influences show themselves first of all in Hugh's 
understanding of man's earthly dilemma, which is presented 
in the De Sacramentis under the guise of the Pseudo-Dyonysian 
figure of the three eyes. The fall caused blindness in the 
eye of contemplation and a blearing of vision in the eye of 
126 
reason. The eye of the flesh was left unimpaired. Hugh 
124 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, p. 288. 
125 Jerome Taylor in "Introduction" to Hugh of St. Victor, 
The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, trans. Jerome Taylor 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 3, writes 
that the Didascalicon may be studied from the standpoint of 
the relationship it establishes between the arts and Scrip­
tural exegesis. 
220 This metaphor is found in Hugh of St. Victor, De Sac­
ramentis I. x. 2 and I. vi. 12-15 (PL. CLXXVI, 329C-330A and 
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expresses the same idea in a more straightforward fashion 
in the Didascalicon; 
For the mind, stupified by bodily sensations and enticed 
out of itself by sensuous forms, has forgotten what it 
was, and, because it does not remember that it was any­
thing different, believes that it is nothing except what 
is seen. But we are restored through instruction: so 
that we may recognize our nature and learn not to seek 
outside ourselves what we can find within.127 
The defective state of man's nature can be corrected "by 
active effort" in philosophy and the arts, whose purpose is 
"to restore within us the Divine likeness, a likeness which 
128 
to us is a form, but to God is his nature." 
For the Middle Ages, of course, the arts do not include 
except in a peripheral way, imaginative literature as we 
define it today. The arts for Hugh are all included under 
the general heading of philosophy. Philosophy itself is 
divided into the theoretical, the practical, and the mechan­
ical; the theoretical is divided into theology, physics 
and mathematics (which is itself split into arithmetic, music, 
geometry, and astronomy). The practical is divided into sol­
itary, private, and public; the mechanical into fabric mak­
ing, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and 
theatrics. Hugh offers us his reason for the omission of 
what he calls "the appendages of the arts"— 
270C-272C, pp. 167; 102-104). See Taylor p. 14 and p. 177 
for other references. 
127 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalion, p. 47. 
128 
Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 52. 
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all the songs of the poets—tragedies, comedies, satires, 
heroic verse and lyric iambics, certain didactic poems, 
fables and histories, and also the writings of those 
fellows whom today we commonly call 'philosophers:1 
Occasionally, it is true, they touch in a scattered and 
confused fashion upon some topics lifted out of the arts, 
or, if their narrative presentation is simple, they 
prepare the way for philosophy....who willingly deserts 
truth in order to entangle himself in these mere by­
products of the arts will find, I shall not say infinite, 
but exceedingly great pains and meagre fruit. 
Here we see traces of a Platonic animosity toward all that is 
not openly philosophical. Hugh's idea is to perfect the eyes 
of reason and contemplation through an exercise of the prac­
tical and theoretical arts and to exercise prudence or 
130 
knowledge by means of the remaining arts. Imaginative 
literature, diffuse as it is, and weighed down with a multi­
tude of colors and forms is considered by Hugh much less 
valuable for the task of beginning the ascent which will 
bring man back into the realm of the eternal verities. For 
Hugh, the first stage in the process is study, and it is for 
this reason that the Didascalicon was written. 
The idea of an ascent to the Divine Mind and of the moral 
effort required for it—indeed, the whole notion of the arts 
as an integral part of that ascent, ("increments," as Taylor 
131 
has it, "of a growing divine likeness in man")— is a 
conception which is contrary to orthodox doctrine and one 
129 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 88. 
130 See Taylor, p. 15. 
131 Taylor, p. 30. 
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which forms a clear contrast with Augustine1s approach to the 
matter. For him, the arts were not indispensable to salva­
tion. The arts could sharpen man's perceptions and widen 
his cultural horizons, but they are not necessary to a know­
ledge of saving grace. In his later years, Augustine even 
retracted some of his early writings which in his eyes put 
too much stress on the liberal arts: 
In these books, I am displeased...because I attributed 
a great deal to the liberal arts, of which many saintly 
men are much in ignorance, and with which many who are 
not saintly are thoroughly conversant. (De Ordine, 
I. viii)132 
For Augustine, knowledge is not defined in terms of know­
ing the arts, but in terms of the exercise of Charity. The 
arts are always subsidiary to the pursuit of that goal, 
reached only through the redeeming love of Christ. As 
Taylor puts it, while Hugh puts all the arts under philos­
ophy and enjoins their pursuit, Augustine "interprets his 
analysis of the pagan arts in terms of what a Christian 
133 
intellectual may not improperly acquire." 
However, both Hugh and Augustine agree that the secular 
arts can be useful for Scriptural exegesis, and that the 
Scriptures could be rendered more intelligible through them. 
There are other affinities between Hugh and the orthodox 
tradition as well. First, Hugh's understanding of the 
World-Soul or Nature shows the influence of orthodox 
132 
St. Augustine, De Ordine, PL XXXII, 987-988. 
J 33 Taylor, p. 31. 
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theology,, For him, God, not Nature or "Nous," is the dis­
tributor and governor of the arts and Jesus Christ, "in whom 
134 
all things cohere," is the central figure of his cosmology. 
The influence of orthodoxy is seen most clearly, however, in 
Hugh's approach to allegorical exegesis. Hugh's perspective 
on allegory has something of the sensible balance we found in 
Bede: 
In the divine utterances are placed certain things which 
are intended to be understood spiritually only, certain 
things that emphasize the importance of moral conduct, 
and certain things said according to the simple sense of 
history. And yet, there are some things which can be 
suitably expounded not only historically, but allegori-
cally and tropologically as well.135 
A few paragraphs later, Hugh begins an interesting discussion 
of the significance of words and the added significance of 
things in Holy Scripture which is not only reminiscent of Bede, 
but looks ahead to Dante: 
It ought to be known that in the divine utterance, not 
only words but even things have a meaning—a way of com­
municating not usually found to such an extent in others1 
writings. The philosopher knows only the significance of 
words, but the significance of things is far more excel­
lent than that of words, because the latter was estab -
lished by usage, but Nature dictated the former. The 
latter is the voice of men, the former is the voice 
of God speaking to men. The latter, once uttered, per­
ishes: the former, once created, subsists. The unsub­
stantial word is the sign of man's perceptions; the thing 
is a resemblance of the Divine Idea.136 
Only at the end of this passage does Hugh fall once again 
134 Taylor, p. 29. 
135 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p.' 121. 
J. 36 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 121. 
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into one of the Platonic conceptions which betrays the clas­
sical side of his basic orientation. 
Following his recognition of the "allegory of the theo­
logians" in Holy Scripture, Hugh goes on to insist on the 
necessity of preservation of the historical level of the text. 
In Book VI of the Dldascalicon he reviews the order of alle­
gorical interpretation and requires that a solid knowledge 
of history comes before the allegorical and tropological 
senses: "Nor do I think that you will become perfectly sen-
137 
sitive to allegory until you are grounded in history." 
Later he refers to history as "the foundation and principle 
of sacred learning" and even includes an amusing warning 
against certain "philosophers" who show a propensity for 
jumping up into an allegorical stratosphere without consult­
ing the historical level of a given text: 
I know that there are certain fellows who want to play 
the philosopher right away. They say that stories 
should be left to pseudo-apostles. The knowledge of 
these fellows is like that of an ass. Don't imitate 
persons of this kind.-L38 
Despite the strong emphasis on the historical level of the 
text, however, Hugh draws back a degree from the sacramental 
integration of the historical and allegorical levels which 
we find in Dante. His conception of the aim and purpose of 
Scriptural exegesis, for example, is couched in very Platonic 
terms: 
137 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 135. 
138 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 135. 
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The idea in the mind is the internal word, which is 
shown forth by the sound of the voice, that is by the 
external word. And the Divine Wisdom, which the 
Father hath uttered out of his heart, invisible in 
Itself, is recognized through creatures and in them. 
From this is most surely gathered how profound is the 
understanding to be sought in the Sacred Writings, in 
which we come through the word to a concept, through 
the concept to a thing, through the thing to its Idea, 
and through its Idea arrive at the truth.139 
Still, Hugh's basic orientation seems to be far within 
the orthodox mainstream. Both his doctrinal stance and his 
attitude toward the literal level of the text reveal a 
respect for history which even surpasses the growing aware­
ness of history evinced by John of Salisbury. We were able 
to test John's new awareness of the historical level of the 
text against his practical approach to characterization in 
the Policraticus. In the example I have chosen, John showed a 
handy grasp of the allegorical method of "allegory of the 
poets," or personification-allegory, as we have defined it 
in this study. This does not prove that he had no awareness 
of the kind of realistic characterization allowed by his doc­
trinal stance on free will and by his new attention to the 
historical level of the text, but his silence on this very 
issue may suggest that he either was not fully aware of the 
practical literary implications of his approach to exegesis, 
or that his exegetical principles were not fully integrated 
into his literary practice. Hugh's Didascalicon is a polemi­
cal work which unfortunately contains no direct theoretical 
139 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, p. 121. 
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statements on characterization and no examples which might 
help to test the generalizations I make here. From a study 
of his general approach to allegorical exegesis, however, and 
from John's example, we can probably say that though Hugh 
moves close to a respect for the historical level of the 
text, his basically hostile attitude toward imaginative lit­
erature and his ultimately didactic emphasis on the spiritual 
senses of the Biblical text would lead to the conclusion that 
in the Didascalicon we do not find an environment any more 
conducive to the creation of a historically realistic lit­
erary character than we find in John of Salisbury. 
Thus the great literary theorists from Augustine to 
Hugh demonstrate the growing influence of the classical tra­
dition on their view of literature and the difficulty inherent 
in integrating the two approaches to figurative expression 
we have distinguished in this study. Alain appears to be 
the most classical of the group in his unwillingness to 
accept even a historical retelling of the Scriptural nar­
rative. Regarding the Fall of Man and the crucifixion as 
subjects too debased and common for communication to the 
masses, he creates an allegorical fantasy which in its doc­
trinal content represents the orthodox position, but in lit­
erary form is made palatable to more classical tastes. John, 
although his doctrinal stance is solidly orthodox, and though 
his approach to allegorical exegesis shows the orthodox 
attention to the literal-historical level of the text, yet 
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separates his approach to Scripture from his literary approach 
to characterization. What evidence we have suggests, once 
again, that his approach to characterization is one of per-
sonification-allegory, or "allegory of the poets." In Hugh 
of St. Victor, we find much the same situation—a strong 
respect for the historical level of the text of Holy Scrip­
ture and no demonstration of an integration of that approach 
into his view of imaginative literature. 
The Medieval Ars Poetriae 
Toward the end of the 12th century, the results of the 
cultural reawakening generally associated with that century 
were beginning to appear in the literary theory of the period. 
Whereas most of the literary theory in existence before the 
12th-century renaissance must be culled laboriously out of 
the philosophical and didactic material in which it is sub­
merged, from the twelfth csitury on it became increasingly com­
mon for medieval rhetoricians to treat literary matters in a 
more self-conscious and explicitly technical fashion. Roger 
P. Parr sees the new emphasis on technical virtuosity as a 
result of two basic developments in the history of rhetorical 
theory: first, the breakdown of the Aristotelian tradition 
(involving the Rhetorica, the Topica, and the De Poetica) 
which resulted in the loss of what Parr refers to as "the 
philosophical view of literature," and second, the revival 
of Sophistic Rhetoric with its emphasis on colorful brilliance 
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140 
and form over intensity of subject matter. Parr sees both 
of these factors as a result of the gradual relaxation of 
church discipline over the ascending forces of secular 
humanism. While the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition (involv­
ing the De Inventione, the De Oratore and the Pseudo-Ciceronian 
Ad Herennium) makes some effort to preserve a classical bal­
ance between form and content in its approach to poetry, the 
grammatical tradition (Donatus and Priscian) makes little 
attempt to preserve the philosophical orientation which 
marks the older classics. As C. S. Baldwin has noted, poetry 
began to mean much more the study of style, and specifically 
the study of stylistic decoration. As a result, the new 
"Poetriae" of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries drew heavily 
on the technical aspects of the classical tradition for their 
141 
approach to poetry. Throughout this study, I have drawn 
a contrast between the Greek-Platonic and Christian perspec­
tives on reality and have noted the conflict between them which 
often manifests itself in the lack of integration between 
doctrinal content and literary theory in the medieval period. 
In the poetic manuals of the later twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries we find the same conflict and lack of integration. 
It can be demonstrated that all of the figures associated 
with the poetic manuals of the twelfth and thirteenth 
140 See Roger P. Parr, "Introduction" to Geoffrey of 
Vinsauf, Documentum de Modo et Arte Dictandi et Versificandi, 
trans. Roger P. Parr (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1968), p. 10. Hereafter referred to as Documentum. 
141 . , C. S. Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: 
The MacMillan Co., 1928), p. 195. 
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centuries—Matthew of Vendome (Ars Versificatoria—c. 1176), 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf (Poetria Nova—between 1208-1213), John 
of Garland (Poetria: Exempla vitae honesta—middle thirteenth 
century), Gervais de Melkley (Ars Versificatoria—c. 1216), 
and Evrard of Bethune (Laborintus—uncertain date)—demonstrate 
a strong classical orientation, although we will deal only 
142 
with Matthew and Geoffrey here. Because of the openly 
critical nature of these manuals, it will be possible to 
focus more specifically on those aspects of the theories 
which deal directly with characterization itself. 
Matthew of Vendome 
The approach to characterization taken in the Ars Ver­
sif icatoria of Matthew of Vendome contains a great many ele­
ments of classical doctrine. For Matthew, the purpose of 
characterization is to instruct in virtue, or to warn against 
143 
vice. Thus his characters have a "generalized" quality 
meant to reveal a moral ideal of some sort. Matthew states 
this explicitly at one point toward the middle of his treatise: 
Therefore those characteristics which are attributed 
to the Pope, or to Ceasar, or to various persons who 
are described should be understood not as peculiar 
142 The standard work containing the important treatxses 
on poetics in the Middle Ages in the original Latin in addi­
tion to much valuable commentary is Edmond Faral's Les Arts 
Poetigues du Xlie et du XIIIe siecle; Recherches et Docu­
ments sur la technique lite'raire du Moyen Age (Paris: H. 
Champion, 1962). In this dissertation, however, I will 
cite only translations of Faral's editions of the original 
documents. 
4̂̂ Matthew of Vendome, Ars Versificatoria, trans. 
Aubrey E. Galyon (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 
May, 1970), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Ars• 
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characteristics of those particular persons, but as 
characteristics that may apply to other persons of the 
same status or age or rank, or office, or sex.144 
Thus Matthew emphasizes the exemplary quality of his charac­
terizations, an emphasis which goes hand in hand with his 
understanding of the poet as a moral teacher of exemplary 
145 
character. Even when the person described is identified 
with his proper name, he is still to be treated only as an 
exempla. Matthew writes that proper names are "used to rep­
resent a general class of persons and not to indicate special 
146 
qualities belonging alone to those persons who are named." 
The section which follows contains a very classical check­
list of elements to take into account when creating one of 
these exemplary characters. According to Matthew, one 
should pay attention to name, nature, fortune, moral charac­
ter, goals, change in emotional status, judgment, action, 
exploits, language, course or motive, time and place. He 
stresses the necessity of classical propriety in the assign­
ment of inner and outer qualities to a character of a given 
147 
age and station, and throughout he stresses the typical 
nature of his descriptions. In his own words, the "Pope" is 
not a particular person, but the representation of "the power 
of binding and loosing:" "Caesar" is not the historical 
144 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 35. 
145 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 28. 
"'"'^Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 35. 
147 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, pp. 15-16. 
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Caesar, but his typical essence, "the desire to forge a way 
into forbidden territory and the longing for conflict which 
148 
he vowed to make his way of life." 
Matthew includes in his work a number of characteriza­
tions which bear out the classical approach to characteriza­
tion taken in his theory. A few lines taken from his exten­
ded description of the Pope in Chapter I will serve as a 
clear illustration of his orientation: 
All mankind looks to the Pope as an example 
In him honesty shines, reason is supreme, order flour­
ishes— 
Dutiful in religion and modest in voice, nourisher of 
Virtue, a provider of counsel, the best of mankind, 
He is eager to find what ought to be given, nor does he 
Change his pronouncements to please his hearers. 
His mind is suitable for a leader; his gentle temper 
Remains settled; his gracious piety flourishes in peace. 
His conversation does not smack of earthly affairs; 
Beholding God, he eschews man's sinful pursuits. 
Succoring the sorrowful, ministering to the miserable, 
Reproving the reprobate, upholding those who uphold the 
laws' 149 
He hungers and thirsts after righteousness.... 
The attention to propriety of station and behavior and the 
overwhelmingly moralistic nature of this description follows 
directly in the classical tradition of personification first 
established by the early Greek allegorists and kept alive in 
the literary theory of Alain, John and Hugh. 
Having demonstrated solid evidence of classical elements 
in Matthew's theory of characterization, what of his ostensibly 
Christian world-view? Unlike John, Alain, and Hugh of 
1 48 
Matthew of 'Vendome, Ars, p. 35. 
149 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, pp. 17-18. 
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St. Victor, Matthew's treatise contains almost no direct 
theological commentary. Instead, what little Christian 
influence we can find is usually in the form of Biblical 
metaphors, which are liberally sprinkled throughout the 
Ars: 
To continue this metaphor drawn from material things, 
no one can fashion a gay costume from odds and ends of 
old rags; just as a bit of yeast ferments the entire 
mixture, so it is in verses. (Italics mine)-^u 
In a similar fashion, he writes only a few paragraphs later: 
Since any good principle set forth for public use ought 
to enlighten one—a hidden lamp is of no use whatever— 
this work, therefore, will indicate those forms of 
expression which add to ornamentation. (Italics mine) -,J-
And again: 
These writers (those unskilled in knowledge) are like 
an unworthy hired hand who usurps the position of the 
shepherd, or like an unworthy dependent who tries to 
unseat his patron. (Italics mine)152 
Matthew's obvious familiarity with the Bible reveals itself 
in these passages, but we note that such Biblical references 
are always used to reinforce a very classical doctrine of 
rhetoric. Similarly, Matthew's treatment of the Pope in the 
characterization just quoted includes many Biblical ideals, 
but is ultimately structured around the classical conception 
of characterization as a moral example, a pure type of 
virtue. 
150 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 67. 
151 
Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 67. 
152 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 69. 
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Perhaps the most significant argument for the disjunc­
tion we sense between Matthew's ostensible attachment to the 
Christian perspective and his own practice is the total 
absence of the Charity which illumines the Augustinian 
approach. Matthew apparently wrote the Ars in direct response 
to a detractor or detractors whom he often characterizes 
(following the precedent set by Jerome in the Against 
153 
Rufinus) as "Rufus," a cuckolded lover, the cheap slave 
of an illegitimate passion. The tone of his work as Galyon 
154 
puts it, is "often personal, obsessive, and obscene." 
It is also blatantly vengeful, and quite contrary to the 
spirit of New Testament theology: 
Let a slanderous tongue not be imputed to me, if 
only I slander a slanderer. I take comfort in Solo­
mon's words: 'Answer a fool according to his folly, 
lest you be thought like him!' Therefore having been 
injured by your attacks, I bite a biter back; oppressed, 
I would oppress; wounded, I wound; tit for tat is only 
fair....155 
The passage which follows this vengeful diatribe includes 
several indecent insults directed at the caricature of "Rufus." 
Appearing as it does only a few paragraphs from the end of 
the treatise, this passage blunts the paean to the Triune 
God which concludes the treatise on what is intended to be a 
note of high spirituality. 
153 
See St. Jerome, "Against Rufinus," in Dogmatic 
and Polemical Works, trans. John N. Hritzu (Washington: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), pp. 47-222. 
154 
Aubrey Galyon, "Introduction" to Matthew of Vendome, 
Ars, p. xxi. 
155 Matthew of Vendome, Ars, p. 131. 
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Thus Matthew's theory of characterization definitely 
presents a problem of integration which is even more severe 
than that evidenced in the theorists of the early 12th cen­
tury. Although he presents an avowedly Christian outlook, 
his real perspective can be shown to be directly in line with 
the classical tradition of characterization which we have 
traced throughout this dissertation. 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, writing approximately a quarter-
century after Matthew, is directly associated, as was his 
contemporary, with the School of Chartres through the influ­
ence of Bernard Silvestris of Tours. He was born in Normandy 
c. 1150, spent time in France and Italy, and later worked 
for Richard I. It was during this time that Geoffrey com­
pleted the Poetria Nova, his most important critical work. 
As in Matthew, Geoffrey's interest in characterization grows 
out of a larger interest in the theories of amplification 
and abbreviation, which were the major principles governing 
composition during the twelfth century. Geoffrey is the 
first Latin theorist to make what later became the traditional 
antithesis between the medieval stylistic procedures of 
amplificatio and abbreviatio, and to devote substantial por­
tions of his own poetic treatise to each. (in the Poetria 
Nova, lines 203-218 include a definition and comparison of 
the two concepts, lines 219-689 deal with amplificatio and 
156 
lines 690-736 with abbreviatio. Of the two procedures, 
156See Curtius, p. 49. 
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amplificatio, which involved the extension of a given compo­
sition by means of the proper use of rhetorical figures, was 
regarded as the more important method. Understandably 
enough, the brevitas formula, which was developed in con­
junction with the epistolary style and involved the con­
traction of prolix rhetorical matter received less attention. 
Characterization was developed primarily as a means of 
amplification, and great stress was placed on the description 
of the outward form, the seasons, and various medieval scenes. 
Perhaps the most familiar of these descriptions, and one 
directly relevant to characterization involves the typical 
medieval description of a beautiful woman, which follows a 
fixed order, beginning at the head and continuing down to 
the feet. Geoffrey gives us a typical example of this kind 
of description in the Poetria Nova: 
Let Nature's compass describe first a circle for her 
head. Let the color of gold be gilt in her hair; let 
lilies spring in the eminence of her forehead; let the 
appearance of her eyebrow be like dark blueberries; let 
a milk-white path divide those twin arches. Let strict 
rule govern the shape of the nose, and neither stop on 
this side of, nor transgress, what is fitting. Let 
the lookouts of her brow, her eyes, shine, both of them, 
either with gems1 light or with light like that of a 
star. Let her face rival the dawn, neither red nor 
bright, but at once both and neither color. Let her 
mouth gleam in a form of brief extent and, as it were, 
a semicircle; let her lips, as if pregnant, rise in a 
swell, and let them be moderately red; warm, but with a 
gentle heat. Let order compose her snowy teeth, all of 
one proportion; let the fragrance of her mouth and that 
of incense be of a like scent. And let Nature, more 
potent than art, polish her chin more highly than pol­
ished marble. Let a mild-white column be with its pre­
cious color a handmaiden to the head, a column which 
bears up the mirror of the face on high. From her 
crystal throat let a kind of radiance go forth which 
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can strike the eyes of a beholder and madden his heart. 
Let her shoulders adjust together with a certain dis­
cipline, and neither fall away as if sloping downward, 
nor stand, as it were upraised, but rather rest in 
place correctly; and let her arms be pleasing, as 
slender in their form as delightful in their length. 
Let substance soft and lean join together in her slen­
der fingers, and appearance smooth and milk white, 
lines long and straight; the beauty of the hands lies 
in these qualities. Let her breast be a picture of 
snow, bring forth either bosom as if they were, in 
effect, uncut jewels side by side. Let the circum­
ference of her waist be narrowly confined, circumscrib-
able by the small reach of a hand. I am silent about 
the parts just below; more fittingly does the imagina­
tion speak of these than the tongue. But let her leg 
for its part realize its length in slenderness; let a 
foot of excellent smallness sport in its own dainti­
ness. And thus let beauty descend from the top of the 
head to the very roots, and everything together be highly 
polished down to the very fingernail.157 
Such descriptions originated through the models supplied by 
Sidonius Apollinaris in his description of Theodoric, in 
application of the classical effictio formula, and in the 
Chartrian Platonistic idea (probably originating in Ber­
nard's De Universitate Mundi) that Nature, in creating man, 
158 
begins with the head and proceeds downward to the feet. 
These descriptions, because they follow a fixed pattern and 
deal with an idealized beauty, often became conventionalized 
to the point of triteness. Geoffrey seems to have been aware 
159 
of the problem, but his own description resembles many 
another medieval lady. 
157 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, "The New Poetics," m Three 
Medieval Rhetorical Arts, ed. James J. Murphy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971), pp. 54-55. Hereafter 
referred to as Poetria Nova. 
"^^Atkins, p. 104. 
159 "The 7th device, description, pregnant with words, 
follows that the work may swell, but though she be large, 
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Geoffrey's general description of the creation of char­
acters in the Documentum follows the same conventionalized 
approach that we generally find in medieval portraiture. 
Geoffrey emphasizes the typical aspects of characterization, 
stressing the doctrine of decorum—the suitability of each 
character to his age and station in life. Lecturing on the 
characteristics which should be assigned to boys and old men, 
Geoffrey writes: 
Likewise, if one has to speak of the person of a boy or 
an old man, Horace shows the properties of each time of 
life: and the properties of a boy by these verses: 
A boy knows how to articulate words and touch the 
ground with a firm foot, rejoices to play with 
his equals, flies into a rage and puts it aside 
as easily and is changed every hour.... 
...And he assigns the properties of an old man like 
this: 
Many troubles beset an old man either because he 
seeks something and then abstains miserably from the 
things found—fears to use them, or because he adminis­
ters everything timidly and feebly....He is difficult 
and quarrelsome, praising time past when he was a boy, 
and critical and condemning of youth.160 
Thus the section on the device of description in the Docu­
mentum reflects the same classical emphasis on typicality 
and decorum which we find in the Ars. 
let her be delightful, let her be handsome as well as big. 
Let the matter manage to marry with the words in due form. 
If she seeks to be nourishment and full refreshment for 
the mind, let not her brevity be too terse nor her conven­
tional nature too trite." Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, 
p. 53. 
"'"^Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Documentum, p. 160. 
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Another method of amplification—style—is also relevant 
to Geoffrey's conception of characterization. We have pointed 
out earlier in this study the classical tendency to separate 
styles and to associate each style with a given social level 
of character. In the Ars Poetica, Geoffrey adheres strictly 
to the classification of styles on the basis of social status. 
The high style, employed in the treatment of exalted persons 
and themes, utilizes the "difficult ornaments" (ornatus dif-
ficilis); the middle and low styles, which deal with less 
exalted material and commonplace persons, utilize the "easy 
ornaments" (ornatus facilis). In the Documentum de modo et 
arte dictandi et versificandi, Geoffrey's prose treatise on 
poetics, he makes the association which we describe here and 
gives examples from Virgil: 
Therefore there are three styles; low, middle and 
grand. And the styles receive such nomenclature by 
reason of the person or things about which the treat­
ment is made. For when persons or things are treated, 
the style is low; when we speak of intermediate persons 
or things the style is middle. Virgil employes all 
three; low in the Bucolics, middle in his Georqics and 
grand in the Aeneid. -Lbl 
The classification of the three styles imitates the classical 
categories. In Geoffrey we find none of the Christian goals 
which mark Augustine's treatment of the same classifications. 
Matthew's understanding of classical decorum may be said to 
keep well within the classical tradition. 
In his treatment of comedy Geoffrey also adheres to the 
classical understanding. Although less wary of satire than 
"^"^Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Documentum, p. 88. 
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162 
Matthew, Geoffrey is amenable to the introduction of comic 
figures into literature—even into his own literature—but, 
as in the older classicists, only comedy which includes a 
moral point is allowed. This is borne out in Geoffrey's own 
example for the rhetorical figure "notatio" in the New Poetics. 
Introducing this section, Geoffrey asks, "Do you know about 
the character of the sluggish man?" and follows with a descrip­
tion, including comic dialogue, of the typical actions of a 
sluggard being awakened by a friend in the morning. The lazy 
man makes excuses, pretends to hunt for his clothes ("moving 
with the speed of a turtle") and tries to cover up the fact 
163 
that he is stalling. For Geoffrey, this comic characteri­
zation becomes the occasion for a moral comment to his aud­
ience : 
We are of this man's likeness when we are called to 
the true joys. Captivated by various delights, either 
we stop up the ears of our heart, or if the ear be open, 
we always delay to come to those joys. If finally we 
come, perchance dragged by force, we move with the slow 
motion of the tortoise.164 
Here Geoffrey follows in the classical tradition of allowance 
for "moral" comedy which we saw even in Plato. In the Docu-
mentum, Geoffrey includes a classical warning against the 
danger of excess when dealing with the low or comic style: 
2^02 "If you wish to inveigh against foolish people, attack 
in this way; praise, but facetiously, accuse, but bear your­
self good-humoredly and in all ways becomingly: let your 
gesture more than your words nip the ones mocked." Geoffrey 
of Vinsauf, Documentum, p. 49. 
n r U 
Geoffrey, Poetria Nova, pp. 82-83. 
164 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, p. 83. 
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"If you use the low style be not dull and bloodless, that, 
be not contemptible because of exceeding levity and baseness 
165 
of words." 
There are other strong signs of classical doctrine in 
Geoffrey's general understanding of the poetic task, although, 
as we pointed out earlier, some of these doctrines have 
reached a stage of decadence. Geoffrey's constant reitera­
tion of the doctrine of classical decorum, for example, is 
often undercut by his own tendency to over-emphasize rhetor­
ical virtuosity. Still, the classical treatment of charac­
terization, though couched in terms of the medieval theory of 
amplification, retains a strong classical flavor, emphasizing 
conventional descriptions, social stratification according 
to style, classical decorum, and moral didacticism. 
At this point, we again ask the question, what Christian 
elements enter into Geoffrey's work and can they be said to 
affect his theory of characterization in any way? Geoffrey, 
unlike Matthew, includes a large amount of Christian doctrine 
in his theory of characterization, most of it in the form of 
examples used to illustrate his essentially classical approach. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the disjunction between Geoff­
rey's actual method and his doctrinal content is found about 
midway through the Poetria Nova. Writing about the use of 
"light" figures (figures whose "ornamental effect derives 
from the polished selection and positioning of words in 
165 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Documenturn, p. 91. 
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their literal senses), and of "heavy" figures (those figures 
166 
which are not used in their ordinary meanings, Geoffrey 
launches into a theological statement which comprises impor­
tant aspects of Biblical doctrine from the Fall of Man to the 
Resurrection. This illustration even contains a specific 
and very orthodox reference to the Incarnation, which we have 
shown earlier to be basic to the concept of Christian sacra­
mental symbolism: 
Serpent of ill will and enemy of our race, why did you 
damn Christ to the cross? Did he deserve it? But he 
was void of all sin. Did you think his body an illu­
sion? But he took flesh from the Virgin. Did you 
think him to be all man? But he proved himself to be 
a God in virtue, by which merit he earned the right to 
damn you....For this reason God came to dwell among 
us in true flesh; he could not be disgraced by the 
stain of our flesh, and ultimately he washed us with 
his blood.167 
Not only do we have an explicit reference to the Incarnation 
in this example, but Christ himself is pictured in a very 
orthodox fashion. Geoffrey is true to the Biblical spirit 
in other ways as well. Unlike Alain, he offers a straight­
forward presentation of the humiliation and suffering involved 
in the crucifixion or from an explicit retelling of the 
168 
story of the Fall. 
And yet, while these portions of Geoffrey's work indi­
cate that he has the kind of theological understanding of the 
Incarnation and bodily resurrection to facilitate a sacramental 
166 See Murphy1s note to Poetria Nova in Three Medieval 
Rhetorical Arts, p. 77. 
161 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, p. 75. 
"^®Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, pp. 83-85. 
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understanding of characterization, such references do not 
seem to affect his basic approach to figurative expression 
in any substantial way. His references to "figure" are still 
couched in the same Platonic terms that we have seen in 
Alain, Hugh and John. In Geoffrey's case, the vocabulary 
seems even more indicative of the split between meaning and 
form than the language of Hugh and John: 
Whenever your meaning comes clothed in apparel of 
this sort [referring to the colors'], the sound of the 
words is sweet to the happy ear, and it soothes the 
inner mind with an unexpected delight.169 
Later Geoffrey explains the added weight and seriousness 
which accrues to a given figure when it "covers itself, as 
170 
it were, with a cloud." In addition, Geoffrey's under­
standing of figural expression follows the classical tradi­
tion in the distinction he makes between the "lightness" of 
a word taken only on the literal level, and the "serious" 
171 
nature of a word which has an inner meaning. It is sig­
nificant, too, that Geoffrey's definition of allegory ("the 
figure of speech by which one thing is denoted by the letter 
172 
of the word and another by its meaning") follows the basic 
pattern of the "allegory of the poets:" he shows no awareness 
of the typological method or of the "allegory of the 
169 Geoffrey of Vxnsauf, Poetrxa Nova, p. 67. 
170 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, p. 71. 
171 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, p. 77. 
172 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, p. 64. 
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theologians" which we have shown to be associated with that 
attention to the historical level of the text which may-
result in a more historically realistic portraiture. 
Thus Geoffrey's approach to figurative expression cannot 
be said to constitute the aesthetic soil necessary for the 
production of a historically realistic character. Geoffrey's 
work is moralistic and didactic. In traditionally classical 
fashion, his literary theory emphasizes the conventional, 
typical aspects of characterization over any concern for 
individualizing detail. In fact, the whole orientation of 
Geoffrey's work, as both Atkins and Baldwin have pointed out, 
tends to de-emphasize the substantive content of literature 
in general and to accent instead the formal ornamentation 
which has become the most noted characteristic of the poetic 
manuals. 
Throughout, the thesis of this dissertation has been 
that the Christian perspective on man offers the philosophical 
background necessary for the presentation of a literary char­
acter which possesses a sense of historical reality. Con­
versely, the Greek-Platonic perspective on reality has been 
shown to foster a universalized or typicalized character. 
In dealing with Alain, Hugh, John of Salisbury, Matthew of 
Vendome, and Goeffrey of Vinsauf, we have demonstrated the 
degrees of conflict between the Christian and classical per­
spectives on reality and the resulting effect of that con­
flict on the medieval theorist's approach to figural expres­
sion. In most cases, the theorist's attitude toward history, 
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and more particularly, toward the historical level of the 
narrative as that attitude reveals itself in his general 
philosophical orientation, his exegesis of Scripture and 
poetry and his understanding of comedy, can be demonstrated 
to be directly relevant to the creation of either a histori­
cally realistic or a highly typicalized literary character. 
With each of the theorists I have attempted to demon­
strate how a greater or lesser adherence to the orthodox 
Christian world-view or to the Classical viewpoint affect 
their approach to characterization. In some cases there is 
an attachment to the orthodox perspective in word which is 
not matched in actual fact. That is, many of the theorists 
with which I have dealt have an ostensible attachment to the 
main tenets of Christian doctrine, including the bodily Incar­
nation and Resurrection, which is not fully integrated into 
either their literary theory or practice. Thus respect for 
the Platonic ideals often overshadows a verbal attachment to 
Christianity and results in disparagement of or inattention 
to the representation of history on the literal level of the 
text, and ultimately, as far as characterization is concerned, 
in a propensity toward personification over historical realism 
in characterization. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CLASSICAL AND CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES ON THE 
LITERARY THEORY OF DANTE AND BOCCACCIO 
Following the Ars Poetriae of the 12th and 13th centur­
ies , the aesthetic treatises of early fourteenth-century 
Italy are those closest in order to Chaucer and most immed­
iately relevant to his literary artistry. Though Dante and 
Boccaccio have long been regarded a serious influence on 
Chaucer's portraiture by producing the literary models which 
1 
serve as his sources, it is more rare to find critics who 
deal with these two Italian masters in terms of the theo­
retical influence—indirect, but significant—which comes 
down to us in Boccaccio's De Genealoqia Deorum, and in the 
literary theory which can be collected from Dante's De Vul-
qaria Eloquentia, the De Monarchia, and the "Letter to Can 
Grande." In addition, there is some material which can be 
gleaned from scattered commentary in the poetic works them-
2 
selves. 
See "Chaucer and Dante," Howard Schless in Critical 
Approaches to Medieval Literature: Selected Papers from 
the English Institute, 1958-59, ed. Dorothy Bethurum (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 134-154; 
169-71; J. A. W. Bennett, "Chaucer, Dante, and Boccaccio," 
Medium Aevum 22 (1953), pp. 114-15; John L. Lowes, "Chaucer 
and Dante," MP 14 (1916-17), 705-735; Robert A. Pratt, "Chau­
cer and Boccaccio," TLS (Feb. 28, 1935), p. 124; "Chaucer's 
Use of the Teseida," PMLA 62 (September, 1947), 598-621; 
and J. S. P. Tatlock, "Ghaucer and Dante," MP 3 (January, 
1906), 307-372 , among others. 
2 J. L. Lowes, for example, comments on Chaucer's use of 
the De Vulgaria Eloquentia on Troilus and Criseyde in "Chau­
cer and Dante," MP 14 (April, 1917), 706-707; Paul G. Ruggiers 
in "The Italian Influence on Chaucer," in Companion to Chaucer. 
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Even among these critics it is rare to find those who 
comment specifically on the influence of certain aesthetic 
emphases in the theoretical writings of both Dante and 
Boccaccio which may bear significantly on Chaucer's charac­
terization in Troilus and Criseyde. My task here will be to 
analyze these treatises for purposes of discerning some of 
those philosophical and aesthetic elements which in the 
first three chapters of this dissertation we have demonstrated 
to be relevant to the process of characterization. In so 
doing, my purpose is not to undermine or detract in any way 
from those critics who find the main source of Chaucerian 
characterization in the poetic models which his Italian sour­
ces supply, but only to add the philosophical and aesthetic 
perspectives on characterization which may be gained from a 
close analysis of the theoretical writings of the authors 
in question. Such an analysis should, in light of the com­
parison followed throughout this dissertation, result in a 
more informed evaluation of the perspectives on characteriza­
tion represented by each of these theoreticians, and thus, a 
better view of their overall effect on Chaucerian characteri­
zation. 
Studies, ed. Beryl Rowland (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), pp. 139-161, comments on Boccaccio's connec­
tion in De Genealoqia Deorum with Chaucer's view of comic 
realism, and T. R. Lounsbury, Studies in Chaucer, 2 vols. 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1892), 11:229, also refers, 
although much more generally, to the indirect influence of 
this same work on Chaucer. 
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Dante 
We would expect the Catholic Dante to demonstrate a 
great many elements of orthodox Christian philosophy in his 
approach to literature. But as we have shown in Chapter IV, 
doctrinal elements may not be thoroughly integrated into a 
given theorist's aesthetic approach. The lack of integra­
tion appears not only in the heavily Platonized doctrine of 
the works, but in the theorist's approach to figurative 
expression as well. Thus we may profitably attempt to dis­
cern how well Dante1s openly Christian stance is integrated 
into his total outlook on literature. Following the line of 
questioning set up in the introduction to Chapter IV, we 
begin by asking: What is Dante's conception of history as 
it is revealed in his aesthetic commentary? Is there a dem­
onstrated awareness of the theme of providential control? 
3 
What is the view of salvation expressed? W. H. V. Reade 
points out that for Dante as well as for many other medieval 
writers the course of history is entirely providentialthat 
it has a purposeful beginning and is heading toward a purpose­
ful end. 
The evidence for Dante's own providential vision of 
history as it appears in his aesthetic commentary can be 
better seen against the backdrop supplied by some of his other 
works. Such evidence, of course, is most obvious in the plan 
of the Divine Comedy itself, where providential control is 
3 W. H. V. Reade, Dante's Vision of History, Annual 
Italian Lecture (June 14, 1939), p. 4. 
357 
always placed above the rule of Fortune. In the Inferno, 
for example, Virgil explains to Dante that Fortune has been 
ordained to oversee the distribution of wealth "from one to 
another family/ beyond the intervention of human intelligence" 
4 
(Inf. 11. 61-96). In Dante's less ambitious prose treatise, 
the De Monarchia, the figures of Roman history—Augustus and 
Tiberius—are seen as agents of God who are actually respon-
5 
sible for setting the universal scene for redemption. 
In addition to the notion of providential control which 
appears in this passage from the De Monarchia, Dante's uni­
versal conception of the interaction of sacred and secular 
history is also evident. Roman and Christian history together 
is seen as of one piece—Augustus Ceasar is as much the agent 
of God as any Biblical figure: 
That men were then blessed with the tranquillity of 
universal peace all historians testify, and all illus­
trious poets; this the writer of the gentleness of 
Christ felt it meet to confirm, and last of all Paul, 
who called that most happy condition, 'the fulness of 
time.'6 
7 
Robert Hollander points out that the amalgamation of sacred 
and secular history is a characteristic of both Dante and St. 
Augustine. Neither, he contends, make any distinction 
4 Dante, The Divxne Comedy, trans. H. R. Huse (San Fran­
cisco: Rinehart Press, 1954), pp. 38-39. 
5 
Dante, De Monarchia, trans. Aurelia Henry (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1904), pp. 59-63. 
^Dante, De Monarchia, p. 59. 
7 Robert Hollander, Allegory in the Divine Comedy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 99-103. 
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between Roman and Biblical history. In the De Civitate Dei, 
8 
Book XVIII, for example, Augustine combines what he takes as 
the literal history of the Aeneid with Biblical history. 
Dante follows suit in the Divine Comedy, where he uses inci­
dents from The Aeneid, I, 11. 157-386, as the basis of the 
9 
action in the Inferno I and II. Hollander points out the 
parallelism in five major incidents: (1) the early metaphor­
ical description of Dante's swim through perilous waters 
(Inferno I, 11. 22-27) and the description of a near shipwreck 
in Aeneid I, 173-181; (2) Aeneas' encounter with the three 
beasts of Aeneid I, 184-85 and Dante's parallel encounter in 
Inferno I, 26-60; (3) Venus' appearance before Aeneas in 
Aeneid I: 327 f. and Virgil's appearance before Dante in 
Inferno I, 60f.; (4) Aeneas' description of himself as a pil­
grim with Dante's pilgrim status in Inferno I, 29; (5) Venus' 
appeal to Jupiter, Aeneid I, 228, with Beatrice's visit to 
limbo in Inferno II, 116. Throughout the poem the two great 
histories—Roman and Biblical—are interwoven so closely as 
to form one universal conception. Hollander concludes: 
"As the greatest medieval poet, he gave, as has so often been 
said, one thousand years of human history their fullest single 
10 
expression." H. F. Dunbar also writes that Dante does not 
g 
Augustine, The City of God, in The Writings of St. 
Augustine, trans. Gerald G. Walsh and Grace Monahan, 18 vols. 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1953), 
VIII:83-182. 
^Hollander, pp. 92-93. 
"^Hollander, p. 194. 
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limit the divine message of history to Old and New Testaments, 
but teaches that Roman history, both Pre-Christian and Chris­
tian, forms part of the divine drama. 
In Dante's aesthetic theory, this particular aspect of 
his view of history is revealed openly at only one obvious 
place in the Convivio, where in IV, 5, 16-54, Dante synchro­
nizes the birth of David with the foundation of Rome: 
All in all, this, the birth of David and the birth of 
Rome, happened at the same juncture, namely at the 
coming of Aeneas from Troy into Italy, which was the 
origin of the most renowned city of Rome, as the records 
testify. 
In the'Letter to Can Grande" Dante1s understanding of the unity 
of all history can be observed in his opening greeting to 
Can Grande, where Dante puts Biblical, classical, and present 
truth on the same level in a series of metaphors describing 
his pilgrimage to Verona: 
But that a long uncertainty might not keep me in too 
great suspense, as the Queen of the East sought Jerus­
alem, as Pallas sought Helicon, so sought I Verona to 
examine with faithful eyes the things I had heard.^ 
In Dante's eyes, history both Roman and Christian is viewed 
as a single reality and as contributing to the providential 
plan revealed and established for all time in the Holy 
Scripture. 
Dante, Convivio, trans. William Walrond Jackson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 206; W. H. V. Reade 
points out the quote, Reade, p. 13. 
12 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande della Scala," in A Trans­
lation of Dante's Eleven Letters, trans. Charles Sterrett 
Latham, ed. George R. Carpenter (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1891), pp. 187-88. 
360 
That plan of history needs little review here—except 
to point out once again that it revolves around the central 
event of the Incarnation—on Christ's claims to be the ful­
fillment of Jewish Messianic prophecy from the beginnings of 
time, on his past and present role as Redeemer, and on his 
promise to come again at the end of time. As we have seen 
earlier, the emphasis placed on prophetic fulfillment in Chris­
tianity gives rise to a conception of history in which all 
events are seen in light of God's Word to man in Christ. A 
Christian writer like Dante interprets all history in terms 
of what has been objectively revealed to him in the person 
and actions of Christ as they are recorded in Holy Writ. 
All historical event is seen as a prophetic outworking, in 
the past, present, and future, of God's plan of salvation. 
No critic has depicted this "figural" view of history and its 
contrast with the modern view more clearly than Auerbach: 
We are apt to consider the events of history and the 
happenings of every-day life as a continuous develop­
ment in chronological succession. The figurative inter­
pretation combines two events causally and chronologically 
remote from each other by attributing to them a meaning 
common to both. Instead of a continuous development, 
the direction and ultimate result of which is known to 
us, the figurative interpreter purports to know the 
significance and ultimate result of human history, 
because this has been revealed to mankind; in this 
theory, the meaning of history is the fall and redemp­
tion of man, the Last Judgment, and the eternal Kingdom 
of God. We, on the other hand, are able to explain to 
a certain extent every single historical fact by its 
immediate causes and to foresee to a certain extent its 
immediate consequences, moving, so to speak, on a hori­
zontal plane; with the figurative approach, on the con­
trary, in order to explain the significance of a single 
historical event, the interpreter had to make recourse 
to a vertical projection of this event on the plane of 
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providential design, by which the event is revealed 
as a prefiguration or fulfillment, or perhaps as an 
imitation of other events.13 
It is the view of history described here on which Dante con­
structs the Divine Comedy. The whole meaning of his greatest 
work, in fact, cannot be unlocked without the realization 
that Dante's method is to imitate God's plan of redemption 
as he sees it revealed in the created universe, in the word 
of Scripture and in the Person of Christ. Francis Ferguson 
puts it exactly: 
When Dante writes at the beginning of the Purgatorio, 
'ma qui la morta poesi risurgi,' he might have added 
an invocation of history also, for he intended the poem 
to represent the truth of history. 
This connection between the Biblical view of history 
and Dante's historical vision, if it is not directly avowed 
in Dante's"Letter to Can Grande," still thoroughly informs 
the aesthetic commentary in it. It is significant, for 
example, that in describing the meaning and aesthetic method 
of his Comedy, Dante uses a Biblical metaphor to illustrate 
his point: 
That this method of expounding may be more clearly 
set forth, we can consider it in these lines; 'When Israel 
went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of 
strange language; Judah was his sanctuary and Israel his 
dominion. For if we consider the letter alone, the de­
parture of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time 
of Moses is signified; if the allegory, our redemption 
13 
Eric Auerbach, Typological Symbolism in Medieval Lit­
erature , Yale French Studies, No. 9 (Yale University Press, 
1952), p. 5. 
14 Francis Fergusson, Dante's Drama of the Mind: A 
Modern Reading of the Purgatorio (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1953), p. 126. 
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accomplished in Christ is signified; if the moral mean­
ing, the conversion of the soul from the sorrow and 
misery of sin to a state of grace is signified; if the 
anagogical, the departure of the sanctified soul from 
the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of ever­
lasting glory is signified.-^ 
What is first apparent in this passage is the depth of the 
vision of figural history contained in it. Dante chooses 
perhaps the most important event of Old Testament history as 
his literal text—the story of the Exodus, and then goes on 
to connect it immediately with Christ-event of the New. In 
the last two senses, what Dante refers to as the moral and 
anagogical meanings, the objective history of the literal 
level, is brought into the realm of individual experience. 
Implicit in this movement from the objective historical text 
to the subjective experience of the believer is Dante's con­
viction that Christian history is not only important as 
objective truth, but as personally experienced fact. An 
event in the history of the Jewish nation and its prophetic 
heralding of Christ's redeeming act becomes the external 
foundation for the inner history of the individual believer. 
Thus we see in this passage Dante1s grasp both of the prov­
ident ial plan of god and his understanding of its effect on 
the individual soul. On the basis of this passage alone, 
notwithstanding the clear balance between objective revela­
tion and personal enlightenment which we see in many episodes 
in the Divine Comedy (the Statius episode is perhaps the most 
"^Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," pp. 193-194. 
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complete example in the Divine Comedy), we can see that Dante 
uses the Biblical understanding of history as the basis for 
his own aesthetic. 
Dante's explanation of the opening invocation of his 
Comedy toward the middle of the Can Grande letter brings this 
home in a particularly interesting way. He first makes a 
distinction between an exordium (or introduction) composed 
by poets and those composed by rhetoricians. Rhetoricians, 
he writes, write introductions in order to prepare the minds 
of their listeners for what is to come, but they also 
"pronounce something of an invocation." Dante goes on to 
draw out the form of the rhetorical aspect of the introduc­
tion, relying heavily on "Tullius1 New Rhetoric," (or Cicero's 
De Inventione) for the three preparatory aims of an introduc­
tion, by which "an auditor should be rendered well-disposed, 
attentive, and docile." And yet, he gives the three aims a 
specifically Biblical and very personal character. Describ­
ing his technique in terms of Cicero's three divisions, Dante 
writes that he brings the reader to a "benevolent" or "well-
disposed" state by alluding to "those things which are espe­
cially alluring to human desires, namely, the joys of Para­
dise." He excites them to a state of attention through men­
tion of the "marvellous character" of what follows "namely, 
the nature of the Kingdom of heaven;" and he brings them to 
"docility," or an awareness of the possibilities either for 
"remembering" the state of personal enlightenment which 
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initiated his own vision, or for having an experience of the 
Kingdom of Heaven like to his own and for then "remembering" 
or retaining part of what they would see, "for if he, [that 
16 
is, if Dante has itJ others also would have the power." 
The purpose of Dante's invocation in his own words is thus 
to move the reader to an experience of the Kingdom of God, 
that is, to experience in a mystical sense, a measure of the 
"first heaven," or of the "divine light" which presages the 
presence of God. This condition he goes on to define in 
terms of mystical experiences recorded by apostles and 
prophets and the Fathers of the Church—experiences which 
the memory finds it almost impossible to retain for later 
communication: 
For the comprehension of these things it must be under­
stood, that when the human intellect is exalted in this 
life, on account of the natural relation and affinity 
that it hath to the separate intellectual substance, 
it is exalted to such a degree that after return the 
memory waxeth feeble because it hath transcended human 
bounds. 
It is interesting that despite what looks like some very 
Platonic language in this description, only specifically 
Biblical examples follow, i.e., the experience recorded by 
Paul in II Cor. 12:3 and 4 
And I know a man in Christ above 14 years ago 
(whether in the body or out of the body, I know 
not; God knoweth), that he was caught up into 
Paradise and heard secret words, which it is not 
granted for man to utter. 
"^Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 202. 
17 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," pp. 211-12. 
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and by Matthew (Matt, 17:6 and 7), Ezekiel (Ezekiel 1:28), 
Daniel (Daniel 11:3), and by various Fathers of the Church. 
Thus Dante immediately gives a Biblical content to what 
could be misconstrued as communion with the universal 
forms. 
It is also significant that for Dante, at least, a good 
portion of the vision is deemed communicable: After this he 
saith that he will tell whatever of the Holy Realm he had the 
power to treasure in his mind, and this he saith is the sub-
18 
ject of his song." This fact in itself—that the content 
of his vision is communicable in terms of poetry—is in line 
with the orthodox insistence upon the communicable nature of 
the Biblical Revelation. It is even in line with the direct 
Biblical command to "preach deliverance to the captives and 
recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that 
are bruised" (Luke 4:18). Thus Dante's stated purpose in 
writing the Divine Comedy—"to remove those living in this 
life from a state of misery and to guide them to a state of 
happiness"—can be seen in terms of the mission given by 
Christ to the whole church. The Divine Comedy is a restate­
ment of what has already been objectively revealed in Scrip­
ture and manifested in tradition; however, it is a restate­
ment of the truth under the form of Dante's own poetic gift. 
Despite Dante's obvious awareness of his poetic vocation, his 
primary function as an artist is not to create beautiful 
18 
Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," pp. 214-15. 
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poetry, but to act as a bearer of the divine truth "which 
worketh grace in the hearer." The stated purpose of the 
Comedy reflects Dante's concern with his vocation as a Chris­
tian and as a poet—in that order. 
Thus Dante's conception of history is in line with the 
Christian interpretation of history presented in Scripture. 
We see this especially in his explanation of the four-fold 
method of interpretation which reveals an orthodox under­
standing of prophetic fulfillment and a grasp of the concept 
of individual salvation which De Wulf pointed out earlier 
in Chapter III as one of the salient features of the Chris­
tian interpretation of history. We see this same emphasis on 
an individual experience of divine grace in the statement of 
purpose which follows the interpretive passage on the meaning 
of the Comedy. 
These elements reveal Dante's strong commitment to the 
orthodox conception of history and offer a framework in which 
to consider some further aspects of the notion of individual­
ity which can be demonstrated in Dante's aesthetic commen­
tary. First we may ask—is there any evidence in Dante's 
aesthetic commentary of an emphasis on man's action in his­
torical life as important to his nature and destiny? Is 
there, in other words, any emphasis on the concept of rational 
choice or free will as it is defined in the orthodox tra­
dition? (choice for or against a commitment to Christ)? What 
is the resulting view of judgment and the afterlife? 
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We remember from the discussion of the problem of free 
will in Chapter I that Aristotle, though he rejects the Pla­
tonic notion that "no man is voluntarily wicked," yet retains 
a certain sympathy for the inherent weakness in human nature -
Though he does not wish to absolve man from responsibility, 
he still cannot ultimately explain why one man is good and 
another bad and thus his judgment of human evil is always 
tempered by his great sense of historical accident, of the 
uncontrollable forces in life which threaten to overcome man. 
Still, Aristotle's understanding of virtue as "a habit of 
choice" puts a greater emphasis on free will than we find in 
Plato, and it is not surprising that Dante often quotes the 
great classical philosopher in explaining his own conception 
of human freedom. While he makes good use of that aspect of 
Aristotelianism which points up man's rational choice, 
Dante's essentially Christian vision of free will moves sev­
eral steps beyond pure Aristotelianism. 
Dante1s idea that the soul contains within itself the 
capacity for either virtuous or evil action, and that it is 
through the habitual exercise of either one or the other 
capacity that the individual's nature and destiny develops 
is essentially Aristotelian in conception. For example, 
Dante summarizes Augustine1s and Aristotle's view of the 
matter in the Convivio; 
Both (St. Augustine and Aristotle) would have a man 
accustom himself to do right and to bridle his passions, 
in order that this scion of which we spoke may be 
strengthened by good habit and be confirmed in its 
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uprightness, so that it may be able to bear fruit, 
and from its fruit may issue the enjoyment of human 
happiness .19 
Despite the Aristotelian overtones of this passage, Dante 
earlier makes it perfectly clear that the habit of virtuous 
action does not originate solely within man or even pri­
marily as a result of willed action; but of divine grace, 
A soul may prepare itself for the working of grace by culti­
vating its good rather than its bad potential, but "the 
seed of excellence" comes from the "virtue of the mover of 
20 
heaven." 
Dante1s insistence on the action of grace as the origin 
of virtue in man comes out once again in his discussion of 
"true nobility," where it is abundantly clear that for Dante, 
aristocratic bloodlines have nothing to do with goodness: 
No one, because he is able to say, "I am of such and 
such a stock,' is entitled to believe that he is pos­
sessed of nobility, if these fruits (courage, temper­
ance, liberality, highmindedness, love of honour, good 
temper, affability, truthfulness, pleasantry, justice) 
are not in him...and none can confer this gift save God 
alone, with whom there is no respect of persons, as the 
divine Scriptures declare.21 
Thus, though Dante often uses Aristotelian language, his 
position on free will actually starts from the Christian empha­
sis on the primacy of grace in the exercise of virtue. In 
fact, Dante's whole attitude toward the problem of free will 
ultimately reminds us far more of Augustine1s treatment of 
the problem than Aristotle's, although Augustine utilizes 
19 Dante, Convivio, p. 266. 
20 Dante, Convivio, p. 261. 
21 Dante, Convivio, p. 258. 
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aspects of the Aristotelian approach. Perhaps the clearest 
example of this is Dante1s defense of the divine gift of 
free will in the Convivio: 
God imparts life to all things in His goodness, and if 
anything is made evil thereby, this is no part of the 
divine intention, but must needs come to pass through 
some accident in the progress of the designed effect. 
For if God made.the good angels and the bad, he did not 
make them both designedly, but only the good; the wick­
edness of the bad followed afterwards, apart from His 
design that God did not foreknow their wickedness. 
But so strongly was His affection set on bringing forth 
creatures endowed with spirit that His foreknowledge of 
some who must needs come to a bad end need not and should 
not have withheld God from their production.22 
This passage, aside from the Aristotelian formulation of the 
problem of evil, reminds us forcibly of Augustine's own treat-
23 
ment of the problem in "Free Choice of the Will," where he 
also argues that it is useless to imagine a perfect world in 
which the will is exercised in accordance with a right desire 
for the good. It is better, he suggests, to believe that 
this world is the best of all possible worlds than to denounce 
God for allowing the existence of evil. Boethius, as we have 
already pointed out, gives a similar answer to the problem. 
The view of free will put forth by Dante, Augustine, and 
Boethius is finally paradoxical; although man cannot be con­
verted without the grace of God, he can make motions of 
seeking toward God before the grace of God is activated. 
The latter half of this paradox is what we might call the 
22 Dante, Convivio, p. 170. 
23 St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will, in The 
Teacher, Free Choice of the Will. Grace and Free Will, 
trans. Robert P. Russell (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1968), p. 93. 
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"Aristotelian" half: the former the new Christian element. 
Free will in Dante, as in Augustine, is ultimately a matter 
of voluntary choosing to love God through the state of grace. 
The importance placed on free will in the vision of 
human freedom expressed in Dante becomes the basis for his 
view of judgment, which, though it holds some outward ves­
tiges of the classical view, yet rests securely within the 
more centrally orthodox tradition. We remember that in the 
classical view, man's free choice is de-emphasized in favor 
of his fated innate nature, which is bestowed on him even 
before life begins. When man is seen as having a fixed moral 
capacity from all time, a capacity which is in a sense bestowed 
by the gods, the idea of punishment for that fixed moral 
state is repugnant. The classical solution to this problem 
is to soften the idea of eternal judgment, creating various 
"limbos" or "purgatories" where the soul is purified until 
it loses all taint of earthly existence. 
Dante, with the medieval Church of course, retains part 
of the old classical idea in the concept of purgatory, "the 
second realm where the human spirit is cleansed and becomes 
24 
worthy to rise to heaven," (Purqatorio I, 406) ', and yet 
there is never any question about the state of the souls 
remaining in Hell. In the Inferno, Dante asks Virgil if the 
torments of the damned will increase after the great judgment 
24 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 171. 
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25 
or be "less or equally painful" (Inferno. VI, 103-105). 
Virgil replies with a scientific axiom—"that the more perfect 
a thing is, the more bliss or pain it feels," and goes on to 
suggest that since the damned will be more complete, their 
torture will be the greater for that £act. Earlier in this 
study we pointed out that the characterizations of Francesca 
and Paolo, Farinata and Cavalcanti gain much in dramatic 
intensity through our realization that they are "fixed" in 
judgment with no chance of further development. The stunted 
personalities presented to us are a reminder of the great 
choices these figures made in historical life, and serve 
merely to point up the seriousness of human freedom. There 
is no loophole for a second chance presented in these passages-
no suggestion that the figures will be released from the 
destiny in Hell which they chose in historical life. This 
philosophical stance forms a direct contrast with the Gnostic 
and early-Platonic doctrine of the "perfectibility of all" 
which we see reflected in the Alexandrine exegesis of the 
first and third centuries. 
Perhaps the most Christian statement on free will in the 
26 
Comedy is found in Purgatorio XVIII, where Virgil explains 
the role of love in choice. Defining love as an innate 
spiritual desire for the thing loved, Dante points out that 
there is no merit which can come from a decision directed by 
25 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 35. 
26 William Torrey Harris, The Spiritual Sense of Dante's 
Divine Comedy (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1896), 
p. 174, mentions the passage. 
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a love which is implanted in man from the outside. Virgil, 
the pagan philosopher, answers that only Beatrice and faith 
hold the key to this mystery, and refuses to discuss the 
matter further, except to say that "Those who have gone on 
deeply in philosophy have been aware of this innate liberty, 
and therefore have left ethics to the world" (Purqatorio 
27 
XVIII, 11. 66-68). Thus Virgil implies that a life lived 
according to love is on a higher plane than life lived 
according to an external moral system. Still, he goes on, 
the loves which can be implanted in the soul are only as 
good as the object of their affection. True free will, he 
implies, is exercised only in the choice of the best love; 
all false loves which claim our attention can and should be 
resisted: "Thus supposing that every love by necessity is 
kindled in you, the power exists in you to resist it" (Purg-
28 
atorio XVIII, 1. 68). 
Thus the view of free choice presented throughout the 
Comedy is strongly informed by the Christian vision of Divine 
Love. Like Augustine, Dante walks the paradoxical tightrope 
between God's agency and man's choice and finally resolves 
the problem by pointing his pilgrim toward the only true love, 
a love which will mold all his choices to the right end. 
Although we find no direct mention of judgment in the 
Convivio the strict orthodox view of judgment and free will 
27 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 252. 
2 8 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 252. 
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is clearly reflected in Dante's Letter to Can Grande in the 
key passage following explanation of the four levels of 
literary interpretation: 
The subject, then, of the whole work taken according 
to the letter alone, is simply a consideration of the 
state of souls after death; for from and around this 
the action of the whole work turneth. But if the work 
is considered according to its allegorical meaning, 
the subject is man, liable to reward or punishment, 
according as through the freedom of the will he is 
deserving or undeserving.^ 
The reference to eternal judgment and the importance given 
the human will in historical life is unmistakable. Dante's 
aesthetic commentary is consistent with his masterful exploi­
tation of the possibilities for human drama inherent in the 
Christian view of history as a revelation which requires 
appropriation by the individual human will. The "Letter to 
Can Grande" presents in distilled form what has been implicit 
in the Comedy and the Convivio all along—the assumption of 
a real judgment at the end of time necessitating real moral 
choice in historical life. 
We may now explore a third area of Dante's aesthetic com­
mentary: In conjunction with the Christian understanding of 
human nature and the possibility of sinful behavior in the 
most sterling character, does the theory allow for presenta­
tion of extremes of good and evil behavior in one character? 
Does it allow for the depiction of substantial development 
in character, or is all characterization static, with no mix­
ture of style allowed? 
29 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 195. 
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One of the areas where these questions are most appli­
cable is in the understanding of comic characterization, 
which in classical aesthetic theories I have shown to be 
rigidly held to the depiction of only a certain kind of evil 
(that is, the laughable evil of only slight moral fault) 
within a strict stylistic classification (i.e., how comic 
characters go with low comic style). In light of these con­
siderations , what is the view of comic characterization held 
by Dante? 
Again, we must go first to the Divine Comedy for the added 
background it offers for a discussion of Dante's theoretical 
commentary on this problem. The comedy of the Divine Comedy 
has long been a subject of interest for scholars of Dante. 
Leo Spitzer, concentrating on the farcical elements of the 
Inferno, Cantos XXI and XXIII, notes what he calls the complete 
lack of heroic tone in this section of the Comedy, and attri­
butes this to Dante's use of the farce as a comic form. 
Spitzer defines the character type which emerges from the 
pure use of the form: 
In the purest examples of the farce, no character is 
allowed to rise above the standard level of mediocre 
wickedness; no higher principle of a transcendental, 
or even of a common moral nature is allowed to appear 
on the horizon; with the utter ruthlessness of untran-
scendental comedy man is represented as singularly 
stripped of his suprahuman qualities—wallowing in the 
pitch and mire of his infra-human nature. Not only do 
we see him homo hominis lupus (everyone cheats the other), 
man himself is lupus, no divine grace shines through the 
farce.30 
30 
Leo Spitzer, "The Farcical Elements in 'Inferno" 
CantosXXI-XXIII," in Essays on Dante, ed. Mark Musa (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 173. 
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It seems to bother Spitzer that Dante includes such a "bar­
ren and shallow" picture of man in the Divine Comedy and he 
ascribes its inclusion in Dante1s spiritual masterwork to the 
31 
poet's artistic and moral curiosity. He reasons further 
that the farcical elements in Dante point to a larger provi­
dential scheme of order in which God shows himself to be the 
victor over devilish forces. Spitzer sees Dante's relaxed 
treatment of this part of the Comedy as the reflection of 
a deeper optimistic trend in Christian art which is "respon­
sible," as he puts it, "for its basically undramatic nature." 
Of course, in one sense Spitzer is correct in emphasiz­
ing the final victory of providence in the Christian scheme; 
Christian philosophers have been known from the beginniing 
to highlight the controlling aspect of good over evil. But 
in another, he fails to take into account the other side of 
the paradox—that is that the Christian, though ultimately 
victorious, has a battle with evil in this life despite the 
victory of Christ. Thus he fails to grasp the tension which 
Dante achieves through the comic elements in this episode, 
for the picture of evil presented in Cantos XXI-XXIII of the 
Inferno is not without a deep recognition of the seriousness 
of evil. 
31 Spitzer, "The Farcical Elements in 'Inferno' Canto 
XXI-XXIII," in Essays on Dante, p. 175. 
32 Spitzer, "The^Farcical Elements in 'Inferno' Cantos 
XXI-XXIII," in Essays on Dante, p„ 175. 
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The action in the three cantos revolves around the fact 
that Virgil is tricked into believing Malacoda1s advice to 
go on to the next unbroken bridge in order to continue his 
passage. The bridge, it turns out, is in ruins, and Virgil 
falls prey to the lie. His anger at the lie and at himself 
for not discerning the lie is not laughable, but sympathet­
ically thought-provoking, and the fact that he unknowingly 
quotes Christ's words on the subject of the devil's lying 
spirit adds a note of profound seriousness to Virgil's reac­
tion to evil: "I once heard someone say at Bologna that 
the Devil has many vices, among which I heard that he is a 
33 
liar and the father of lies" (Inferno XXIII, 11. 142-44). 
Then, too, we are disquieted by the fact that Virgil, Dante's 
spiritual guide and the symbol of Reason, has the potential 
to be blinded by a reasonable lie. This in itself causes 
a careful reassessment of the Satanic enemy on the part of 
both Virgil and the reader, however farcically it may be rep­
resented. 
Spitzer's inadequate analysis of the situation may par­
tially be due to the fact that he does not take into thorough 
account the profoundly dramatic view of characterization 
which is operative here. As we pointed out in earlier chap­
ters , the understanding of man in the Christian view includes 
first of all the fact that he is both sinner and saint—that 
33 Dante, Divine Comedy, p. 113. 
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he is an individual capable of substantial change in life. 
Man's potential for change involves the possibility of spir­
itual rebirth, or the creation of the new man in Christ 
through an action of grace. Where there is such a rebirth, 
a radical change in character without destruction of the 
unique personality of the individual takes place. The char­
acter of the conversion experience in the New Testament is 
prefigured by the pattern of judgment/repentance—mercy/regen­
eration in the Old. Of course, the opposite—a temporary 
fall from grace—is possible and this is part of the dramatic 
tension which continues throughout the Christian life. 
The Christian understanding of conversion in this sense 
makes possible the representation of lower characters in 
serious as well as comic narrative. Conversely, a profound 
seriousness always underlies the comic vision of man. Taken 
as a whole, the Christian vision allows for a great melange 
of extremes in one character—the comically low with the 
tragically profound: the heroic with the ridiculous. The 
representation of extremes of character in one individual 
forms a direct contrast with classical view of comic reality 
which when it allows comedy at all keeps it rigidly controlled 
by a representation of only mischievous evil or ludicrousness 
in characters of low social status, and by careful restric­
tions on style. It is the Christian recognition of the 
melange of good and evil possible in each historic situation 
and character which lies behind the farcical elements of the 
Inferno and which explains the appearance of a non-transcendent 
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artistic form in tho midst of a work of such transcendence. 
This cannot be explained merely as a slight case of artis­
tic curiosity, —it is a fundamental reflection of the Chris­
tian vision of the Comedy itself. 
Dorothy Sayers seems to understand the polarities of 
behavior allowed in the depiction of Christian character when 
she analyzes the comic character of Dante the Pilgrim in her 
34 
Introductory Papers on Dante. Dante, she notices, while 
participating in the most serious of all dramas, is often 
laughably ridiculous in behavior. She speaks of the "fear 
and egotism" of Dante's first meeting with Virgil (Inferno I, 
11. 67f.), his "childishness" (Paradiso I, 11. 100-102), and 
35 
"Beatrice's feminine sense of his absurdity." 
The episode, according to Miss Sayers, which best por­
trays both the humanity of Dante and his divine appointment 
is Purgatorio XXVII, where he crosses the lake of fire at 
Virgil's urging. she comments: 
There is a certain reticence about the crucial moment— 
did he go or was he pushed? I think there is a convul­
sive start—better to go before one is pushed—and the 
34 
Dorothy Sayers, "The Comedy of the Comedy," Introduc­
tory Papers on Dante (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 
pp. 151-78. 
35 Sayers, "The Comedy of the Comedy," in Introductory 
Papers on Dante, pp. 155-161; Allan H. Gilbert also points 
out Dante's comic cowardice (Inf. 2:35: 2:122; 3:31; 7:5; 
8:104; 9:55; 17:85; 24:32; 21:121; 31:109; Purgatorio 20:135; 
29:140; and his comic curiosity (Inf. 6:46; 29:106; 32:43; 
33:116; Purgatorio 13:91; 20:15; 21:79; 23:52; 24:11; 32:70; 
Paradiso 85:127; 8:44; 15:87; 32:103; 22:58, and his "unheroic 
heroism" in general. Allan H. Gilbert, Dante and His Comedy 
(New York: New York University Press, 1963), pp. 67-69. 
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humiliating consciousness that it is no good trying 
to bolt, because one will be caught and stopped. It is 
not heroic, but how one sympathizes! Divine Comedy? 
—divine, no doubt, but certainly comedy even in the 
narrower sense of the word-36 
The comically undignified behavior which Miss Sayers notes in 
the passage above is something not to be found in the heroes 
of the classical epics, and yet there is great drama here, 
great suspense of the first order. In fact, the Pilgrim's 
life, his eternal life—is itself at stake. The dramatic 
situation is couched in Biblical terms—the pain of the refin­
ing fire must be experienced before the Christian is allowed 
to cross into Paradise. In the throes of a decision of 
whether or not to subject himself to the refining process 
Dante comes across as timid and absurdly unheroic, and yet 
ummistakably a child of grace. This mixture of the sublime 
and the humble is an integral part of the Comedy, as it is an 
integral part of the Christian perspective on reality. 
The perspective we identify here is also discernible 
in Dante's aesthetic theory. We note in the Convivio, for 
example, a general unwillingness to classify men as "noble" 
in terms of either wealth or aristocratic background. 
37 
"Riches," writes Dante, are "mean in their nature," and 
true nobility is based on virtue, not noble birth: 
No one, because he is able to say, 'I am of such and 
such a stock,' is entitled to believe that he is pos­
sessed of nobility, if these fruits (virtues) are not 
3 6 Sayers, "The Comedy of the Comedy," in Introductory 
Papers on Dante, pp. 165-166. 
37 Dante, Convivio, p. 191. 
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in him...and none can confer this gift save God alone, 
with whom there is no respect of persons, as the divine 
Scriptures declare.38 
Here we see that Dante's classification of men rests solely 
on Scriptural grounds. He sees virtue not in terms of ethi­
cal goodness or evil, but in terms of the grace of God. 
Thus in very unclassical fashion he crosses the lines of 
wealth, position and birth, setting up an absolute standard 
of nobility which rests firmly on the Biblical understanding 
of Grace. 
We see the same tendency to blur the classical distinc­
tions in Dante's defense of the common language in which the 
Comedy is written. In the De Vulgari Eloquentia Dante iden­
tifies two kinds of speech—the naturally acquired vernacular 
and what he refers to as "secondary speech" or language which 
is acquired only by much diligent study of grammar and the 
rules of language. He then comments in typically unclassical 
fashion: 
Of these two [kinds of speech], then, the vernacular is 
the nobler, both because it is enjoyed by the whole 
world (although it has been divided into [languages with] 
differing words and paradigms), and because it is nat­
ural to us, while the other is more an artificial pro­
duct.39 
In the Convivio, Dante offers several more reasons for his 
use of the vernacular—he wishes to magnify it and he wishes 
38 Dante, Convivio, p. 258. 
39 Dante, "De Vulgari Eloquentia," in Literary Criti­
cism of Dante Aliqhieri, trans. Robert S. Haller (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1973), p. 4. 
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to defend it from detractors. But the main issue for him 
is clearly a concern for the precise communication of his 
subject matter. 
The goodness which is most loved and commended in any­
thing is most distinctive of it....the clear showing 
forth of the conception is most lovely and commendable 
and this is best done by the native tongue.41 
Dante thus reveals a consistent concern for communication of 
truth which overrides the rigid classifications of stylistic 
appropriateness of style and subject-matter set up by clas­
sical and classically-influenced theoreticians. 
The relaxed attitude toward the use of common language 
and Dante's tendency to cross stylistic lines, also shows up 
in the commentary on characterization which he makes in 
the "Letter to Can Grande," where he writes that "a tragic 
42 
figure may lament in a commonplace language." Allan Gil­
bert interprets this to mean that "the normal epic figure may 
be lowered in dignity to fit a comedy," and goes on to cite 
instances of characterization in the Comedy—for example, 
the figures of Brunetto Latini, and Guido da Montefeltro, 
where Dante seems to mix ridicule with respect. In these 
cases, there is a recognition both of the exalted dignity of 
43 
man and his sinful foolishness and pride. 
40 Dante, Convivio, p. 56. 
41 Dante, Convivio, p. 63. 
4? 
Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 197. 
43 
Gilbert, p. 77. 
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Dante goes even further than this in his approach to 
comedy and comic character. He not only allows for a rep­
resentation of the noble and debased aspects of man, and for 
a combination of lofty subject-matter with what was consid­
ered at the time a vulgar style, but he exalts the comic 
form itself. This begins to be apparent in his description 
of comic form in the "Letter to Can Grande:" 
The title of the book is: 'Here beginneth the Comedy 
of Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, but not 
by character.' And for the comprehension of this it 
must be^ understood that the word "comedy" is derived 
from^^//*- , village, and c!/Jr? , which meaneth song; 
hence comedy, as it were, a village song. Comedy is in 
truth a certain kind of poetical narrative that dif-
fereth from all others. It differeth from Tragedy in 
its subject matter,—in this way, that Tragedy in its 
beginning is admirable and quiet, in its ending or 
catastrophe foul and horrible: and because of this, the 
word "tragedy" is derived from f^yo5, which meaneth 
goat, and Tragedy is, then as it were a goatish 
song; that^ foul like a goat, as doth appear in the 
tragedies of Seneca. Comedy, indeed, beginneth with 
some adverse circumstances, but its theme hath a happy 
termination, as doth appear in the comedies of Terence. 
And hence certain writers were accustomed to say in 
their salutations in place of a greeting, 'a tragic 
beginning and a comic ending.1 Likewise they differ 
in their style of language, for Tragedy is lofty and 
sublime, Comedy, mild and humble,—as Horace says in 
his Poetica, where he concedeth that sometimes comedians 
speak like tragedians and conversely: 'Interdum tamen 
et vocem somoedia tollit. Iratusque Chremes tumido 
delitigatore; Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedes-
tri.1 From this it is evident why the present work is 
called a comedy; for if we consider the theme, in its 
beginning it is horrible and foul, because it is Hell; 
in its ending, fortunate, desirable, and joyful, because 
it is Paradise; and if we consider the style of language, 
the style is careless and humble, because it is the ^ 
vulgar tongue, in which even housewives hold converse. 
Here Dante makes an implicit contrast between the "goatish 
song" of tragedy and its ending in adverse circumstance, and 
44 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 197. 
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the "happy termination" of comedy. He also links the clas­
sical conception of comedy (a poem beginning in sadness and 
ending in happiness) with a vision of the Christian life as 
something begun in hell and progressing toward Paradise. 
This link between comedy and the Christian vision of 
historical life becomes even more explicit in Dante's expla­
nation of the four levels of meaning which we pointed out 
earlier. As Nevill Coghill puts it, Dante claims for his 
Comedy not only that it is an example of comic form, but 
45 
that it corresponds to the shape of ultimate reality. In 
the suggestion, Coghill goes on, that the movement of the soul 
from corruption to grace is a movement from hell to Paradise, 
Dante reveals to us that the theme of the Christian life— 
and of his Christian comedy—is "love absolute.the power 
and glory of God, seen by created souls as the Beatific vision 
46 
for which they were created." Dante includes a definition 
of this ultimate theme at the end of the "Letter to Can 
Grande:" 
...true blessedness con.sisteth in knowing the source 
of truth; as doth appear in St. John where he saith: 
'This is true blessedness, that they might know thee, 
and true God, etc., and in Boethius III of de conso-
latione where he saith: 'To see Thee is our end.' 
Hence it is that many things that have a great utility 
and delight will be asked from these souls, as from 
those beholding all truth, in order to reveal the glory 
of their blessedness. And because when the Source or 
45 
Neville Coghill, "The Basis of Shakespearean Comedy," 
Essays and Studies 3 (1950), p. 14. 
46 
Coghill, p. 6. 
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the First, which is God, hath been found, there is 
nothing to be sought beyond (since He is the Alpha and 
Omega, which is the beginning and the End, as the 
vision of St. John doth demonstrate) the treatise draw-
eth to a close in God, who is blessed throughout all 
the ages.47 
Thus in Dante's commentary on his own work we see an aesthetic 
approach which springs from a profoundly Christian vision of 
reality. Comedy is seen in light of the Christian under­
standing of man as capable of great extremes of circumstance 
and action, and the greatest of comic themes is the movement 
of man from a state of misery to an experience of Divine 
Love. 
The fourth and for the purpose of this study the most 
important aspect of this analysis of Dante's aesthetic com­
mentary is his theoretical understanding of allegory and 
symbol as it bears on characterization. We will attempt to 
answer the following questions: What can be gleaned from the 
Convivio, the De Eloquentia and the Letter to Can Grande on 
the subject of allegory and symbol? In light of our under­
standing of the orthodox exegetical tradition, and the tra­
dition of "typical" exegesis, what emphasis is given in each 
treatise to the historical level of the narrative? Is there 
an objective referent for the allegory or symbol used, and 
what is the content of that referent? 
The most obvious references in Dante's aesthetic theory 
to the subject of allegorical interpretation occurs in the 
47 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," pp. 215-16. 
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Convivio II, and in the "Letter to Can Grande." In the 
Convivio, Dante makes his famous distinction between the 
"allegory of the poets" or "a truth hidden under a beautiful 
fiction," and the "allegory of the theologians" which is pat­
terned after the orthodox understanding of Scriptural alle­
gory expounded by Augustine, St. Thomas and the early exeget-
ical tradition: 
I say that, as is affirmed in the first chapter, it is 
meet for this exposition to be both literal and allegor­
ical. And to make this intelligible, it should be known 
that writings can be understood and ought to be expounded 
chiefly in four senses. The first is called literal, 
and this is that sense which does not go beyond the 
strict limits of the letter; the second is called alle­
gorical and this is disguised under the cloak of such 
stories and is a truth hidden under a beautiful fiction. 
Thus Ovid says that Orpheus with his lyre made beasts 
tame and trees and stone move toward himself; that is 
to say that the wise man by the instrument of his voice 
makes cruel hearts grow mild and humble and those who 
have not the life of Science and of Art move to his will, 
while they who have no rational life are as it were like 
stones. And wherefore this disguise was invented by 
the wise will be shown in the last Tractate but one. 
Theologians indeed do not apprehend this sense in the 
same fashion as poets; but inasmuch as my intention is 
to follow here the custom of poets, I will take the 
allegorical sense after the manner which poets use/® 
It is the second, or allegorical sense which is of particular 
interest to us here as an example of the classical habit of 
separating fiction from truth and making the allegorical and 
not the literal sense the most important. Compare this alle­
gorical method with Dante's description of the "allegory of 
the theologians" in the "Letter to Can Grande:" 
48 Dante, Convivio, p. 73. 
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For the clearness, there, of what I shall say, it must 
be understood that the meaning of this work is not sim­
ple, but rather can be said to be of many significations, 
that is, of several meanings; for there is one meaning 
that is derived from the letter, and another that is 
derived from the things indicated by the letter. The 
first is called literal, but the second is allegorical 
or mystical. That this method of expounding may be 
more clearly set forth, we can consider it in these 
lines: 'When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of 
Jacob from a people of strange tongue, Judah was his 
sanctuary and Israel his dominion.1 For if we consider 
the letter alone, the departure of the children of Israel 
from Egypt in the time of Moses is signified; if the 
moral meaning, the conversion of the soul from the sor­
row and misery of sin to a state of grace is signified; 
if the anagogical, the departure of the sanctified soul 
from the slavery of corruption to the liberty of ever­
lasting glory is signified. And although these mys­
tical meanings are called by various names, they can in 
general all be said to be allegorical since they differ 
from the literal or historic; for the word alleqoria is 
derived from the Greek—which in Latin in alienum or 
diversum.49 
Here we see a restatement of the orthodox exegetical posi­
tion on allegory. Dante sees the relationship between the 
major historical event of the Old Law—the Exodus—and the 
major event of the New Law—Redemption wrought by Christ—as 
allegorical. It is important to note that although the 
allegorical sense is regarded as distinct from the literal-
historical, there is a relationship between them differing 
from the relationship between the "beautiful lie" and its 
meaning in "allegory of the poets." Charles Singleton char­
acterizes the difference in the following manner: 
But the kind of allegory to which the example from 
Scriptures given in the Letter to Can Grande points is 
not an allegory of "this for that," but an allegory 
of "this and that," of this sense plus that sense. The 
verse in Scripture which says, "When Israel went out 
of Egypt," has its first meaning in denoting a real his­
torical event; and it has its second meaning because 
that historical event itself, having the Author that it 
^Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," pp. 193-94. 
had, can signify yet another event: our Redemption 
through Christ. Its first meaning in facto, in the 
event itself. The words have a real meaning in point­
ing to a real event; the event, in its truth, has 
meaning because events wrought by God are themselves 
as words yielding a meaning, a higher and spiritual 
sense.50 
Not only does the literal-historical level receive primary 
emphasis in Singleton's analysis of Dante's method, but the 
literal and allegorical meanings described by Dante are 
seen as having a far more substantial relationship in the 
"allegory of the theologians" than in the "allegory of the 
poets." 
The distinction Singleton observes here between the def­
inition of "allegory of the poets" given in the Convivio and 
the "allegory of the theologians" put forth in the "Letter 
to Can Grande" is not accepted in all critical circles. R. H 
Greene, for example, argues that the kind of allegory 
described by Dante in the Convivio is not essentially dif­
ferent from the allegory described in the "Letter to Can 
51 
Grande," and attributes the method of allegorization in 
both cases to the "rhetorical tradition of the conventional 
accessus ad auctores," rather than to the tradition of ortho­
dox exegesis. Although Greene admits some similarity 
between the allegorical method described by Dante in the 
"Letter to Can Grande" and conventional Scriptural exegesis, 
50 
Charles S. Singleton, Dante Studies I (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 91. 
51 R. H. Greene, "Dante's 'Allegory of Poets' and the 
Medieval Theory of Poetic Fiction," Comparative Literature 9 
(Spring, 1957), 122. 
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he insists that the first level of meaning in any poetry is 
a poetic fiction, and thus is rooted in the medieval tradi­
tion of the classical aesthetic. 
There can be, Greene suggests, a Christian allegory of 
the poets, in the sense of a poetic fiction or veil' which 
would serve as the abstract sign for a specific Christian 
52 
message, but he insists that in the primary or literal sense 
poetry cannot attain the level of historical reality ascribed 
to it by Singleton. All medieval art, he writes—even 
Christian medieval art—is a human art and thus belongs to 
the classical tradition represented by such writers as 
Macrobius, Boccaccio, Fulgentius, Alain de Lille and Pruden-
tius. D. W„ Robertson sides with Green in insisting that the 
medieval poetic tradition is essentially classical in its 
orientation and method. In a footnote to his article, "Some 
53 
Medieval Literary Terminology," Robertson characterizes 
Dante's distinction between the "allegory of the poets" and 
the "allegory of the theologians" as the difference between a 
narration of fictitious events and a narration of the actual 
events of Scripture. He concludes: 
But Professor Singleton confuses this distinction with 
that between verbal allegory and the allegory of things. 
It seems obvious, moreover, that the Divine Comedy is a 
poem, not a history, and certainly not a new chapter in 
Scripture. 
52 Greene, p. 125. 
53 D. W. Robertson, "Some Medieval Literary Terminol­
ogy," SP 48 (July, 1951), 653, n. 51. 
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Singleton himself answers these charges not by insist­
ing that the historical reality of the Comedy's literal level 
is the same as the historical reality of Scripture, but by 
suggesting that the illusion of reality on the literal level 
is so powerful that the reader, while in the act of reading, 
may be said to fall under the spell of that fiction in such 
a way that it becomes history for him. This whole illusion 
of a reality, which may be said to occur also in a reading 
of the best novelists of our own age, is yet qualitatively 
different from the experience of reading a modern historical 
novel, for example. That is, reading Dante is different 
from reading Tolstoy because under Tolstoy's illusion of 
reality we get no sense of the Biblical time-frame which 
structures all of history and gives it meaning; while under 
54 
Dante's, we do. In other words, the first illusion which 
is created in the Comedy is an illusion of real event, an 
imitation of the Scripture and of the created universe. 
In the "Letter to Can Grande" Dante tells us that the 
subject of his work, "the state of souls after death," is to 
55 
be taken literally. If so, then the event pointed to by 
the literal level is the actual journey to God through the 
world beyond. This event in turn prefigures the historical 
event of man's pilgrimage to God in this life. The literal 
level is a projected fiction of the author—Dante has not 
54 Singleton, p. 130. 
55 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 193. 
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yet experienced the "soul's state after death," nonetheless 
he is so positive of its reality in the life-after-death 
being experienced by the departed Beatrice and Virgil and in 
its coming reality for himself that it is an actual sub­
stantive even for him, despite the fact that it is outside 
the present time-space continuum. Moreover, the literal 
reality of the journey to God after death is not literal 
because Dante experiences it; it is literal because Scripture 
says it will happen, and because Scripture itself is rooted 
in the historical Incarnation of Jesus Christ, the bodily 
Word of God, He who gives flesh to symbol. 
In "allegory of the theologians," the human poet builds 
his creation parallel to the allegorical method used in 
Scripture. The truth of Scripture is used by the artist as 
both the spiritual origin of the operation and the pattern 
by which it proceeds. As Joseph Bryant puts it: 
The human poet is not a Christ, and he cannot make 
something out of nothing, as Christ did, but his making 
is a species of creation nonetheless. One might call 
it an act in continuation of that impulse by which the 
world was made--an act performed in emulation of the 
original creator, or the human and partial redemption 
of experience from scattered data and the transforma­
tion of that data into something strange, admirable, 
and of great constancy. In short, the poet is not God, 
but he does God's work in God's way.56 
57 
Thus Dante's poem can be considered a double imitation. 
It is first an imitation of the created universe of God 
56 Joseph Bryant, Hippolyta's View; Some Aspects of 
Shakespeare's Plays (Louisville: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1961), p. 4. 
57 Singleton, p. 6. 
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(itself a book of symbols of divine things) and second, an 
imitation of the Bible which is a record of God's use of 
historical event to reveal Himself to mankind. Its authority 
is not that of Scripture only, but the reality to which Scrip­
ture points—the Incarnate Word of God. One can see a small 
vignette of this double imitation in the Paradiso, XXV, 
11. 55-56, when Beatrice (herself a historical personality) 
speaks of Dante as one who "was allowed to come from Egypt 
to see Jerusalem, before his life's warfare was over." The 
reality of the two characters of the allegory is indisputably 
historical, as are the Biblical events in which they see 
themselves as living actors. 
Thus the "allegoryof the poets" and the "allegory of 
the theologians" are different in the way that the literal 
level is interpreted. Singleton puts it in terms of a two­
fold test: 
(1) Does the reader in the act of reading view the 
literal sense as "fable," "fiction," as "imaginary," 
and justified only if it conveys the truth? If so, 
this is the reading focus of the allegory of the 
poets. 
(2) Does the reader in the act of reading take the 
literal sense to be real, that is, take the events nar­
rated as real, and does it happen that this literal 
line of event discloses along its way the shape of 
other events, also real? If so, this is the reading 
focus of the allegory of the theologians. ° 
Greene is wrong, Singleton observes, in insisting that we 
do not have to change our own allegorical focus when we 
switch from reading according to the kind of poetic allegory 
58 
Singleton, p. 131. 
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described in the Convivio, to the kind of allegory described 
59 
in the "Letter to Can Grande." Etienne Gilson treats the 
same problem, resolving it in much the same way: 
We cannot understand the Divine Comedy in the sense in 
which he (Dante) himself meant it unless we treat as 
fiction what was to him only fiction, and as reality 
what he himself conceived as reality. Those who do 
not share Dante1s faith are not thereby absolved from 
the duty of reading his work on the assumption that it 
was written by a believer.60 
Adding to observations on the "historicity" of the 
Comedy, Robert Hollander notes that Dante, along with his 
imitation of Scriptural truth, treats the events of classical 
antiquity as though they had actually happened, and never 
regards them as a "discardable fabula:" 
All that must be understood is that for Dante the 
events recorded in the literature of pagan antiquity 
have for purposes of his fiction, as much historical 
validity as do the events recorded in the Bible. The 
latter may be more "true" in his eyes, but the situations 
of Aeneas or Jason are as significant for Dante's theory 
59 
Singleton makes the point here that Greene's inabil­
ity to accept the notion of a distinction between Dante's alle­
gorical method and the method of most medieval and modern writers 
is a "sense of real repugnance at the notion that anyone, in this 
latter day of our enlightenment should be asked to adopt a "read­
er's attitude" which looks like superstition or obscurantism, or 
at least to require an act of faith which one is not at all 
disposed to make." The underlying reason for this attitude, 
Singleton points out, is the difference between the Greek mind, 
which finds the Incarnation to be foolishness, and the Christian 
mind which makes the Incarnation the central event of history. 
Philo Judeaus cannot accept the literal-historical level of 
Scripture as true, because he thinks according to the classical 
rationalism which is behind "allegory of the poets." St. 
Thomas, St. Augustine, and Dante do accept it because of their 
fundamental belief in the integration of matter and spirit in 
Christ. Singleton, p. 133. 
^°Etienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher (New York: Sheed-& 
Ward, 1949), p. 296. 
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of the "true lie" as the situations of Moses or 
Rahab.^l 
In the same vein, Francis Fergusson observes that Dante's treat­
ment of the individuals in the Divine Comedy is based solidly 
on the drama of history revealed in the Christian faith and 
contrasts sharply with his treatment of character in the Con-
vivio, where he uses individuals in rationalistic fashion, to 
62 
illustrate "his own moral principles." Fergusson points out 
with Gilson and Singleton that the figures in the Comedy must 
be apprehended in the same spirit in which they were created 
by Dante. The reality of the Comedy, finally, goes back to 
the fact of the Incarnation, and to the meaning it gives to 
63 
history. 
^Robert Hollander, Allegory in Dante's Commedia (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 75. 
6 2 Francis Fergusson, Dante's Drama of the Mind , p. 126. 
ergusson comments eloquently on the kind of reality 
which gives meaning to Dante's great work: "The realms of 
the Inferno and the Purgatorio are not real as God's 
world is real; the Virgil who appears there is not real 
as the Christians of St. Paul's time were real. But the 
act of spirit whereby Dante grasps the historic Virgil and 
the Virgil of the Commedia is truthful, he believes, in the 
same way as St. Paul's historic understanding was true. In 
both cases the understanding is formed and authenticated by 
the love of Christ. Christ, appearing at a moment in his­
tory, gives form and meaning to the temporal sequence itself. 
At the same time the love of Christ (available to humanity 
since the Incarnation) can form the life (or actions) of the 
human spirit in accord with truth. Insofar as Dante or St. 
Paul was moved, in the effort to understand history by the 
love of Christ, this effort of understanding gave truth." 
Fergusson, p. 131. 
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Thus we see in Dante strong ties with the orthodox 
emphasis on the historical validity of Christianity and a 
resultant emphasis on the literal-historical level of the 
text. These ties are especially evident, as we have observed, 
in Dante's aesthetic commentary on the subject, and especially 
in the "Letter to Can Grande." We may point out here that 
even in the more rationalistic Convivio, which most critics 
recognize as having more affinity with the classical rather 
than the Christian view of reality, Dante's accent on the im­
portance of the historical level of narrative is very strong 
and may reveal a definite link both with the orthodox exeget-
ical tradition and his later, more complete statement of the 
figural view of reality in the "Letter to Can Grande." In 
the Convivio, Dante writes: 
Wherefore inasmuch as in writings the literal meaning 
is always the outside, it is impossible to arrive at 
other meanings, especially the allegorical, without first 
arriving at the literal. It is impossible, moreover, 
because in everything natural and artificial, it is 
not possible to proceed to the form unless the matter 
on which the form must be imposed is first made ready 
for it.64 
This passage reveals that the literal text was of first 
importance to Dante even during the writing of the Convivio, 
and also reveals once again the concern with content over 
form which we have shown to be related to an essentially 
Christian vision of reality. Although Singleton, Fergusson, 
and Hollander are correct in distinguishing the allegorical 
64 Dante, Convivio, p. 74. 
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approach described in the Convivio from that of the "Letter 
to Can Grande," it does not seem to me that the distinction 
is so strong as to indicate a complete reversion on Dante's 
part from a "rationalistic" to a Christian perspective. The 
Convivio in its basic form and content reflects the Christian 
view of reality—perhaps not so obviously nor forcefully as 
the "Letter to Can Grande," but nevertheless clearly enough 
that foundations of the faith are visible. Perhaps the best 
explanation for the "rationalistic" tone of the Convivio is 
the medieval tendency to conform Christianity to philosophical 
precept. Ernst Curtius reminds us that in the centuries 
leading up to and including the Middle Ages, it was a common 
tendency of apologists to equate Christianity with philoso-
65 
phy. Furthermore, he is careful to note that such an 
equation is not solely or exclusively the result of Alexan­
drine rationalism, or even early Greek Classicism, but instead 
reflects a "mode of thought which goes back to the early 
66 
church." 
Dante, himself, Curtius points out, claims a philosophi­
cal function for his poetry. In the "Letter to Can Grande," 
he writes that 
form or method of treating is poetic, figurative, 
descriptive, digressive, transumptive, and, in addi­
tion, explanatory, divisible, probative, condemnatory 
and explicit in examples.b/ 
65 
Ernst R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Mid­
dle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 
1953), pp. 211-13. 
^Curtius, p. 213. 
®^Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 196. 
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Curtius points out that the last group of descriptive phrases 
is taken directly from the Scholastic tradition, and their 
inclusion in a description of a poetic work represents an 
integration of the philosophic-scientific tradition found 
68 
in Scholasticism with the Christian aesthetic. 
In sum, Dante's aesthetic theory as it is expressed in 
both the Convivio and the "Letter to Can Grande" reflects the 
basically Christian understanding of reality which we see in 
his poetry. In both the Convivio and the "Letter to Can 
Grande" we see evidence of a universal view of history in 
which Fortune is the handmaid of Providence and secular his­
torical data is subsumed into a larger vision of divine con­
trol. The Biblical content of that vision is seen to be con­
sistent with the universal figural approach to history which 
is first utilized by Christ and St. Paul within Scripture 
itself and later developed by the orthodox exegetes. Such an 
approach involves not only the concept of a universal and 
prophetically realized series of historical events, but a 
recognition of man's individual place within and response to 
68 
Curtius notes that both Albert the Great (Summa Theo-
logica and St. Thomas made a distinction between "a poetry 
based upon human fictions and a poetry of which divine wisdom 
makes use to impart absolute truth and certainty." Curtius, 
p. 227. Divine Scripture utilizes poetic metaphor "because 
it is needful and profitable." (Summa I, 1, 9, ad. i.). 
Nevertheless, writes Curtius, St. Thomas and Albert are not 
interested in evaluating poetry, and regard it as inferior 
to philosophy. Dante's integration of poetry and philosophy 
in the "Letter to Can Grande" thus represents a radical depar­
ture from the Thomistic approach to poetry, a distinct con­
trast which is not usually noted by scholars. Curtius, 
pp. 223-224. 
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those events. The development of an orthodox concept of free 
will and grace in both the Convivio and the "Letter to Can 
Grande" reveal Dante's adherence to the traditional approach 
to the subject. In line with the Biblical understanding of 
man as a creature capable of substantial change and extremes 
of behavior, Dante develops in his aesthetic commentary a 
theory of comedy which allows for the representation of ludi­
crous or ridiculous behavior in the most exalted characters. 
Dante makes comedy—the transformation of a "foul and sad begin­
ning into a happy end"—a metaphor for the shape of ultimate 
reality as it is interpreted in the Christian vision. Finally, 
Dante's understanding of allegory and symbol, as it appears 
both in the Convivio and the "Letter to Can Grande," but 
especially in the latter epistle, reflects the allegorical 
approach first developed by St. Paul and utilized by orthodox 
exegetes through the Middle Ages. This approach is based on 
an understanding of symbol as the total integration of sign 
and substance, of word and thing which rests, ultimately, on 
the truth revealed in the Incarnation. 
Boccaccio 
Boccaccio's aesthetic treatise, the De Genealoqia Deo-
69 
rum, exhibits an interesting blend of Christian and classical 
69 Known first hand by Chaucer, according to T. R. Louns-
bury, Studies in Chaucer, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Broth­
ers, 1892), 11:229. Lounsbury suggests that Chaucer did not 
know the Decameron, but was more familiar with the aesthetic 
theory of the De Genealoqia Deorum. 
398 
elements which despite its adherence to orthodox theological 
principles ultimately encourages a classical rather than a 
Christian approach to the problem of characterization. Though 
Boccaccio's defense of poetry is informed on all levels by 
the truth of the Christian revelation, Boccaccio, unlike 
Dante, is unable to grasp the deeper implications of the sac­
ramental view of reality for his entire approach to literature 
and aesthetics. 
Throughout the De Genealogia Deorum, Boccaccio manifests 
a clear commitment to orthodox Christian doctrine. In the 
preface to the work, for example, he stresses the superiority 
of Christian truth to "deadly Gentile error" and emphasizes 
the objective quality of the Scriptural revelation: 
The ancients departed the way of all flesh, leaving 
behind them their literature and their famous names for 
posterity to interpret according to their own judgment. 
But as many minds, so many opinions. What wonder? 
There are the words of Holy Writ, clear, definite, 
charged with unalterable truth, though often thinly veiled 
in figurative language. Yet they are frequently distor­
ted into as many meanings as there are readers.'® 
In the opening pages of Book IV, Boccaccio again stresses the 
importance of poetic adherence to Scriptural truth. Poets, 
he writes, should not be scorned because they are not wealthy, 
but instead admired as "the wisest of men" provided that they 
71 
"recognize the true God." 
70 Boccaccio, Boccaccio on Poetry; The Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Books of De Genealogia Deorum, trans, with a 
preface by Charles G. Osgood (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 
1956), p. 11. Hereafter cited as De Genealogia Deorum. 
71 Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, p. 23. 
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In keeping with this very orthodox view of the poetic 
vocation, Boccaccio goes on to write that poetry itself is a 
"gift from God" and that it depends solely on a "strange, 
72 
supernal inspiration." Boccaccio is even careful to define 
the content of this "supernal inspiration" as something spe­
cifically Christian. Discussing the similarities between the 
poetic inspiration of the Gentile and that of the Christian 
prophets and poets, he makes the following distinction: 
And I think the poets of the Gentiles in their poetry— 
not perhaps without understanding—followed in the steps 
of these prophets; but whereas the holy men were filled 
with the Holy Ghost, and wrote under his impulse, the 
others were prompted by mere energy of mind, whence such 
a one is called a "seer."73 
Here Boccaccio's careful adherence to Christian doctrine is 
clear? the distinction between "nature" and "grace" is made 
specific to the problem of poetic inspiration. This same 
adherence to specifically christian content is evident later 
on in Book XV where Boccaccio refers to Christ's life, 
death and Resurrection, thereby giving, once again, an explic­
itly Christian content to his references to the "sincere faith 
74 
and eternal truth" to which he is committed. 
And yet, Boccaccio's actual approach to poetry, though 
attached to an orthodox conception of the Christian faith, 
does not go much beyond the classical understanding of literary 
72 Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, pp. 39-41. 
73 Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, p. 46. 
74 Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, pp. 124-127. 
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representation. Bocc?.ccio, for example, sees no truly pro­
found significance in the distinction made by Dante between 
the "allegory of the poets" and the "allegory of the theolog­
ians." For Dante, we remember, the distinction between the 
two kinds of allegory is qualitative; in the "allegory of the 
theologians," the reader in the act of reading takes the lit­
eral level of the text as actually true and as prophetically 
disclosing the outline of other events, also true. The orig­
inal pattern for this type of writing is the Scripture, in 
which both the literal level and its prophetic counterpart are 
historically true, and part of the foreordained plan of God. 
While the human poet cannot create a literal level which is 
historically true in the same sense as God's creation is his­
torically true, he may imitate God's way of creating and thus 
produce a work of art which has its mimetic basis in histor­
ical reality. While interacting with this kind of literature, 
the reader, as Charles Singleton puts it, may be said to "fall 
quite under the spell" of the illusion of reality created &n 
75 
the literal level. 
In the "allegory of the poets," on the other hand, the 
reader is invited from the start to view the literal level as 
a fiction, and as justifiable primarily by its conveyance of 
a hidden meaning or truth, which the reader is to be ferreting 
out as he goes along. In the De Genealoqia Deorum, Boccaccio's 
definition of the nature, origin, and function of poetry does 
75 Charles Sxngleton, "The Irreducible Dove," Comparative 
Literature 9 (Spring, 1957), p. 12. 
401 
not go beyond that of the figurative approach of the "allegory 
of the poets" and his treatment of the literal level is def­
initely casual, in the tradition of John, Hugo, and Alain. 
This becomes clear in Boccaccio's description and analysis of 
the four forms of fictional truth. It is significant in 
itself that the whole discussion is couched in terms of a 
defense of the disguised truth which is hidden under the var-
76 
ious types of veils which are available to the poet. The 
first types of fictional veil require little if any semblance 
of historical reality: 
The first superficially lacks all appearance of truth; 
for example, when brutes or inanimate things converse.... 
The second kind at times superficially mingles fiction 
with truth, as when we tell of the daughters of Minyos 
at their spinning, who, when they spurned the orgies of 
Bacchus, were turned into bats....7' 
It is true that Boccaccio in his definition of the third kind 
of fictional expression makes provision for a narrative which 
78 
seems "more like history than fiction." However, the recog­
nition given to the historical level here is probably more a 
result of the influence of euhemerism and Boccaccio's know­
ledge of the classical tradition of mythological exegesis 
than it is the sign of any profound grasp of the sacramental 
79 
principle. Also Boccaccio is very careful to emphasize the 
76 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 48. 
77 Boccaccxo, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 48. 
78 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 48. 
79 Charles G, Osgood, "Preface" to Boccaccio, De Genealoqia 
Deorum, p. xix. 
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need for recognizing the hidden or moral meaning attached 
to these historical fables, and makes his final point with 
a reference to the Odyssey, the Aeneid, and the parables of 
Christ: 
For however much the heroic poets seem to be writing 
history—Vergil in his description of Aeneas tossed 
by the storm, or Homer in his account of ulysses bound 
to the mast to escape the lure of the Siren's song—yet 
their hidden meaning is far other than appears on the 
surface.. ..My opponents need not be so squeamish—Christ, 
who is God, used this sort of fiction again and again 
in his parables.80 
Thus even when Boccaccio allows for historical realism on 
the literal level, he is more interested in the moral wisdom 
which it hides, and consistently enjoins the reader to look 
for the level of meaning which lurks below the surface of the 
historical narrative. As Singleton points out, this 
approach to allegory is very classical in its method—it is 
an allegory of "this for that" and not the allegory of double 
significance—of "this and that" which Dante calls the alle-
81 
gory of the theologians." 
Because of his more classical approach to poetic allegory 
in this sense, the historicity of the literal level is less 
of an issue for Boccaccio than it is for Dante. Instead of 
the great emphasis on the need for historical truth on the 
literal level which we find in the Convivio, for example, we 
find in the De Genealogia Deorum what amounts to a defense 
SO Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, p. 49. 
81 Singleton, "The Irreducible Dove," p. 134. 
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of the use of the "beautiful lie" on the literal level. It 
is not, as Boccaccio explains, that a poet cannot use his­
torical truth on the literal level if he so chooses, but that 
there is really no need to do so if some kind of spiritual 
82 
or moral purpose is conveyed. In other words, there is no 
essential difference in Boccaccio's mind between a truth con­
veyed by means of a fiction and a truth conveyed by means of 
real history. In his eyes, both are equally the truth. 
The implication here is that the truth is essentially cap­
able of existence apart from finite forms. Dante, shaped by 
his profound commitment to the central fact of the Incar­
nation and by his awareness of the implications of that fact 
for his poetry, gives historical or incarnated reality a much 
more vital function. In keeping with the tradition of ortho­
dox exegesis which we traced back to Ireneaus, Chrysostome, 
Augustine, and others, he places a higher value on literature 
which grounds itself in finite and the historical and which 
thus finds itself automatically closer to the creative center 
of Christianity. 
In contrast, we find Boccaccio consistently defending 
the use of the poetic lie throughout the De Genealogia Deorum 
by virtue of the fact that it carried ideal or eternal truth. 
We find a good illustration of this classical tendency in 
Boccaccio's description of Virgil's motives for writing the 
82 Boccaccio, De Genealogia Deorum, p. 65. 
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Aeneid. First, he comments, Virgil makes no effort to be 
historically correct, but fashions history solely for its 
83 
poetic effect. Second, Virgil creates Aeneas for the purpose 
of shewing "with what passions human frailty is infested, and 
84 
the strength with which a steady man subdues them." Third, 
Virgil writes the Aeneid in order to praise the moral upright­
ness of the existing emperor, and fourth and last, in order 
to exalt the glory of Rome. It is by a citation of these 
very classical conceptions of ideal truth that Boccaccio 
proves that "Virgil is not a liar, whatever the unthinking 
85 
suppose." Thus Boccaccio's major theme in the De Genealoqia 
Deorum—the defense of poetic fiction in the service of truth— 
manifests itself in obvious form once again. 
The conception of poetic mimesis operative here is only 
very slightly removed from the classical conceptions of mimesis 
outlined in Chapter I. It is even closer to the kind of poetic 
allegorization promoted by Christian-Platonist exegetes of 
the first, second and third centuries, whose influence we see 
in the writings of Alain, John of Salisbury, and Hugh of St. 
Victor. Jn fact, we remember from a discussion of the Greek 
Platonists Clement and Origen and from a description of the 
Gnostic heresies which influenced some of their doctrines, that 
83 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, pp. 67-68. 
84 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 68. 
^Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 69. 
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the Platonic emphasis on the moral ideal was generally linked 
with the development of moral hierarchies designed to measure 
the degrees of moral purity in men. We see traces of this 
tendency to categorize moral excellence in Boccaccio, who in 
the opening pages of Book IV categorizes his opponents in 
just such a fashion, placing the poet at the very top of the 
moral scale because of his gift of greater insight into the 
eternal truths. The emphasis on the moral excellence of the 
poet can be traced to the origin of the classical definition 
of propriety; a poet cannot truly perceive what is fitting 
and proper in his poetry unless he displays a quality of moral 
excellence in his own character. 
The division of literary styles according to the depic­
tion of high, middle or low types of character is rooted 
in this concept of a moral hierarchy. We see the classical 
influence on Boccaccio along precisely these lines in his 
treatment of comedy in the De Genealoqia. Charles Osgood has 
noted that Boccaccio's division of fictional types into three 
basic categories with the inclusion of the fourth but barely-
treated category of "Old Wives'Tales" derives from Cicero's 
classical definition of the fictional types in both the De 
86 
Inventione 1. 19. 27 and the Ad Herrenium 1. 8. 13. Boc­
caccio's category one matches the Ciceronian definition of 
fabula (neither true nor probable); category two parallels 
86 See Osgood note 14 to Book 14, Chapter 9, Boccaccio, 
De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 165. 
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the Ciceronian type arqumentum (fiction, yet probable); and 
category three resembles the Ciceronian type historia (like 
history, but remote in time). 
It is the second category, or arqumentum, which is most 
relevant to our discussion of comedy. Boccaccio expands on 
the use of the for*m which mingles truth and fiction, writing 
that although it can be put to good use, as in the case of 
the ancient Hebrew writers, it can be perverted by comic 
writers who care more "for the approval of a licentious pub-
87 
lie than for honesty." Here, in addition to the Ciceronian 
association of the type arqumentum with comic form (cf. Chapter 
II, pp. 87-88), we see the classical concern for the corrup­
tive influence of comedy and its depiction of low and licen­
tious character. This same concern surfaces in several other 
places in the De Genealoqia Deorum. In Book XIV, Chapter 15, 
Boccaccio denounced Ovid for the "licentious imagination" 
and "unrighteous mind" which are displayed in the Art of Love. 
Earlier, Boccaccio refers to "bad poets" who fill the stage 
with adulteries and corrupt the public morals. Osgood writes 
that this may refer to the Greek practice, cited by Boccaccio 
in the Commentary on Dante, of reciting adulterous stories 
from a small stage in the midst of the theatre, and often 
88 
enacted by mimes and buffoons. Boccaccio's stern denunciation 
8 7 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 48. 
88 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 182, n. 25. 
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of the decadence of these comedies reflects his classical 
commitment to a virtuous and dignified poetry in the high 
style: 
Their works should be condemned, hated, and spurned, as 
I shall show later. Yet if a few writers of fiction 
erred thus, poetry does not therefore deserve universal 
condemnation, since it offers us so many inducements to 
virtue, in the monitions and teachings of poets whose 
care it has been to set forth with lofty intelligence, 
and utmost candor, in exquisite style and diction, 
men's thoughts on things of heaven.89 
Although Boccaccio is very hard on licentiousness in comic 
poetry, he follows the classical tradition in making an excep­
tion of the poetry of Plautus and Terence, and remarks on 
their use of historical realism in comedy. Writing that these 
poets themselves intended no meaning other than the literal 
level of their poetry, he yet comments on the incidentally 
instructive function of this poetry—and its relation to the 
parable form. In fact, the passage in which this statement 
occurs is one of the few passages in the De Genealoqia Deorum 
in which Boccaccio specifically mentions the portrayal of 
character: 
The better of the comic poets, Terence and Plautus, for 
example, have also employed this form, but they intend 
naught other than the literal meaning of their lines. 
Yet by their art they portray varieties of human nature 
and conversation, incidentally teaching the reader and 
putting him on his guard.9^ 
89 Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, pp. 38-39. Osgood 
mentions that this denunciation of bad comic poetry may come 
from the Ars Poetriae of Horace or from Macrobius' Somnium 
Scipionis, note 25, p. 182. 
^Boccaccio, De Genealoqia Deorum, p. 49. 
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The association of good or moral comedy in this sense with 
the portrayal of varieties of human nature may derive from 
Cicero's rather elaborate explanation of the comic form, 
occurring under the category "argumentum" in the De Inventione 
In any case, the classical emphasis on moral instruction as 
the end and purpose of all types of good poetry finds clear 
expression in Boccaccio. it is clear, too, that however 
instructive comic poetry may be, it receives a less exalted 
position in the hierarchy of types because of the incidental 
nature of that instruction. 
We see this same classical approach operating once again 
in Boccaccio's discussion of Dante's Comedy, where Boccaccio 
shows concern over the inappropriateness of the term 'comedy" 
for Dante's subject-matter. It is clear that he associates 
comedy only with low subjects and persons of low degree. 
Dante's Comedy, however, is a strange mixture of the humble 
and the sublime, since it, according to Boccaccio, deals with 
exalted persons (angels, men of eminence and the Deity) and 
is yet written in low language. Boccaccio's true classical 
purism comes out strongly when he comments at the end of this 
passage that had Dante written his poem in the more exalted 
Latin tongue, it would have been all the more sublime and 
92 
dignified. 
91 See Cicero, De Inventione, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 56-61. 
92 Commenta,I, pp. 84-85. I amgrateful to Paget Toynbee, 
Dante Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), p. 73, for 
pointing out the passage. Robert Hollander has noted that in 
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The literary results of Boccaccio's concern for the clear 
separation of the sublime from the ridiculous can best be 
illustrated in a comparison with the more Dantean Chaucer. 
Chaucer, following in the Dantean-Christian tradition of pre­
senting great extremes of noble and comic behavior in char­
acter, takes the heavily dramatic suicide scene in Boccaccio's 
Filostrato and flaunts its comic possibilities. 
In Boccaccio the scene is one of unrelieved dramatic 
intensity. The lovers embrace one another, cry bitter tears 
and sigh in anguish. When Criseyde faints, Troilus curses 
Jove and prepares to kill himself before Criseyde awakens and 
93 
stops him. The scene is narrated with an eye toward enhanc­
ing the high drama of the situation in which Troilus and 
Criseyde find themselves. In Chaucer, the scene follows 
essentially the same sequence except that Chaucer draws atten­
tion to the double religious standard which is evident in the 
very language of the two participants. When Troilus is about 
his treatment of the four-fold method in the same commentary 
on Dante (Hollander uses the Esposizioni sopra la Comedia di 
Dante, ed. Giorgia Padoan, Milan, 1965). Boccaccio seems to 
substantially analyze only a two-fold allegorical method, 
dealing simply with the literal and allegorical/moral senses. 
Hollander bases his opinion on the distinction set forth in 
the accessus. In this passage, Boccaccio makes an obvious 
distinction between the "superficial" literal-historical sense 
and the allegorical senses, which include both moral and Bib­
lical meanings. It is clear, too, that the literal-historical 
level has less status, according to Boccaccio, than the "alle­
gorical" levels. 
9 3  . . .  See Boccaccio, The Filostrato of Giovanni Boccaccio, 
trans. Nathaniel Edward Griffin and Arthur Beckwith Myrick 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), 
pp. 343-349. 
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to kill himself, he bids a defiant farewell to the fates and, 
in keeping with his devotional attitude toward Criseyde, 
implores him in the words of Christ on the cross to "receive 
94 
his spirit." Chaucer again draws out attention to the mean­
ingless religious language used by both lovers when a few sen­
tences later, Criseyde conveniently awakens from her swoon, 
"thonks Cipride" for her good fortune, later swearing "0 
mercy God" when she "realizes" how close Troilus was to death 
In both instances Chaucer adds the religious rhetoric to the 
basic story supplied by Boccaccio. The contrast between the 
words and their religious implication produces an obvious 
comic irony which takes a good deal of the edge from the high 
drama of the situation and forms a clear contrast with Boc­
caccio's narrative. 
Though his portrayal of the would-be suicide exploits 
the comic irony contained within it, Chaucer's treatment of 
the scene does not fall into frivolous levity. The very ser­
iousness of useless oaths and of Christian" language used in 
the service of an illicit love would not have been lost on the 
reader, and reminds us rather strongly of the ethic underlying 
Dante's treatment of comic episodes in the Inferno. 
Thus we may conclude this short section on Boccaccio's 
literary theory with the observation that Boccaccio, although 
demonstrating a clear attachment to the content of Scriptural 
94 Geoffrey Chaucer, "Troilus and Criseyde," in The Works 
of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F. N. Robinson (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1957), pp. 453-454. 
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Revelation, has not integrated his faith with his total 
approach to poetics in the profound way in which Dante and 
Chaucer accomplish the same task. Boccaccio's aesthetic 
theory is marked by philosophical emphases and methods 
reaching back into the tradition of classical exegesis which 
finds its roots in allegorical methods developed by Plato and 
Aristotle, refined by later classicists, and carried into the 
Middle Ages through the allegorical method promoted by the 
Christian Platonists and other Greek-influenced Christian 
theologians and aestheticians. As a result, Boccaccio's 
understanding of figurative expression, an understanding 
which derives from a very classical conception of literary 
theory, cannot be said to constitute an environment conducive 
to the production of historically realistic characters in fic­
tion, except as these figures are viewed as exponents of the 
classical definition of comedy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CHARACTERIZATION IN CHAUCER'S TROILUS AND CRISEYDE 
We come now to the focal point of this study. Having 
established the origin, history, and general character of 
two important perspectives on literature which exist at the 
time of Chaucer, what light can they be seen to shed on the 
nature of Chaucer's approach to poetics? Specifically, what 
can be said about the nature of Chaucer's characterization 
in Troilus and Criseyde? To what extent, in other words, 
does Troilus and Criseyde manifest the classical perspective 
on reality? To what extent the centrally orthodox view? 
How does Chaucer's relation to each tradition affect the 
presentation of the characters of Troilus, Criseyde and Pan-
darus? These questions will be explored through a focus on 
the four basic issues which have been demonstrated earlier 
to be most relevant to the problem of the literary presenta­
tion of character: (1) the artist's general view of history, 
(2) the resulting view of fate and free will, (3) his attitude 
toward comedy, and (4) his approach to figurative expression. 
A number of Chaucerian critics have commented on the 
remarkable sense of history which pervades Chaucer's Troilus 
and Criseyde. Bloomfield comments on Chaucer's preoccupation 
with accurate chronology and his "strong feeling for the past, 
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1 
the present, and the future." John McCall observes that 
Chaucer's sense of history enables him to create a narrative 
2 
which is "more realistically and completely dramatic," and 
R. K. Root observes that Chaucer gives his story a "compell-
3 
ing sense of actuality." In addition, Bloomfield reinforces 
the major thesis of this paper by ascribing Chaucer's sense 
of history primarily to his insight into the implications of 
the Christian view of reality, a view "profoundly marked by 
the belief that events necessary to the salvation and res­
toration of man and his world will and have taken place in 
earthly history," and by the assmmption that such events 
"reveal providential plans and purposes which are essen-
4 
tially benevolent." 
In the course of this chapter, it will be demonstrated 
that Chaucer, though he exhibits some ties with the classical 
perspective on reality, yet shows a more fundamental attach­
ment to the Christian vision which informs his immediate 
predecessor, Dante, whose basic theological and allegorical 
orientation comes down to us in the sacramental tradition. 
"^Morton Bloomfield, "Chaucer's Sense of History," 
JEGP 51(1952), 305. 
2 John McCall, "The Trojan Scene in Chaucer's Troilus," 
ELH 29 (March, 1962), 274. 
3 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Book of Troilus and Criseyde, 
ed. and with a preface by R. K. Root (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1926), p. xxxiii. 
^Bloomfield, p. 301. 
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Chaucer's essentially Christian perspective on history 
is perhaps most evident in the theme of providential control 
which stands at the center of his narrative. Like Dante, 
Chaucer faithfully depicts the old classical story of the 
fall of Troy while yet demonstrating a clear awareness of 
its limitations from the Christian perspective. It is his 
own clear awareness of the providential perspective from 
which he speaks that gives Chaucer's careful handling of his 
pagan tragedy —a story which takes place before the birth 
of Christ—such a profound sense of Christian meaning. 
Throughout the retelling of the classical story, we are 
reminded of the view of reality which is Chaucer's consis­
tent absolute. This absolute, of course, becomes explicit 
5 
in the Epilog (Troilus and Criseyde V, 1835f.), where Chaucer 
makes a clear contrast between the Christian and pagan 
world-orders and gives us a sense of the difference between 
Christ's love and an earthly love controlled by destiny and 
unillumined by the higher definition of freedom which is 
implicit throughout the Troilus. 
Although this aspect of the poem is often pointed out 
by critics, it will be useful to review some of the more 
obvious reminders of the Christian world-view which Chaucer 
scatters liberally through his poem. This first hint of a 
5 Geoffrey Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, in The Works of 
Geoffrey Chaucer , ed. F. N. Robinson (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1957). Hereafter all references to the text are 
taken from this edition. 
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contrast between natural and heavenly love, between love moti­
vated by fate, and love motivated by freedom occurs in the 
opening verses of Book I, when :he narrator introduces his 
tale of love and asks his readers in remembering their own 
sorrow in natural love to pray for those lovers they know who 
may be in the same circumstance as Troilus: 
And Preieth for hem that ben in the cas 
Of Troilus, as ye may after here, 
That Love hem brynge in hevene to solas; 
And ek for me preieth to God so dere. 
(I, 28-32) 
The confusion between earthly and heavenly love evident in 
the narrator1s devotional plea serves as an implicit reminder 
of the Christian values which undergird the poem. Chaucer 
uses the same technique in describing Troilus1 capitulation 
to his romantic destiny. 
Early in Book I, the narrator refers to Troilus• fall 
into love as a "conversion" and later Pandarus urges Troilus 
to "have pees with himself," by accepting the "grace" which 
is offered to him, and to "repente" of his former coldness 
to love. At the end of Book I Pandarus in planning his 
approach to Criseyde opposes the two loves and comments on 
the susceptibility of human nature to one or the other kind: 
Was nevere man or womman yet bigete 
That was unapt to suffren loves hete, 
Celestial, or elles love of Kynde: 
Forthy some grace I hope in hire to fynde. 
(I, 977-980) 
In Book II, Criseyde and Pandarus continue the opposition 
with their consistently religious references—mostly in the 
form of mild oaths. In the first conversation alone, Pandarus 
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swears "If God wol," "By God," "God yow see," "I thonk it 
God," "For love of God," and "God be my savacioun" over 10 
times. Criseyde runs a close second with her constant cries 
of "For Goddes love," "Yea, holy God," "By God," "With grace 
of God," and "for love of God." These references to God as 
Pandarus and Criseyde use them are obviously casual conver­
sational fillers. They are not intended by either charac­
ter to carry the depth of meaning that Chaucer conveys through 
their inclusion in the language of each character here. 
Unobtrusively, he keeps the contrast between earthly and 
heavenly love before us. 
Pandarus1 description of Troilus1 dream-confession affords 
Chaucer another chance to display his talent for double-
entendre. Troilus, according to Pandarus' report, "repents" 
of his rebelliousness against Cupid, begs him for "mercy" 
and even berates himself with the words of the catholic con­
fessional—"Mea culpa"—all in his sleep (II, 525). Later 
on, when Criseyde debates the matter of her surrender to 
Troilus, she reveals a clear awareness of the distinction 
between "celestial" and "natural" ethics: 
What shal I doon? To what fyn lyve I thus? 
Shal I nat love, in cas if that me leste? 
What, par dieux! I am naught religious. 
And though that I myn herte sette at reste 
Upon this Knyght, that is the worthieste, 
And keepe alway myn honour and my name, 
By alle right, it may do me no shame. 
(II, 757-763) 
It is obvious that Criseyde's first allegiance is not to an 
inner code of faith, but to an outer code of social reputation. 
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In Book III, we have what first appears to be an eclipse of 
the tension between heavenly and earthly love which is 
implicit in the early books of Troilus and Criseyde. The 
third book opens with a paean to the "thousand formes of 
love" including the loves of man, beast and God (III, 7-14). 
The body of Book III is in itself a paean to the natural love 
of Troilus and Criseyde, which the narrator in conclusion 
links once again to the love of God: 
So wolde God, that auctour is of Kynde, 
That with his bond Love of his vertu liste 
To cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde, 
That from his bond no wight the wey out wiste; 
And hertes cole, hem wolde I that he twiste. 
To make hem love, and that hem liste ay rewe 
On hertes sore, and kepe hem that ben trewe! 
(Ill, 1765-1771) 
The clear linkage between earthly and heavenly love at this 
point and the narrator's obvious enthusiasm over the con­
summation of Troilus and Criseyde's love seems to refute the 
subtle hints of opposition which were pointed out in Books 
I and II. 
E. T. Donaldson has a very interesting explanation of 
this short eclipse of the narrator's objectivity at this point 
which also has a direct bearing on Chaucer's historical sense. 
Donaldson suggests that the narrator in Troilus and Criseyde 
has essentially two identities; one the "unloved servant of 
the God of Love" and one as a historian. It is as a histor­
ian that the narrator first presents himself—the careful 
follower of his "auctour Lollius" and the "olde bookes" which 
portray Criseyde as the historical embodiment of the faithless, 
! 
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deceiving woman. However, it is as a vicarious participant 
in the love-affair that the historian loses his objective 
view of Criseyde and becomes emotionally involved in his own 
6 
narration, halfway falling in love with Criseyde himself. 
Donaldson points out that the tension between the two views 
increases to an almost unendurable level until the beginning 
of Book IV where the historian is entirely subverted for 
the moment by the vicarious lover. The narrator begins as 
the historian—"For how Criseyde Troilus forsook"—and then 
under the force of his sympathy for her breaks down into— 
"Or at the leeste, how that she was unkynde" (IV, 15-16). 
Although Donaldson has grasped the tension which is 
operative here, and the narrator's momentary capitulation to 
a subjective point of view, we must note that Chaucer the 
author finds ways of controlling our emotional reactions to 
the lovers even as his narrator himself yields to the beauty 
of Troilus and Criseyde's romantic liaison. In the very 
first scene of Book III, for example, Chaucer continues to 
remind us of the Christian universe which constantly threatens 
to break into the romantic world created by Pandarus and the 
lovers. At the point in their first meeting at Deiphebus1 
house when Criseyde receives Troilus into his service, it 
seems to Pandarus that bells ring spontaneously as a manifes­
tation of the miracle which has taken place (III, 183). 
0 E. T. Donaldson, "Troilus and Criseyde," in Chaucer's 
Poetry: An Anthology for the Modern Reader (New York: Ron­
ald Press, 1958), pp. 966-67. 
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Besides heralding the miracle of the beginning of the 
courtly relationship, the bells also serve as a subtle 
reminder of the high point of the Christian eucharist, when 
the host is elevated to symbolize the union of flesh and 
spirit in Christ. Chaucer keeps the contrast of the two 
world-views—the pagan and Christian—before us. Pandarus 
adds to the religious overtones of this scene by falling 
down on his knees and thanking the goddess Venus for the 
miracle. 
Chaucer continues his subtle reminders of the Christian 
world-view throughout the rest of Book III. Pandarus con­
stantly "prays" to Apollo for help. Criseyde, unsettled by 
Pandarus' contrived story about her "fals" love for Horast 
reacts with a comment on the "mutability of earthly joys" 
(III, 820), the most Boethian-Christian of Middle-English 
themes. When Troilus and Criseyde are finally together, 
there is another "repentance and forgiveness" scene and just 
before Troilus finally embraces Criseyde he puts "al in 
Goddes hand." Criseyde yields, and welcomes Troilus by call­
ing him her "knyght" her "pees" and her "suffisaunce." If not 
open heresy in the pagan world which Chaucer has created, 
Criseyde's comment is certainly suspect from the standpoint 
of the Christian condemnation of idolatrous love. 
At two points during the consummation scene, Chaucer 
even seems to allow the Christian world-order which hovers 
so subtly over the romantic universe of the lovers to break 
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into the poem on an almost consciously explicit level. The 
first instance occurs when Criseyde comforts Troilus after 
his swoon and speaks to the feigned "problem" of his jealousy. 
When she finds he is jealous because she refused to look at 
him during the Feast of Palladin, she replies: 
Swete, al were it so 
What harm was that, syn I non yvel mene? 
For by that God that bought us bothe two 
In all thyng is my entente clene. 
(Ill, 1163-1166) 
This very orthodox reference to Christ's redemptive act on 
the cross is, from the perspective of the characters, simply 
another example of the careless epithets which Criseyde and 
Pandarus scatter freely through their conversation. However 
casual, this passage still serves to introduce a clear ref­
erence to Christ's love directly into the romantic world of 
the lovers and demonstrates Chaucer's conscious attempt to 
control that world. 
The second instance of a more explicit interjection of 
the Christian perspective into the narrative occurs at the 
very height of the narrator's excitement over the lover's 
meeting. In the conclusion to Book III, the narrator comments 
that Troilus held everyone lost who was not in "Love's heigh 
service," and then remarks rather ambiguously: "I mene folk 
7 
that oughte it ben of right" (III, 1793-95). Thus even in 
Book III, where the narrator becomes totally involved in the 
7 Howard Patch points out these two passages in Howard 
R. Patch, On Rereading Chaucer (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1959), p. 25. 
421 
action of the poem and the emotions of the lovers Chaucer 
reminds us of the Christian universe which threatens at 
every point to break into the fateful circle which the lov­
ers have drawn around themselves. Like Pandarus poking his 
head through the curtains of Criseyde's bed, the Christian 
reality threatens entrance into the world of an idolatrous 
Eros on every level. 
In the last two books, that reality breaks into the 
poetic universe of the lovers in force. The fact that they 
perceive its entrance as fortune's whim makes the irony 
Chaucer achieves in his Christian allusions all the more 
powerful. One of the most poignant of these allusions occurs 
in Troilus1 wish that all lovers find a love "of steel" 
which will "endure in joy:" "God leve that ye fynde ay love 
of stiel, and longe maie youre lif in joie endure" (IV, 
325-26). The contrast between what Chaucer's Christian aud­
ience knew about the eternal quality of God's love and the 
only love which Troilus perceives at the moment is only too 
obvious. Chancer continues to use this technique throughout 
Criseyde, referring to the turn of the wheel of fortune, remem­
bers that she has fallen from "heven" into "helle" (I, 712); 
her "soule" seeks only Troilus (IV, 699); she swears faithful­
ness to him "by all the gods" (IV, 1535-1540). Troilus, like­
wise, "prays" to Jove, and considers himself in "hell" at the 
end of Book IV. In Book V, he calls Criseyde's home the 
"shrine of a Saint," dreams the sort of prophetic dreams 
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which are commonplace in Biblical history, and once again 
prays to Cupid for relief. By using traditional Christian 
language and action throughout the pagan world of his poem, 
Chaucer keeps his reader subtly aware of the Christian vision 
which informs it. 
In the Epilog, of course, the Christian perspective 
which informs the poem up to this point mostly through ironic 
inversion becomes totally explicit. Troilus goes up to the 
eighth sphere, and having seen the vanity of his "fals" 
love, finds the true joy which Chaucer's narrator, now fully 
objective and fully within the Christian world-view once 
again, defines a few verses later in the famous address begin­
ning "0 yonge fresshe folkes...." In this address, Chaucer 
enjoins his audience to worship Christ, whose sacrificial 
love evidenced on the cross is the only true and enduring 
love. Thus he gives an explicit content to the love of 
which his whole story is the impermanent and imperfect image. 
It is obvious, too, that Chaucer's view of history is informed 
at all levels by the central historical fact of the Christ-
event, which he reiterates in almost creed-like form: 
And loveth hym, the which that right for love 
Upon a crois, oure soules for to beye, 
First starf, and roos, and sit in hevene above. 
(V, 1842-44) 
The subtle hints of the Christian historical perspective which 
we have seen all along in the ironic duality of the speech 
and actions of the characters thus culminates in a clear 
statement of the historical fact against which Chaucer measures 
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all seeming reality. Although his characters are pagan, 
their lives are given significance through the Christian 
matrix in which they move. 
The characters of Troilus and Criseyde are informed by 
the Christian view of history not only through the philosoph­
ical control which Chaucer constantly exercises over his 
characters through their inadvertent references to the Chris­
tian world view, but also through an increase in the dramatic 
tension brought about in the interplay of the classical notion 
of fate and the Christian belief in individual free will. 
In Chapter II of this study I noted the effect of a fated 
or an historical notion of reality on the representation of 
character in literature. The philosophers of the classical 
age, as I have shown, encouraged a view of history which 
emphasized its chaotic nature. Man, defeated from the first 
by the very nature of earthly history, yet strives to find a 
way of ordering or controlling the chaos he sees for the 
purpose of attaining eternal truth. As R. G. Collingwood 
put it, "Man's fate is master of him, and the freedom of his 
will is shown not in controlling the outward events of his 
life, but in controlling the inward temper in which he faces 
8 
these events. Eric Auerbach, we remember, notes that the 
destiny man spends most of his life trying to escape is his 
own, and that classical tragedy arises out of the struggle of 
g 
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clar­
endon Press, 1946), p. 20. 
424 
man against his own substantive and unchanging nature, deter­
mined before birth, and only gradually unfolded to him as he 
lives. A man's choices, though apparently free in the begin­
ning, are shown to have been governed by fate all along. 
The drama arises out of the seeming reversals of the fateful 
situation of the character. These reversals cause momentary 
hope in a good outcome, momentary belief in free will. 
But in classical drama, the hope and the belief are always 
short-lived. Through some new twist of circumstance, some 
new piece of information, the character once again recognizes 
his true destiny and is forced to bow to it. Aristotle 
points out that these elements of recognition and reversal 
occur only in the plot and thus suggests that freedom of the 
human will is always secondary in classical drama to the 
inevitability of the action. Where plot is more important 
than character, where the colossal dimensions of the struggle 
against destiny are more important than personality, we might 
expect a movement away from a historically individual repre­
sentation of man toward a more universalized "type-character." 
There are elements of this view reflected in both George 
L. Kittredge's and John L. Lowes' suggestion that Chaucer's 
characterizations in Troilus and Criseyde arise from the his­
toric circumstances surrounding the fate of Troy. Lowes 
comments that Chaucer's handling of the narrative makes us 
9 
consistently aware of the impending fate of Troy, and 
9 John L. Lowes, Geoffrey Chaucer and the Development of 
his Genius (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1934), p. 180. 
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Kittredge writes explicitly that for Troilus and Criseyde, 
"the fate of Troy is their fate...the tragedy of character 
10 
grows out of the tragedy of situation." For these critics 
11 
and others it is clear that the dramatic unity of action in 
Troilus and Criseyde resides in plot rather than in charac­
terization. 
We would expect such a view to go hand in hand with a 
mention of Chaucer's failure to create convincingly dramatic 
characters which have true flesh-and-blood appeal. However, 
this is seldom the case. Most critics give Chaucer a grudg­
ing respect for the dramatic appeal of the character of 
Criseyde, at least, and sometimes attribute elements of his­
torical realism to Pandarus or Troilus as well. The resolu­
tion of Criseyde1s individually dramatic appeal with an 
aesthetic which seems to give more attention to plot than 
character varies from critic to critic. One of the more inte­
resting explanations is offered by Arthur Mizener, who locates 
the modern tendency to see Criseyde as a psychologically 
realistic character in a failure to perceive that Chaucer 
"^G. L. Kittredge, Chaucer and His Poetry (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1915), pp. 119-121. 
"'""'"Lowes and Kittredge are supported in their view that 
Troilus and Criseyde is essentially tragic in conception by 
Arthur Mizener, "Character and Action in the Case of Criseyde," 
PMLA 54 (March, 1939), 65-79; D. S. Brewer, Chaucer (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 99n; Paul F. Baum, 
Chaucer: A Critical Appreciation (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1958), p. 155; and W. C. Curry, "Destiny in Chaucer's 
Troilus," PMLA 45 (March, 1930), 129f. 
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never motivates his heroine, in the fact that he never pre-
12 
sents Criseyde as making a clearly-motivated choice,, Cri-
seyde never changes, writes Mizener. She is the type of a 
faithless woman from the start, and Chaucer creates sympathy 
for her by enlisting us on the side of what she seems to be 
at the beginning of the narrative. The gap between what 
Criseyde is in the early books and what she is shown to be 
later is the answer to the mystery of her character and the 
dramatic intensity of her appeal. In other words, the tragedy 
is that in Book V, Criseyde does not act in accordance with 
what we thought her nature to be in Book I. We discover 
that she is not what she seemed to be. She is, however, 
what she has been all along—a faithless woman; we simply 
did not perceive the fact earlier. 
This, of course, is to view the characters of Troilus 
and Criseyde in much the same light as those critics who 
13 
tend to deal with all Chaucerian characters as fixed types. 
Viewing the characters of Troilus and Criseyde in this light 
puts Chaucer directly within the classical tradition of 
characterization, with its emphasis on substantive and 
unchanging moral natures, inevitability of plot, and drama 
which arises only out of the tension between the appearance 
of good and the ultimately tragic reality. 
12 Mizener, p. 68. 
13 D. Wo Robertson, for example, emphasizes the fixed 
nature of Chaucerian characterization. D. W. Robertson, 
Preface to Chaucer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963), p. 269. 
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Although this particular critical viewpoint helps to 
identify the operation of classical aesthetic elements which 
come down to Chaucer in the classical tradition we have 
explored in this study, it does not fully account either for 
the attention given to the concept of free will in Troilus 
and Criseyde, nor for the changes which we see in the char­
acters of Troilus and the narrator, nor for the optimistic 
Christian vision expressed in the Epilog. It can be demon­
strated that while Chaucer1s characters show evidences of 
the influence of a classical conception of character they are 
ultimately subsumed into the higher comic vision of the 
Dantean-Christian reality. Although Fortune is mock mistress 
of ceremonies for the duration of the action, the Christian 
God is the final measure of all things. On the classical 
side, Chaucer does seem to construct a formal hierarchy with 
his three major characters, a hierarchy which seems at first 
to be based on moral and social grounds. However, the social 
and moral categories of this hierarchy, though present and 
utilized by Chaucer, are muted in favor of a new Dantean-
Boethian standard of love and free will which becomes the 
final test of each character's spiritual authority in the 
narrative. Though Chaucer uses the classical categories to 
delineate his characters, he finally undercuts the whole 
classical notion of fate which underlies the predetermined 
status of his characters and brings us, with Troilus, into 
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a new awareness of the imperfection of all natural loves and 
the failure of all human intention both to will and to do 
the good. 
The characterization of Pandarus, for example, demon­
strates a world-view founded on a false love of gaiety and 
14 
pleasure. Pandarus' language, full of conventional moral 
15 
sententia and easy ornament, marks him immediately as a 
middle-class comic type from the classical perspective, and 
reveals both a studied use of moral aphorism and an incon­
sistent proclivity for metaphors of gaming and fortune. 
Behind a respectable facade of moral truth, Pandarus hides 
a voracious love of gaming and a questionable ethic. 
Chaucer constructs that double world-view from the open­
ing talk with Troilus, when Pandarus convinces the unhappy 
lover that he can help him with the argument: "A fool may 
ek a wise man ofte gide" (I, 630). The proverb itself is a 
16 
perfect example of conventional sententia, and yet at the 
same time Pandarus has correctly characterized himself as a 
jester, a worldly-wise gamester, who slips in and out of his 
various roles like quicksilver, and who sees love as nothing 
14 See Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. 
Richard H. Green (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), 
p. 70. 
15 Robt. O. Payne, The Key of Remembrance: A Study of 
Chaucer's Poetics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 
p. 187. 
"*"^W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Medieval 
Phase (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), Appendix. 
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more than a fascinating game with alternate serious and comic 
phases. Just before he pushes Troilus into a revelation of 
his secret love, he says to himself: "Aha! Here begynneth 
17 
game!" (I, 868). He pays homage to The Goddess of Love 
and realizes love's power over personal feeling, but refuses 
to be hindered from his gaming even by his own love-failures; 
he even turns those failures, by means of a Boethian metamor­
phosis, into an asset to his strategy: 
Sith of two contraries is o lore, 
I that have in love so ofte assayed 
Grevances, oughte konne, and wel the may 
Conseillen the of that thow art amayed. 
(I, 645-49) 
The logic, while recalling the Boethian discussion of con-
18 
traries, fails to mention that the "one thinge larned" by 
Boethius is God, who creates the contraries and binds them 
together in unity. Thus Chaucer subtly calls the original 
rendering to mind through Pandarus1 distortion of it, a tech­
nique which serves to keep the characterization in the proper 
spiritual perspective. 
In the conversation which follows Pandarus again reveals 
his talent for using Boethius for his own game. This time the 
subject is fortune. He explains to Troilus that fortune's 
wheel must move up, not down, since Troilus is already on the 
bottom, thereby comforting Troilus, but leaving the inevitable 
17 Sister Anne Barbara Gill, Paradoxical Patterns in 
Chaucer's Troilus: An Explanation of the Palinode (Washing­
ton: Catholic University of America Press, 1960), points 
out the passage. 
T O  
Boethius, pp. 70-71. 
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movement of the wheel downward once again hanging implicit 
in the air. Pandarus, of course, is not thinking about the 
implications of the total movement of Fortune's wheel, since 
what is important to him at the moment is simply the excite­
ment of the game of love, the challenge of getting his friend 
to play. While the entire conversation heads toward Pandarus1 
successful manipulation of Troilus into "repentaunce," toward 
Troilus1 entrance into what Pandarus sees as the game of love, 
Chaucer manages to keep the elements of the Boethian world 
view implicit in and defining the jester's perspective. 
At the end of the meeting with Troilus, Pandarus leaves 
to plot his game with Criseyde the next day, and when he 
finally arrives, plays it masterfully. Entering the room 
his attitude is one of boisterous good fun, and soon he has 
Criseyde charmed by his absurd high spirits and his irrev­
erent desire for dancing. After the highjinks at the begin­
ning, he indirectly brings up the subject of his secret, on 
which Criseyde quickly pounces, and then once having manipu­
lated his partner into the right position, begins another 
kind of dance which leads to a series of gradual conces­
sions on Criseyde's part and to her final accession to his 
will—and her own—in Book III. 
When Pandarus calls the next day, he once again plays 
the fool and gets Criseyde to laugh at this expense before 
proceeding with Troilus' case. The jokes Pandarus employs 
in both these instances reflect his usual incapacity for 
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taking anything seriously—including himself—and points up 
his ultimate attachment to the process of gaming. In an 
almost three-level pun, Chaucer has Pandarus advising Cri­
seyde: "Loke alway that ye fynde Game in myn hood!" (II, 
1109-10). Here the jab at himself, the spoof on cuckolding, 
and the word "game" itself bring to the surface all of Pan­
darus' multi-faceted attachment to the Goddess of Flux, to 
the process rather than the "end" of things. 
In the last books, Chaucer carries out this philosophy 
to its logical conclusion. In Book IV, reacting to Troilus1 
grief and anxiety at the prospect of losing Criseyde, Pan­
darus remarks: 
Swich fir by process, shall of kynde colde, 
For syn it it is but casuel pleasaunce, 
Some cas shall putte it out of remembraunce. 
(IV, 418-420) 
Here the emphasis on the ability of "cas" (i.e., circumstance) 
to change all for better or for worse echoes his arguments 
in the initial scene with Troilus. His attitude further 
reveals itself in the statement arguing for the abduction of 
Criseyde in Book IV: 
Forthi tak herte, and thynk right as a Knyght, 
Thorugh love is broken alday every lawe, 
Kith now somwhat thi corage and thi myghtt 
Have mercy on thiself, for any awe 
Lat not this wrecched wo thyn herte gnawe. 
But manly set the world on six and sevene, 
And if thow dye a martyre, go to hevene! 
(IV, 617-623) 
Not only does this passage directly contradict Boethian 
philosophy, in which the law of God expressly governs the 
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the lawlessness of human love, but it falls into the very 
language of chance itself at the end, adjuring Troilus to 
"stake the world on a throw of dice!" Thus Chaucer keeps 
his character in control through the Boethian standard of 
love implicit in Pandarus' reversal of it. The ironic proph­
ecy of Troilus1 martyrdom spoken in jest by the essentially 
irreligious Pandarus also points toward the fulfillment 
against which Chaucer plays his limited world-view. Troilus 
will die and he will "go to hevene" in a much more literal 
sense than Pandarus suspects. 
In Book V Pandarus, now dealing with a despondent 
Troilus, offers the only remedy he knows—a time of play 
at Sarpedoun. His strategy, true to form, is to get Troilus' 
mind off his philosophical speculations and back into the 
world of the moment, into the flux of time. Barbara Gill 
has pointed out that Pandarus is in this sense a false Lady 
Philosophy, trying to cure Troilus by illusion and decep­
tion. Pandarus, she concludes, has no remedy as does Lady 
Philosophy; he is caught in his own game: 
By all the sleight of that game he has offered 
Troilus a false view of love, affording him 
only temporary sensual pleasure and approximate 
despair in its deprivation.^0 
Furthermore, Pandarus' false friendship has become the nega­
tive model of the genuine friendship—based on virtue 
19 Boethius, p. 74. 
20Gill, pp. 51-52. 
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described in Boethius and Jean de Meun. Thus through a 
multiple use of ironic religious foreshadowing, negative 
contrast, and the underlying metaphor of "gaming," Chaucer 
constructs a character who in his limited view of love-as-
game suggests the very values which he negates, and prefigures 
the positive statement of those values in the Epilog. 
There is another technique which Chaucer uses in defin­
ing the limits of Pandarus' world-view. I have suggested 
that love defined as a game does not recognize the existence 
or operation of free will. Pandarus' whole technique in 
dealing with Troilus is a combination of manipulation and 
chance. Where decision can have no real effect, where love 
is not controlled with the mind of reason and choice, man 
can exercise no real dominion over his world, but becomes a 
victim (albeit, in Pandarus1 case, a canny victim) of the 
Goddess Fortuna. Pandarus, whose world-view is limited to 
exactly this understanding of reality, becomes the very sym­
bol of chance as a result. 
But what is more important, Pandarus is himself presented 
as being aware of the other alternatives to his own position 
on the subject. In Book I, during his first talk with Troilus, 
Pandarus tells the love-stricken warrior that he intends not 
to restrain Troilus from his love "theigh that it were Eleyne 
that is thi brother wif, if it wiste!" This comment not only 
21 
See Robertson's discussion of this friendship in 
Preface to Chaucer, p. 486. 
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demonstrates Pandarus1 total attachment to the God of 
romantic love, but also reveals his awareness of the external 
moral code which puts restrictions on romantic feeling and 
which thus contradicts his own position. His emphatic will­
ingness to flaunt that code in the face of romantic attach­
ment is obvious. 
Later on, Chaucer again makes us aware of Pandarus1 con­
scious knowledge of an external ethic which is at variance 
with his own. In Book III, 11. 274-280, he says he has not 
helped Troilus for "covetise," but "oonly for t'abregge that 
distresse/ For which wel neigh thow deidest," (ill, 262-63), 
and then contrasts his obvious attachment to the "good" of 
pleasurable satisfaction with the public code: 
And were it wist that I, thorugh my engyn 
Hadde in my nece yput this fantasie, 
To doon thi lust and holly to ben thyn, 
Whi, al the world upon it would crie, 
And seyn that I the werste trecherie 
Dide in this cas, that evere was bigonne 
And she forlost, and thow right nought ywonne. 
(Ill, 274-280) 
Pandarus1 recognition of the public code of morals at this 
point serves as a subtle reminder of that Christian code of 
ethics which hovers around the characters at numerous places 
in the narrative. It also makes us aware of a conscious 
choice that Pandarus himself has made, probably at some point 
before Chaucer1s story even begins. 
In the characterization of Criseyde, Chaucer shifts his 
attention to a different form of false love. Robert Payne 
has noticed that Criseyde's rhetorical style is consistently 
'I 
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unelaborated and natural, placing her in a middle-class social 
category distinct from Pandarus1 exaggerated sentiousness, 
but still more closely allied with his plain style (she speaks 
only one lyric and almost never employs tropes in dialogue) 
22 
than with Troilus' idealism. The general rhetorical kin­
ship between Criseyde and her "em" is carried out in at least 
one other area. Criseyde, like her uncle, demonstrates a 
slightly less cynical, but still very unmistakable awareness 
of the "game" she plays. When Pandarus threatens death in 
Book II if she will not "give mercy," Criseyde says to her-
23 
self: "It nedeth me ful sleighly for to pleie" (II, 462). 
But it is significant that the context of her remark reveals 
more the fear of a loss of reputation than the inherent 
attachment to "gaming" which Pandarus displays. Criseyde is 
worried about "what men wolde of it deme" if Pandarus makes 
a scene in her house, and although she is concerned with the 
rules of the game (she demurs when Pandarus' imagination 
wanders too far to the future of the love affair, cf. "Nay, 
therof spak I nought!" (II, 590), she is more concerned with 
her own honor—and specifically, with the paradoxical enlarge­
ment of personal self-esteem along with the threats to public 
honor which unmarried love, even of a worthy man, brings. 
22Payne, p. 199. 
23 Gill points out the passage, p. 43. 
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Chaucer establishes this attention to honor solidly 
through the descriptio at the beginning of Book I ("And ek 
the pure wise of hire mevynge/ Showed well that men myght 
in hire gesse honour, estat, and womanly noblesse"), and 
24 
develops it in her decision to love Troilus: 
All were it nat to doone, 
To graunte hym love for his worthynesse. 
It were honour with pley and with gladnesse; 
In honestee with swich a lord to deele, 
For myn estat, and also for his heele. 
(II, 703-707) 
Here Criseyde exhibits a remarkably canny appreciation of 
the social advantages of loving a king's son. 
In Book II, Criseyde vacillates between her desire for 
physical pleasure and the personal security of loving a 
worthy man, and her fear that her honor and reputation will 
be smirched by the relationship. She reasons: 
What shal I doon? To what fyn lyve I thus? 
Shal I not love, if that me leeste? 
What, par dieux! I am naught religious. 
And though that I myn herte sette at reste 
Upon this knight, that is the worthieste, 
And kepe alwey my honour and my name, 
By alie right, it may do me no shame. 
(II, 757-763) 
Despite her decision and the confirmation given by Antig­
one's Song, Criseyde's buried anxiousness surfaces again 
in Book III when she checks to make sure that Pandarus 
understands the stipulation of secrecy which applies to her 
visit to his house and warns him against "goosish people's 
24 See Robertson, p. 487: see also C. S. Lewis, Alle­
gory of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), 
pp. 186-190. 
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spech, that dremen thynges which that never were" (II, 
25 
584-585). Later on in the same book her fear once again 
reveals itself in the rhetorical question: "And who may 
stoppen every wikked tonge/ or soun of belles while that 
26 
thei ben ronge?" 
Clearly, Criseyde's phobia about the secrecy of her 
affair and the protection of her honor (a phobia which is 
in part conventional, but also a reflection of an overcon-
cern for public sanction) affects Pandarus and Troilus with 
a hypersensitivity for her reputation, even as it makes 
us wonder why she is so concerned with secrecy if she really 
plans to keep her honour in the first place. In Book III, 
immediately after the meeting in Deiphebus1 house, Pandarus 
advises Troilus to keep Criseyde "out of blame, Syn thow art 
wys, and save alwey hire name" (III# 265-266). Later on, 
Troilus decides not to abduct Criseyde for the express 
reason that he holds her honor derer than his life ("And 
me were levere ded than hire diffam" (V, 565). 
Criseyde's concern for her honor rises up again in 
Book IV during her last meeting with Troilus. She argues 
for her 10-day stay in Calkas; camp by bringing up Troilus 1 
27 
pledge to keep her honor: "May ye nought 10 dayes thanne 
abide/ For my honour, in swich an aventure?" (IV, 1328-29). 
25 See Gill, p. 58. 
See Gill, p. 56. 
27 
See Gill, p. 42. 
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In fact, "honour" informs Criseyde's vocabulary in the same 
way that "game" informs Pandarus1 vocabulary. "Honour" 
comprehends a kind of ultimate religious standard for Cri-
seyde, even as "gaming" forms the ultimate ethic for Pan­
darus. This becomes particularly apparent in the mixture 
of religious and secular language in her final plea to 
28 
Troilus not to plan an elopement: 
...Thynketh on my honestee 
That floureth yet, how foule I should it shende, 
And with what filthe it spotted sholde be 
If in this forme I shoulde with yow wende, 
My name should I nevere ayeyn wold wynne 
Thus were I lost, and that were routh and synne. 
(IV, 1576-82) 
"Routhe and synne" are obviously defined in this instance 
as attacks on public reputation, and not sin in the orthodox 
sense. It is a sign of Criseyde's ultimate perspective that 
the conventional Christian definition of sin has no meaning 
for her. Criseyde's inattention to this fact cannot be 
explained away literarily by her pagan condition, since 
she demonstrates awareness of her alternatives, and the 
contrast between her defense of personal honor and the 
Christian ideal of sacrificial love could not have been 
lost on Chaucer's audience. 
Criseyde's definition of "routhe and synne" is not the 
only use of stock religious phrases. Meaningless religious 
language echoes through her speech, and every other word is 
a conventional religious oath: "For Goddes love I preye," 
^See Gill, p. 61. 
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"for the love of God I yow wrecche," "with Goddes gover-
naunce." The emptiness of this kind of language reaches a 
climax in Book IV, when Criseyde, needing some extra rhe­
torical mileage, swears her fealty to Troilus on all the 
gods and invites "Atropos my thred of lif to brest, if I 
be falsi" (IV, 154-57). A stanza later she even opens her­
self to damnation to substantiate her point. All this is 
followed by her vow that she will be so faithful to Troilus 
"that ay honour to meward shal reboun" (IV, 1666). 
T^ere is a certain hysteria lacing Criseyde's whole 
l 
manner at this point. Sensing that somehow her own author­
ity ris inadequate in the face of such a need to convince 
Troilus of her sincerity, she drags in all the outside 
"authority" she can muster and still fails to convince. Of 
course, the heart-weakness of her "intent" becomes clear at 
the end as Criseyde talks with Diomede. Despite her feel­
ings for Troilus, she finally chooses her immediate "securi-
tee" as the more solid value: 
In hire soule ay up and doun, 
The wordes of sodeyn Diomede, 
His grete estate, and peril of the toun 
And that she was alone and hadde need 
of freendes help.... 
(V, 1023-27) 
Diomede's "grete estat" has a great attraction; Criseyde's 
fear of being alone does the rest; and all the while Chaucer 
has made his own subtle point: that sincerity is no substi­
tute for the truth. 
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Apart from the general Christian definition of "unlaw­
ful love" which has already colored the reader's suspicions 
about Criseyde, there is an explicit irony in her use of 
Boethian aphorisms on the mutability of human joy even as 
29 
she expects Troilus1 arrival at her bedside. Chaucer sets 
his characterization of Criseyde against several Boethian 
injunctions, the most important of which is a denunciation of 
honor not based on virtue: 
For virtue has its own honor, and this honor is trans­
ferred to those who possess virtue. Since popular 
acclaim cannot accomplish this, clearly it does not 
have the beauty which is characteristic of true honor. 
It is significant that Dante has a long section on this very 
subject in the Convivio, and comes to essentially the same 
31 
conclusions as Boethius. Thus Criseyde stands exposed. 
Her real attachment has been not to virtue, but to reputa­
tion, social status, and personal safety; ironically, she loses 
all in seeking the public honor which these goals represent. 
Chaucer makes it clear, as he did with Pandarus, that 
Criseyde has freely chosen her own "false god"—that she has 
been at least half-consciously aware of her alternatives from 
the beginning. When Criseyde first hears of Troilus1 request 
2 9  
Gill, p. 59. 
30 Boethius, p. 49. 
31 Dante, Convivio, trans. William Walrond Jackson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 258. Dante writes: 
"No one, because he is able to say, 'I am of such and such a 
stock,1 is entitled to believe that he is possessed of nobil­
ity, if these fruits (virtues) are not in him...." 
441 
for love from Pandarus, for example, she pushes him for his 
exact meaning. When Pandarus tells her straightforwardly 
"that ye hym love ayeyn for his lovynge/ As love for love is 
skilful guerdonynge11 (II, 391-92). Criseyde reacts with what 
should only be construed as a charming bit of feminine 
hypocrisy: 
With he stynte, and caste adoun the heed 
And she began to breste a-wepe anon, 
And seyde, "Alias for wo! Why nere I deed? 
For of this world the feyth is al aqoon 
Alias what sholden straunge to me doon 
When he, that for my beste frend I wende 
Ret me to love and sholde it me defende? 
(II, 407-413, Italics mine) 
That Criseyde is fully aware of the external "code of faith" 
which condemns illicit love is clear from her reference to 
32 
"the world" in which "the feyth is all agoon." In fact, 
her ostensible attachment to that "lost feyth" is what 
Chaucer uses to great effect in this passage, since it is 
very clear not only here but a few verses later as well that 
Criseyde is only too willing to throw that faith over when 
it becomes expedient. 
Once again we go back to the key passage in Book II 
where Criseyde weighs the advantages and disadvantages of a 
love-affair with Troilus. Significantly, Criseyde, like 
Pandarus, demonstrates disregard for the public institution 
of marriage, commenting that most husbands either "-..ben 
ful of Jalousie,/ or maisterfull, or loven novelrie" (II, 
32 Howard Patch points out the reference, p. 25. 
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755-56). Immediately after, she shows both her allegiance to 
Pandarus' pleasure-ethic and her awareness of an external 
code which judges her own by exclaiming: 
Shall I nat love: if that me leeste? 
What, par dieux! I am nought religious. 
(II, 758-59) 
Criseyde's recognition of the "religious" code which con­
demns her own and the choice she makes is patently clear at 
this point. Although Chaucer cannot be said to emphasize 
her decision in favor of the pleasure-ethic, he does find 
ways of subtly letting us know that Criseyde is on very 
33 
shaky ground. Once again, Chaucer may at first seem to be 
using the classical technique of creating a heroine who is 
"fated" from the beginning to a particular degree of moral 
awareness, but with only a phrase, he makes us aware that we 
are still in a universe where free choice is fully operative. 
Throughout, Chaucer's treatment of the character of Criseyde 
is managed so that we see her "slydynge corage." She never 
really comes to the point of a conscious decision, but her 
surface indecision is often only a "game"—played sometimes 
with others, sometimes only with herself—which hides a deci­
sion already formulated, even if she refuses to admit it, on 
the deeper levels. As the modern epigram has it—"Not to 
decide is to decide." 
33 
H. R. Patch comments that "the degree of intent is 
delicately managed, we admit, so that she fcriseydej has al­
most nothing to do. This is a method which suits her tem­
perament admirably....Still, Chaucer does not himself waver 
for the moment and depict a heroine of pagan morality." 
Patch, p. 25. 
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With Troilus, of course, the problem of fate and free 
will, subtly implicit in the characterizations of Criseyde 
and Pandarus, gradually becomes an explicit and agonized 
issue. Up to the point of the consummation scene, Troilus 
hardly seems aware that free will exists. Unlike Pandarus 
and Criseyde, he never exhibits an even half-conscious aware­
ness of the external code of ethics which breaks into the 
limited world-views of the two other major characters. Unlike 
Criseyde and Pandarus he is "religious,11 but his "religioun" 
is totally the religion of love, and there is no split between 
his reverence for Providence and his love for his lady. We 
see this at the beginning of Book I, when he asks God to help 
him toward his goal of service to Criseyde: 
Yow thanke I, Lord that han me brought to this 
But whither goddesse or womman, iwis, 
She be, I not, which that y do me rewe. 
(I, 424-426) 
Here it is clear that in Troilus' mind there is little dis­
tinction between earthly and heavenly love, love of "Kynde" 
and love of God. 
Several times during his first conversation with Pan­
darus, Troilus continues to make references to God, first 
asking Pandarus to leave "for the love of God," and then 
praying to God that it will be for his "beste" to tell Pan­
darus his problem. At the end of Book I, encouraged by Pan­
darus to pursue his love for Criseyde, Troilus transfers that 
confidence to his assessment of the war and boldly pronounces, 
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"God will helpe us atte laste!" referring to his belief that 
God will give the Trojans victory= Again in Book III, during 
his first visit with Criseyde, Troilus pleads for mercy and 
then comments: 
God woot, for I have, as ferforth as I have had konnynge, 
Ben youres al, God so my soule save 
And shal, til that I, woful wight, be grave. 
(Ill, 100-103) 
For Troilus, the exclamations "God Woot!" and "God so my 
soule save" have not the ironic effect that they have in the 
mouths of Pandarus and Criseyde. In Troilus1 conversation 
the oath is believable, and just how meaningful it is to him 
becomes clear later on in Book III: 
And for the love of God, my lady deere, 
Syn God hath wroght me for I shall yow serve, 
As thus I mene, he wol ye be my steere. 
(Ill, 1289-91) 
It is clear that for Troilus the God of Love has willed this 
relationship and gives his blessing to it. There is, as Dronke 
points out, a complete equation of the whole idea of trust 
34 
and service to the beloved with service to God. Troilus1 
understanding of God, limited though it may be, is untainted 
by the scheming pragmatism of Pandarus, and the ever-so-subtle 
calculations of Criseyde. His love, though misplaced, is 
whole-hearted and naive. 
Of course, from the Christian perspective which stands 
just outside Troilus1 world-view, there are obvious problems 
34 
Peter Dronke, "The Conclusion of Troilus and Criseyde," 
Medium Aevum 33(1964), 49. 
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in equating the love of God with human love. For one thing 
there is a tendency to evoke God's sanction on something 
which is not His chosen destiny for us at all. Clearly, 
this is exactly what Troilus does throughout the poem. At 
the very beginning of Book I, when Troilus first realizes 
he is in love, he laments the fact that God made him love a 
lady without pity, "Sith thow most loven thorugh thi des­
tine" (I, 520). Later, as his love affair develops, Troilus 
continues to view the whole business as his destined end. 
Thus he takes no real responsibility for his actions in it. 
This lack of active responsibility is evident throughout the 
poem. 
Troilus himself views the state of being in love in terms 
of being caught in a trap, with no warning or defense. 
Early in Book I he comments: 
O fool, now artow in the snare 
Tha whilom japedest at loves peyne. 
Now artow hent, now gnaw thin owen cheyne! 
Thow were ay wont ech lovere reprehende 
Of thing fro which thou kanst the nat defende. 
(I, 507-11) 
Troilus' love seems to "happen" to him, to come to him 
entirely by circumstance. Whenever there is a need for aggres­
sion, the impetus for action always comes from the outside 
in the form of Pandarus' machinations. It is Pandarus who 
makes the first foray into Criseyde's heart: Pandarus who 
initiates the first letter; Pandarus who plans the first 
meeting at Deiphebus' house and then orchestrates the proceed­
ings. In all of this, Troilus is totally acquiescent, totally 
without an active part in the proceedings. 
446 
In the consummation scene Chaucer exploits the comic 
absurdity of this lack of aggression to the hilt. Pandarus1 
manipulation of the action, as quick and ingenious as it has 
been in the first two books, in the consummation scene be­
comes positively inspired. Not only does Pandarus play the 
exhausting game of getting Criseyde to come without ruffling 
her sense of honour, not only does he spend an evening 
entertaining her and hiding Troilus, not only does he con­
trive the jealousy story which finally brings Troilus to Cri­
seyde' s side, not only does he then tell both Troilus and 
Criseyde what to say, but he is finally obliged to rip off 
Troilus' shirt and bodily throw him into Criseyde's bed. 
In all this, Troilus exhibits not a spark of free will-
he simply lets things happen. Of course, he finally does 
take "sodeyn" possession of his lady, but this comes as the 
result of sudden sexual arousal rather than of any "planned" 
35 
or intentional action on his part. Chaucer seems to draw 
our attention to this "new quality" in Troilus' love at least 
twice within the verses following. When Troilus goes home to 
his palace after the first night with Criseyde, he remembers 
every detail of the evening and Chaucer comments that "Desir 
35 
H. R. Patch suggests that Troilus' "sin" is inaction— 
his failure to exercise free will. Though it is true from 
the Christian viewpoint, it seems to me that Chaucer takes 
pains to absolve Troilus from guilt by presenting him as 
completely unaware of an alternative ethic. Unlike Pandarus 
and Criseyde, Troilus is unconscious of any "religioun" 
but the "religioun" of love. 
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al newe hym brende, and lust to brede/ Gan more than erst, 
and yet took he non hede" (III, 1546-47, Italics mine). 
Again, when Troilus reports the story of his "glade nyght" 
to Pandarus, he tells his friend, "I not myself nought wisly 
what it is/ But now I feele a newe qualitee,/ Yee al another 
than I dide er this" (III, 1653-55, Italics mine). One gets 
the feeling that this is the sincere report of a newly-
experienced passion on Troilus1 part. 
Pandarus' reaction, however, reveals more than a hint 
of double-entendre: 
Pandare answerd, and seyde thus, that "he 
That ones may in hevene blisse be 
He feleth other weyes, dar I leye, 
Than thilke tyme he first herde of it seye." 
(Ill, 1656-1659) 
Somehow in Pandarus' mouth, the identification of earthly 
and heavenly love which we see in Troilus becomes a mockery. 
We sense immediately that Pandarus knows much more about 
earthly passion than Troilus and that he is simply talking 
Troilus' language in order to pacify him and gain power 
over him—something which he has done throughout. It is Pan­
darus, in fact, whose actions we find most interesting and 
whom we follow most closely, simply because Troilus' actions 
are so predictably passive. 
Troilus' main contribution to the action of the narra­
tive has been his vacillating emotional state. He is con­
stantly in a "traunce bitwixen hope and derk disesperaunce," 
depending, Chaucer tells us, on the tone and frequency of 
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Criseyde1s letters. ("And after swich answeres as he hadde/ 
So were his dayes sorry outher gladde", II, 1350-51). He is 
also constantly praying to the God of Love—and to Criseyde— 
to help him out. Thus when Criseyde finally accepts him 
fully and asks forgiveness for hurting him, Troilus takes 
this as a sign of God's blessing on the relationship and, 
"sodeynly avysed, hire in armes faste to hym hente" (III, 
1187). 
It is my opinion that Chaucer draws out attention to 
Troilus1 religious devotion in this scene by pointing out 
that just before Troilus takes possession of Criseyde he puts 
"all into Goddes hand, as He that mente nothyng but wel" 
(III, 1185-86). Troilus1 sense of trust in the goodness 
of the God of Love is exactly the issue on which Chaucer 
wants us to focus. If we did not know better, we would say 
at this point that from a certain Christian perspective 
Troilus has done everything exactly right. Instead of trust­
ing in his own powers he has trusted in God's grace and he 
has believed that God's ultimate intentions toward him are 
good ones. He confidently states his trust in the goodness 
of God before he acts. The problem is, once again, that 
Troilus has put his trust in an object which does not possess 
the objective goodness to which he appeals. Instead of plac­
ing his trust in a god which is above circumstance and flux, 
Troilus puts his faith in an unconsecrated fleshly good 
which cannot bear the weight of his belief. 
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It is not surprising that when his fortune changes, 
Troilus blames God for turning on him, for "falsing" his 
truth in what Troilus had believed to be God's goodness. 
But of course the whole point is that God is good and His 
goodness lies in the very fact that He will not let Troilus 
remain blind to His larger will. God's ultimate intentions 
are good; this is what Troilus cannot see. Again, it is the 
apparent goodness of Troilus' love which is the whole crux 
of Chaucer's story. Troilus' definition of Goodness is 
totally circumstantial. For him, the good is defined in 
purely romantic terms; "God" is the God of love and love 
can be satisfied only by full possession of his lady-idol. 
According to Chaucer's ultimate world-view, Troilus' 
real sin is that he presumes to worship a false god as the 
ultimate good. This same presumption in different forms is 
the main problem with all the characters in Troilus and Cri-
seyde; they put their faith either in fortune, in themselves, 
or in romantic love, although Troilus, because he seems most 
unaware of the revealed truth which judges his actions, comes 
out a bit better than Pandarus and Criseyde in the end. 
Chaucer makes the problem of placing one's trust in an 
unworthy object abundantly clear in an important passage in 
Book I, when he links pride or presumption with "blynde 
entencioun:" 
0 blynde world, o blynde entencioun. 
How often falleth al the effect contraire 
Of surquidrie and foul presumpcioun! 
(I, 211-213) 
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In various ways each character in Troilus is discovered to 
be relying in some basic sense on a false concept of their 
capacity to will and to do the good. In fact, this is how 
Chaucer defines "pride" and "presumpcioun." In the case of 
Pandarus and Criseyde, Chaucer calls the very sincerity of 
the intention itself into question. In the case of Troilus, 
the intentions are sincere, but, as we have pointed out, they 
are not grounded in reality, and thus prove inadequate in the 
face of suffering and evil. 
Chaucer's non-didact.ic emphasis on this truth is felt 
throughout the story in his emphasis on the character's 
"entent" to do the good and in a constant reference to the 
gap between what is said and what is actually meant. This 
emphasis probably results from the combined interest of both 
Dante and Boethius in the problem. In the Purgatory, XXI, 
105-108, Dante states explicitly that "the will cannot do 
all it wishes," and throughout the Comedy points out instances 
where intention breaks down in the face of circumstance. (See, 
for example, the case of Piccarda and Constance in Paradiso, 
Canto IV, 346-350.) Boethius deals with the problem of inten­
tion in Book IV, prose 2 when he discusses the difference in 
36 
will-power between the good and the evil man. 
The influence of Dante and Boethius on the problem of 
intention is felt throughout Troilus and Criseyde. Pandarus, 
for example, responds to Troilus in their very first conver­
sation together by assuring him that his "entencioun/ Nis 
36Boethius, p. 77. 
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not to yow of reprehencioun" (I, 683-84). Later on, he en­
joins Troilus to repent "with al thyn herte in good entente" 
(I, 935). In Book II, Pandarus quiets Criseyde's fears of 
the "end" of the relationship in which Pandarus invites her 
to participate by assuring her that he speaks "of good 
entencioun" (II, 295). Of course. Pandarus must follow the 
code of romantic love, and is thus caught between his real 
intention—to bring the love of the lovers to a physical 
consummation—and the "intent" which he ostensibly presents 
to Criseyde. 
Criseyde herself is aware of Pandarus1 real intent from 
the first, and just after the long internal monologue in 
which she mulls over the pros and cons of loving Troilus, 
Chaucer brings the subject of "intent" into sharp relief as 
Antigone sings her song in the garden. This song, in which 
Antigone urges Criseyde to love, begins with the phrase: 
"0 love to whom I have and shal/ Be humble subgit, trewe in 
myn entente...." and continues on to praise the power of love 
to move the will to virtuous intention: 
This is the right lif that I am inne 
To flemen all manere vice and synne: 
This dooth me so to vertu for t1entende 
That day by day I in my wille amende. 
(II, 851-854) 
Immediately after this, Criseyde begins to weaken. Although 
Chaucer does not say she consciously decides to love Troilus 
at this point—he does comment "And ay gan love hire lasse 
for t'agaste/ than it dede erst, and synken in hire herte,/ 
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That she wex somwhat able to converte" (II, 900-03). Immed­
iately after this, Criseyde goes to bed and dreams that an 
eagle rends her heart from her breast and carries it away, 
after replacing it with his own. This is the conventional 
way of telling us that Criseyde has fallen in love; that 
Troilus has taken her heart away and replaced it with his 
own. Without mentioning a conscious decision to love, Chaucer 
makes it clear that Criseyde has been conquered. 
Although she has already decided to love—and to love 
without holding back—Criseyde yet must play the game with 
Pandarus, veiling her own true intent. Once again Chaucer 
subtly calls our attention to the whole problem of intent. 
When Criseyde answers Troilus1 letter, she thanks him for 
"al he wel mente towards her" (II, 1221). The narrator, 
immediately following, comments that Criseyde's intent is 
"pleynly" "to love hym unwiste, if she myghte;/ And guerdon 
hym with nothing but sighte" (II, 1293-95). Later on, he 
assures us that Criseyde is "al innocente of Pandarus' 
entente" when she goes into Troilus' sick-chamber. Of 
course, the narrator's attitude, as we pointed out earlier, 
is suspect because of his own obvious fondness for Criseyde. 
In Book III, Criseyde herself draws attention to the 
whole problem of good intentions when she responds to Troilus' 
accusation that she refused to look at him in the temple 
with the comment: "What harm was that, syn I non yvel mene?/ 
For, by that God that bought us bothe two,/ In alle thyng is 
myn entente cleene" (ill, 1164-66). Later, the narrator 
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explains that Criseyde yields to Troilus because she trusts 
his "clene entente" (III, 1229-30). 
Again and again, Chaucer weaves the good intentions 
of his major characters into the dialogue and gradually 
strengthens our impression that for Pandarus and Criseyde, 
at least the end of their intent is more than superficial 
satisfaction of a courtly code of manners. That Criseyde 
and Pandarus have been playing the same game all along becomes 
clear during the last part of Book III. Pandarus1 invitation 
to Criseyde to dine at his home offers a classic example of 
unsaid intent. Criseyde, guessing that Troilus is at Pan­
darus1 home even after Pandarus swears that he is not, gladly 
takes up her uncle's invitation "withowten await" (III, 1579). 
Of course, Criseyde1s probable awareness of Troilus1 where­
abouts is not told us explicitly, but Chaucer manages to 
draw our attention to the problem with typical delicacy: 
Nought list myn auctour fully to declare 
What that she thoughte whan he seyde so, 
That Troilus was out of twone yfare, 
As if he seyde thereof soth or no. 
(Ill, 575-78) 
Thus Chaucer, while he gives us no concrete revelation of 
Criseyde's actual intent in accepting Pandarus1 invitation, 
points a finger directly at what he knows is already in her 
mind. 
After the consummation scene, Pandarus seeks out Cri­
seyde as she lies in bed in the morning, and Chaucer's por­
trait of Criseyde at this point reflects both her immediate 
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happiness and a typically feminine tendency to foist her 
responsibility for the affair on to her uncle. But in the 
end, Criseyde forgives Pandarus for his machinations, and 
begins to "pleye" with him in a manner which suggests not 
only full forgiveness, but a secret and delighted approval 
of all which has occurred. In fact, the slightly lascivious 
"pleyeing" which ensues at this point is almost grounds for 
assuming secret complicity between Pandarus and Criseyde— 
an unsaid but hilarious recognition that both have reached 
their unconfessed goals, that each has played the game 
without giving anything away—even to each other. Chaucer, 
fox that he is, never allows us to go too far in our judg­
ment, however, and leaves the scene at a point of careful 
ambiguity. 
As the story winds to its unhappy conclusion, Chaucer 
keeps the notion of betrayed intentions before us. Caught 
in the circumstances surrounding the Trojan war, Criseyde in 
a secret meeting with Troilus declares her plan and her 
"entente" to come back to him (IV, 1525-26). When Troilus 
registers apprehension at her plans, Criseyde berates him 
for not trusting her good word: 
Now for the love of Cinthia the sheene, 
Mistrust me nought thus causeles, for routhe, 
Syn to be trewe, I have yow plight my trouthe. 
(IV, 1608-1611) 
Not only is Criseyde1s unintentional lie at issue here, but 
its falseness is underscored by the use of the phrase 
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"pl.ighte my trouthe," by which Chaucer through yet another 
double-entendre, keeps the Christian ethic subtly before us. 
In Book V, Criseyde writes the letter which finally 
brings Troilus to an acceptance of the truth. After promis­
ing Troilus once again that she will come ("but yet in swich 
disjoynte? I stonde as now, that what yer or what day/That 
this shal be, that kan I naught apoynte."), she concludes 
with the blythe comment that she hopes he will not take 
offense because her letter is so short since "th'entente is 
al, and nat the lettres space, (V, 1630). Just before this 
the narrator, referring to Criseyde's first letter comments 
on Criseyde's "botmeles bihestes" (bottomless promises) and 
laments openly: "thus goth the world. God shilde us fro 
meschaunce,/ And every wight that meneth trouthe avaunce!" 
(V, 1435). "Every wight that meneth trouthe...."—this is 
the crux of Chaucer's subtle message, and cannot be seen 
except against the background of the Christian reality 
which is Chaucer's final authority. Pandarus and Criseyde 
do not mean the truth at all; Troilus, although sincere 
in his promises and intentions, finds them empty—even pre-
sumptious—when placed in the service of a good which has 
been given only human definition. Ultimately, all of Chau­
cer's characters are seen as sinners when judged according 
to the larger set of standards constantly set forth through­
out the poem. Thus Chaucer 1s Christian world-view greatly 
affects the representation of his characters, especially in 
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regard to the emphasis given the problem of intention and its 
subterranean connection with pride and presumption. 
Mary McCarthy offers some insight into a general realism 
which emphasizes the problem of human incorrigibility when 
she observes that realistic characterization is never achieved 
without comedy, and that contrary to popular belief, a comic 
character is "likely to be more complicated and enigmatic 
37 
than a hero or heroine, fuller of surprises and turnabouts." 
Miss McCarthy identifies the source of the comic character's 
realism in his very appeal to our corporate sympathy with 
man's willful refusal to change or grow: 
The comic element is the incorrigible element in every 
human being; the capacity to learn from experience 
of instruction is what is forbidden to all comic crea­
tions and to what is comic in you and me.38 
It is not clear exactly whether or not Miss McCarthy herself 
would associate what she calls "human incorrigibility," that 
comic but exasperating willfulness (which breaks out unpre­
dictably in all of us) with the more serious reality of human 
sin, but it is certain that a medieval Christian audience 
would have been capable of seeing the connection. In the 
Christian view, human imperfection in any form, whether char­
acterized as morally serious or not, from a human stand­
point is regarded as the sign of a deeper malaise. 
37 Mary McCarthy, "Characters in Fiction," On the Contrary 
(London: Heinemann, 1962), pp. 288-89. 
O Q 
McCarthyB] p. 288. 
457 
The depth of that malaise in the Christian understanding 
is the more striking by contrast with the classical views of 
human nature which precede it. Plato, for example, even 
though disillusioned with man's capacity to come up to the 
ideal, never lost his faith in the capacity of education to 
activate the will and produce good actions and character. 
Aristotle, while he saw the powerlessness of good intention 
in the face of man's passionate nature, did not develop 
the deep recognition of the powerlessness of human will 
reached in the Christian vision of man. Neither offers a 
solution to the problem of the weakness of the will beyond 
the exhortation to cultivate on one's own power, the natural 
goodness one finds within the human personality. In both 
Plato and Aristotle, the view of human nature is always 
tinged with optimism, a faint hope that if the conditions 
are exactly right, man will be able by the light of his own 
reason, to apprehend, to will and to do the good. In contrast, 
the Christian view of man recognizes human ability to appre­
hend the truth and even intend it, but utterly rejects any 
notion of man's capacity to fulfill those intentions: "For 
I know that in me (that is, in my flesh), dwelleth no good 
thing; for to will is present with me: but how to perform 
that which is good I find not" (Romans 7:18). 
The Christian emphasis on the utter depravity of man 
adds a dark dimension even to a comic representation of his 
"incorrigibility," for human imperfection in any measure 
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betrays the presence of forces which work toward destruction 
of the ideal. Thus even the minor faults of a particular 
fictional character are no laughing matter for any man to 
whom the fact of human sin is an occasion for the eternal 
wrath of God. Chaucer, it seems to me, rests firmly within 
the orthodox Christian tradition when it comes to the atten­
tion he gives to the whole problem of intention in this 
sense. He exposes man's tendency to overestimate his capacity 
to perform that which he intends at every opportunity. 
The Christian view of comedy operative in Chaucer also 
affects his presentation of the major characters on a slightly 
different level. We remember that in the classical view of 
man, characters are born into a fixed moral level which, 
though it may appear to change actually remains a function of 
an individual's ultimate destiny throughout life. This 
unchanging moral nature, we remember, led to the depiction 
of ideal characters with a fixed moral and social standing 
and a universal rather than an individual appeal. The Chris­
tian vision of man, however, depicts man—any man, regardless 
of social standing—as capable of radical moral change in 
life. The potential for change involves the possibility of 
spiritual rebirth, or the creation of the new man in Christ 
through an action of grace. Such a conversion experience, 
which also involves a conscious commitment to the person of 
Christ, takes place without destruction of the unique personal­
ity of the believer. The opposite—a temporary or permanent 
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fall from grace—is also possible, and the drama of the Chris­
tian vision of man arises from just these possibilities. 
We remember, too, that the Christian perspective makes 
possible the representation of lower or sinful characters 
in serious or comic narrative. In Dante, such a view of 
man makes possible the low comedy in Cantos XXI-XXIII of 
the Inferno. Not only does this episode present the bestial 
side of man, and his cowardice in the farcical style, but it 
presents a Virgil who is capable of serious error, or a ser­
ious misestimate of the devil's power. It is comic, but it 
is also profoundly tragic, a mixture of both the exalted dig­
nity of man and his sinful foolishness. The representation 
of extremes of behaviour in one character forms a direct 
contrast with the classical view of comic reality, which, 
when it allows comic characterization at all, keeps it 
rigidly controlled by a representation of only mischievous 
evil or ludicrousness in characters of low social stand­
ing, and by careful restrictions on style. 
The contrast in these two views of, comedy may shed some 
light on Chaucer's characterization in Troilus and Criseyde. 
Although it seems to me that much of the surface tone of 
Troilus and Criseyde is mischievous rather than seri ous, the 
poem is profoundly serious in its ultimate vision of reality, 
and there are hints of that seriousness throughout the narra­
tive, especially at those points, identified in the preced­
ing sections of this study, where Chaucer allows the Christian 
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world-view which controls his characters to break consciously 
into the poem. It is during these touchstone moments in 
the poem, when we are made aware of the free Christian uni­
verse which generally hovers outside the fated world in 
which the characters move, that the characters seem most 
dramatic in the Christian sense, that they seem most capable 
of making a free choice. It is also at these moments when 
the extremes of moral behavior possible for any given human 
being come into sharpest focus. This may be one reason why 
Pandarus, and especially Criseyde, have a deeper sense of 
felt life than the character of Troilus, who is presented 
as so morally impeccable, so sincerely and blindly devoted 
to the "religioun" of love. It may also be another reason 
why the comedy surrounding the characters of Pandarus and 
Criseyde takes on a darker note than that surrounding Troilus. 
In fact, Chaucer builds much of the humour in the scene 
involving Pandarus and Troilus around the gap between Pan­
darus 1 rather jaded understanding of the ways of erotic love 
and Troilus1 uninitiated innocence, his reverent attitude 
toward the whole subject of love. In the first scene between 
the two characters in Book I, for example, Pandarus' jokes 
are directed precisely toward Troilus1 "religious" behavior: 
Pandarus asks first whether the Greeks have made him weak, 
and then surmises: 
Or hastow som remors of conscience 
And art now falle in some devocioun, 
And wailest for thi synne and thin offence, 
And hast for ferde caught attricioun? 
(I, 554-557) 
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This is Pandarus 1 typical manner—joking,irreverent, tinged 
with ironic religious allusion. Troilus responds with an 
exclamation of woe which, however silly, has none of the 
overtones of Pandarus' knowing irony. 
The contrast in the two characters reflects the dif­
ference once again in their aware --.ess and recognition of 
good and evil. Pandarus, having t .ire earthly experience, more 
carnal knowledge in both senses, u iderstands fallen human 
nature. Troilus, though most certainly fallen from the 
Dantean-Christian perspective, yet within the world of the 
poem has a certain innocence. The characterization of Troilus 
itself demonstrates a definite Christian element in its 
mixture of the sublime and the ridiculous, in its mixture of 
the war-hero image and the portrait of the ineffectual lover. 
He is a King's Son—the person of highest social standing in 
the narrative—and at the same time behaves in a ridiculously 
melodramatic fashion. His actions may be attributable to 
youth, but they are no less ridiculous on that account. Like 
Dante the Pilgrim in the Divine Comedy, ̂ roilus is often the 
picture of unheroic heroism. Chaucer makes us patently aware 
through the clash of extremes in his protagonist that we are 
in a world far removed from the classical vision of comedy. 
Of course, Chaucer accomplishes this melange of extremes 
within the circumscribed limits of his story, and Troilus, as 
we have pointed out, is not nearly so conscious of his choices 
as Dante the Pilgrim. Troilus is foolish, but naive in 
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his foolishness, and his characterization, lacking the self-
consciousness of the two other major protagonists, is less 
dramatically convincing as a result. Somehow Chaucer's 
audience is made to feel that Troilus1 woebegone romanticiz­
ing is ridiculous without being in any way threatening to 
our sense of the good. 
With Pandarus, we have another situation. Pandarus is 
a middle-class type whose comedy often fits exactly the mold. 
In this sense, his character is very classical in conception— 
and yet Pandarus, while falling directly into a proper 
classical category, displays comedy which is not untouched 
by a darker element which can arise only out of the Christian 
vision of man. We think of Pandarus primarily as a mischief-
maker and we participate in his game with the same high 
spirits in which he carries it on at Criseyde's palace. But 
Pandarus1 mischief-making is motivated by the god of good 
fortune in love, and thus his machinations have a slight taint 
of lawlessness and chaos. Not only is this brought out in 
his attachment to gaming, which we mentioned earlier, but 
Chaucer draws out attention to it, sometimes explicitly, as 
when in Book IV he urges Troilus to "ravisshe" Criseyde and 
rationalizes, "Thorugh love is broken al day every lawe" 
(IV, 618). 
The darker side of Pandarus1 characterization can also 
be seen in his comic witticisms. With Pandarus, there is 
always the underlying double-entendre, the knowing leer, the 
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recognition of the ulterior motive. This makes him more 
cognizant of human failing, ineffably more sinister., And 
it is the reason why Pandarus comes closer to the vision of 
dramatic characterization reached in the comic recesses of 
the Divine Comedy, with Dante's profound awareness of human 
capacity for evil. Pandarus himself, it is clear, has long 
ago decided to attach himself to a false god of gaming and 
pleasure. In him, we see none of the struggle and choice we 
see in both Troilus and Criseyde at various points in the 
narrative. He has been a "servant of Love" for a long time— 
as Chaucer makes clear in the beginning of Book II. It is 
also clear from his banter with Criseyde that he either has 
not had a successful love-life, or that he is now too old to 
attract an affair of his own. In any case, the liaison between 
Troilus and Criseyde gives him a chance for vicarious partic­
ipation in what is no longer a viable option for him. Un­
like the younger lovers, Pandarus, although he demonstrates 
clear awareness of his alternatives, has already made his 
decision to attach himself to a false good, and as such, he 
is much more the tempter than the tempted. He has no prob­
lems with guilt and sin because his religion of chance does 
not allow them definition. In his world, there is no good 
and bad, only good luck and bad luck. Aware of the outside 
standard which judges his own, he is yet fully committed to 
the fateful world which he creates for himself, and into 
which he draws both his niece and Troilus. 
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E. T. Donaldson has noticed that in this sense Pandarus 
bears a relation to the problem of reality in being what the 
39 
modern world would deem a "thoroughgoing realist." Para­
doxically, writes Donaldson, this seems to mean Pandarus has 
no respect for an objective reality at all. For him, things 
are what he makes them, and what he creates in Troilus and 
Criseyde is a world of illusion, which finally crashes down 
around all the participants. 
Pandarus, of course, accepts no responsibility for the 
crash. There is no evidence in the poem that he has any con­
science about his role in the sad end of the love-affair at 
all. To him, it is all Criseyde's fault, and he hates 
her as a result (V, 1733). To Troilus, also, he pictures 
himself only as a servant, ("I dide al that the leste") 
(V, 1736), thus absolving himself on that front. While 
recognizing the fact of human failure and sin, Pandarus 
keeps it always at arm's length, never allowing it to judge 
his own behavior or to affect his ultimate attachment to the 
religion of chance and pleasure. 
With "tendre-hearted" Criseyde, however, guilt and fear 
come much closer to piercing to the inner spirit. Neverthe­
less , the comedy in her characterization springs from essen­
tially the same source as her uncle. Criseyde1s comic behav­
ior is most evident in the gap between her "inner" and "outer" 
39 
Donaldson, p. 972. 
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intentions. I have pointed out in an earlier section of this 
chapter the subtle calculating which goes on in her mind as 
she fences with her "em" in their first meeting. The whole 
problem for Criseyde, once she has decided not to lose what 
may be her last chance at love seems to be how to get Troilus 
within the limits of courtly tradition—and how to get him 
without admitting to her "em," herself, or Troilus how 
eagerly she awaits the consummation of their love. After 
the first night with Troilus, however, Criseyde can relax 
a bit, and comments to Troilus when he claims her, "Ne hadde 
I er now, my swete herte deere,/ Ben yold, ywis, I were now 
nought heere!" (Ill, 1210-1211). 
Later on, her comic pleasure in melodrama and the phys­
ical aspect of love becomes even more apparent in the meeting 
with Troilus just after they both find out the news of her 
pending return to the Greek camp. After the suicide scene, 
in which Criseyde swoons and Troilus swears he will follow 
her in death, and pulls his sword out of its sheath, Crisyde 
handily revives and they begin to lament together. Cri­
seyde then promises that if Troilus had killed himself, she 
surely would have followed suit. Immediately after this, 
however, she tires of the melodrama and the proof of love 
game and gets down to business: 
But hoo, for we han right ynough of this; 
And lat us rise, and streght to bedde go, 
And there lat us speken of our wo. 
(IV, 1242-44) 
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I do not wish to suggest that Chaucer presents Criseyde as 
a wanton or a slattern at this point; he is much too subtle 
for that. But it is clear that there are elements in her 
motives which are not entirely pure, which are tainted by 
the same dark blood which ties her with her uncle. What 
makes Criseyde different from her "em," and somehow more 
appealing is her deeper awareness of guilt and death— 
the forces of divine judgment. The dramatic force of her 
characterization, in fact, arises to a great degree from her 
struggle against these forces. 
The conflict is first evident when Criseyde is in the 
process of deciding the depth of her involvement with Troilus. 
It is true that Criseyde is afraid of loving Troilus because 
of reputation and "honour," as I pointed out earlier, but 
there is a deeper fear which underlies her final decision— 
fear of old age and death. Chaucer is careful to point this 
out in her first long conversation with Pandarus, when he 
suggests that if Criseyde does not have pity on Troilus, her 
beauty will not stretch to make-amends for it: 
Thenk ek how elde wasteth every houre, 
In ech of yow a partie of beautie 
And therefore, er that age the devoure 
Go love; for old, there wol no wight of the. 
(II, 392-96) 
Immediately after this passage Pandarus brings up spectres 
of "crows-feet" and unkind mirrors, playing more on Criseyde1s 
fear of fading beauty. Criseyde1s response to all this, sig­
nificantly enough, is to react morally—expressing shock at 
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a world (and an uncle) in which the "feith is al agoon" 
(II, 410). Earlier, I pointed that Criseyde has already 
allowed her moral sensibilities to be undermined at this 
point, and I think Chaucer would have us seriously consider 
the effect of Pandarus1 much more pragmatic argument on her 
feminine psyche. Criseyde is not immune to carpe diem logic. 
The fact that she reacts morally, expressing fear of 
Troilus' intentions and her involvement, it seems to me, is 
only a cover-up for what she really fears and may not be able 
to admit to herself—loss of beauty and earthly security, 
without father or husband in old age. It is interesting that 
Chaucer again subtly brings up the point in the description 
of Criseyde which occurs in Book V—Criseyde is "tendre-
hearted" and "slydynge of corage" Chaucer tells us, and then 
adds, "But trewely, I cannot telle hire age" (V, 825-26). 
Criseyde is also plagued by guilt, a fact which appears 
most clearly in the scene already treated in this study, 
where she absolves herself directly after berating herself 
for having "falsed oon the gentileste/ That evere was!" It 
is this outcry which reveals Criseyde1s true heart in the 
matter, but it is her self-made absolution which demonstrates 
a mind and spirit unwilling to face responsibility in sin, 
much as she is unable to face the thought of aging and death. 
Chaucer's phrase, "slydynge of corage" takes on added meaning 
in this light. 
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But Criseyde obviously has the admirable qualities of an 
utterly charming, high-spirited nature, great beauty, cul­
ture, and a capacity for true romantic feeling. These quali­
ties not only affect the narrator, who is constantly defend­
ing Criseyde until the end; they also affect us. How could 
such a one?—is our question as well as Troilus1; and the 
answer, once again, is found in the Christian vision of 
reality which allows for great extremes of behavior in the 
most sterling of characters. In the Biblical vision, man is 
a creature capable of both good and evil, depending on his 
moral choices. While the great Biblical figures of David, 
Solomon, Noah, and Abraham commit serious sins, they may be 
restored in an instant to the Grace of God as they choose to 
recognize their sin and repent. A sinner has always the 
opportunity for conversion and thus for a changed—often a 
radically changed—life. Seen in this light, Criseyde's 
character is darkened by our knowledge that she has had 
alternatives and has chosen not to recognize them, has 
decided not to face herself on the deeper levels. 
Thus we have in Chaucer1s characters some of the quality 
of the comic characterizations in the Divine Comedy. The 
sublime and the ridiculous, the admirable and the undesirable, 
the sinner and the saint are found in each character with 
perhaps a trifle less emphasis on the dark side than we see 
in Dante. 
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As a corollary to the new status given the humble, the 
ridiculous, and even the sinful aspects of man's behavior in 
the Christian vision, it is also interesting that Chaucer 
wrote, like Dante, in the vernacular. Scholars recognize 
Chaucer's unigue contribution in the vernacular, stressing 
that the literary language utilized during his lifetime was 
overwhelmingly French, and that it remained so up to the 
Fifteenth Century. They point out that Richard the Second's 
Court was the first English-speaking court after the French 
invasion, and that almost all courtly literature was written 
in French during Chaucer's lifetime. In addition, the only 
other major contemporary of Chaucer's to write poetry in Eng­
lish was Gower, and he does not attempt an English poem until 
the late 1380's, making a great point of it (in the First Pro­
logue of the Confessio Amantis) when he does. Dante, we remem­
ber, defended his use of the common language in which the 
Divine Comedy is written in the "Letter to Can Grande." There 
Dante reasons that his native tongue is best for the high 
subject-matter of the Comedy because it is most easily under­
stood, and clear communication of the truth is Dante's major 
aim. We find no such explicit concern for the communication 
of truth in the native tongue in Chaucer, but it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that Dante may have offered a model 
for Chaucer in this regard, and that Chaucer's use of the 
vernacular has some connection with the relaxed attitude which 
Dante takes toward rigid classical prescriptions concerning 
appropriateness of style and content. The "Letter to Can 
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Grande" also contains the interesting comment on characteriza­
tion which we pointed out earlier—that a tragic figure may 
40 
lament in a commonplace language. Allan Gilbert interprets 
this to mean that "the normal epic figure may be lowered in 
41 
dignity to fit a comedy." Here it would seem that we have 
an aesthetic prescription which exactly fits Troilus1 charac­
terization in Troilus and Criseyde. In Troilus, Chaucer 
seems to mix ridicule and respect in exactly the manner sug­
gested by Dante1 s "Letter.11 
While the Christian vision of reality allows for extremes 
of behavior in the presentation of a given character, and while 
it allows for the mixture of ridicule and respect, its 
emphasis is ultimately on the hope that the individual will 
choose to leave his sinful "darkness" and come into the 
light of the Kingdom of God. In other words, Man, though 
born into a state of perversity, may, through the grace of 
God become attached to a force which empowers his will to do 
the good, which gives him hope for escaping from his hopeless 
state. The objective grounds for this experience are sup­
plied in the redemptive act performed through Christ1s death 
and Resurrection. 
This, then, is what forms the basis for the Christian 
comic vision. As Nevlle Coghill has pointed out, comedy can 
40 
Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," in Eleven Letters of 
Dante, trans. Charles Sterrett Latham, ed. George Rice 
Carpenter with a preface by Charles Eliot Norton (Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1891), p. 197. 
41 Allan H. Gilbert, Dante and His Comedy (New York: New 
York University Press, 1963), pp. 61-68. 
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only be ultimately laughable where there is an objective 
solution to the problem of human incorrigibility and will­
fulness, where there are objective grounds for seeing beyond 
the human predicament. The highest reality for any Chris­
tian is comic in nature; that is, beginning in the painful 
circumstances of sin and death, the Christian moves through 
repentance to an experience of God's love and mercy. The 
shape of comic form becomes the shape of reality. 
"Realism" thus becomes a word fraught with profound 
meaning, and with profound implications for an analysis of 
realism in medieval characterization. A truly "realistic" 
narrative structure in the medieval sense, will be construc­
ted on the Christian pattern; i.e., there will be a movement 
or suggestion of a movement from the fallen to the redeemed 
state; there will be a conflict exhibited between the indi­
vidual's incorrigibly human will and the will of God, lead­
ing on the individual's part to submission and redemption. 
Such a conception of narrative allows for a great deal of 
dramatic conflict in a peculiarly modern sense because it 
sees human life as a process involving conflict and yet lead­
ing toward ultimate fulfillment. The conflict is seen as a 
necessary part of the final resolution. Such a view of medi­
eval realism refuses to admit a strong distinction between 
medieval "hierarchical stasis" and modern dramatic tension. 
Instead, it places the modern element of dramatic conflict 
within a framework which gives ultimate meaning to that 
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conflict. Eric Auerbach has shown that in the case of Dante 
this kind of conceptualization 
does not destroy or weaken the earthly nature of 
his characters, but captures the fullest intensity 
of their individual earthly being and identifies it 
with the ultimate state of things.^ 
Dante achieves a greater sense of dramatic reality in 
the Comedy, not only by allowing for representation of both 
the noble and debased aspects of man, and for a combination 
of lofty subject-matter with vulgar language, but by exalt­
ing the comic form itself. Comedy for Dante is part of the 
very shape of reality, and he consistently links the classical 
definition of comedy (a poem beginning in sadness and ending 
in happiness) with a vision of the Christian life as some­
thing begun in the relative hell of fallen earthly life, 
and progressing toward Paradise. Coghill reminds us at this 
point that the movement of an individual soul in this sense 
is a movement toward God, toward "love absolute...the power 
and glory of God seen by created souls as the Beatific Vision 
43 
for which they were created." Dante seals the union of 
comedy with the theme of the soul's movement toward absolute 
love in the "Epistle to Can Grande," when he defines "true 
blessedness" as consisting in: 
...knowing the source of truth; as doth appear in 
St. John where he saith: 'This is the true blessed­
ness that they might know thee and the true god, etc., 
42 Eric Auerbach, cited by Charles Singleton, Dante Stud­
ies , 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954-58), 
11:108. 
43 Coghill, p. 6. 
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and in Boethius III of de consolatione, where he saith: 
'To see thee is our end.1̂  
Although we can find no explicit commentary on this view in 
Chaucer, the whole thematic structure of the work—which is 
an exploration of the inability of human love to lift man 
into the presence of God—supports the Dantean view. 
The best evidence for an association of Dante and Chau­
cer on this issue is the Epilog to the Troilus itself, where 
the end of Troilus' love is given an explicit content: 
0 yonge, fresshe folkes, he or she, 
In which that love up groweth with your age, 
Repeyreth hom fro woroldly vanyte, 
And of youre herte up casteth the visage 
To thilke God that after his ymage 
Yow made, and thynketh al nys but a faire 
This world, that passeth soone as floures faire. 
And loveth hym, the which that right for love 
Upon a crois, oure soules for to beye, 
First starf, and roos, and sit in hevene above; 
For he nyl falsen no wight, dar I seye, 
That wol his herte al holly on hym leye. 
And syn he best to love is, and most meke, 
What nedeth feynede loves for to seke? 
(V, 1835-47) 
The comic vision of reality defined here is explicitly Chris­
tian, with an explicitly historical content. Love is Christ's 
life, death and Resurrection; by loving Him, the Christian 
will come to an ultimately happy end. This is the cornerstone 
upon which Chaucer's comic vision, like Dante's, rests. 
In light of Chaucer's openly Christian explanation of 
Troilus' end in the Epilog, the characters gain even more in 
44 Dante, "Letter to Can Grande," p. 215. 
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personal appeal due to their uniquely individual definitions 
of the love which they each see as the ultimate Good, 
Chaucer shapes his characters through his evaluation of their 
implicit relation to the Christian standard: Pandarus as 
the type of those who would see the workings of Fortune as 
the governing force of love and a fierce participation in 
its game as the only possible solution to the problem of 
reality; Criseyde as a representative of those whose view of 
love is dominated by an underlying concern for personal secur­
ity defined in earthly terms; Troilus as the type of those 
who although naturally closer to the Christian ideal through 
courtly deference to others, are yet blinded on earth by 
allowing their love to be governed by human, rather than 
divine authority. Chaucer's theme is the Christian message 
of perfect love represented by Jesus Christ: his technique, 
the implicit contrast between Christ's love and the false 
loves represented by Pandarus and Criseyde, and the imperfect 
love represented by Troilus. Chaucer arrives at his end, as 
I have shown, through a standard Dantean-Boethian progression— 
we follow Troilus from a false to a true conception of love, 
from the stoic acceptance of his fate at the end to the heav­
enly revelation after his death. 
In developing his characters, Chaucer keeps the positive 
standards of the Epilog before our minds through unmistakable 
reference to Christian principles, however ironically dis­
torted, throughout the work and through the use of religious 
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language which recalls the Christian schema of salvation. 
The governing pattern of spiritual love has thus been evident 
from the beginning, and Chaucer disposes his characteriza­
tions according to a preconceived framework, developing the 
different aspects and failures of the human love which affords 
an imperfect, though reflected image of Divine love while 
pointing to its end in the perfect love of Christ. 
Since Troilus is a pagan without the benefit of Bibli­
cal revelation, he must come to an understanding of Divine 
love through the failure of human love, and his particular 
brand of human love must be demonstrated to contain within 
it prefigurations of the Christian solution. The beauty of 
the love-affair takes much from Troilus1 deference to his 
lady—in his complete and noble concern for the "other." 
It is because of his complete attachment to the noble ideal 
which is his conventional birthright as a king's son (there 
are even Christian overtones in this) that Troilus is granted 
the privilege of the highest comic vision. Human and divine 
love are not presented as opposites, but as two parts of 
hierarchical continuum which for the pagan Troilus begins in 
the lower realm of experience and ends in revelation. As 
Boethius puts it: "but if, as I have pointed out, there is 
a certain imperfect happiness in transitory goods, no one can 
45 
doubt that there is a perfect and enduring happiness." 
45 Boethius, p. 43. 
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Part of the genius of the technique Chaucer employs in 
drawing his characters is that it allows him to disentagle 
his audience from an immediate romantic involvement with them, 
and thus to give us the artistic objectivity to grasp the 
spiritual principles at work in his poem. This does not mean 
that we are not emotionally affected by the love-affair. It 
simply means that our emotions are finally enlisted on the 
side of the Christian view of reality out of which his poem 
46 
grows, and we are taught, along with Troilus, a new defi­
nition of love. 
The standard medieval-Christian view of reality is 
finally what determines the reality of a given medieval 
narrative as I have defined it; it is the comic shape of the 
narrative which controls the ultimate realism of the char­
acters within such a pattern. Not only that, but a knowledge 
of the ultimate resolution of human fallibility becomes the 
basis for a sympathetic—if sometimes slightly rueful—enjoy­
ment of the comic representation of human error within the 
narrative pattern. V7e could not profoundly enjoy the imita­
tion of human error if its power to enslave had not been 
broken. This is not to say that a Christian audience would 
have condoned the representation of sin? it is simply to say 
that from the final Christian perspective, sin and death have 
lost their sting, and this knowledge can affect our attitude 
toward the fictional representation of sin. For one thing, 
4^Payne, p. 223. 
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the knowledge of this fact makes possible a greater capacity 
to see the ideal potential inherent in man. Where there is 
a more profound understanding of the power of redemption, 
there is a more profound capacity to look through man's immed­
iate faults and to envision him in the likeness of Christ, 
to see him with the eyes of faith, as it were. Because of 
this capacity for seeing the end of things for a character 
operating within a Christian framework, the representation of 
his moral lapses, done without an eye toward sensual titilla-
tion, cannot be viewed with bitterness or condemnation. I 
would even go so far as to suggest that the extent of the 
sympathy evinced by the author—or the critics—for the 
characters of a particular fictional work will have a direct 
relation to their emphasis either on the vices and errors 
evident in human character, or on the "end" of those vices 
and errors in salvation. That there were two such strains 
in medieval theory has been demonstrated by Coghill, who 
distinguishes between "satiric comedy," or comedy which pur­
sues the principal characters with some bitterness for their 
vices and teaches what is useful and expedient in life, and 
what is to be avoided; and "romantic comedy," or comedy which 
focuses on life as something to be grasped and depicts the 
happy resolution of a series of confusions and mishaps. 
Romantic comedy, Coghill suggests, is much more likely to 
take into serious account the comic narrative line, and 
although the ends of either comic form are ethical, in one 
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the laughter effected is gentle and comfortingr in the other, 
punitive and deterrent. The two contrasting views form the 
basis, Coghill suggests, for the typical medieval comic 
strain, which springs from the romantic root, and the typi­
cal Renaissance strain, which evolves into bitter satire. 
Chaucer, of course, he identifies as springing directly from 
the medieval romantic strain, and the point of his article 
is that Shakespeare "reached for his Chaucer" in construct­
ing his own masterful comedies. 
Coghill's categories are especially interesting in light 
of the aesthetic problem of the relation of the didactic ends 
of medieval art to its grasp and expression of real life. 
A truly Christian view of life will exclude neither of the 
two ends of art, and scholars are wrong to emphasize the 
didactic ends of Troilus and Criseyde. Even in their recog­
nition of the power of the Epilog of Chaucer's great tragi­
comedy Troilus and Criseyde, they emphasize to too great a 
degree the deterrent effect of the work, its moral "sentence," 
to the exclusion of the end of "grete joye and solas," which 
Chaucer suggests elsewhere as an equally proper end of comedy. 
47 The only direct mention of comedy in the Canterbury 
Tales, for example, occurs when the Knight, tired of the 
Monk's repetitive examples of tragedy, bids him stop his 
boring monologue and then comments: 
I seye for me, it is a greet disese, 
Whereas men han been in greet welthe and ese, 
To heeren of hire sodeyn fal, alias! 
And the contrarie is joye and greet solas, 
As whan a man hath been in povre estaat, 
And clymbeth up and wexeth fortunate, 
And there abideth in prosperitee. 
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We come now to the subject of Chaucer's view of alle­
gory, and, mare particularly, to his treatment of the literal 
level of the narrative and the nature of the content which it 
disguises. Throughout this chapter, I have suggested that 
Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde may be taken as a humorous, 
sometimes ironic, sometimes serious reflection or "allegory" 
of the divine love which controls and gives meaning to the 
romantic-pagan action of the poem at all levels. 
In sections of Chapters III, IV, and V of this disser­
tation, I explored the history of the differences between the 
allegorical tradition promoted by classical poetics and the 
allegorical perspective of the centrally orthodox Christian 
tradition. The major differences in the approach to alle­
gory taken in the two traditions was seen to have resulted 
from early disagreements over the nature of the Biblical Rev­
elation. The conflict focused on the interpretation given 
the literal level of the Biblical text. Basically two ways 
of treating the literal narrative developed during the centur­
ies following the birth of Christ: one view, what I have des­
ignated the "classical" or "Greek-Platonic" view, sees the Old 
and New Testaments purely as a material springboard into an 
elevated realm of moral and spiritual truth. The other view, 
Swich thyng is gladsom, as it thynktth me, 
And of swich thyng were goodly for to telle. 
"Prologue of the Nun's Priest's Tale," 11. 2769-78, 
Robinson, p. 198. iamgrateful to Mr. Coghill for pointing 
out the passage. 
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which I have designated the "sacramental" or centrally ortho­
dox Christian view, sees the literal level of both Testaments 
as having historical validity in addition to their function 
as a type or "allegory" of future historical and spiritual 
events, specifically the advent of the Kingdom of God, both 
within and beyond history. 
On a more fundamental level, the differences between 
the two traditions involve a distinction between the sacra­
mental view of symbol which finds its incarnational meaning 
in Christ and its historical referrent in Scripture, and the 
classical view of symbol in which the symbol serves as the 
abstract "sign" for an intellectual system which has no fixed 
objective content. It is clear that the emphasis given to 
the literal level of the text in the sacramental approach to 
allegory will be much greater than that given in the classi­
cal tradition. That emphasis will also tend to be manifested 
in greater attention to historic reality and individualizing 
detail, which in turn can be shown to be directly relevant 
to characterization. Where the historical basis of a piece 
of literature is de-emphasized or ignored, the imitation of 
concrete historical details or character portrayal will tend 
to disappear or become only minimal adjuncts to the portrayal 
by personification of an abstract idea. In other words, the 
classical conception of mimesis, which has as its first object 
the eternal world of ideals tends to foster a universalized, 
non-realistic presentation of character in literature. In 
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the Judeo-Christian view, on the other hand, the created 
world is not only a proper subject of mimesis, but actually 
constitutes a physical manifestation of the truth. From the 
central Judeo-Christian perspective, the representation of 
dramatically realistic character in literature finds its 
legitimate rationale in the Christian understanding of the 
nature of the material universe and the purpose of history. 
Although Chaucer does not achieve the same sense of 
sacramental reality in his allegorical approach which we see 
in Dante, his use of individualizing detail on the historical 
level of the narrative is striking, and the portraits of Cri-
seyde, Pandarus, and Troilus gain much in their sense of 
felt life from his attention to the historical setting of his 
narrative and his pictorial eye for detail. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I explored some of 
the larger ways in which the Christian view of history is 
manifested in Troilus and Criseyde. I noted earlier, for 
example, how the Christian view of reality informs the narra­
tive in a general philosophical sense at all levels, and how 
Chaucer uses Christian standards to control the progress of 
the narrative—especially as they are manifested in the ironic 
inversions of the language of the characters, and even in 
certain comments made by the historian-narrator. There are 
other ways, as well, by which Chaucer gives an explicitly 
historical caste to the literal level of the text which spring 
directly from the Christian vision of reality. 
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I noted that Christianity gives a new importance to 
history through the concept of revelation, the belief that 
God entered history in accordance with His pre-ordained plan 
to "perform actions necessary to the salvation and restora-
48 
tion of the temporal order." The utter uniqueness of the 
Christ-event not only insures that history will be viewed as 
a linear progression, but also gives each historical event a 
unique place in the chronology of the three major events of 
the Divine Plan—the Creation, the Coming of Christ, and the 
Second Coming. 
This attention to chronology contrasts with the classical 
perspective in which the passage of time is seen as a series 
of repeating cycles, resulting in a de-emphasis on the unique­
ness of the particular event and a relatively unconcerned 
attitude toward chronology in general. Henry W. Sams points 
out the difference between the Christian and classical atti­
tudes toward time in his article on the time-strategies of 
49 
the Troilus. 
R. K. Root has noted that Chaucer takes a considerable 
interest in the chronological progression of his story and 
even marks particularly significant dates by the calendar. 
48 
Bloomfield, p. 3010 
49 See Henry W. Sams, "The Dual Time-Scheme in Chaucer's 
Troilus," in Chaucer Criticism, ed. Richard J. Schoeck and 
Jerome Taylor, 3 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1961), pp. 180-85. Sams compares Chaucer's consistent 
preoccupation with a formal chronology in Troilus and Cri-
seyde with Boccaccio, who does no more than identify the 
seasons at the beginning and end of the poem. 
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Troilus1 first meeting with Criseyde at the Feast of Palla-
din, for example, is dated April 1 (I, 156); Pandarus makes 
his first visit to Criseyde on May 3 (II, 56); and the meeting 
at Deiphebus1 house is marked as having occurred near "Aperil 
the laste" (III, 360). At other points in the narrative, 
Chaucer makes us aware of the passing of time by general ref­
erences to the cycle of the moon and the seasons. Troilus1 
first meeting with Criseyde, for example, is dated by "the 
crescent moon," and in Book V Chaucer informs us that three 
50 
springs have passed since the beginning of the love affair. 
Morton Bloomfield has pointed out that Chaucer's sense of 
passing time is also explicitly illustrated in Book II, when 
he comments on the change which takes place in language: 
Ye knowe ek that in forme of speche is chaunge 
Withinne a thousand yeer, and wordes tho 
That hadden pris, now wonder nyce and straunge 
Us thinketh he, and yet thei spake hem so, 
And spedde as well in love as men now do; 
Ek for to wynnen love in sondry ages, 
In sondry londes, sondry ben usages. r-i 
(II, 22-28) 
50 See R. K. Root, ed. The Book of Troilus and Criseyde 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), p. xxxiii. 
51 Bloomfield notes that though this is the only explicxt 
passage referring to the passing of time in Troilus and Cri­
seyde , Chaucer often draws attention to time or chronology in 
other works. In the "Knight's Tale," for example, two of 
his characters apologize for violating chronology and the 
Knight himself comments on the historical murals in Mars' 
Temple which depict events after the time of Theseus (the 
murders of Julius Ceasar, Nero, and Corolla), and remarks that 
these men were "unborn" (II, 2031f), Bloomfield, p. 305. Tat-
lock notes that Chaucer deliberately archaizes the Franklin's 
Tale in order that "the Franklin might with more propriety rail 
at such acts and astrological magic as heathenish and might 
disavow serious approval of them or faith in their efficacy, 
especially for an evil purpose." J. S. P. Tatlock, The Scene, 
of the Franklin Revisited (Chaucer Society, Second Series, 51), 
p. 914. 
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And of course Chaucer makes his audience most acutely aware 
of time in the long section in Book IV dealing with Troilus1 
10-day wait for Criseyde's return. 
After the sorrowful Troilus watches Criseyde being led 
away by Diomede, he is subjected to an excruciating time of wait­
ing , which Pandarus tries to fill with every sort of unac­
ceptable gaiety. In the description of the party at Sarpe-
doun1s we feel Troilus' ennuie and his impatie nee to get 
away. Particularly effective in conveying this sense of 
impatience is Troilus' small exchange with Pandarus in Book V, 
475-500, in which Troilus expresses his desire to leave and 
Pandarus convinces him to stay until the week's end. Although 
Chaucer does not go into detail about the three long days 
which ensue, he has succeeded in suggesting how interminable 
they seem to Troilus. 
Later, when Troilus is on the wall with Pandarus look­
ing for Criseyde's return, Chaucer again makes his audience 
mindful of the passing of time. The day begins with the ris­
ing of the sun which progresses, "in his course ay upward as 
he wente," and Troilus and Pandarus watch each new arrival 
with increasing disappointment. At noon they are still there 
and though they go home to dine, are back again in the after 
noon for another vigil. Troilus during this time is full of 
the false hope which makes each new disappointment a harder 
blow and which seems to lengthen the time of waiting still 
more. The next day again, Troilus hangs his hopes on the 
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slender thread that he may have miscalculated the day, and 
that Criseyde will be coming during the next few hours,, 
Chaucer emphasizes the excruciating length of Troilus' wait 
by drawing it out still more: 
The thridde, ferthe, fifte, sexte day 
After tho dayes ten of which I tolde, 
Bitwixen hope and drede his herte lay 
Yet somwhat trustyng on hire estes olde.... 
(V, 1205-1208) 
During this whole section Chaucer makes his audience acutely 
aware of the passage of time with explicit references to the 
days and hours of Troilus1 vigil. All this reinforces the 
sense of history which pervades Chaucer's narrative. 
In addition to Chaucer's emphasis on chronology, Henry 
Sams has pointed out that there is a second type of attention 
given to the passage of time in Chaucer. This time-scheme, 
according to Sams "lags behind the formal dating and keeps 
52 
pace with the emotional climate of the story." For exam­
ple, Criseyde's first emotional awareness of Troilus' love 
is compared with an early spring day in which a cloud quickly 
passes over the face of the sun (II, 764-68). Later, Troilus' 
ecstatic reception of good news from Criseyde is compared to 
closed flowers which open at the coming of a spring dawn 
(II, 967-72). And at the beginning of Book IV, Chaucer com­
pares Troilus' feelings on leaving Criseyde with an autumn 
scene: 
And as in wynter leves ben biraft, 
Ech after other, til the tree be bare, 
52 Sams, p. 182. 
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So that they nys but bark and braunche ilaft, 
Lith Troilus.... 
(IV, 225-28) 
Thus in Troilus and Criseyde, Chaucer demonstrates the atten­
tion to time, unique circumstance, and chronology, which 
53 
springs directly from the Christian vision of reality. 
Not only does the Christian view of reality encourage an 
emphasis on chronology and time in the literal level of the 
text, but it allows for a greater attention to pictorial 
detail due to the greater emphasis given to the particular 
historical event. In Troilus and Criseyde the attention given 
to historical detail has been compared with the comic "Nun's 
54 
Priest's" and "Miller's Tales." Though Chaucer is careful 
to preserve the pagan mind-set of his characters and the out­
ward form of the classical narrative, the pictorial details 
of his story are all thoroughly medieval—and thoroughly 
realistic. H. M. Smyser has pointed out, for example, that 
Chaucer seems to have definite fourteenth-century images in 
his mind when he writes of the houses within Troy. The 
53 
See Bloomfield's discussion of Chaucer's attention to 
chronology in the Legend of Good Women, "The Knight's Tale," 
and the "Monk's Tale." He comments that Chaucer makes some 
anachronisms, but that these are largely due to the superior 
claims of art. On the whole, writes Bloomfield, Chaucer is 
still more historically-minded than his contemporaries 
(Bloomfield, p. 305). Of course, my argument in this study 
has been that Chaucer's "anachronisms" spring directly from 
the historical vision of reality which is promoted by Chris­
tianity, and are therefore eminently "historical" in the 
larger sense. 
54 H. M. Smyser, "The Domestic Background of Troilus and 
Criseyde," Speculum 31(April, 1956), 315. 
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arrangement of Pandarus! house, for instance, is very clear; 
one can easily reconstruct it from the information given in 
the text with its "outer house," "middle chaumbre," "closet" 
55 
and secret trap-door. Another critic has noted the same 
attention to detail in Chaucer's reconstruction of Criseyde's 
palace. Criseyde and her ladies read in a "paved parlour" 
(II, 78-84); Criseyde's own room is apart from the hall and 
shaded from the outside by a large cedar tree growing next to 
the window (II, 599 and II, 9:18). At one end of the parlour 
there is a window-seat which overlooks the street furnished 
with a stone of jasper and a cushion embroidered with gold, 
(EI, 1226-2^); and downstairs, there is a large garden with 
56 
railed walkways, benches and leafy trees (II, 813-26). 
Although we cannot say that Chaucer pays the same attention 
to pictorial detail as the modern movelist, there is a measure 
of imitative realism here which far surpasses most of his 
contemporaries. 
Again in the vigil scene of Book V, Chaucer adds the 
kind of realistic detail which makes his narrative so his­
torically convincing. When Troilus is on the wall, he is 
described as misconstruing every new dot on the horizon as a 
potential Criseyde. When this proves fruitless, he goes down 
to the porters to tell them to keep the gate open if she comes 
55 Smyser, p. 308. 
56 
See Robert D. Mayo, "The Trojan Background of the 
Troilus," ELH 9 (December, 1942), 245-56. 
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late. Later in the afternoon he "loketh forth by hegge, by 
tre, by greve," and leans far out over the wall to get a 
better glimpse of passers-by. Perhaps the most realistic 
touch of all comes at the end of the day, when the warden of 
the gates calls in the flocks and shepherds which feed without. 
This is the final medieval commonplace which—for that day 
at least—extinguishes Troilus1 hope. 
Another thoroughly medieval detail which comes through 
strongly in the narrative is the constant press of people 
around the major characters. On the evening after Criseyde 
has seen Troilus riding by her house, Pandarus seeks Troilus, 
but has no opportunity to talk to him privately until they 
are in bed. Criseyde, too, is constantly surrounded by ladies-
in-waiting, and Pandarus must ask for an audience "al pryvely" 
in the garden before he can deliver Troilus1 first letter. 
Even there they are not alone, as is evident from Pandarus' 
dare that Criseyde "cast it (Troilus1 letter) awey anon/ 
57 
That folk may gauren on us tweye" (II, 1156-57). Later on 
when Pandarus invites Criseyde to his house he pressures her 
to be there and then "swor hire softe in hir ere" (III, 566), 
that if she does not come "he" will never come to her. Cri­
seyde responds in kind by going "to hym to rowne" (III, 568), 
and asking if he means Troilus. In each situation Chaucer 
seems to assume that his characters are surrounded by a public 
57 Smyser, p. 313. 
489 
audience—a realistic detail which would again have been a 
normal aspect of medieval life. 
The sense of realism which accrues from the pictorial 
background of the story also carries over into the glimpses 
Chaucer gives of his major characters. Chaucer's first ref­
erences to Criseyde, although they contain a measure of the 
conventional elements often used to praise a medieval lady, 
yet retain a pictorial freshness which is striking. He 
introduces Criseyde with what seems a conventional remark on 
her "aungelik" beauty: 
So ciungelik was hir natif beaute, 
That like a thing immortal seemed she, 
As doth an hevenyssh perfit creature, 
That doun were sent in scornynge of nature. 
(I, 102-104) 
Of course, Chaucer uses the conventional comparison later to 
accentuate the idolatry of Troilus' love. Immediately after 
this, Chaucer gives a quick but romantically colored account 
of Criseyde's plea before Hector to stay in the city. During 
this short section of the narrative Chaucer offers us only 
one truly individualizing detail to offset the idealized por­
trait we receive—Criseyde is dressed in a "samyt broun" 
widow's habit (I, 109)» Significantly, when she appears at 
the feast of Palladin, Chaucer capitalizes on the detail which 
he introduced only a few verses before: 
Among thise othere folk was Criseyda, 
In widewes habit blak, but natheles 
Right as oure first lettre is now an A, 
In beaute first so stood she, makeles. 
Hire goodly lokyng gladed al the prees 
Nas nevere yet seyn thyng to ben preysed derre, 
Nor under cloude blak so bright a sterre 
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As was Criseyde, as folk seyde everichone 
That hir behelden in hir blake wede 
And yet she stood ful lowe and still allone, 
Byhynden other folk, in litel brede, 
And neigh the dore, ayundre shames drede, 
Simple of atir and de onaire of chere 
With ful assured lokyng and manere. 
(I, 169-82) 
The visual impression received here is one of striking sim­
plicity. Though Chaucer does not describe Criseyde1s beauty 
in detail, he knows the visual effect of a black dress on a 
beautiful woman and he conveys that effect with great impact 
through a focus on one concrete detail—the dark widow's 
habit. 
A few verses later, Chaucer again gives what seems a con­
ventionalized description of Criseyde, stressing her statuesque 
form and her "Honour, estat, and womanly noblesse" (I, 281-87). 
Immediately following this typicalized description of the qual­
ities befitting her station, Chaucer gives us the single 
detail which makes his portrait come alive: 
To Troilus right wonder wel with alle 
Gan for to like here mevynge and hire chere, 
Which somdel deignous was, for she let falle 
Hire lok a lite aside in swich manere, 
Ascaunces, 'What! May I nat stonden here!' (I, 288-292) 
Criseyde seems to have a clear, supremely confident awareness 
of the effect that she has on the passers-by. She is so sure 
of her feminine power that if she were not acknowledged, she 
would be surprised. It is against this vision of female 
vitality and self-assurance that we see the luckless Troilus' 
entrapment in the next verse: 
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And of hire look in him there gan to quyken. 
So gret desir and such affecioun, 
That in his hertes botme gan to stiken 
0 hir his fixe and depe impressioun. 
(I, 295-298) 
Chaucer has made sure that the "deep impressioun" which 
Troilus receives here has just as surely registered on his 
audience, and he has done this primarily by means of a few 
striking details which give life to what seems an otherwise 
conventional portrait. 
Chaucer uses the same technique on his heroine toward 
the end of Troilus and Criseyde (V, 799-840) when Criseyde 
has said good-bye to Troilus and has arrived with Diomede at 
the Greek camp. The three portraits which Chaucer injects 
into his narrative here have been denounced by Louis Hasel-
mayer as utterly conventionalized, "an afterthought by which 
Chaucer seeks to force his new creation into the conventional 
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format." Although Haselmayer may have a point when it 
comes to the conventionalized portrait of Troilus, the descrip­
tion of Criseyde once again has that single precise detail 
which makes her beauty almost palpable. After a thoroughly 
generalized reference to her face, figure, and bearing, 
"Thereto of shap, of face, and ek of cheere/ There myghte ben 
no fairer creature"—Chaucer comments: 
And ofte tyme this was hire manere 
To gon ytressed with hire heres clere, --
Doun by her coler at hire bak behynde 
Which with a thread of gold she wolde bynde. (v, 809-812) 
58 
Louis A. Haselmayer, "The Portraits in Troilus and 
Criseyde," PQ 17 (April, 1938), 220-23. 
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There is no more individual expression of a woman's physical 
"atmosphere" than the way she wears her hair, and it seems 
to me that Chaucer has picked up on this fact in a way which 
demonstrates once again his attention to the historically 
concrete. 
Though not as strikingly individual as his various por­
traits of Criseyde, Chaucer's first description of Troilus 
contains a number of concrete details which reinforce the 
sense of historical reality operative on the literal level of 
the narrative. Though Troilus as a great warrior is conven­
tionally compared to "Mars, that god is of bataille" (II, 
630), he is described as riding his wounded bay steed at a 
"pas ful softely," thus revealing a gentler side which con­
trasts with his war-like demeanor. Chaucer adds to this par­
ticular contrast a moment later when he describes Troilus1 
embarrassment at the accolade he is receiving: 
And ay the peple cryde, 'Here cometh oure joye/ 
And next his brother, holder up of Troyel' 
For while he wex a litel red for shame.... 
(II, 643-45) 
Furthermore, in the midst of a rather generalized description 
of Troilus' "heigh prowess," his "might", his "youth" and 
his "hardynesse," Chaucer gives us the sharp visual image of 
Troilus' battered armor: 
His helm tohewen was in twenty places; 
That by a tyssew heng his bak byhynde; 
His Sheeld todasshed was with swerdes and maces 
In which men myght many an arwe fynde 
That thirled hadde horn and nerf and rynde; 
(II, 638-42) 
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The detail of the ruined helmet which hangs down Troilus1 
back, "by a tyssew" is especially effective in giving this 
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scene a sense of historical actuality. 
The character of Diomede, as well, demonstrates Chaucer 1 s 
skill in concrete description. Chaucer gives us a glimpse 
of Diomede's ambition and egotism from the first. Approaching 
the Greek host, Diomede comments under his breath on the 
transaction which is taking place: "I have hered seyd ek 
tymes tweyes twelve/ 'He is a fool that wole foryete hymselve 1 11 
(V, 97-98). Immediately after, he begins his knowing court­
ship of Criseyde with all the conventional and impressive 
courtesies, and when he comes to her tent the day before 
Criseyde is to return to Troy and Troilus, Diomede wastes no 
time. First he let Criseyde know that he is aware of her 
emotions. Stressing the hapless plight of Troy, he urges 
Criseyde to take another "worthy" lover, and then "sobreliche 
on hire he thew his lok,/ And seyde I am al be it yow no joie,/ 
As gentil man as any wight in Troi" (V, 929-30). After this 
not-so-subtle advertisement, Diomede continues to press Cri­
seyde for mercy until she finally gives in. 
In the narrator's final comment on Diomede, we get the 
conventional portrait of the mighty warrior—with one added 
detail which reinforces the individualized portrait Chaucer 
has managed to convey in the earlier descriptions: 
59 H. M. Smyser points out this particular detail, p. 315. 
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This Diomede, as bokes us declare 
Was in his nedes prest and corageous, 
With sterne vois and myghty lymes square 
Hardy, testif, strong, and chivalrous 
Of dedes, lik his fader Tideus 
And som men seyn he was of tonge large 
And heir he was of Calydoigne and Arge. 
(V, 799-805) 
While it is true, as Robert Mayo suggests, that Chaucer 
achieves most of his realistic effect by means of dramatic 
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action and dialogue, we should not ignore the wealth of 
concrete detail which finds its way into the descriptive sec­
tions of Troilus and Criseyde. Throughout the narrative 
there are those distinctly Chaucerian, distinctly realistic 
touches—Troilus' exultant "Now be ye kaught" when he finally 
embraces Criseyde, Diomede*s "tonge large," the "smoky reyn" 
of the lover's first encounter. Chaucer's attention to 
historical detail in the sense we have defined it once again 
harks back to his roots in the Dantean-Christian allegorical 
tradition, where an emphasis on the literal is an essential 
part of the concept of mimesis. 
By pointing out Chaucer's careful attention to creating 
an illusion of historical reality on the literal level of his 
narrative, I am not suggesting that he exactly imitates the 
Dantean allegorical method. In the introduction to this 
study, I suggested that Christian realism has two basic 
components. First, Christian reality is defined in terms of 
its unified historical overview—the monolithic revealed plan 
60 ___ Mayo, p. 256. 
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of God begun at Creation, progressing through the Advent of 
Christ and his death and Resurrection and terminated by the 
Second Coming. This great overview of history gives meaning 
and significance to the minute and particular events of ord­
inary historical reality because any historical circumstance 
has its unique place within the larger outlines of Divine 
Revelation. Translated into literary terms, the author who 
is committed to a demonstration of the Christian view of 
history will exhibit both a sense of the underlying structure 
of the Christian universe (and its corollary doctrines of the 
Incarnation, the Atonement, and Judgment) and a strong atten­
tion to particular historical circumstance and individual 
commitment to the objective facts of Christian history. 
In Dante1s Comedy the realism exhibited is not the 
flatly imitative realism of philosophical materialsim (al­
though imitation even in this sense plays a part) but a 
literary picture of the whole of Christian reality, including 
a world and an afterlife structured after the Christian under­
standing of history and eschatology, and a journey faithful 
to the prophetic experience of a particular individual. It 
is my opinion that Dante achieves a more integrated portrayal 
of this understanding of history, balancing his emphasis on 
the total structure of the Christian reality with his emphasis 
on the concrete, historical moment and the decisions which it 
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requires. Obviously, as B. F. Koonce has pointed out, 
61 B. F. Koonce, Chaucer and the Tradition of Fame: 
Symbolism in the House of Fame (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1966), pp. 82-824. 
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Chaucer's historical narrative is not history in the same 
sense as Dante's Comedy. The first level of Chaucer's story 
is secular and pagan—Trojan history; Dante's is sacred and 
openly Christian—the afterlife journey of an individual 
soul. But I am suggesting that while Chaucer chooses an 
ostensibly secular cortex to relay his spiritual meanings, 
that cortex itself not only contains subtle but unmistakable 
references to the total Christian Revelation (both explicit 
and indirect), but it bears the marks of the Christian per­
spective in the high level of historical realism it maintains 
throughout. The total structure of the Christian revelation 
is, as I have pointed out, most clear in the Epilog of the 
Troilus, when Troilus mounts up to the eighth sphere and 
looks down on "this wrecched world." Although it is true 
that Troilus, in keeping with the pagan fiction that Chaucer 
has maintained throughout, is not looking down from a Chris-
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tian heaven, it cannot be doubted that the eighth sphere as 
Chaucer uses it has allegorical overtones which suggest the 
Christian world-view undergirding Chaucer's narrative. Troilus 
is described as a soul rising "blisfully" upward, he holds the 
world "al vanite" when compared with the "pleyn felicitee" 
of "hevene above," and he damns the "blynd lust, the which 
that may nat last" (V, 1815-25). The final condemnation of 
6 2 Morton Bloomfield points out that the eighth sphere, 
or Ogdoad, is the traditional resting-place of the good soul 
who possesses gnosis in the Greco-Roman tradition. (See 
Morton W. Bloomfield, "The Eighth Sphere: A Note on Chaucer's 
Troilus and Criseyde, V, 1809," MLR 53 (July, 1958), 408-410. 
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the world's "blynd lust" is especially suggestive of the 
Christian perspective in that it is almost a direct reference 
to I John 1:16 and 17. The Christian language used to 
describe Troilus' pagan experience at this point is in my 
opinion simply a continuation of the same technique we have 
seen throughout the Troilus; it is part of a conscious effort 
by Chaucer to remind us of the Christian world view by which 
his pagan fiction is informed and controlled. This is made 
all the more clear in Chaucer's explicit restatement of the 
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Christian view of history in lines 1835-1849. It is my 
opinion, based on the evidence of Troilus' Dantean-Boethian 
movement from a false to a true perspective on worldly real­
ity, on direct reminders of the Christian reality which break 
into the pagan world of the Troilus throughout, on the atten­
tion paid to historical detail on the literal level of the 
text, and on the explicit revelation of that world-view in 
the Epilog, that in Troilus and Criseyde we have a narrative 
which verges on religious allegory strongly related to the 
sort of allegory we find in the Divine Comedy. I am aware that 
this puts me just on the outer limits of Mr. Howard's "fringe 
0 3 It should be clear at this point that I do not agree 
with the critical perspective on this passage represented by 
Donald Howard, who defines Troilus' movement into the eighth 
sphere in terms of a universal secular phenomenon which he 
calls "world-alienation," i.e., a "sensibility" which occurs 
"if we commune with nature or with God, or if we sink very 
deep into our own thoughts or into intimacy with others...." 
(Donald R. Howard, "Renaissance World-Alienation," in The 
Darker Vision of the Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason, 
ed. Robert S. Kinsman (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), pp. 47-76. 
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group of nostalgia freaks" who "think all of Chaucer's poems 
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are religious allegories." 
Viewed in these terms, the illusion of the Christian 
sense of reality which Chaucer achieves in Troilus and 
Criseyde is very powerful. Of course, one might argue, and 
with some reason, that it is not as powerful as the sense of 
Christian reality achieved in the Divine Comedy. Dante's 
pilgrim is utterly conscious of his state and of the meaning 
of the choices he makes. In addition, he is openly defined 
in terms of Scriptural prophecy—there will be a real after­
life according to Scriptural Revelation; there will be a 
judgment; there will be a final encounter with God. Thus 
Dante's history has the authority of its essentially Scriptural 
content, which is openly portrayed within an explicitly Chris­
tian setting. Using the two aspects of the Christian view 
of reality as an evaluative tool, we might say that Dante 
emphasizes the objective historicity of the Biblical Revela­
tion—the great historical events of the Incarnation, and the 
Second Coming. In so doing, he cannot achieve the level of 
commonplace historical detail which we see in Chaucer. Chau­
cer's narrative, on the other hand, exhibits the close attention 
64 See Donald Howard, "Flying Through Space: Chaucer and 
Milton," in Milton and the Line of Vision, ed. Joseph 
Anthony Wittreich, Jr. (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1975), pp. 7-8. While I do not think that all of 
Chaucer's poetic work is allegorical, there are solid grounds 
for seeing Troilus and Criseyde as a poem containing a well-
developed secondary level of religious meaning which runs 
parallel to the classical fiction which serves as its vehi­
cle. 
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to concrete detail and unique circumstance which springs 
from the Christian view of history, but relegates the great 
objective markers and doctrines of Christian history to the 
background until their complete exposure at the end. He 
must do this—his fiction is not the fiction of divine 
reality which we see in Dante, but the fiction of classical 
legend. Though the outlines of that legend as Chaucer sees 
it and large elements within it reflect the Christian vision 
of reality, the fictive level is essentially that of pagan, 
not divine history, and therefore cannot carry the authority 
of the Divine Comedy. We remember that one of the most 
Striking characteristics of Greek-Platonic exegesis in the 
pre-Christian era is its use of allegory as a means for obscur­
ing or excusing moral weakness in heroic character. (See 
Chapter IV, p. 18f.) The influence of this view can be 
seen in the characterization of Troilus, who is presented as 
a "righteous pagan," unconscious, unknowing, ignorant of any 
higher love than the love of romantic feeling which is the 
religion of his pagan world-view. His characterization, as 
a result, cannot match in dramatic intensity the more con­
scious characterization of Dante's Pilgrim. (Paradoxically, 
of course, Pandarus and Criseyde, who exhibit the most con­
scious awareness of their alternatives do achieve that inten­
sity. ) 
The classical influence also makes itself felt in Chau­
cer's attitude toward the idea of judgment. If a character 
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is presented as incapable of knowing what his choices are, 
he cannot be judged for making the* wrong ones. Even in the 
case of Pandarus and Criseyde, who demonstrate a half-
conscious and sometimes fully explicit awareness of their 
alternatives, Chaucer refuses to judge them openly or to 
categorize them in heaven or hell as would Dante. Chaucer's 
literal level will not permit that judgment because he has 
created a pagan world which—on the surface at least— 
excludes awareness of the Christian vision. Thus Chaucer's 
heathen allegory is in constant tension with the Christian 
world-view which surrounds and informs it until the end, when 
it is fully revealed in the Epilog. 
In a sense, Chaucer's mimetic method lies mid-way between 
Boccaccio, who, though he does not disparage the use of a his­
torical allegory, places poetic effect and moral purpose 
over any effort to be historically correct, and Dante, who 
consistently places a higher value on literature which grounds 
itself firmly in the finite and the earthly, and whose moral 
message arises only accidentally from its faithful represen­
tation of the way things are. Chaucer, while faithfully 
reflecting the historical details and circumstances of his 
medieval world, chooses not to present a straightforward image 
of the religious forces which govern it. His method, as I 
have said before, is the method of ironic indirection, and he 
seems fully aware of the advantages which his negative alle­
gorical method gives him. Chaucer is unwilling to make the 
501 
judgment of character which Dante makes. He draws back from 
a final assignation of rewards and punishments, and when he 
does assign, it is only, in the case of Troilus, to the eighth 
sphere, the traditional place for good or righteous men. 
He makes a point of leaving Criseyde's Pandarus1 actions 
unevaluated (at least explicitly). 
Thus the overall tone of Chaucer's narrative is one of 
sympathetic irony, not judgment. There is a moment of exal­
tation in the end, a moment of undisguised Christian devo­
tion, but it is not the ecstatic mysticism of the Beatific 
Vision. Instead, Chaucer is content merely to recognize 
the truth, to renew his dedication to "The which that right 
for love/ First starf, and roos and sit in hevene above" 
(V, 1842-45). Where he judges, it is only for the good; 
where there is possibility for another verdict, he remains 
silent. There is something very significant about this. 
Chaucer seems to have a better sense of his human limits than 
Dante, who is not afraid to assume a position of divine 
authority, bestowing both reward and punishment where he 
decides that it is due. Of course, Dante may be so sure that 
his standards are patterned after the divine that he assumes 
his divine pose from a reliance on revealed truth, on a con­
fidence that he has like St. Paul, "the mind of Christ." 
With Chaucer, there is no sense of the supreme self-confidence 
(or God-confidence) which radiates through Dante. Chaucer's 
vision is true to the Christian faith, but it is less ideal 
! 
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than Dante's, less sure= Except for the Epilog, his allegory 
is a negative reflection of the Christian reality and his 
allegorical method is one of ironic indirection rather than 
positive imitation. Although a good deal of Dantean "his­
toricity" rubs off on him, certainly more than on any of his 
immediate contemporaries, Chaucer's vision is finally a trifle 
less integrated, a trifle less clear in its sacramental 
vision than Dante's, a fact which results in characters who 
are a trifle less conscious of their choices, and a trifle 
less historically realistic in the Christian sense. Whether 
this is the sign of an underlying tremor of doubt, or a 
healthy refusal to make decisions which are out of the realm 
of human responsibility, I cannot say. Whatever the case, 
Troilus and Criseyde, for all its classical trappings, dem­
onstrates a subterranean recognition of the Christian per­
spective on objective historical reality and achieves a level 
of historical reality on the literal level which shows the 
definite influences of Dante and thus of the centrally ortho­
dox Christian tradition as I have defined it in this paper. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The primary aim of this study has been to determine the 
nature of the realism of Chaucer's characters and the 
literary tradition from which it springs. Throughout, I 
have attempted to show how the peculiar definition of his­
torical reality operative at a given point in time influences 
both the theoretical understanding of character and its rep­
resentation in literature. In the first three chapters a 
comparison was made between the classical and Christian 
definitions of historical reality and their respective 
effects on the theory and representation of character in 
literature. I demonstrated that the classical separation of 
historical actuality (sensory reality; the experiences of 
men in the natural world) from the eternal verities, or 
the ideal forms which were seen as existing independent of 
earthly history, results in a view of man's nature which is 
essentially static in conception. Man's nature has its ori­
gin in a fixed point outside of history and a man's histori­
cal life is merely a manifestation of the substance of his 
eternal nature. Though it might appear to change for good 
or evil, a man's character remains at a fixed and substan­
tive ethical level throughout his life. 
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Such an understanding of the nature of man, as we have 
seen, leads to a universalized conception of characterization 
in literature in which characters are fixed at a certain 
ethical, social and stylistic level, and are not allowed 
movement either within or across the categories. A side 
aspect of this view of character presentation involves the 
classical tendency to create a moral hierarchy out of such 
rigid social, ethical and stylistic categories. Thus a 
tragic character, who has the highest social and ethical 
standing despite his tragic flaw1' is deemed closest to the 
universal ideals and most worthy of imitation. Conversely, 
the comic character is seen as the least desirable subject 
of characterization because closest to the norm of mutable 
historical existence. 
In addition, the classical emphasis on the role of fate 
and destiny in the composition of man's basic nature leads 
to a literary model in which the dramatic tension arises from 
the character's struggle against his own inevitable destiny. 
As a result of the classical view of fate, the role of free 
will in man is de-emphasized, or, where it is presented, is 
ultimately found to be an illusion. This leads to a sympa­
thetic portrayal of the condition of man, who is regarded as 
destined, despite his best intentions, to a fate pre-ordained 
from the beginnings of time. Though the existence of real 
evil in the Aristotelian sense of vices and depravities 
is recognized, literary representation of character (in both 
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its tragic and comic aspects) will tend to de-emphasize this 
kind of evil and to focus more on the errors and frailties 
of human nature, the flaws which result from unintentional 
evil. 
The literary character which is a product of this view 
of reality, as I have shown, will tend to be highly abstract 
and universalized in his appeal. He will not develop sub­
stantively during the course of his historical life, and 
whether comic or tragic, he will serve primarily as a vehicle 
for ethical instruction, a means for lifting the reader out 
of the realm of mutable historical experience and into the 
realm of eternal truth. 
The emphasis on a fixed nature in character resulted 
in certain techniques of style. First, the fact that a given 
man's nature can be expressed in universal terms encourages 
a straightforward and rather transparent presentation of 
character. The characters of Greek fiction, writes Auerbach, 
are open to the point of almost complete externalization— 
"what they do not say to others they speak in their own 
1 
minds, so that the reader is informed of it." The very 
style of such a character's speech is often self-consciously 
rhetorical and intended for a splendid effect. As a result, 
the motives of the characters are obvious and relations be­
tween characters are set forth clearly and directly, without 
"'"Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 6. 
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the elements of unmotivated or obscurely motivated conflict 
and vacillation which is characteristic of other approaches 
to characterization. 
As might be expected, the literary theory which governs 
such an understanding of characterization tends to emphasize 
careful classification of character types with their respec­
tively appropriate styles, a strong expression of moral 
purpose, especially in the high or tragic character, and 
careful restriction, where it is allowed at all, on comic 
representation of character. Various combinations of these 
characteristics were shown to be components of the theories 
of characterization demonstrated by Plato, Aristotle, Horace, 
Cicero and Quintillian. 
In contrast, the Christian approach to history generates 
an environment much more conducive to the creation of a char­
acter which has earthly or historical dimensions. This is a 
result of the fact that from the Christian perspective, his­
tory and substantive truth are no longer separate entities, 
but. bound together by the Incarnation. Christ, the Word made 
Flesh, is the God who enters history and gives it a signifi­
cance and a unity impossible in the classical tradition. 
The importance given to the redemptive act of Christ in 
history is a result in part of the importance attached to the 
problem of evil in the Christian analysis of reality. In the 
classical view, evil is regarded as a by-product of the matu­
ration process, an accidental missing of the mark of 
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philosophic perfection. In the Christian view, evil is not 
regarded as accidental but as an inevitable consequence of 
man's historic fall from grace. As a result of Adam's fall, 
the entire human race is in the same predicament. The prob­
lem of sin is thus a universal fact which requires a univer­
sal solution. The Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ 
become the historical answer to the unavoidable problem of 
man in history. They also become the center of meaning for a 
universal history which is bounded at one end by creation 
and fall and at the other by the Second Coming of Christ. 
The historical plan encompassed by these events is seen by 
the Christian historian as all-inclusive and God-given. 
Despite the apparent chaos of history, it is basically an 
ordered reality, controlled by God and moving toward a pre­
dicted end. Christ, the revealed Word of God, reveals or 
discovers the meaning of past, present and future reality. 
The Christian rationale for the idea of a providential 
plan in history is based on a belief in the concept of Reve­
lation. Christian insight, or sapientia, is a necessary 
prerequisite for understanding the facts of history. For­
tune and chance, while they might appear to be forces with 
substantial power, are in the end ordered by the controlling 
hand of Providence. The basis for the Christian belief 
that "all things work together for good to them that love 
God, to them that are called according to His purposes," is 
the Resurrection of Christ. For those individuals who believe 
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in the resurrection of the body and the redemption of crea­
tion at the end of time, there is no ultimate fatality in 
matter. Commitment to such a belief, of course, is a matter 
of free choice: a man follows or denies Christ as he wills. 
The new emphasis on man-in-history and on the individual 
exercise of free will in the Christian vision has a great 
effect on the theory and presentation of character in lit­
erature. In the classical vision, man's nature was fixed by 
the destinal forces which ordered his character before his 
entrance into history. In the Christian view, man, because 
of his free will, retains the capacity for substantial change 
in history. The portrayal of a real change of character in 
a given man involves the depiction of both the evil and good 
aspects of his character. Thus in the Biblical view, there 
is little of the classical reticence in regard to the imita­
tion of evil behavior. David is both sinner and saint; and a 
truthful representation of God's dealings with him requires 
the portrayal of both aspects of his development. Sublimity 
and humility, great nobility of heart and low social stand­
ing (or vice versa), great weakness and great strength of 
character may be common qualities represented in any given 
individual. It is the very extremes through which a character 
moves that give him an intense historical life; an intimate 
and dramatic connection with the revealed historical process 
and the God behind the Revelation. Sin, repentance, renewal 
and rebirth in the life of the believer form an individual 
reflection of the larger pattern of Christian history. 
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This conception of the nature of man and reality has 
certain effects on stylistic technique. First, the character 
and his relations with other characters are tinged with a 
certain obscurity and mystery. Description is spare; char­
acter motivation is often left to the imagination. Emphasis 
is less on the on-going plot-line than on the characters them­
selves, and on their intimate and dramatic interaction with 
the Christian God, with the claim of Christ upon their lives < 
It is the emphasis on free will, the necessity for deci­
sive commitment in the life of the believer, which dis­
tinguishes the Christian approach to characterization most 
sharply from the classical view. Though a Christian character 
may be presented as having striven against the tyrannical 
pressure of accident and fate in the universe, he ultimately 
resolves the problem through" a belief in free choice and the 
ultimate sovereignty of God. As a result of this belief, 
man's historical character takes on a "painful and immoderate 
2 
intensity." Unable to use the forces of destiny as an 
excuse for his behavior, man decides his own eternal destiny 
amid the conflicting forces of good and evil in historical 
life. Like Christ, the believer is called to a humble immer­
sion in earthly happening. The intimate relation of spirit 
and historical existence in just this sense forms the basis 
for the Christian concern for the value of the individual and 
2 Eric Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, 
trans. Ralph Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1929), p. 14. 
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the existence of personal identity even beyond death. Christ 
came in the body and was resurrected in the body; the indi­
vidual believer follows the same pattern. Thus the individual 
through an act of the will achieves an integration with his 
chosen destiny in historical life which is prophetic of total 
integration after death. The emphasis given to human per­
sonality in such a view affects characterization through a 
consequent emphasis on individuality and the acts of choice 
which determine the individual's destiny. In sum, the three 
chapters of this study demonstrated that the two great per­
spectives on historical reality evinced by the classical and 
Christian world-views have a great effect on the presentation 
of character in literature. 
In the fourth chapter, the influence of each view of 
reality on a given author1s approach to symbol and allegory 
was explored through the content supplied by the exegetical 
tradition. It was demonstrated that the classical exegetical 
perspective fosters an allegory built on a laminated pattern 
of "this for that" which is not necessarily given content by 
the Biblical understanding of history. This in turn results 
in the creation of "personifications," of abstract ideals or 
theological principles which rely for their effect primarily 
on their didactic message. Following the old classical split 
between mutable history and substantive truth, such person­
ifications do not require that the symbolic representation of 
a given truth have historical reality. In fact, the gap 
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between the literal level of the text and its spiritual 
or allegorical ' meaning is often very wide indeed. In con­
trast, the orthodox Christian approach to the subject was 
seen to foster a view of allegory in which both the literal 
and the figurative levels of a given narrative or characteri­
zation have a strong historical appeal, solid grounding in 
historical fact. In Scripture, both levels of meaning have 
an actual basis in fact and a prophetic relation one to the 
other. In Christian literature such as that produced by 
Dante, an imitation of the allegorical technique of Scripture, 
while it does not attain the same degree of historical reality 
as Scripture still produces a much greater sense of historical 
actuality than that generated by the tradition of personifica­
tion-allegory which is fostered by the Classical view. 
In Chapters V and VI, a number of works important to an 
understanding of aesthetic theory during the time of Chaucer 
were analyzed for the elements identified in Chapters II, 
III, and IV as being directly or indirectly relevant to the 
study of characterization in Chaucer. It was demonstrated 
that of the literary theorists of the early Christian cen­
turies , Macrobius and Martianus Capella display an almost 
exclusively Neo-Classical approach to the problem of reality 
and figurative expression. Augustine and Bede, on the other 
hand, demonstrate a clear understanding both of the orthodox 
Christian tradition and of the literary principles which derive 
from that tradition. 
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In Alain de Lille, John of Salisbury and Hugh of St. 
Victor, I found large elements of orthodox doctrine which 
have, however, been significantly modified by the Neo-Classi-
cal Christian tradition coming down through the School of 
Alexandria. Philosophical elements in the School of Chartres, 
for example, reveal strong Neo-Classical elements which weaken 
orthodox doctrine by an emphasis on knowledge over faith as 
the criterion for salvation. The philosophical influence of 
the Neo-Classical tradition also results in a de-emphasis on 
the literal level of the text and a greater attention to the 
spiritual or moral meaning of a given narrative. Alain de 
Lille, I conclude, exhibits the greatest degree of Neo­
classical influence in this sense, demonstrating the Alex­
andrine tendency to disguise the unpleasant subjects of sin, 
death, and suffering under a cloak of fantasy. John and Hugh, 
although rooted in essentially the same tradition as Alain, 
demonstrate a slight movement toward a greater attention to 
representation of historical truth on the literal level which 
may reflect a gradual strengthening of the pure orthodox 
tradition as the fourteenth century approaches. 
In Chapter VI, I dealt once again with the aesthetic 
commentary of two literary theorists who have the most 
immediate relevance to Chaucer—Dante and Boccaccio. I found 
Boccaccio's literary theory to be a blend of Christian 
doctrine and classical theory in somewhat the same tradition 
as Hugh, John and Alain. On the other hand, Dante, despite 
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the heavy classical influence which is demonstrable in his 
work on all levels, exhibits an approach to figurative rep­
resentation which is deeply within the orthodox tradition. 
Dante's treatment of the figures of comedy, his statement 
of purpose, and his figural approach all bespeak a profoundly 
Christian understanding of poetics, which, as I have shown 
before, has a direct bearing on hxs approach to characteriza­
tion. 
In the final chapter, Chaucer is shown to exhibit strong 
ties with the Dantean-Christian approach to characterization 
which derives primarily from the centrally orthodox tradi­
tion. First, the same general understanding of history is 
evident throughout. Chaucer, like Dante, is concerned with 
the problem of providential control and its conflict with 
fortune, and devises a narrative in which God is shown to 
have the ultimate authority. Chaucer's characters, and 
especially Troilus, incorporate a philosophical understanding 
of that conflict into the very structure of their dialogue. 
Like Dante, Chaucer1s whole approach to comedy in Troilus and 
Criseyde has dark overtones of sin and death—a manifestation 
of the Christian understanding of the nature of man, whose 
comic humai. "errors" are often only surface reflections of a 
deeper malaise. Unlike Dante, however, Chaucer is careful 
to emphasize the innocently ridiculous qualities of his hero 
over his evident sins against the Christian code of ethics. 
Chaucer, in fact, gets a great deal of artistic sympathy from 
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the fact that his protagonist is young, pagan, and basically 
naive. On the other hand, Chaucer does not shun the serious 
moral failings of his characters, and makes it clear that 
Criseyde and Pandarus operate with a full awareness of their 
choices. In fact, the profound dramatic appeal of the char­
acterization of Criseyde arises from our awareness of her 
conscious struggle with her alternatives. On this account, 
the deep influence of the Dantean-Christian world-view is 
completely evident. But Chaucer remains distinctly himself 
by stopping just this side of any ultimate evaluation of 
his characters, of any final judgment. He pities Criseyde; 
he does not condemn her or assign her to hell. 
For both Dante and Chaucer, however, love is the gov­
erning force of the Christian universe which forms the ethos 
of boch authors, and this love in each is given objective 
content in the central facts of the Incarnation, death, 
Resurrection, and Second Coming of Jesus Christ. For Dante, 
the Biblical revelation is an integral and explicit part of 
his own pilgrimage toward Love Absolute. For Chaucer, the 
pilgrimage is veiled by a secular fiction. But that fiction 
is given a peculiarly historical caste, a realistic weight 
of detail which distances it from the figurative approach of 
the classical tradition and puts it much closer to the Dan-
tean frame of reference. The reading focus of Troilus and 
Criseyde is somewhere between the "allegory of the theologians" 
and the "allegory of the poets" as Singleton defines them. The 
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reader knows the story does not have the same historical 
authority as does Dante's Comedy, which is placed directly 
within the context of Biblical prophecy, but it is history, 
and its history is only ostensibly secular. 
Chaucer, as many others have suggested before me, 
ultimately defuses the transcendent vision of Dante's 
Paradise. He remains on the human level and looks back, 
not forward into history. His Christian world-view is a 
bit less integrated, a touch more classical than Dante's. 
As a result, his characterizations, as I have suggested, do 
not all achieve the same level of reality. Criseyde and 
Pandarus, who exhibit a capacity for free choice and a strong 
awareness of their alternatives, rise almost to the full 
stature of the Christian realism exhibited in Dante. Troilus, 
bound as he is by innately high social and spiritual quali­
ties and by a special innocence bestowed on him by Chaucer, 
manifests overtones of a classical understanding of charac­
terization which detract from his humanity and ultimately 
reduce his credibility as a realistic character in the 
Christian sense. 
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